JUDGMENT B.D. Gupta, J. - This petition in revision discloses a very sorry state of affairs and, in the circumstances of the case, the only order which appears to me just and appropriate is to quash the proceedings against the applicant. 2. It appears that, in consequence of certain discrepancies appearing in the statement made by the applicant in the course of a criminal trial, Judicial Officer, Fatehgash, Sri R. K. Saksena, directed the filing of a complaint against the applicant for the offence punishable under Sections 193/211, I. P. C. The trial of the applicant appears to have been taken up by the Judicial Officer, Sadar and, on the 16th of December, 1966, on which date the applicant appeared in that court, the hearing was adjourned to the 23rd of December, 1966. On the 23rd of December, the applicant was present but the case was adjourned to the 3rd of January, 1967, on the ground that prosecution witnesses were not present. On the 3rd of January, 1967, the applicant appears to have been absent at the time the case was called out whereupon the court ordered issue of non-bailable warrants against the applicant and fixed the 12th 'of January, 1967. The record reveals that a little later, the same day, the applicant made an application representing that he had been present in court from 10 a.m. but as he was under an attack of dysentery he was absent at the time the case, was called out and when he came back he learnt that warrants had been issued. The prayer in the application was that the order directing issue of warrants be cancelled. The applicant was, however, taken into custody and was directed to furnish fresh bonds and sureties. 3. On the 12th of January, 1967, the applicant was present but the case was adjourned to the 17th of January, on which date the evidence of a witness was recorded but was not completed and the 21st of January, 1967, was fixed. The case was again adjourned on the 21st of January and the 30th of January, 1967, was fixed. The applicant was present on the 30th of January but the case was again adjourned to the 8th of February, 1967. The case was again adjourned on the 21st of January and the 30th of January, 1967, was fixed. The applicant was present on the 30th of January but the case was again adjourned to the 8th of February, 1967. On the 8th of February, again, the applicant was present but the case was adjourned because the Assistant Public Prosecutor appears to have desired an adjournment, and the 24th of February, 1967, was fixed. On the 24th of February again the case was adjourned and the 13th of 'March, 1967, was fixed. On the 13th of March, 1967, the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) passed an order transferring the case to the court of a Special 'Magistrate for disposal and directed the applicant to appear in that court on the 20th of March, 1967. The 20th of March, 1967 appears to have been a date on which the special Magistrate does not appear to have been present to hold his sitting with the result that the case -was again adjourned to the 31st of March, 1967, on which date the Special Magistrate passed an order stating that he was not competent to try the case which could be tried only by a I class Magistrate and directed the applicant to appear before the (A.D.M., J.) on the 6th of April, 1967. 4. The Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) does not appear to have passed any order on the 6th of April, 1967, but on the 12th of April, 1967, he paned an order transferring the case to the court of J. O. Chhibramau for disposal. The applicant does not appear to have been informed of the aforesaid date. He, however, appeared in court on the 8th of May, 1967, which was a date fixed for recording the prosecution evidence, but the case was again' adjourned as no prosecution witness appears to have been present, and the 18th of May, 1967, was fixed as the next date. On the 18th of May, 1967, again, no prosecution witness was present, though the applicant was, and the hearing was again adjourned to the 27th of May, 1967. 5. On the 27th of May, 1967, also no prosecution witness was present. Two applications appear to have been made before the learned Magistrate on the 27th of May, 1967. On the 18th of May, 1967, again, no prosecution witness was present, though the applicant was, and the hearing was again adjourned to the 27th of May, 1967. 5. On the 27th of May, 1967, also no prosecution witness was present. Two applications appear to have been made before the learned Magistrate on the 27th of May, 1967. One of these was an application by the Assistant Public Prosecutor praying that Sri R. K. Saksena, the Judicial Officer, who had filed the complaint under Sections 193/211, I. P. C., be exempted from personal appearance, and the other was an application by the applicant detailing the harassment he had passed through on account of the large number of adjournments which had already taken place and praying that, in the circumstances, an order discharging the applicant be passed. The learned Magistrate, whilst accepting the prayer on behalf of the Assistant Public Prosecutor exempting Sri R. K. Saksena from personal appearance, dismissed the application made by the applicant by the following order :- "Heard the applicant and the A.P.P. It is not mandatory to dismiss the complaint in all the circumstances. Mr. R. K. Saksena is a busy public servant and he is not expected to be present in this court to hear the call of the case. Moreover, the A.P.P. has applied for his exemption and it has been allowed. The application has no force and is rejected." 