Judgment :- 1. The petitioners are lessees of lands belonging to the Devaswom in question and they seek to quash the notices Exts. P1 to P11 issued in pursuance to the rules framed under the Cochin Devaswom Proclamation stating that the properties specified therein will be sold in public auction for realisation of arrears of rent due from them. The petitioners also pray for stay of further proceedings in respect of the properties already sold. 2. Although the petitioners have raised several grounds in the writ petition. Mr. D Narayanan Potti appearing for the petitioners, submits that in view of Act V of 1969 passed by the Kerala Legislature on 12-2-1969, the Devaswom, the landlord, is incapacitated from taking any proceedings for recovery of arrears of the rent which accrued due before the 1st day of May 1966 and therefore, the proceedings initiated by Exts. P1 to P11 must be quashed. 3. The Maharajah of Cochin has framed rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) providing for the mode of recovery of rent due to Devaswom from their tenants. In substance, the procedure prescribed is practically same as that prescribed in the Revenue Recovery Act for recovery of arrears of land revenue. 4. Mr. Potti contends that although steps are taken by the landlord under these rules without recourse to court, the proceedings would come within the ambit of S.5 of Act V of 1969, and therefore, are prohibited. S.5 reads "5. Arrears of rent payable by tenant: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or land tribunal, no landlord or any person claiming under him shall initiate or proceed further with any proceedings, whether by suit, application or otherwise, for the recovery of arrears of rent in respect of or for damages for use and occupation of a holding or part of a holding or a kudikidappu, accrued due before the 1st day of May 1966, or any proceedings incidental or ancillary thereto and any such proceedings pending at the commencement of Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings (Amendment) Act, 196), in courts or Land Tribunals, shall be stayed". 5. 5. The first part of the section enjoins that no landlord shall initiate or proceed with any proceedings whether by way of suit, application or otherwise for the recovery of arrears of rent in respect of any holding which accrued due before the 1st day of May 1966. The second part of the section is an injunction to court to stay all such proceedings pending in Courts or Land Tribunals. The argument of Mr, Potti is that the first part of the section is not confined to proceedings in court. According to him, proceedings mentioned in the first part of the section would include proceedings taken under the Rules to recover the arrears of rent. He submits that the word 'otherwise' is wide enough to take in proceedings initiated outside court and that there is an absolute bar on the part of a landlord to initiate or proceed further with such proceedings. On the other hand, it was contended for the Devaswom that the scope of the first part of the section is indicated in the second part and that since the second part speaks only of stay of proceedings in court, the proceedings mentioned in the first part must be confined to proceedings in Court. I find considerable difficulty in agreeing with this contention. As already stated, the first part of the section enjoins a landlord not to initiate or proceed further with any proceedings whether by way of suit, application or otherwise for the recovery of the arrears of rent due before 1st day of May 1966 I think, the word 'otherwise' is wide enough to comprehend proceedings taken by the landlord for the recovery of such arrears under the Rules. So far as proceedings taken in court are concerned, the second part of the section directs the courts to stay all such proceedings. It does not follow that because the operation of the second part of the section is confined to proceedings taken in court, the first part of the section is also confined to proceedings in court. In other words, the first part of the section operates as an absolute bar on a landlord to take any proceedings either in court or outside for recovery of the arrears of rent accrued due before the 1st day of May, 1966. In other words, the first part of the section operates as an absolute bar on a landlord to take any proceedings either in court or outside for recovery of the arrears of rent accrued due before the 1st day of May, 1966. The second part is a mandate to court not to dismiss any proceedings commenced by the landlord but to stay them. But for the second part of the section it would have been open to court to dismiss any proceedings taken by a landlord and pending in court. 6. It was contended by Mr. Krishnankutty Menon appearing for the Devaswom, that the word 'proceedings' mentioned in the first part of the section cannot include proceedings taken by the landlord under the Rules outside court but only proceedings in court. The word 'proceedings' is a verbal coat of many colours. The context alone can determine its meaning. 