Munna Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation — 1969 DIGILAW 156 (ALL)

JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - The relationship between the parties will appear from the following pedigree table :- 2. Har Narain Singh was the sir and Khudkasht holder of the plots in dispute. His two sons Babu Singh and Raghunandan Singh predeceased him. On his death which took place on April 19, 1952, the widows of his predeceased sons, namely, Shrimati Javitri and Shrimati Chiranji, and his grandson Kaley succeeded to the sir and khudkasht. On the date of vesting, i.e., July 1, 1952, these three persons became bhumidhars of their shares in the plots. Shrimati Chiranji died on August 29, 1958, and the name of Kaley was recorded in her place. In consolidation proceedings, Shrimati Brahmo, daughter of Shrimati Chiranji, filed an objection that she had succeeded to her mother's share in the bhumidhari and that her name should also be recorded as a co-tenure-holder. The Consolidation Officer rejected her objection. In appeal, the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was of the view that, though Shrimati Chiranji had only a life interest when she succeeded to the property, her interest was converted into an absolute interest by Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In doing so, he followed the decision of a single judge of this Court in Ram Lal v. Mst. Mangari, 1958 ALJ 275. He accordingly held that Smt. Brahmo succeeded to the interest of Smt. Chiranji. In revision, the Director of Consolidation, relying on the decision of another single Judge of this Court in Malkhan Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation, 1967 RD 336 has held that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act was inapplicable to the devolution of tenancy and that succession was governed by Section 172 (2) (a) (i) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, with the result that Kaley and not Shrimati Brahmo succeeded to Shrimati Chiranji. Against this order, Smt. Brahmo's son Munna. Singh has filed this writ petition, Smt. Brahmo having died during the pendency of the revision before the Director of Consolidation. 3. The real question, which arises for decision in this case, is whether sub-clause (1) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 172 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act applies to the facts of this case. 3. The real question, which arises for decision in this case, is whether sub-clause (1) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 172 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act applies to the facts of this case. Leaving out the words which are not applicable to the present case, Section 172 (2) reads : "172 (2) -where a bhumidhar who has, before the date of vesting inherited an interest in any holding as a widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent- (a) dies, and such bhumidhar was on the date immediately before the said date an intermediary of the land comprised in the holding, and- (i) she was, in accordance with the personal law applicable to her, entitled to a life estate only in the holding, the holding shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir (such heir being ascertained in accordance with the provisions of Section 171) of the last male intermediary: and if. (ii) she was, in accordance with the personal law applicable to her, entitled to the holding absolutely, the holding shall devolve in accordance with the table mentioned in Section 174." 4. The contention of Shri K. C. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that sub-clause (ii) applies to the facts of the present case, because, on the date of the death of Smt. Chiranji, she was holding the holding absolutely by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. We are unable to accept that the relevant date for determining the capacity of the bhumidhar as a life estate holder or as an absolute holder is the date of the death of the bhumidhar. The relevant date is the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. This appears from a plain reading of the section. On the date of the death of a bhumidhar, which was bound to be July 1, 1952, or some date thereafter the personal law would not be applicable to any holding and no question can arise of determining whether, on such date under the personal law the bhumidhar was entitled to a life estate or to an absolute estate. Further, it has now been decided by the Supreme Court in Ramji Dixit v. Bhirgunath, A.I.R. 1968 SC 1058 that all bhumidhars, male or female, hold their bhumidhari rights absolutely. Further, it has now been decided by the Supreme Court in Ramji Dixit v. Bhirgunath, A.I.R. 1968 SC 1058 that all bhumidhars, male or female, hold their bhumidhari rights absolutely. For this reason also, no question can arise for determination whether a bhumidhar has a life estate or an absolute estate in his holding. It is clear that, for determining whether sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) applies, it has to be determined whether the bhumidhar held the holding on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, as a life estate or as an absolute estate. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act has no application to the present case. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Prema Devi v. Joint Director of Consolidation, 1969 ALJ 253 that the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, cannot be made applicable to agricultural plots. Even if this Act were applicable, it would be irrelevant to determine the nature of the estate of the holder on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. 5. Admittedly, Shrimati Chiranji held a life estate in the sir and khudkasht plots before the date of vesting. She had inherited her interest in the holding as a widow of a male lineal descendant of Har Narain Singh before the date of vesting and was an intermediary of the land at that time. On these facts, it is sub-clause (1) which is applicable and not sub-clause (ii) . Her share in the bhumidhari holding will accordingly devolve upon the nearest surviving heir of the last male intermediary ascertained in accordance with the provisions of Section 171. 6. It was then contended by Sri Saxena that, even if sub-clause (i) is applicable, Shrimati Brahmo would succeed as the last male intermediary was Raghunandan Singh and Shrimati Brahma, his daughter, was a preferential heir to Kaley, his nephew. According to him, Smt. Chiranji had inherited the interest of Raghunandan Singh and, therefore, Raghunandan Singh should be deemed to be the last male intermediary. This argument is fallacious. Har Narain Singh was admittedly the original sir and khudkasht holder. Raghunandan Singh never succeeded to him, as he predeceased him, and he never became the sir and khudkasht holder or an intermediary in respect of these plots. Smt. Chiranji succeeded to Har Narain Singh as the widow of a predeceased son. This argument is fallacious. Har Narain Singh was admittedly the original sir and khudkasht holder. Raghunandan Singh never succeeded to him, as he predeceased him, and he never became the sir and khudkasht holder or an intermediary in respect of these plots. Smt. Chiranji succeeded to Har Narain Singh as the widow of a predeceased son. There can be no doubt that Har Narain Singh was the last male intermediary of the plots in dispute. Under Section 171 his grandson Kaley, who is a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent, is his heir in preference to Shrimati Brahmo who is his son's daughter. 7. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Director of Consolidation was right in holding that Kaley was entitled to succeed to the interest of Smt. Chiranji in the bhumidhari holding in preference to Smt. Brahmo. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with-costs.