JUDGMENT : G.N. Prasad, J. This application in revision is directed against the order of acquittal recorded by the Second Assistant Sessions Judge, Chapra, in Sessions Trial No. 59 of 1967. Out of the four accused on trial, two namely, Akalu Ahir and Chandrika Singh were charged under Section 307, Indian Penal Code, for having attempted to commit the murder of petitioner Ramdeo Ram, who deposed at that trial as P.W. 1. The other two accused persons, Jagarnath Kanu and Ramchander Kana were charged under Section 307 read with Section 109 of the Code for having abetted the commission of the same offence. 2. The offence is alleged to have taken place at 11 p.m. in the night of the 13th June, 1966, at the house of the petitioner in village Arakpur, police station Darauli, in the district of Saran. The prosecution case is that at the relevant time the petitioner was sitting in the Osara of his house along with his wife Fuljharia (P.W. 9) and his ploughman Bhudhar Chamar (P. W. 10). All on a sudden, the four accused persons came up. Accused Akalu was armed with a Pistol, accused Chandrika with a gun, accused Jagarnath with a farsa and accused Ramchander with a lathi. Akalu fired a shot from his pistol, whereby the left hand of the petitioner was injured. The petitioner stood up, in the meantime accused Jagarnath and Ramchander gave an order that he should be killed, whereupon accused Chandrika fired a gun-shot which hit the petitioner on his chest. The petitioner fell down and four accused persons fled away. 3. After the occurrence, the petitioner was removed to Siwan Hospital where his fardbeyan was recorded at 6. 30 a.m. on the following day. In the meantime a Saneha entry was also made at Darauli Police Station on the statement of the village Chaukidar Bhagrasan. The investigation was held by Maheshwari Prasad Dubey (P.W. 12), the Officer-in-charge of Darauli Police Station. This Police Officer found ample signs of the occurrence in the Osara of Ramdeo (P.W. 1). There were marks of firings, besides some pellets on the back and some of the ground of the Osara. He took charge of one wad and 12 pellets, besides a lantern, under a seizure list (Ext. 6). This Police Officer found ample signs of the occurrence in the Osara of Ramdeo (P.W. 1). There were marks of firings, besides some pellets on the back and some of the ground of the Osara. He took charge of one wad and 12 pellets, besides a lantern, under a seizure list (Ext. 6). These pellets, besides more pellets extracted from the body of Ramdeo (P.W.1), were forwarded to the Fire-Arms Expert, but the report of the Expert was not exhibited in the case. 4. Dr. R. S. P. Sinha of Siwan Hospital bad found the following injuries on the person of the petitioner; (i) Multiple small lacerated round wounds with invested margins on the right side of the chest to an area of 31/4 x 3". The wound was mostly of the size of split masur. 14 small pellets were extracted from this wound. (ii) Lacerated wound 1/2 x 1/4 skin deep on the back of the left hand between index and middle fingers. Injury no. 1 was grievous and No.2 simple. The opinion of the doctor was that the weapon employed was fire-arm. 5. The prosecution also put forward a motive for the recurrence, which was one of enmity arising cut of the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in election to the office of the Mukhiya of village Arakpur after defeating the sitting Mukhiya named Chandrashekhar Singh, a brother of accused Chandrika Singh. 6. The defence is that the accused persons were innocent but were falsely implicated on account of enmity. No witness was examined, but a number of documents were put in on the side of the defence. 7. Three witnesses figured as eyewitnesses of the occurrence at the trial, namely, the petitioner (P.W. 1), his wife Mosammat Fuljharia (P.W. 9) and his ploughman Bhuidhar Chamar (P.W. 10). But the learned Judge did not feel impressed by their testimony. He has held that there is, no doubt, that Ramdeo had been injured by gun-shots, but he was on terms of enmity with the accused persons, and the manner of the occurrence which has been alleged by the prosecution has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the learned Judge gave the benefit of doubt to all the four accused persons and acquitted them. Being thus aggrieved the petitioner has moved this Court in revision. 8. Accordingly, the learned Judge gave the benefit of doubt to all the four accused persons and acquitted them. Being thus aggrieved the petitioner has moved this Court in revision. 8. The scope of interference in revision at the instance of the private complainant in a case of this kind is very limited. The most recent decision on the point is (i) Mahendra Pratap Singh V. Sarju Singh and another (A. I. R. 1968 Supreme Court 707), wherein certain previous decisions of the Supreme Court have been referred to. In one of them, D. Stephens V. Nosibolla (A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 196), it has been laid down that to justify an interference with an acquittal in revision, there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of acquittal, or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. A mere wrong view of law or misapprehenciation of evidence is not enough. In another case, (2) Logendranath Jha. V. Polsilal Biswas (A.I.R. 1951 Supreme Court 316), it has been pointed out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal where there has been an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. But it must be borne in mind that in ordering a re-trial, the danger is that the dice may be loaded against the accused, however much the High Court might caution the Subordinate Court. The third case to which reference has been made is (3) K. Chinnaswamy Reddy V. State of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 1788), where it has been pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place in the following cases: (1) If there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to by the case; or (ii) the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible; or (iii) the Court had attempted to take into account the evidence which was not admissible; or (iv) the Court had overlooked some evidence. After referring to these three decisions, their Lordships have observed as follows : "Although that list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision, it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court." It is within these limits that I am called upon to decide whether I should interfere with the acquittal which the learned trial court has recorded in this case. 9. It is quite plain that the prosecution case could not fail on the mere ground of enmity, because if that were so, then hardly any else could succeed. In fact, it is the enemies, and the friend, who indulge in such occurrence. The fact that the prosecution witnesses are drawn from inimical source must undoubtedly put the court on its guard, which must scrutinize the evidence with great care, so that all reasonable chances of false implication might be exc1uded. But that does not mean that the evidence of inimical witnesses should not receive proper consideration at the hands of the court, m that it cannot form the basis of conviction. 10. In the present case, even the learned Judge has conceded that the petitioner had suffered injuries by gunshots, and although the learned Judge bas not said so in so many words, there can be no doubt upon the evidence of the Investigating Officer that the scene of the occurrence was the eastern verandah of the petitioner's house. But the learned Judge his doubted the true manner in which the occurrence had taken place, and that substantially for two reasons; (i) it was strange that even after sustaining the first shot on his left hand, the petitioner did not try to run away. In this connection the learned Judge pointed out that about one month before the occurrence, the accused persons had surrounded the petitioner and so "in such circumstances it is expected that he would be cautious and as soon as the pistol was fired on him, he should have tried to run away from that place to inside his house which was adjacent to his verandah. But conduct of informant, Ramdeo Ram after being fired by the pistol in remaining standing does not appeal to reason that at first he was fired by the pistol as alleged by him." But one can well visualise the rapidity with which both the shots must have been fired. The evidence of the informant is that after sustaining the pistol shot he had got up and then he had sustained the gun-injury on his chest. It may well be that the reason why he had got up was, as visualised by the learned Judge, that he was trying to run away towards the inner apartment of his house, but before he could do that, the second shot was fired and it hit him on his Chest. The more fact that the petitioner was unable to avert the second shot would not justify the rejection of his version of the occurrence. The second reason why the learned Judge has doubted the manner of the occurrence is that Fuljharia (P. W. 9) has made some discrepant statements. In court she said that none of the accused persons had climbed on her Osara whereas her statement before the Police was that all of them had done so. I do not think that this is such a discrepancy as to merit a total rejection of the prosecution case about the manner of the occurrence. Gun-shots bad undoubtedly been fired while the petition was on the Osara. It did not matter much whether the accused persons had mounted on the Osara or not. The learned Judge has not clarified whether the Osara was substantially on a higher level them the ground below it. Therefore, there appears nothing substantial which might cast a reasonable doubt on the manner of the occurrence. 11. While considering the question as to whether P.Ws. 1 and 9 have truly named the accused persons among the culprits, the learned Judge bas taken note of three important circumstances, namely, (i) Bhagrasan Chaukidar who had recorded a Saneha entry in respect of the occurrence has not been examined as a witness by the prosecution, and that constitutes a great lacuna in the prosecution case. 1 and 9 have truly named the accused persons among the culprits, the learned Judge bas taken note of three important circumstances, namely, (i) Bhagrasan Chaukidar who had recorded a Saneha entry in respect of the occurrence has not been examined as a witness by the prosecution, and that constitutes a great lacuna in the prosecution case. Besides, the Saneha entry recorded by Bhagrasan has not been brought on the record as an exhibit; (ii) Ramdeo Ram (P. W. 1) did not name his assailants before the Police, and (iii) Fuljharia (P. W. 9) has denied in court that her version before the Police was that since she was anxious to take her husband to Siwan Hospital, so in a perturbed state of mind she did not name the assailants. Each of these three appears to me to be much too infirm to reject the evidence of P.W. 1 and 9. Bhagrasan Chaukidar was not a witness of the occurrence and, therefore, the failure to examine him cannot possibly constitute a great lacuna in the prosecution case. Besides, the Saneha entry recorded on his statement could have neither contradicted nor corroborated the testimony of P. W s. 1 and 9. As to the second ground, there can be no doubt that the learned Judge has misread the evidence of P. W. 1. In his fardbeyan (Ext. 1), the petitioner did name has assailants. It is therefore, not right to say that he did not name his assailants before the Police. It appears that what P. W. 1 had stated to the Police was that he had not named his assailants to the persons who had come near him after the occurrence, but that has been read by the learned Judge as implying that P. W. 1 did not name his assailants before the Police. The result of this unfortunate misreading of evidence has been that the evidence of an important witness of the occurrence, which P.W. 1 undoubtedly is, has not received proper consideration at the bands of the learned Judge. The contradiction which, the learned Judge has noticed in the evidence of Fuljharia (P.W. 9) cannot legitimately be character as material contradiction in the accepted sense of the term. It can have no bearing upon the manner of the occurrence. The contradiction which, the learned Judge has noticed in the evidence of Fuljharia (P.W. 9) cannot legitimately be character as material contradiction in the accepted sense of the term. It can have no bearing upon the manner of the occurrence. It may have come relevance on the question of identity of the culprits but that must be taken into consideration along with other factors, one of which is that the petitioners and his wife are not expected to leave out the real assailants and implicate innocent persons on account of enmity. Thus from the manner in which the learned Judge has sought to explain away the evidence of two out of three eye-witnesses I feel that the acquittal of the accused persons cannot be allowed to stand. It is true that a re-trial must not be ordered except under exceptional circum star case but I feel that this is one of those exceptional cases in which there will be a miscarriage of justice, unless the evidence of the principal eye-witnesses of the occurrence is considered in the true perspective. 12. For the reasons which I have given above, I set aside the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court on the 20th September, 1968, and send the same back for re-trial. The rule is thus made absolute. 13. It may be mentioned that one of the accused Jagarnath Kana has been reported to be dead. Therefore, there will be no trial so far as he is concerned. Application allowed.