7. In M/s. K. J. Lingan v. Jt. Commercial Tax Officer AIR. 1968 Madras 76 the court held that a notice of composition issued under S.46 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act (Act I of 1959) is a proceeding. The court said that the word 'proceeding' is sometimes used in a narrow sense and sometimes in wide sense and that in its narrow sense, it (proceeding) is a step in any action or in any independent proceeding analogous to an action by which a litigation is initiated. The court further observed that the meaning to be attributed to the word 'proceedings' would depend upon the scope of the enactment wherein the expression is used and with reference to the particular context wherein it occurs. 8. In 'Words and Phrases,' Permanent Edition, Vol. 34, a number of meanings taken from American decisions are given for the word 'proceeding'. (See AIR. 1968 Mad. 76). There, it is said that the term 'proceeding' is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right and hence it necessarily embraces the requisite steps by which a judicial action is invoked. The word is defined in'The Random House Dictionary of the English Language' as including'a legal step or measure'. It was held in G. G. In Council v. S. S. Mills AIR. 1946 FC 16 that the expression 'other legal proceedings' would cover any proceeding by revenue authorities under S.46 (2) of the Income Tax Act. The word is defined in'The Random House Dictionary of the English Language' as including'a legal step or measure'. It was held in G. G. In Council v. S. S. Mills AIR. 1946 FC 16 that the expression 'other legal proceedings' would cover any proceeding by revenue authorities under S.46 (2) of the Income Tax Act. I am inclined to take the view that the word'otherwise' would include a proceeding taken outside court by a landlord under the Rules. 9. Mr. Krishnankutty Menon contended that the word 'otherwise' should be read ejusdem generis, and if so read, will include only proceedings in court. I am unable to agree. In order that the word 'otherwise' may be read ejusdem generis, it must be established that there is a category or genus constituted by the previous words. In Jagdish Chandra v. Kajaria Trades (India) Ltd., AIR. 1964 SC. 1882 Hidayatullah J., (as he then was) said: "Interpretation ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociss need not always be made when words showing particular classes are followed by general words. Before the general words can be so interpreted, there must be a genus constituted or a category disclosed with reference to which the general words can and are intended to be restricted". (See the head note). Craies on Statute Law summarises the principles as follows: "The ejusdem generis rule is one to be applied with caution and not pushed too far To invoke the application of the ejusdem generis rule there must be distinct genus or category. The specific words most apply not to different objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a class of kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply, but the mention of a single species does not constitute a genus". (See "Craies on Statute Law, 6th edition, P. 181). Maxwell in his book on'Interpretation of Statutes' explained the principles by saying. "But the general word which follows particular and specific words of the same nature as itself takes its meaning from them, and is presumed to be restricted to the same genus as those words Unless there is a genus or category, there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine". (See Maxwell on'Interpretation of Statutes' 11th Edn. pp. 325, 327) 10. (See Maxwell on'Interpretation of Statutes' 11th Edn. pp. 325, 327) 10. Even if there is genus constituted by the previous word or words, it will not always follow that any general word following it or them should be read ejusdem generis. After all, a canon of construction cannot prevail over the intention of the legislature, if that is clear. Looking at the scope and the reason for the amendment, I see no reason why in the context, the word should not include proceedings taken outside court under the Rules. It is instructive in this connection to note the wording of S.5 as it stood before it was repealed by the present section. That section ran as follows: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court or land tribunal, with effect on and froth the commencement of this Act, no suit or application or other proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent in respect of, or for damages for use and occupation of, a hotting or part of a holding or a kudikidappu, accrued due before the 1st day of April, .1966, shall lie in any court of Land. Tribunal, and all suits, applications, proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings pending in courts or land tribunals at such commencement for recovery of such arrears of rent or damages shall be stayed." Unless the word 'otherwise' was intended to comprehend every other proceedings in or outside court, there was no purpose in making the amendment. I cannot assume that the amendment was made to bring about only verbal felicity. I think, the amendment was intended to give relief to tenants from proceedings taken by landlords for recovery of the arrears of rent which accrued due before the 1st day of May 1966 both in and outside court, during the currency of Act 5 of 1969. 11. It is not necessary for me to express any opinion on the other contentions raised by the petitioners in this writ petition in view of my conclusion on the preliminary point. I do not therefore express any opinion upon the merits of these contentions. The writ petition is allowed in the manner and to the extent indicated. I make no order as to costs.