BIJOY KUMAR SINGH v. PROJECT ADMINISTRATOR, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD.
1969-08-05
G.K.MISRA, R.N.MISRA
body1969
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The Petitioner is an employee of the Industrial Development Corporation, Orissa, Ltd, in the Cement Project at Bargarh in the district of Sambalpur. On a charge of theft of a mirror belonging to the Corporation he was suspended from service on 3-10-1963. He furnished an explanation denying the charge. In a prosecution before a Magistrate for an offence u/s 379, Indian Penal Code, he was acquitted. The Petitioner's case is that without making any enquiry he was removed from service on 23-2-1965 with retrospective effect from the date of suspension. He accordingly filed this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution alleging that be is entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution, and that the termination of his service is illegal once he was acquitted in the criminal case. 2. A counter was filed on behalf of the Project Administrator, Cement Project, stating clearly all the facts which the Petitioner had suppressed in his writ application. The allegations in the counter-affidavit may be stated in brief. The Petitioner was a temporary Fitter and during the relevant period he was in charge of the sanitary fittings in the new Guest House of the Project at Hirakud. He committed theft of a large-sized dressing mirror from the Guest House and was kept under suspension pending enquiry into the charge. Ultimately he was acquitted on benefit of doubt. There, was, however, a thorough enquiry on the charge framed for termination of service. On 12-10-1963 the enquiry was held and, in the presence of the Petitioner, a number of witnesses were examined whom he declined to cross-examine. Besides examining himself, the Petitioner examined two witnesses in his defence. The Enquiry Officer found the Petitioner guilty of the charge and he was ultimately removed from service. 3. At the time of hearing a preliminary objection was taken that the Industrial Development Corporation, Orissa, Ltd. was a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and as there was no failure on the part of the company in the discharge of a public or statutory duty, the writ application is not maintainable. This objection was not taken in the counter-affidavit, though the contention raises a mixed question of law and fact. Mr.
This objection was not taken in the counter-affidavit, though the contention raises a mixed question of law and fact. Mr. Palit accepted the position that the Industrial Development Corporation, Orissa, Ltd. is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and that its entire share capital is contributed by the Government of Orissa and all its shares have been registered in the name of seven officers, of the Government of Orissa. They are: the Chief Secretary; the Secretary to Government, Industries Department; the Additional Secretary to Government, Finance Department; the Secretary to Government, Works Department; the Secretary to Government, Commerce and Supply Department; the Director of Industries; and the Chief Engineer, Electricity. The Industrial Development Corporation, Orissa, Ltd. is therefore a Government company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act. The writ application could therefore be considered on the aforesaid accepted position which is not controverted by either party and in support of which the memorandum and articles of association of the Corporation were filed on behalf of the opposite party. 4. The law is now well settled that an incorporated company has a separate existence. It is a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality comes into existence from the moment of the incorporation of the company; from that date the persons subscribing to its memorandum of association and others joining it as members, are regarded as a body corporate. The new person" begins to function as an entity. Its rights and obligations are different from those of its shareholders. (See the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1463 of 1968 decided on 12-3-1969) Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar and Ors. C.A. No. 1463 of 1968-D/12-3-1969. 5. It is also settled that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it had a sufficient legal interest. An application for mandamus will not lie for an order of reinstatement to an office which is essentially of a private character, nor can such an application be maintained to secure the performance of obligations owed by a company towards its workmen to resolve any private dispute.
An application for mandamus will not lie for an order of reinstatement to an office which is essentially of a private character, nor can such an application be maintained to secure the performance of obligations owed by a company towards its workmen to resolve any private dispute. The condition precedent for the issue of a mandamus is that there is in one claiming it a legal right to the performance of a legal by one against whom it is sought. It is not, "however, necessary that the person or authority on whom ",the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or official body. Mandamus can issue to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the society is constituted or governed, and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them, by the statutes authorising their undertaking. Mandamus will also lie against a company constituted by statute for the purpose of fulfilling public responsibilities see Praga Tools Corporation v. I manual and Ors. 1969 S.C.D. 505. 6. In this case, as asserted in the counter-affidavit, a through enquiry was made before the termination of service. Nothing has been pointed out to show that the company failed to do anything in fulfilling its public responsibilities or in doing anything contrary to any statutory obligation. Accordingly the writ application is not maintainable against the opposite party. 7. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the other questions raised, namely, whether the Petitioner's service could be terminated retrospectively from the date of suspension and also after the order of acquittal. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. R.N. Misra, J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed