JUDGMENT D.D. Seth, J. - This reference has been made by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Varanasi, and arises out of proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. 2. The facts of the case are that the relations of the applicant, Munna, with Jhingur, opposite party, had been strained for some time as there was a dispute between them regarding a plot of land in which Bela flowers were grown. Jhingur had filed a suit against Munna for declaration and partition (suit No. 480 of 1950) in the court of the learned Judicial Officer, Varanasi, in respect of the plot in dispute and obtained an ex-parte decree on April 17, 1965. Thereafter, on April 29, 1965 Jhingur obtained Dakhal Dihani of the plot in dispute. Against the ex-parte decree. Munna applicant, preferred an appeal which was allowed by the learned Additional Commissioner, who set aside the ex-parte decree which had been passed in favour of Jhingur and remanded the case to the Judicial Officer for fresh decision. In the meantime Munna made an application for restitution of possession of the plot under Section 144 C.P.C. Jhingur, on the other hand, filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Commissioner before the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue stayed delivery of possession. Ultimately Jhingur's anneal was dismissed by the Board of Revenue which maintained the Additional Commissioner's order setting aside the ex-parte decree passed by the Judicial Officer in favour of Jhingur. On May 30, 1966 Munna obtained possession of the plot in dispute under Section 144 C.P.C. after Jhingur's appeal had been dismissed by the Board of Revenue. After Munna had obtained possession under Section 144 C.P.C. Jhingur preferred an objection on June 23, 1966 before the Judicial Officer. His objection was dismissed by the Judicial Officer and then Jhingur preferred an appeal before the Additional Commissioner which was also dismissed. The judgment of the Additional Commissioner was confirmed by the Board of Revenue also. Thereafter Jhingur filed an application on July 6, 1966 before the learned City Magistrate, Varanasi, praying for proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. to betaken against Munna but his application was rejected on the ground that proceedings under Section 107, Cr.P.C. were pending. The judgment of the Additional Commissioner was confirmed by the Board of Revenue also. Thereafter Jhingur filed an application on July 6, 1966 before the learned City Magistrate, Varanasi, praying for proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. to betaken against Munna but his application was rejected on the ground that proceedings under Section 107, Cr.P.C. were pending. Against that order Jhingur preferred a revision on which the learned Additional District Magistrate (J) made a reference to this Court recommending that the order passed by the learned Magistrate be set aside. Jhingur again filed an application for initiating proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. on April 17, 1967 and the learned Magistrate passed a preliminary order attaching the plot in dispute and asking the parties to file their written statements, affidavits and evidence in support of their respective cases. On July 29, 1967 Munna filed an application requesting that proceedings under Section 145. Cr. P.C., be dropped and the plot be released from attachment. In the meantime the parties had filed written statements and affidavits and the learned Magistrate referred the matter to the civil court for determining which party was in possession on the date of the preliminary order and two months prior to the same. The learned Munsif found, by his order dated January 8, 1968, Jhingur to be in possession of the plot in dispute on the date of the preliminary order and two months prior to the same. Thereupon, Feb. 2, 1968 the learned Magistrate passed a final order in conformity with the finding passed by the learned Munsif and holding that Jhingur was in possession of the plot in dispute and directed release of the plot in his favour and forbade Munna to interfere with the possession of Jhingur until he was evicted under the orders of some competent court. 3. Against the order of the learned City Magistrate dated February 2, 1968 Munna preferred a revision which was heard by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Varanasi, who, by his order dated June 1, 1968, has made the present reference. 4. I have heard Sri G.N. Verma, learned counsel in support of the reference and Sri Shitla Prasad, learned counsel appearing for Jhingur, who has opposed the reference. 5. 4. I have heard Sri G.N. Verma, learned counsel in support of the reference and Sri Shitla Prasad, learned counsel appearing for Jhingur, who has opposed the reference. 5. Sri G.N. Verma submitted that since his client had already obtained possession by a decree passed by a competent court before proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C., had started the learned Magistrate was not competent to initiate proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C., ignoring the judgment passed by the civil court until the order passed by the civil court was vacated. Sri Shitla Prasad, on the other hand, submitted that the learned Magistrate was fully competent to start proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C., if there was an apprehension of breach of peace between the parties. According to Sri Shitla Prasad, the Magistrate could drop proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C.. only if there was no apprehension of breach of peace between the parties that there was an apprehension of breach of peace between the parties and since in this case the Magistrate was satisfied that there was an apprehension of breach of peace between the parties the Magistrate was competent to initiate proceedings under Section 145. Cr.P.C. Sri Shitla Prasad, further submitted that after the preliminary order had been passed by the learned Magistrate Munna did not prefer a revision against that order and hence the order passed by the learned Magistrate need not be interfered with. Sri Shitla Prasad relied on sub-section (1) (d) of Section 146, Cr. P.C., which provides that no appeal shall lie from any finding of a civil court given in a reference made by the Magistrate nor can any review or revision be filed against that finding. This point of law is not challenged by Sri G.N. Verma. It is true that once an order is passed by a learned Magistrate under provisions of Section 145, Cr.P.C., in conformity with the decision of the civil court that decision is not amenable to the revisional powers of the sessions court or the High Court in so far as the decision of the Civil Court is concerned. (See Guru Prasad Pandey v. State, 1967 ACC 294. 