Judgment :- 1. The Malabar Market Committee, Kozhikode is the appellant in both these appeals; and the common respondent is a hill produce merchant. The questions involved in the cases are also the same. The view expressed by a learned judge of this Court (Sadasivan J.) in The Secretary, Malabar Market Committee v. M. K. Thavutty, Crl. Appeal No. 294 of 1967 was doubted, and hence, these cases were referred to a Division Bench and ultimately, to a Full Bench. There are three questions to be decided in these cases; and I shall come to them one by one. 2. The respondent applied for licence from 1st January 1965 to 31st December 1966 as contemplated by S.5 of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act remitting the requisite fee and complying with the other formalities. He carried on his trade in arecanuts expecting the licence to be issued in due course. Subsequently, he was called upon to produce his account books as a licensee, and he did not even send a reply to the demand. Then he was prosecuted for breach of bye-law 25 (6) framed by the Market Committee, which is made punishable by bye-law 25 (18). The District Magistrate, Tellicherry acquitted the respondent, and the Market Committee has filed these appeals. 3. Though some evidence was adduced by the Market Committee that the licence was issued to the respondent, there is nothing on record to show that the latter received the licence. The District Magistrate proceeded on the basis that though the respondent applied for licence, the licence was not in fact issued to him. However, the Market Committee relies on R.41 (2) of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Rules, which provides that an applicant who complied with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of R.41 who applied for the licence with the receipt for the payment of the prescribed fee shall, until orders are communicated to him, be entitled to act as if the licence applied for has been granted to him in accordance with R.42. And R.42 provides that every licence issued by the Collector or the Market Committee shall expire on the last day of the Market Committee's official year for which it is issued. And R.42 provides that every licence issued by the Collector or the Market Committee shall expire on the last day of the Market Committee's official year for which it is issued. The argument of the counsel of the Market Committee is that by virtue of this sub-rule the respondent is a licensee who is bound by the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws, and hence his failure to produce accounts is a breach of bye-law 25 (6) punishable under bye-law 25(18). The argument on the side of the respondent is that the deeming provision in R.41 (2) does not make the respondent a licensee, who alone is bound by the bye-laws, and hence, a breach of bye-law 25 (6) by a person like the respondent is not punishable This argument was accepted by the District Magistrate; and Sadasivan J. said in Thavutty's case that all that was enjoined by R.41 (2) was that a person who had applied for licence could carry on the business with immunity until orders issuing the licence were communicated to him, and during the interval between the date of application and the date of issue of the licence, if he carried on trade, he would not be liable to prosecution for not taking out a licence, and liability under bye-law 25 (6) could be fastened only on a holder of a licence. Whether this is correct is the first question in the cases. 4. A few provisions of the Commercial Crops Markets Act may be noted. Under S.4 the State Government may declare a notified area; and under S.4A the State Government shall establish a Market Committee for every such noti8ed area. S.5 (1) provides that no person shall, within a notified area, set up, establish or use, or continue or allow to be continued, any place for the purchase or sale of a notified commercial crop, except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted by the Collector. Sub-section (3) of S.5 provides that no person shall, within a notified area, set up, establish or use, continue or allow to be continued, any place for the storage, weighment, pressing or processing of any notified commercial crop except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted by the Collector. Sub-section (3) of S.5 provides that no person shall, within a notified area, set up, establish or use, continue or allow to be continued, any place for the storage, weighment, pressing or processing of any notified commercial crop except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted by the Collector. Sub-section (4) of the same section then enacts that the Collector may refuse a licence to certain persons like one whose licence was cancelled and three years have not elapsed since the date of the cancellation, one who has been convicted of an offence or been guilty of misconduct, which, in the opinion of the Col lector, affects the said person's integrity as a man of business, and one in regard to whom the Collector is satisfied that such person is a benamidar for, or a partner with, any other person to whom a licence may be refused for the foregoing reasons. The proviso to this sub-section allows an appeal to such an applicant, whose application for licence has been refused, to the Revenue Board and a second appeal to the Government. Then comes sub-section (5) which enacts that every person to whom a licence is granted under S.5 shall comply with the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws made thereunder and the conditions specified in the licence. S.11 provides for the levy of fees by the Market Committee depending upon the quantity of the commercial crops bought and sold. S.18 confers power on the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act; and S.19 confers power on the Market Committee to frame bye-laws with the previous sanction of the Director of Agriculture, and in case the Market Committee fails to make bye-laws, for the Director of Agriculture himself to make bye-laws. Power is also given to provide by the bye-laws for punishment for breach of a bye-law with fine up to Rs. 50. The other provisions of the Act need not be considered. 