6. Against the aforesaid order the applicant filed a revision in the court of the Sessions Judge which was dismissed on the ground that the power of the learned Magistrate under Section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to dismiss a complaint was a purely discretionary power, that it was within the jurisdiction of the power of the learned Magistrate not to pass an order discharging the applicant and that, therefore, no ground for interference in revision had been made out. The applicant then filed the present revision in this Court. 7. No exception can be taken to the proposition that the power to dismiss a complaint under Section 239, Cr. P. C. is a power in regard to which the Magistrate concerned acts in his discretion. The discretion, however, has to be a judicial discretion. The applicant then filed the present revision in this Court. 7. No exception can be taken to the proposition that the power to dismiss a complaint under Section 239, Cr. P. C. is a power in regard to which the Magistrate concerned acts in his discretion. The discretion, however, has to be a judicial discretion. The observation of the learned Magistrate, in the course of his order dated the 27th of May, 1967, quoted above, that "Sri R. K. Saksena is a busy public servant and he is not expected to 'be present in this court to hear the call of the case", discloses complete lack of appreciation of the harassment involved to an accused person when indiscriminate adjournments of hearing of a criminal case against him take place for reasons connected with omission or neglect on the part of the prosecuting agency. The history of the case, which has been detailed earlier in this order, has been drawn from the entries on the order-sheet of the case. Reference may be made to the order passed by the court on the 3rd of January, 1967, directing issuance of non-bailable warrants for the arrest of the applicant because the applicant happened to be absent from the court at the time the case was called out, as also to the subsequent order passed by the learned Magistrate, the same day, directing the applicant to be taken into custody and to furnish fresh bonds and sureties notwithstanding representation to the court that on account of illness, even though he had been present in court since 10 a.m., the applicant was absent at the time when the case had been called out. I have no desire to comment on the strict manner in which the above mentioned lapse on the part of the applicant on the 3rd of January, 1967, was dealt with by the learned Magistrate. What I desire to record is that there should not be two yard-sticks, one for the prosecution and the other for the accused person. The accused person is also entitled to protection against the harassment involved in adjournments occasioned solely by neglect on the part of the prosecuting agency. What I desire to record is that there should not be two yard-sticks, one for the prosecution and the other for the accused person. The accused person is also entitled to protection against the harassment involved in adjournments occasioned solely by neglect on the part of the prosecuting agency. The history of the manner in which the instant case has been conducted has created on my mind the impression that the prosecuting agency was being accommodated without regard to the harassment involved to the accused by adjournments and, though the order of the learned Magistrate dated the 27th of May, 1967, refusing to discharge the applicant was within his powers, the proceedings against the applicant having been conducted in utter disregard of protection from uncalled for adjournments involving a long period of harassment to the applicant, those proceedings deserve to be quashed. I am conscious that the passing of an order quashing the proceedings involves, in effect, exonerating the applicant from punishment which he may deserve in case he is guilty of the offence for which he is being tried, but for this result the prosecuting agency has to thank itself. After a detailed perusal of the Order-sheet and the manner in which the trial of the applicant has proceeded I am satisfied that on account of negligence of the prosecution the applicant has been subjected to uncalled for harassment sufficient to justify an order quashing the proceedings. 8. Accordingly, I allow this revision, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate dated the 27th of May, 1967, and quash the proceedings pending against the applicant before the Judicial Officer, Chhibramau, under Sections 193/211 of the Indian Penal Code.