Judgment :- 1. The defendant in a suit for eviction from a building is the appellant before me. The suit was for eviction of the defendant from the plaint building on the allegation that the building belonged to the plaintiff and was given on lease to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 3/-. The defendant denied the case set up by the plaintiff. The Munsiff's Court decreed eviction in the suit by its judgment dated 3131962 and the matter was taken up in appeal by the defendant. The Appellate Court remanded the case for a fresh trial. It was urged before the appellate court that though the building was put up by the plaintiff, as found by the trial court, the defendant was a 'kudikidappukaran' within the meaning of that term in Act IV of 1951 and was, therefore not liable to be evicted. A consideration of the question necessarily involved the determination of the question whether the plaint building was a 'hut' within the meaning of Act IV of 1961. There was no evidence as to the value of the building. The defendant contended that such value would be less than Rs. 400/-while the plaintiff contended that it is above Rs. 400/-. No commission had been taken out to determine such value. The case was remanded by the District Court to enable the defendant to take out a commission to determine such value, for the purpose of ultimately deciding the question whether the plaint building was a 'hut' within the meaning of that term in Act IV of 1961. After remand, the learned Munsiff went into the matter afresh. No evidence was adduced by either party after remand and no commission was taken out as directed. The learned Munsiff found that even according to the plaintiff the monthly rent of the dwelling was only Rs. 3/- so that the test as to the rental value of the dwelling house satisfied the definition of 'hut'. On the question of the value of the building, the learned Munsiff found that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff, who had special knowledge about the value of such building, and therefore, he was bound to prove the same. He applied S.105 of the Indian Evidence Act to the circumstances of the case. Therefore, it was found that defendant was a 'kudikidappukaran' and was liable to be evicted. He applied S.105 of the Indian Evidence Act to the circumstances of the case. Therefore, it was found that defendant was a 'kudikidappukaran' and was liable to be evicted. The plaintiff thereupon filed an appeal to the District Court, which rightly held that the burden to show that the value of the building was above Rs. 400 was not on the plaintiff but was on the defendant. On this aspect of the matter, I agree with the learned District Judge, that if the defendant wanted to claim the benefit of the provisions of Act IV of 1961 (or Act I of 1964), it was up to him to show that he was a'kudikidappukaran' and it was also not correct to apply S.106 of the Indian Evidence Act to the facts of the case. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the defendant had failed to prove that the value of the building was below Rs. 400/- and it accordingly allowed the appeal and held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. The unsuccessful defendant has come up before me in second appeal. 2. The question has to be decided with reference to definition of 'kudikidappukaran' contained in S.2 (25) of Act I of 1964, as amended by Act IX of 1967. 400/- and it accordingly allowed the appeal and held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. The unsuccessful defendant has come up before me in second appeal. 2. The question has to be decided with reference to definition of 'kudikidappukaran' contained in S.2 (25) of Act I of 1964, as amended by Act IX of 1967. So amended, the material part of the said definition reads: "'kudikidappukaran' means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding three cents in extent, either as owner or as tenant in possession, on which he could erect a homestead and (i) who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead; or (ii) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of any land to occupy, with or without an obligation to pay rent, a but belonging to such person and situate in the said land, but otherwise has no interest in the land; and 'kudikidappu' means the land and the homestead or the but so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easements attached thereto: Provided that a person shall not be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran if the aforesaid permission was granted after the llth day of April, 1957, by a mortgagee in possession or by a tenant from whom the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is liable to be resumed: Provided further that a person shall not be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran if the aforesaid permission was granted in respect of any but not belonging to him and situate (a) in a plantation; or (b) in any area of land which is appurtenant to a mill factory or workshop, and in connection with the employment of such person in the plantation mill, factory or workshop, unless he was, immediately before