5. Rules have been framed under S.18 of the Act providing for several matters including the issue of licence. Under R.28A the form of the application for licences under S.5(1) and S.5 (3) is prescribed, and the form of the licences to be issued is also prescribed. 50. The other provisions of the Act need not be considered. 5. Rules have been framed under S.18 of the Act providing for several matters including the issue of licence. Under R.28A the form of the application for licences under S.5(1) and S.5 (3) is prescribed, and the form of the licences to be issued is also prescribed. The application for licences contains a clause that the applicant shall abide by all the provisions of the Act, the relevant rules and bye-laws made thereunder in force from time to time, and the licence form provides that the person to whom the licence is issued may set up, establish etc., within a notified area, any place for the purchase or sale of a notified commercial crop [if the licence is under S.5 (1)], and may set up, establish, etc. any place for storage, weighment, etc. [ if the licence is under S.5 (3) ] in accordance with the provisions of the Act as amended from time to time and rules made by the Government and bye-laws framed by the Market Committee. The Note to R.28A provides that an appeal shall lie to the Revenue Board against any order passed by the Collector refusing to grant a licence within a month from the receipt of the order, and that a second appeal shall lie to the Government against the appellate order of the Revenue Board refusing the licence within three months of the receipt of the order. I need not refer to the several other rules excepting to R.41 and 42, the purport of which I have already indicated. 6. The Market Committee framed bye-laws as contemplated by S.19 of the Act. In the Act and the rules the term "licensee" is not defined, but in the bye-laws "licensee" is defined under bye-law 2 (ix) as a person who holds a licence issued under the Act, the rules and the bye-laws as amended from time to time. Bye-law 25 has several clauses, of which I am concerned in these cases only with some. Clause (6) provides that a licencee shall maintain regular accounts of all his transactions in each kind of commercial crop in a form or forms approved by the Secretary and shall send to the Secretary such reports and returns as may from time to time be required in such forms as may be specified by him. Clause (6) provides that a licencee shall maintain regular accounts of all his transactions in each kind of commercial crop in a form or forms approved by the Secretary and shall send to the Secretary such reports and returns as may from time to time be required in such forms as may be specified by him. Again, clause (14) provides that every trader in any commercial crop shall keep regular accounts of all his transactions and shall furnish to the licensees of the place or to Superintendents of Regulated Markets such information as may be required of him to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Act and more specifically the provisions of the bye-laws. Clause (18) makes the contravention of the bye-laws punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 50. The other bye-laws need not be mentioned. 7. As already indicated, sub-sections (1) and (3) of S.5 prohibit a person from establishing, setting up, etc. any place for the purchase or sale of a notified commercial crop or for storage, weighment, etc. of the same in a notified area without a licence from the Collector. The Collector may refuse the licence to certain persons under sub-section (4); and in the event of such refusal, an appeal and a second appeal are provided to the Revenue Board and to the Government respectively. The respective times for appeal and second appeal (a month and three months) are also provided under R.28A. The licence contemplated is normally for the Market Committee's official year under R.42; and under R.41 (2) an applicant who has complied with the formalities and applied far a licence is entitled to act as if the licence applied for has been granted to him until orders are communicated to him. The question for us to consider is whether such a person who is entitled to act as if a licence has been granted to him will be a licensee under the bye-laws. 8. The argument of the counsel of the respondent is that only a holder of a licence will be a licensee under the bye-laws, and a person who is entitled to act as if a licence has been granted to him is not a holder of a licence, and hence not liable to be punished for the breach of any bye-law. The argument of the counsel of the respondent is that only a holder of a licence will be a licensee under the bye-laws, and a person who is entitled to act as if a licence has been granted to him is not a holder of a licence, and