JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - This civil revision, which has been referred, to us for decision at the instance of a learned Single Judge on the ground that the amount involved is high, is directed against an order of the Civil Judge of Basti, dated 8-11-1965, impounding an arbitrator's award that had been filed in his court under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act and demanding stamp duty of Rs. 810/- thereon under Article 45 of the Stamp Act, together with a penalty of Rs. 8,100/-. 2. The applicants in this revision are the persons who had filed the award before the learned Civil Judge under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act, with the prayer that it may be made a rule of the court and a decree be passed on its basis. Their contention is that although this document directs partition of property among the co-owners, it is not an "instrument of partition" "chargeable with stamp duty" under Article 45 of the Stamp Act, because it has not so far been finalised by being made a rule of the court. This argument, however, finds no support in the definition of "instrument of partition" given in Section 2 (15) of the Stamp Act, which runs as follows :- " (15) "Instrument of partition" means any instrument whereby co-owners of any property divide or agree to devide such property in severalty, and includes also a final order for effecting a partition passed by any Revenue-authority or any Civil Court and an award by an arbitrator directing a partition." 3. It is to be noted that an order for partition passed by a Revenue-authority or Civil Court must be a "final order" before it amounts to an instrument of partition; but no such restriction has been imposed in the case of an arbitrator's award. An award by an arbitrator directing a partition is ipso facto an instrument of partition and requires no ratification or acceptance by any court of law to make it an instrument of partition. An award by an arbitrator directing a partition is ipso facto an instrument of partition and requires no ratification or acceptance by any court of law to make it an instrument of partition. The same argument that is now being pressed before us was advanced in Hamirmal Mehta v. Samrathmal Mehta, A.I.R. 1955 Ajmer 52, but was repelled as follows :- "The learned counsel for the respondents have urged that an award by the arbitrators directing the partition would be liable to stamp duty as instrument of partition only if it is a final award and not liable to be set aside by the civil court. The suggestion is that if an award is liable to stamp duty as an award and is subsequently set aside, the stamp duty would not be refundable and the parties would . have been made to pay twice over. In my opinion, this contention cannot be attached any weight. The words of the section are clear and lay down that an award by the arbitrator directing partition will be liable to stamp duty. There is nothing said about its being a final award not liable to being set aside by a court of law, and I cannot subtract from or add to the definition." 4. Various rulings have been cited by learned counsel for the applicants but are of no help to us in deciding the present case, for they merely enunciate the proposition that under the present law an arbitrator's award cannot be enforced until made a rule of the court. It must be emphasised that we are not concerned with whether the award before us is enforceable or not; all that we are called upon to decide is whether it is liable to stamp duty or not; and there is no justification for confusing the one question with the other, since it cannot be denied that an instrument may be for some reason invalid and unenforceable and yet may still be liable to stamp duty. No case has been cited before us to show that an arbitrator's award is not liable to stamp duty before it is made a rule of the court. The contrary view, however, finds expression in numerous cases. No case has been cited before us to show that an arbitrator's award is not liable to stamp duty before it is made a rule of the court. The contrary view, however, finds expression in numerous cases. In Kalidas Lalbhai v. Tribhuvandas Bhagwandas, ILR XXXI Bom 68, for example, an award was filed in the court of the Subordinate Judge, who straight away made a reference to the High Court, inquiring whether it should have been stamped as an instrument of partition; and the High Court replied in the affirmative. In Bikhabdas v. Ballabhadas, A.I.R. 1962 SC 531 the Supreme Court set aside the trial court's order for sending an award for partition of properties back to the arbitrator to be rewritten on stamped paper and observed: "The award has already been made and the arbitrator has therefore become functus officio. It is that award which requires stamp." 5. We are satisfied therefore that an award given by an arbitrator directing partition becomes an "instrument of partition" chargeable with stamp duty as soon as it is made, and that there can be no question of deferring liability for the payment of stamp duty to the later stage when such an award is made a rule of the court. As pointed out in Ramkumar v. Kushalchand Ganeshdas, A.I.R. 1928 Nag. 166 : "The executant of the award being the arbitrator, under Section 29 (g) Stamp Act, it was his duty primarily to direct any of the parties to provide him with the necessary stamp and to see that he did not deliver or publish his award on a plain paper and thus have himself from the blame attaching to him of having evaded the stamp law." 6. Further support for this view is to be found in Section 17 of the Stamp Act, which lays down that- "17. All instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in India shall be stamped before or at the time of execution." 7. The time of execution of an award is obviously the time when it is signed by the arbitrator; and it is not possible to hold that the time when an award is made a rule of the court can in any circumstances be deemed to be the time of execution. The time of execution of an award is obviously the time when it is signed by the arbitrator; and it is not possible to hold that the time when an award is made a rule of the court can in any circumstances be deemed to be the time of execution. An award directing partition therefore re quires to be stamped at the very time when it is signed by the arbitrator. 8. The result is that we find that the action taken by the learned Civil Judge in this case, impounding the award and levying stamp duty and penalty thereon, was fully justified. This revision is accordingly dismissed with costs. The stay granted by this Court on 10-1-1966 is vacated.