Judgment :- 1. In this appeal against a second appeal, the plaintiff-appellant claims that the decision of Velu Pillai J. in second appeal is erroneous. The decision in second appeal in this case only follows another decision of Velu Pillai J. in Thomman v. Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. (1964 KLT. 62). Thus, the question before us is whether the said decision in Thomman's case is right. 2. The appellant is a banking company; and the company filed a suit against the respondent for a debt over Rs. 1,500/- after the commencement of Act XXXI of 1958. The suit was decreed allowing the respondent to pay the debt in instalments and refusing him his costs and directing him to pay the costs of the appellant. This was confirmed in appeal by the District Judge, but reversed by Velu Pillai J. in second appeal. Velu Pillai, J. held that S.3 (2) of Act XXX[ of 1958 applied to the case and therefore, the appellant was liable to suffer its own costs and to pay the costs of the respondents. It is the correctness of this decision that is in dispute. 3. The term'debt' is defined in S.2 (c) but several categories of debts are not included in the definition by the subsequent clauses (i) to (xi). The last of these clauses relates to a debt exceeding Rs. 1,500/- borrowed under a single transaction before the commencement of the Act from a banking company as defined by the Banking Companies Act, 1949 a debt similar to the one before us. A proviso is added to this clause which provides that in the case of such a debt exceeding Rs. 1,500/ -due to a banking company, an agriculturist debtor shall be entitled to repay the debt in eight equal half yearly instalments as provided in subsection (3) of S.4. (The rest of the proviso is not relevant.) S.4 (3) allows a debtor to pay his debt in half-yearly instalments, the first instalment to be paid during the six months following the commencement of the Act. In other words, the debtor gets six months to pay the first instalment and a further period of six months each for every succeeding instalment. The relevant S.3 (2) may now be noted. In other words, the debtor gets six months to pay the first instalment and a further period of six months each for every succeeding instalment. The relevant S.3 (2) may now be noted. S.3 (2) enacts that where a creditor filed a suit for recovery of a debt before the expiry of six months from the commencement of Act, etc. or after the agriculturist has paid or deposited the same in instalments as specified in S.4 and during the period when he is so entitled to pay, the court shall decree the suit, but shall direct the plaintiff to pay his own costs and to pay the costs of the defendant-agriculturist except in cases where the claim would have been barred by limitation if no suit were filed. 4. Now, the argument of the counsel of the appellant is that the debt in question is not a debt as defined by S.2 (c) as it is excluded by clause (xi) of the section, and therefore, it cannot come within the scope of S.3 (2) of the Act. The argument on the other side to meet this is that by the proviso to S.2(c) (xi) a debtor like the respondent is entitled to the benefits of S.4(3) with the result that he is not liable to pay any amount during the first six months after the commencement of the Act. The argument proceeds that in such a case, if a suit is brought when the debtor is still entitled to pay the instalment - when he cannot be said to be in arrears of the instalment, the suit comes within the scope of S.3(2), and therefore, the consequence contemplated by that sub-section must also follow. In this connection, the reasoning of Velu Pillai J. may be noted. The learned judge refers to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT 1), wherein the Full Bench has observed that where the legislative intent is clear from a reading of all the provisions of a statute and if such intent is not properly reflected in the interpretation or definition section, the legislative intent must prevail over the legislative definition and the legislative definition should not be allowed to control the legislative intent. The Full Bench has said further that this principle must apply all the more or with more force in a case where the definition section opens with the words "subject to the context to the contrary" or "unless the context otherwise requires" or similar words. It is clear from the proviso to S.2(c) (xi) that the legislature wanted to give the benefits of S.4(3) to a debtor like the respondent. It must then follow that he is entitled to pay the first instalment during the first six months after the commencement of the Act with the result that the instalment cannot be collected from him during the said period - can be collected only after the period. It must further follow as a consequence of this that, if during that period a suit is filed while the debtor is still entitled to pay the amount, he must get the benefits of S.3(2). The only apparent difficulty to this approach to the question is the fact that in the opening portion of the sub-section the word 'debt' appears, which must mean a debt as defined by the definition in S.2 (c). It is here that we apply the principle laid down by the Full Bench. We also point out that the definitions in S.2 are controlled by the expression "unless the context otherwise requires". We may also, in passing, refer to the preamble of the Act, which states that the Act is intended to provide for the relief of indebted agriculturists. The interpretation we have given hereinbefore thus accords with the purpose of the legislation too. 5. The correctness of the decision of Velu Pillai, J. in Thomman's case is approved; and the decision impugned before us is also approved. The appeal is dismissed. Since the question was in some doubt, we direct both parties to bear their respective costs in the appeal. Dismissed.