hence not liable to be punished for the breach of any bye-law. The first result, if we accept this contention, will be that such a person will get all the benefits of a licence but will not be bound by any obligation under the bye-laws like keeping accounts, producing them before the officers of the Market Committee, etc. He cannot be prevented from keeping a place for purchase and sale, or for storage, weighment, etc., of a notified commercial crop in a notified area without a licence; he cannot be compelled to comply with the bye-laws either! This looks anomalous; and this could not have been the intention of R.41 (2) to make such a person a free trader not bound by the bye-laws. Moreover, there will be yet another consequence if this contention is accepted a more serious consequence. Sub-section (5) of S.5 of the Act, I have already pointed out, makes it obligatory that a person to whom a licence is granted shall comply with the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws. If a person like the respondent in these cases is not a person to whom a licence is granted, then this sub-section will not apply to him, with the result that he need not comply with the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws. In other words, he is not bound by any of the provisions of the Act even. Obviously, the intention of R.41 (2) could not have been to put a person like the respondent beyond the pale and outside the ambit of the Act even; if that were the intention, he need not have been allowed to act as if the licence applied for has been granted to him. Therefore, the intention of R.41 (2) must have been to create a fiction of an interim licence in terms of the licence applied for. This was also necessary, because the application for licence before the Collector, the appeal to the Revenue Board and the second appeal to the Government would take fairly considerable time. Therefore, the intention of R.41 (2) must have been to create a fiction of an interim licence in terms of the licence applied for. This was also necessary, because the application for licence before the Collector, the appeal to the Revenue Board and the second appeal to the Government would take fairly considerable time. Again, if the matter is scrutinised more closely, what emerges is that even without the definition of the term "licensee" in the bye-laws a person coming within R.41 (2) is bound to comply with the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws. In other words, even if the respondent is not a licencee as defined by the bye-laws (the holder of a licence), he is still bound to comply with the provisions of the bye-laws under S.5(5) of the Act, if he is to act under R.41 (2) as if the licence has been granted to him. This effect of the Act and the rules cannot be nullified by a bye-law framed under the Act. Therefore, the holder of a licence a licencee under the bye-laws can only be a person to whom a licence has been granted, as contemplated by the Act and as deemed by R.41 (2). 9. There are some well-recognised principles regarding interpretation of statutes. A court cannot legislate, but only interpret the law. In doing so, the court will take care to see that the interpret it gives is harmonious, so that the different parts of the statute constitute a harmonious whole without conflict. Similarly, in considering whether a rule or bye-law framed under a statute is intravires or ultra vires, the court should strive, if possible, to avoid a striking down. Of course, if the impugned rule or bye-law is beyond the powers conferred by the statute, the court will not refrain from declaring the rule or bye-law void. Interpreting a statute is to get at the intention of the legislature; but, the intention can be gathered only from the language used by the legislature. The court cannot add to or subtract from the language of the statute so as to bring out its supposed intention. To these may be added that a penal statute has to be interpreted strictly, and should not be interpreted in such a way as to widen its penal provisions. The court cannot add to or subtract from the language of the statute so as to bring out its supposed intention. To these may be added that a penal statute has to be interpreted strictly, and should not be interpreted in such a way as to widen its penal provisions. I may add one more principle here that a deeming provision or a legal fiction can be used only for the purpose for which it is enacted, and within its ambit or purpose full effect has also to be given, in other words, after accepting the fiction "imagination should not be allowed to boggle" 10. In these cases, even the definition of the term "licensee" is unnecessary in the bye-laws; and the term as defined by bye-law 2 (ix) a person who holds a licence issued under the Act, rules and bye-laws can only mean a person to whom a licence is granted under S.5 of the Act. As I have already pointed out, licences are contemplated only under S.5; and the expression used therein is "a person to whom a licence is granted." I reiterate that a person who holds a licence issued under the Act, the licensee of the bye-laws, is a person to whom a licence is granted. Under "rule 41 (2) a person who has applied for a licence complying with the formalities can act as if the licence applied for has been granted to him. That means, he can only act as if a licence has been granted to him, as if an interim licence in terms of the licence applied for has been granted to him, as if he is a person to whom a licence has been granted, as if he holds a licence, as if he is a licensee under the bye-laws. For these reasons, I am inclined to think that the opinion expressed on this point in Thavutty's case is not correct; and that the conclusion of the District Magistrate on this point is also erroneous. 