the commencement of this Act, entitled to the rights of a kudikidappukaran or the holder of a protected ulkudi or kudikidappu under any law then in force. Explanation I. For the purpose of this clause, 'hut' means any dwelling house which was constructed at a cost not exceeding five hundred rupees or could have, at the time of construction, yielded a monthly rent not exceeding five rupees. Explanation I. For the purpose of this clause, 'hut' means any dwelling house which was constructed at a cost not exceeding five hundred rupees or could have, at the time of construction, yielded a monthly rent not exceeding five rupees. xxx x" The words 'five hundred rupees' and 'five rupees' in Explanation I were substituted by Act IX of 1967 for the words 'four hundred rupees' and 'four rupees' occurring in that Explanation. In the present case, the finding that the defendant has not put up the building but that it has been put up by the plaintiff has become final. Therefore, sub-clause (1) of S.2 (25) will not apply. That will apply only if the person who claims kudikidappu right has himself put up the dwelling house. It is on sub- clause (ii) of S.2 (25) that the defendant relies. According to the defendant, he has been permitted by the plaintiff to occupy the but belonging to the plaintiff and situate in the plaint property. The only difference of opinion between the parties is as to whether what the defendant has been permitted to occupy is a 'hut'. The term 'hut' has been defined in Explanation I, to mean "any dwelling house which was constructed at a cost not exceeding Rs. 500/-, or could have, at the time of construction, yielded a monthly rent not exceeding Rs. 5". As I have observed earlier, there is no evidence in this case to hold that the dwelling house, which is the subject-matter of the suit, was constructed at a cost not exceeding Rs. 500/-. All the same, the defendant would contend that the dwelling house in question is a 'hut' because according to him at the time of construction of the same it yielded a monthly rent not exceeding Rs 5/-. The plaintiff's case in the plaint is that it was given on rent to the defendant for Rs. 3/- per mensem. In the evidence, it is seen that prior to letting it out to the defendant, it had been let out to one Velayudhan who was occupying it for three years. There is no case that it was let out to Velayudhan for a higher rent. Since even according to the plaintiff, the building was let out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. There is no case that it was let out to Velayudhan for a higher rent. Since even according to the plaintiff, the building was let out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 3/-long prior to the date of the suit and in the absence of any case in the plaint that it was let out to the defendant at a rent lower than the normal rent, and that for some special reason, I agree with the finding of the learned Munsiff that at the time of construction, the dwelling house could not have yielded rent exceeding Rs. 5/-. It would not be unsafe, in the circumstances of the case, to assume that such rent at the time of construction would have been Rs 3/- per mensem. This would have been sufficient to dispose of the matter since in the definition of 'hut' this is one of the tests which has to be satisfied and that is satisfied in the present case. 3. But the learned counsel for the respondent contended before me that the word 'or' in Explanation I should really be read as 'and'. According to the learned counsel, a dwelling house will not be a but within the meaning of S.2 (25) of the Act, merely because at the time of construction, it yielded a monthly rent not exceeding Rs. 5, but in addition to this, it has also to be shown that it was constructed at a cost not exceeding Rs. 500/-. Since it has not been shown in this case that the cost of construction of the dwelling house did not exceed Rs. 500, it is urged on behalf of the respondent that the dwelling house cannot be a 'hut' as defined in Explanation I to S.2 (25), and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree in terms prayed for by him. This is the question which engages my attention in this second appeal. 4. Explanation I, which I have already extracted above, clearly provides that for the purpose of that clause one or the other of the requisites mentioned therein should be satisfied. It must be a dwelling house which was constructed at a cost not exceeding Rs. 500/-or it must be a dwelling house which at the time of construction yielded a monthly rent not exceeding Rs. 5/-. It must be a dwelling house which was constructed at a cost not exceeding Rs. 500/-or it must be a dwelling house which at the time of construction yielded a monthly rent not exceeding Rs. 5/-. The normal plain meaning of this clause is that one of the two requirements is sufficient for a dwelling house to be construed as a 'hut' for the purpose of S.2 (25). No doubt, under certain circumstances a departure from the plain and normal meaning may be justified. It depends upon the context in which the word 'or' is used and also on a consideration of the question whether