6. (See Guru Prasad Pandey v. State, 1967 ACC 294. 6. Sri G.N. Verma placed reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Sohan Lal v. State, 1967 ACC 275 in which it was held as follows: "The provisions of Section 145, Cr.P.C. should not be invoked when civil litigation about the indentical subject matter is actually pending. When there is choice between Section 145 and Section 107 before a Magistrate by reason of the pendency of civil litigation he must choose Section 107 and not Section 145." 7. Sri Shitla Prasad, on the other hand, placed reliance on the judgment of another learned single Judge of this Court in Jafar Husain v. State, 1969 ACC 70 in which the learned Judge held as follows: "If there is an apprehension of breach of peace unconnected with any immovable property, then certainly Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. applies; but if a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, then the Magistrate shall make an order in writing under Section 145 (1), Cr.P.C. The Magistrate has no option in the matter. He cannot proceed under Section 107, Cr.P.C. If the dispute is co-related to land or water or boundaries thereof, it is only Section 145, Cr.P.C. which gives him power to proceed in the matter. This jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. remains unaffected by the pendency of a civil litigation between the parties in respect of title." 8. There is obviously a conflict of decision between two learned single Judges of this Court in Sohan Lal's case and in Jafar Husain's case. Sri Shitla Prasad requested that the reference be referred to a larger Bench for decision. At one point I was of the opinion that in view of the conflict between the decisions of two learned single Judges of this Court referred to above the matter should be referred to a larger Bench but after considering a few more decisions on which reliance was placed by Sri G. N. Verma do not think any useful purpose would be served by referring the matter to a larger Bench because the main argument advanced by Sri G.N. Verma has not been considered in Sohan Lal's case or Jafar Husain's case. 9. 9. It was held by a learned single Judge of this Courts in Mrs. Angles v. Chhail Behari, AIR 1949 Allahabad 230 as follows: "In view of the provisions of sub-section (9) of Section 145, it is discretionary with the Magistrate to summon or not to summon witnesses in a proceeding under Section 145. When the rights of the parties have been recently determined by a competent revenue Court (a decree of which Court is as effective as a decree of a Civil Court) the dispute is at an end and it is the duty of the Magistrate in a proceeding under Section 145 to maintain the rights of the successful party and not to allow the defeated party to invoke the aid of the Magistrate and the police to neutralise the effect of the decree of a competent Court." 10. It was held by another single Judge of this Court in Masih Uddin v. The State, AIR 1953 Allahabad 383 that: "It is the duty of the Magistrate holding proceedings under Section 145 to maintain the rights of the parties when such rights have been declared by a competent court within a time not remote from taking proceedings under the section." 11. To the same effect is the decision of a single Judge of the Patna High Court reported in Jang Bahadur v. Nazimul Haque, A.I.R. 1947 Patna 245. 12. In view of these decisions it must be held that once the applicant had obtained Dakhal as a result of a decree passed by a competent civil court the second proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C., were not maintainable till the order passed by the civil court had been vacated. The judgment of the civil court in the instant case in favour of Munna applicant could not be nullified by the criminal court. 13. Sri Shitla Prasad finally placed reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Badri Nath v. U.P. State, AIR 1965 Allahabad 127 in which a learned Judge held that: "The finding of the Civil Court on a reference made to it under Section 146, Cr.P.C. though erroneous, is not subject to appeal, review, or revision, even when a party is challenging the final order of the Magistrate based on the finding of the civil Court. When the law prohibits the parties from challenging the finding of the Civil Court in appeal, review or revision, the revisional Court cannot go into the propriety of that finding on a revision made to challenge the final order of the Magistrate based on the finding of the Civil Court." 14. The case of Badri Nath relied upon by Shri Shitla Prasad can be of no help to him because in the instant case the Magistrate had clearly no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. after Munna had obtained possession of the plot in dispute as a result of the decree passed in his favour by a competent civil court. 15. For the reasons mentioned above and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after carefully going through the orders passed by the courts below I accept this reference, although not for the reasons contained in the referring order, and quash the order of the learned Magistrate dated February 2, 1968 and also quash the proceedings pending before him under Section 145, Cr.P.C.