11. The next contention of the counsel of the appellant is that the District Magistrate should have referred the cases to this Court under S.432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure instead of deciding the validity of the bye-laws himself. 11. The next contention of the counsel of the appellant is that the District Magistrate should have referred the cases to this Court under S.432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure instead of deciding the validity of the bye-laws himself. Sub-section (1) of S.432 reads that where any court is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court, to which that court is subordinate, or by the Supreme Court, the court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons therefor, and refer the same for the decision of the High Court. The Explanation attached to this sub-section states that "Regulation' means any Regulation of the Bengal, Bombay or Madras Code or Regulation as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, or in the General Clauses Act of the State. The General Clauses Act of 1897 defines Regulation to mean a Regulation made by the President under Art.240 of the Constitution and shall include a Regulation made by the President under Art.243 thereof and a Regulation made by the Central Government under the Government of India Act, 1870, or the Government of India Act, 1915, or the Government of India Act, 1935. The definition of the term in the State General Clauses Act is also similar. The argument of the counsel of the appellant is that the bye-laws framed by the Market Committee can be said to be an Ordinance. The counsel has rightly left out Act and Regulation, because the bye-laws cannot be an Act and cannot be as explained by the Explanation. The only question for us to consider is whether the bye-laws can be an Ordinance In support of his argument the counsel has attempted to show that such bye-laws as those before us framed by the Market Committee will come within the general law of the country, and for the sake of uniformity, the interpretation of such bye-laws should be done by the High Court. He has cited some rulings also to show that such bye-laws have the force of law. He has cited some rulings also to show that such bye-laws have the force of law. In S.2 (29) of the General Clauses Act of 1897 "Indian law" is defined as any Act, Ordinance, Regulation, rule, order, bye-law or other instrument which before the commencement of the Constitution had the force of law in any Province of India or part thereof, or thereafter has the force of law in any Part A State or Part C State or part thereof, but does not include any Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or any Order in Council, rule or other instrument made under such Act. Again, "Rule" is defined in the same General Clauses Act as a rule made in exercise of a power conferred by any enactment, and shall include a regulation made as a rule under any enactment. "Bye-law" is not defined in the General Clauses Act; but the counsel has drawn our attention to Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. IX, page 40, Para.77, where it is said that all regulations made by a corporation and intended to bind not only itself and its officers and servants but members of the public who come within the sphere of their operation may properly be called bye-laws. May be that the bye-laws before us have the force of law among the traders in commercial crops in the notified area. But, I need not pursue the question any further, because the position appears to be fairly clear that S.432 of the Cods of Criminal Procedure covers only Acts, Ordinances and Regulations in the restricted meaning in which these words are understood in the filed of legislation. The argument that for the purpose of uniformity in interpretation the cases should be referred to this Court under this section has no force. I do not think that the purpose of the legislature in enacting this provision is to bring about uniformity in interpretation of every type of legislation including subordinate legislation as the bye-laws framed by a Market Committee or a corporation. The counsel has suggested that a bye-law might even be unconstitutional against some provision in the Constitution and if the validity of a bye-law need not be referred to this Court under S.432 the result will be that a subordinate criminal court will have the power to interpret a provision of the Constitution. The counsel has suggested that a bye-law might even be unconstitutional against some provision in the Constitution and if the validity of a bye-law need not be referred to this Court under S.432 the result will be that a subordinate criminal court will have the power to interpret a provision of the Constitution. I do not think that this argument has any force either. If there is in a bye-law a question involving the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution, the matter may be brought to this Court under Art.228 of the Constitution. And if a bye-law is declared void in other cases by a subordinate criminal court, the remedy to test the correctness of the decision and to secure uniformity is only by way of appeal or revision. For the purpose of securing uniformity alone, the provision in S.432 of the Code need not be pressed into service, as the provision, in my opinion, is intended to cover only Acts, Ordinances and Regulations as these terms are understood in the parlour of legislation, and since the provision is not intended to cover every type of subordinate legislation. 