it is necessary that in such circumstances the word 'or' should mean anything other than what it would normally and plainly mean. The Kerala Land Reforms Act is an ameliorative piece of legislation intended to confer certain benefits on tenants and kudikidappukars Even if the building belongs to the owner of the property and is let out either with or without obligation to pay rent, the benefit of 'kudikidappu' is intended to be conferred on the occupant if the building is not substantial. It is to determine this that the Legislature has laid down the two tests, either a low value for the building or a low rental value. Evidently, this is the scheme contemplated in Explanation I. To decide whether a dwelling house so let out is a hut, the standard that has been adopted by the Legislature appears to be the value of the building at the time of construction (if such value is above Rs. five hundred, to treat it not as a hut) or the rent that it should yield at the time of construction (to deny the benefit of kudikidappu if the building of such a nature as would yield a rent above Rs. 5/-per mensem on the date of construction). I do not see anything in the context of the section or in the nature of the Act which warrants a reading of the word 'or' in Explanation I as 'and'. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri Narayanan Nair has invited my attention to a series of decisions where the use of the word 'or' is construed to mean'and'. I may refer to those decisions to see how far they would apply to the facts of this case. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri Narayanan Nair has invited my attention to a series of decisions where the use of the word 'or' is construed to mean'and'. I may refer to those decisions to see how far they would apply to the facts of this case. Before I go into the decisions cited by learned counsel, I may refer to 'Modern English Grammar' by Nesfield (Page 190) where the author considers the various uses of the word 'or'. This is what he says: "The conjunction has four different meanings: (a) An alternative or exclusive sense: Either this man sinned or his parents. (b) an inclusive or non-alternative sense. Here the "or" is nearly equivalent to "and". Such trades as those of leather., or carpentry, or smith's work flourish best in large cities. (c) To indicate that one word is synonymous or nearly synonymous with another: The tribes or castes of India are very numerous, (d) As an equivalent to "otherwise". You must work hard; or(=otherwise= if you do network hard) you will lose your place in the class." Clauses (c) and (d) mentioned above are not applicable to the present case Clause (a) says that the word 'or' can be used in an alternative or exclusive sense and clause (b) says that it can be used in an inclusive or non-alternative sense, and it is nearly equivalent to "and". I would wish to point out that it is not equivalent to "and", but only nearly equivalent, when used in an inclusive or non-alternative sense. 5. In many of the decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondent, where the word 'or' has been construed to mean 'and', the use has been in an inclusive or non-alternative sense. The question that arose for consideration in Shri Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan (AIR. 1963 SC. 1368) concerned with the construction of S.5 (2) (g) of the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act (Act XIII of 1959). S.5 of that Act dealt with the composition of the Board in regard to the particular temple and its endowments. Sub-section (2) of S.5 prescribed the disqualifications for being a member of the Board. 1963 SC. 1368) concerned with the construction of S.5 (2) (g) of the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act (Act XIII of 1959). S.5 of that Act dealt with the composition of the Board in regard to the particular temple and its endowments. Sub-section (2) of S.5 prescribed the disqualifications for being a member of the Board. These disqualifications were specified in clauses (a) to (g) unsoundness of mind, adjudicated upon by competent court, conviction involving moral turpitude, adjudication as an insolvent or the status of an undischarged insolvent, minority, the defect of being deaf-mute or leprosy; holding an office or being a servant of the temple or being in receipt of any emoluments or perquisites from the temple; being interested in a subsisting contract entered into with the temple; and lastly, not processing the Hindu religion or not belonging to the Pushti-Margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. It is the use of the word 'or' in the last clause, namely, 'not professing the Hindu Religion or not belonging to the Pushti-Margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya" that arose for consideration there. What was meant by that clause was that a person would be disqualified if he was not professing the Hindu religion and also not belonging to Pushti-Margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. It is not enough if he professed Hindu religion but in adition he must belong to the particular Sampradaya. In the context in which the word 'or' was used in the case, it really meant 'and' and the Supreme Court reading it as such justified on the ground "for the contest clearly indicates that way." 6. Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. /. T. & E. P. T. Commissioner (AIR. 1958 SC. 861) is a case where the use of the word 'or' in a particular section of the statute happened to be rather inappropriate, and the Supreme Court said that the courts would be justified in reading it to mean'and'. In the said case, S.42 (2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 arose for construction. There, the words "profits derived therefrom or which may reasonably be deemed to have been derived therefrom" necessitated the construction. The word 'or' if it did not mean anything other than what it would mean in its plain sense, it would lead to the result that certainly could not have been intended. There, the words "profits derived therefrom or which may reasonably be deemed to have been derived therefrom" necessitated the construction. The word 'or' if it did not mean anything other than what it would mean in its plain sense, it would lead to the result that certainly could not have been intended. It was in such circumstances that the Supreme Court considered the use of the word'or' in the clause "to be rather inappropriate", and read it to mean'and'. This case cannot be an authority for the proposition contended by counsel for the respondent in this case. 7. The construction that arose for consideration in the decision in State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala (AIR. 1V57 SC. 699) was of S.2 (1) (d) of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax Act (Act 54 of 1948), as amended by Act 30 of 1952. S.2 (1) (d) as amended by Act 30 of 1952, runs as follows: " "Prize competition" includes (i) (1) cross-word prize competition, (2) missing word prize competition, (3) picture prize competition, (4) number prize competition; or (5) any other prize competition, for which the solution is or is not prepared beforehand by the promoters or for which the solution is determined by lot or chance; (ii) any competition in which prizes are offered for forecasts of the results either of a future event or of a past event the result of which is not yet ascertained or not yet generally known; and (iii) any other competition success in which does not depend to a substantial degree upon the exercise of skill." The qualifying clause of the five categories mentioned in S.2 (1) (d) can be broken up into three parts, separate from each other by the disjunctive word 'or'. It is this word 'or' that was construed by the Supreme Court in that decision. S. R. Das C. J. said at page 709 (para 20): "Considering the nature, scope and effect of the impugned Act, we entertain no doubt whatever that the first category of prize competitions does not include any innocent prize competitions. It is this word 'or' that was construed by the Supreme Court in that decision. S. R. Das C. J. said at page 709 (para 20): "Considering the nature, scope and effect of the impugned Act, we entertain no doubt whatever that the first category of prize competitions does not include any innocent prize competitions. Such is what we conceive to be the clear intention of the Legislature as expressed in the impugned Act read as a whole and to give effect to this obvious intention as we are bound to do, we have perforce to read the word 'or' appearing in the qualifying clause after the word "promoter" and before the word "for" as "and". Well-known canons of construction of Statutes permit us to do so (See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 238)". Here again, it can be seen that it is in the context in which the word 'or' was used that called for construction of that word to mean 'and'. 8. Sub-section (1) (a) of S.4 of the Travancore-Cochin Vehicles Taxation Act, 1950 read: 'The tax levied in respect of a motor vehicle in pursuance of a notification issued under sub-section (1) of S.3 shall be paid by the registered owner or person having possession or control of the motor vehicle, at his choice, either quarterly, half-yearly or annually, upon a quarterly, half-yearly, or annual licence to be taken out by him." S.8 of the said Act read: "If the tax due in respect of any vehicle has not been paid, the ragistered owner or the person having possession or control thereof shall be punishable " It cannot be said that only one of them, the registered owner, or person in possession or control of the vehicle, is liable for punishment consequent on default. This is an instance in which the word 'or' may have to be read as 'and'. That was what was held by this Court in construing the above section in the decision reported in Travancore Forward Bank Ltd. v. State (1959 KLT. 410). Dealing with this question, it was said by this Court: "The appellant's interpretation is based on the use of the conjunction "or" in the expression, "the registered owner or person having possession or control of the vehicle". Such an interpretation is not warranted. 