JUDGMENT: The respondent, a boy aged 15, has been acquitted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kunnamkulam of an offence under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. And the Food Inspector has filed the appeal. One of the objections taken before the Magistrate on behalf of the respondent was that he was a mere carrier of the milk sent by his father and therefore, was not liable to be convicted. Two decisions were also cited before the Magistrate: Krishnan v. Municipality of Cannanore, 1960) K.L.T. 773 and Public Prosecutor v. T. Pulla Reddy, (1966) Cr.L.J. 1122. In the first case the accused was a servant and he was not convicted. In the second case the accused was a mere carrier and he was also not convicted. The Magistrate says that both these decisions do not apply, because the accused in the present case was the son of the vendor of the milk and as such, he had also some interest in the sale, so that he might be convicted. The Counsel of the respondent points out fairly enough that even a servant might be convicted. However, it is not necessary for me to say anything on that question in this case. There cannot be any doubt that a mere carrier cannot be convicted. In this case, it is difficult to hold that a boy of 15, who was asked by his father to carry a bottle of milk and give it to another can be said to be anybody other than a carrier. Therefore, the view of the Magistrate that the boy had some interest in the sale and might also be convicted is erroneous. The ground on which the Magistrate acquitted the respondent may now be considered. The Food Inspector produced a notification (Exhibit P-9) dated 3rd February, 1966, and another notification (Exhibit P-11) dated 23rd September, 1967. He also produced two other notifications, Exhibit P-10 dated 1st January, 1963, under sections 2 and 9 of the Act declaring the Guruvayoor Township area as a local area and appointing the Health Inspector of Guruvayoor Township as the Food Inspector arid Exhibit P-8 dated 3rd February, 1966, authorising the Food Inspector to institute prosecutions under the Food Adulteration Act. (I find that Exhibit P-8 is only a copy of Exhibit P-9). (I find that Exhibit P-8 is only a copy of Exhibit P-9). Under Exhibit P-11 the appellant (the particular officer) was appointed Health Inspector of the Township by the Executive Officer; and the order also said that the officer would work as the Food Inspector. The Magistrate says that this order will not enable the appellant to be the Food Inspector, because the order was not by the State Government or the Central Government. May be so. But, Exhibit P-10 says that the Health Inspector of Guruvayoor Township will be a Food Inspector; and this notification is by the State Government. The reasoning of the Magistrate appearing hereunder does not appear to be correct. This is what he says: “Those notifications will not enure to the benefits of the complainant as he was not a Food Inspector on the date of those notifications and as those notifications refer to only Food Inspectors appointed under the Act. At the time of those notifications the complainant was not a Food Inspector and so he is not a Food Inspector appointed under the Act for the purpose of those notifications. He was appointed only subsequently.” This reasoning is wrong; and even the Counsel of the respondent does not try to support it. Exhibit P-10 made the Health Inspector of the Township the Food Inspector for the area; and by Exhibit P-11 the appellant was appointed Health Inspector. The Magistrate seems to think that on the appointment of a particular individual as Health Inspector, there must be a notification appointing him as Food Inspector, or a particular individual must be appointed as Food Inspector. This need not always be the case. Appointments may be either by name or by official designation. In other words, particular individuals mentioned by their names may be appointed by the State Government as Food Inspectors: or the Government may appoint incumbents of particular offices like Sanitary Inspectors or Health Inspectors to be Food Inspectors by virtue of their offices (vide section 15 of the General Clauses Act-(Central Act X of 1897). In this case, the State Government appointed the Health Inspector of Guruvayoor Township to bea Food Inspector; and the appellant was subsequently appointed Health Inspector of the Township. I do not think that, in such a case, a fresh notification is necessary after the appellant was appointed Health Inspector. In this case, the State Government appointed the Health Inspector of Guruvayoor Township to bea Food Inspector; and the appellant was subsequently appointed Health Inspector of the Township. I do not think that, in such a case, a fresh notification is necessary after the appellant was appointed Health Inspector. There is also no case that the appellant does not possess the requisite qualification. As already stated, the notification may be to appoint the Health Inspector as Food Inspector and need not necessarily be to appoint a particular or individual Health Inspector by name as Food Inspector. The Health Inspector of the Township is thus a Food Inspector; and the appellant is the Health Inspector. Therefore, on this question also the reasoning of the Magistrate is erroneous. In spite of both these errors, the conclusion of the Magistrate seems to be right. The respondent could not have been convicted, since he was onlya carrier of the adulterated milk. Therefore, the acquittal is confirmed; and he appeal is dismissed. M.C.M.-----Appeal dismissed.