12. In this connection, I shall refer to one decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court by H. R. Krishnan, J. in Akhar Bhai Nazarali v. Md. Hussain Bhai AIR. 1961 M. P. 37. The learned judge has stated in the said decision that "Regulation in S.432 is used in a very general sense as equivalent to any secondary legislation, in other words, any rule or what amounts to a rule made by the Government in exercise of the powers given by an enactment and itself having the force of law". With due respect to the learned Judge, I wish to point out that this opinion is directly in conflict with the Explanation attached to the section itself. The learned judge appears to have lost sight of the Explanation: and I find it difficult to subscribe to this view. The second contention of the counsel of the appellant is therefore rejected. 13. Lastly it is urged that the District Magistrate is erroneous in his conclusion that bye-law 25 (6) is beyond the bye-law making power of the Market Committee. The second contention of the counsel of the appellant is therefore rejected. 13. Lastly it is urged that the District Magistrate is erroneous in his conclusion that bye-law 25 (6) is beyond the bye-law making power of the Market Committee. In the opinion of the District Magistrate, an employee of the Market Committee has no power to call upon a trader to produce his accounts since the provision conferring such power is not a reasonable provision. This conclusion does not appear to be correct. S.19 of the Act dealing with the bye-law making power of the Market Committee provides that the Committee may make bye-laws "for the regulation of the business and the conditions of trading therein". The question therefore boils down to whether directing a trader in a commercial crop in a notified area to keep accounts and calling upon him to produce them are for the regulation of the business and the conditions of trading therein. Evidently, directing a trader to keep accounts is a mode of regulating his trade and the conditions of trading. Under S.11 of the Act, as I have already pointed out, the Market Committee has the power to levy fees on a commercial crop bought and sold in a notified area on the basis of the quantity of the crop bought and sold. This is also found in R.28. Again, under the same rule the Market Committee has power to levy a cess by way of salestax; and this is also based on the quantity of the crop bought and sold. For these purposes the Market Committee has to ask traders to keep accounts and has also to call upon them to produce the accounts for scrutiny. There is no meaning in the District Magistrate saying that the accounts might contain trade secrets and the Market Committee cannot therefore demand the production of the accounts. Therefore, the impugned bye-law is not unreasonable, nor beyond the scope of the bye-law making power conferred on the Market Committee by S.19 of the Act. 14. Still, I do not think that the appellant can be convicted in these cases. Bye-law 25 (6) itself says that a licensee shall maintain regular accounts of all his transactions in each kind of commercial crop in a form or forms approved by the Secretary. 14. Still, I do not think that the appellant can be convicted in these cases. Bye-law 25 (6) itself says that a licensee shall maintain regular accounts of all his transactions in each kind of commercial crop in a form or forms approved by the Secretary. The counsel of the appellant himself has admitted before us that no particular form or forms have been prescribed or approved by the Market Committee. Still, the counsel contends that the respondent should have kept accounts in whatever form he thought fit and should have also produced such accounts before the Market Committee for approval. This argument cannot be accepted, because, if the form for keeping accounts adopted by the trader is not approved by the Market Committee, then he will have to re-write the accounts in another form and repeat the process until the form adopted by him is approved. Evidently, what is contemplated by bye-law 25 (6) is the prescribing of a form or forms, though the word used is not 'prescribed' but only'approved'. It is fairly clear that, before the form or forms are approved or prescribed, no accounts could be kept. The Market Committee should therefore have prescribed or approved the form or forms for keeping accounts, and without doing that the Market Committee should not have prosecuted the respondent for breach of this clause of the bye-law. 15. Thus, though I agree with the counsel of the appellant on two of the main contentions raised by him, T confirm the acquittals on the short ground mentioned by me in the paragraph just preceding and dismiss the appeals. Mathew,J. 1A. I agree with the conclusion of my learned brother Raghavan J., that the order acquitting the accused should be confirmed on the ground that the Market Committee have not prescribed form or forms for keeping accounts and that without doing that the accused cannot be found guilty of breach of bye-law 25 (6) of the Bye-laws of the Malabar Market Committee. But I am not quite sure whether the accused were 'licensees' within the definition of the term 'licensee' in bye-law 2 (9). 