410). Dealing with this question, it was said by this Court: "The appellant's interpretation is based on the use of the conjunction "or" in the expression, "the registered owner or person having possession or control of the vehicle". Such an interpretation is not warranted. This is an instance in which as pointed out by Maxwell in his book: On interpretation of Statutes (10th Edition), Page 238) to carry out the intention of the Legislature, it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunction "or" and "and", one for the other". 9. Velu Pillai J. had occassion to consider a similar question in construing S.36 of the District Municipalities Act (Madras Act, 1920). The material part of the S.36, which my learned brother was concerned with, ran as follows: "The State Government may, by order in writing (1) suspend or cancel any resolution passed in pursuance or under colour of this Act, if, in their opinion, (a) such resolution has not been legally passed (b) (c) Provided that the State Government shall before taking action under this section on any of the grounds referred in clauses (a) and (b) give the authority or person concerned an opportunity for explanation." The learned judge observed: "It was faintly urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the word "or" in the expression "authority or person" in the proviso, must be read as meaning "and", and that so interpreted, not only the Council, but also the petitioners ought to have been given an opportunity for explanation. I am aware that a departure from the natural and plain meaning of this word can be made, whenever the context justifies it, or makes it necessary so to do; but I also feel, that the departure ought not to be made, except for good and sufficient reasons which I am unable to find, in the present case." (See Achuthan v. State (1960 KLT 243) What has been held in these decisions only goes to substantiate what I have said earlier, that is, unless the context in which the word 'or' appears compels the Court to depart from its plain and natural meaning, such departure will not be justified. Though normally the word "or" would mean what its plain sense would indicate, and that is, in the alternative sense, there may be circumstances where, in statutes it may have to be understood differently. Though normally the word "or" would mean what its plain sense would indicate, and that is, in the alternative sense, there may be circumstances where, in statutes it may have to be understood differently. It is possible, in certain circumstances to read it in certain statutes as meaning 'and', or at any rate, nearly equivalent to 'and'. But the enquiry in every case should be whether there is justification to depart from the plain or natural meaning of the word. If the nature of the enactment and the context of the provision therein where the word 'or' appears compels the Court to depart from the plain meaning and construe it in a non-alternative sense, courts will not hesitate to adopt such a construction. But where the nature of the legislation as well as the particular provision in which this appears justifies reading the word in its ordinary plain sense as indicating an'alternative', there would be no justification to assume that the word was meant to be used in any other sense, though such use is possible, if the context warrants or compels it. In the present case, I find no difficulty in construing Explanation I in S.2 (25) of Act I of 1964. The plain meaning is consistent with the object of the provision bearing in mind what I have already referred to, that the Kerala Land Reforms Act I of 1964 is one enacted with a view to benefit certain classes of tenants and kudikidappukars and among other things to prevent their eviction. That in construing such provisions reference may be made to the nature and character of the legislation is no longer open to doubt, as it is a principle now well-established. Keeping all this in view, I cannot agree with the learned counsel for the respondent to read the word 'or' in Explanation I to S.2 (25) of Act I of 1964 as meaning 'and'. A dwelling house will satisfy the definition of a 'hut', if one or the other of the requirements in the said Explanation I, namely, the value on the date of construction being less than Rs. 500/-, or the rental value at the time of construction being less than Rs. 5/- is satisfied. A dwelling house will satisfy the definition of a 'hut', if one or the other of the requirements in the said Explanation I, namely, the value on the date of construction being less than Rs. 500/-, or the rental value at the time of construction being less than Rs. 5/- is satisfied. One of these conditions is seen satisfied in the present case and hence the defendant will come within the scope of definition of kudikidappukaran in S.2 (25) of Act I of 1964. 10. It therefore follows that the appellant is entitled to succeed, that the defendant is a kudikidappukaran within the meaning of the Explanation I to S.2 (25) of Act I of 1964 as amended by Act IX of 1967 and as a result, the suit has to be dismissed. In the result, the appeal is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will suffer their respective costs. Allowed.