2A. But I am not quite sure whether the accused were 'licensees' within the definition of the term 'licensee' in bye-law 2 (9). 2A. S.5(1) of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, 1933 (Madras Act 20 of 1933) hereinafter referred to as the Act, provides that no person shall within a notified area, set up, establish or use, or continue or allow to be continued, any place for the purchase or sale of a notified commercial crop, except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted to him by the Collector. Sub-section (4) specifies the grounds on which the Collector may refuse licence. Sub-section (5) states that every person to whom a licence is granted under the section shall comply with the provisions of the Act, the rules and bye-laws made thereunder and the conditions specified in the licence. R.41, of the rules framed under S.18 of the Act provides: "(1) Every application for licence under S.5 shall be made by the applicant immediately after obtaining the receipt for the payment of the prescribed fee and shall be accompanied by such receipt. (2) An applicant who has complied with the provisions of sub-rule (1) shall, until orders are communicated to him, be entitled to act as if the licence applied for has been granted to him in accordance with rule 42". Rule 42 states: 'Every licence issued by the Collector or the Market Committee and every registration: shall expire on the last day of the Market Committee's official year for which it was issued. Full fee shall be payable even for a part of one year." So if a person makes an application for licence,' after complying with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of R.41, he shall, until orders are communicated to him, be entitled to act as if the licence applied for has been granted to him. Although the accused contended that sub-rule (2) of R.41 is ultra vires the Act, for the reason that S.5 or any other provision in the Act does not provide for a deemed licence, I do not think that the rule making authority was incompetent to provide for a deemed licence for the interim period between the making of the application and the communication of the order thereon. The rule-making authority is entitled to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. The rule-making authority is entitled to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. There is no reason why a person who makes an application after paying the prescribed fee for the licence should wait until the order is communicated. I think, the rule being one to supplement the provisions of the Act and not being repugnant to any of them must be held to be validly made. 3A. When R.41 (2) says that until an order is communicated to the person who has applied for the licence he is entitled to act as if a licence has been granted under R.42, it does not mean that the order can only be an order granting the licence. It might as well be an order refusing to grant the licence, on any of the grounds specified in sub-section <4) of S.5 of the Act. R.41 (2) cannot take away the power of the Collector under sub-section (4) of S.5 to refuse the licence on the grounds specified therein. In these cases it has been found by the learned District Magistrate and that finding has been confirmed by my learned brother -that the licences applied for have not been issued to the accused. 4A. Now, let us see whether there is any justification for holding that the accused are 'licensees' within the definition of the term 'licensee' in bye-law 2 (9). Bye-law 2 (9) reads: "Licensee means a person who holds a licence issued under the Act, the rules and the bye-laws as amended from time to time." Bye-law 25 (6) runs as follows: 'The licensee shall maintain regular accounts of all his transactions in each Kind of commercial crop in a form or forms approved by the Secretary and shall send to the Secretary such-reports and returns as may from time to time be required in such forms as may be specified by him. These shall include a daily report of arrivals and despatches from licensees within five miles of a regulated market or office under the control of the Committee and a weekly report from other licensees transacting business within the notified area. The records themselves shall be produced for inspection on demand by any employee of the Committee not below the rank of Supervisor at such time and place as may be indicated in the demand made. The records themselves shall be produced for inspection on demand by any employee of the Committee not below the rank of Supervisor at such time and place as may be indicated in the demand made. Any employee of the Committee, not lower in rank than Supervisor, may enter, any licensed premises or other place suspected to be used for storage, processing, weighing etc., of any commercial crop for inspection of accounts, verification of stocks or detecting any other contravention under the Act". It is said that a person who has made an application for the licence, and is, therefore, entitled to act as if the licence applied for has been granted to him will be bound by the Act, the rules and the bye-laws, even if he is not a 'licensee' within the meaning of that term in the bye-law. I do not think that such a person would be bound by bye-law 25 (6) unless he is a'licensee' as defined by bye-law 2 (9). In other words, whether bye-law 25 (6) would bind a person would depend upon the answer to the question whether he is a 'licensee' within the meaning of the definition of 'licensee' in the bye-law. 5A. It is said that a person who made an application for the licence, and is therefore, entitled to act as if a licence had been granted, should in justice be bound by all the obligations imposed upon a person to whom a licence has been granted under S.5 (1) as he is entitled to all the benefits of a licensees under that sub-section. That might be so. But when we are concerned with the question whether the accused are licensees within the meaning of the term 'licensee' in bye-law 2 (9), I am not sure whether any such considerations of policy would be relevant. To my mind the only relevant consideration is whether the framers of the bye-laws used apt words in the definition clause to cover the case of persons like the accused. 6A. Now, let us take a case where a person made an application for the licence, and the Collector refused to grant it. That person was entitled to act as if a licence had been granted to him until the order refusing to grant the licence was communicated to him. But what is the licence that has been issued to him during the interim period? That person was entitled to act as if a licence had been granted to him until the order refusing to grant the licence was communicated to him. But what is the licence that has been issued to him during the interim period? Is he the 'holder of a licence issued under the Act, the rules or the bye-laws'? No issue of a licence for the interim period is contemplated by R.41 (2). The fiction in the sub-rule is that a licence in accordance with R.42 has been granted to him; but he is entitled to act only till the licence applied for has been granted or refused. A licence granted in accordance with R.42 will expire only on the last day of the Market Committe's official year. Now, can we say that a person to whom an order refusing a licence has been communicated was the holder of a licence issued to him under the Act, the rules, or the bye-laws, during the period between the date of the application and the communication of order of the refusal, merely because he was entitled to act as if the licence applied for has been granted to him in accordance with R.42? I think not. The only licence which is or can be issued is a licence in accordance with R.42, and that will expire only on the last day of the Market Committee's official year. If we assume that such a licence was issued by virtue of the fiction, certainly I will not allow my imagination to boggle. I will say that such a licence is issued. But is the person the holder of a licence issued to him? I think not. Why? Because, if we assume that, the period of that licence will expire only on the last day of the Market Committee's official year, which I think, would be absurd, as ex hypothesi when the order refusing the licence was communicated he would cease to be entitled to act as if a licence has been granted in accordance with R.42. Why? Because, if we assume that, the period of that licence will expire only on the last day of the Market Committee's official year, which I think, would be absurd, as ex hypothesi when the order refusing the licence was communicated he would cease to be entitled to act as if a licence has been granted in accordance with R.42. To put it in other words, the only licence which can actually be issued under the Act or the rules or the bye-laws is a licence which will expire only on the last day of the Market Committee's official year; and a person can be said to be the holder of a licence issued under the Act, the rules or the bye-laws, only when such a licence is issued to him either actually or by virtue of the fiction in R.41 (2). But when an order is communicated to the person refusing the licence, he cannot be held to have been the holder of a licence issued to him under the Act, the rules or the bye-laws, the reason being that if he is held to be one, that licence can expire only on the last day on the Market Committee's official year, which is absurd, as when the order is communicated refusing to grant the licence, he is no longer entitled to act. Now, the situation could not be otherwise even in a case where the order communicating is one granting the licence. The licence which is deemed to be granted in accordance with R.41 (2) cannot survive the actual grant of a licence under R.42. The person cannot, therefore, be held to be the holder of a licence issued under the Act, the rules or the bye-laws, because, then that licence must enure for the whole period as visualised in R.42; whereas he is entitled to act under it only till the order granting the licence is communicated to him. 7A. The point, in other words, is that when bye-law 2 (9) speaks of the 'holder of a licence issued to him', it must be a licence in accordance with R.42, for, R.41 (2) says "as if the licence applied for has been granted to him in accordance with R.42". 7A. The point, in other words, is that when bye-law 2 (9) speaks of the 'holder of a licence issued to him', it must be a licence in accordance with R.42, for, R.41 (2) says "as if the licence applied for has been granted to him in accordance with R.42". The licence applied for is a licence in terms of S.5 (1) of the Act read with R.42, and such a licence is deemed to be granted, and therefore, issued. Though such a licence alone is deemed to be issued, the person is entitled to act only till an order is communicated to him granting or refusing to grant the licence applied for. The fiction in R.41(2) is not that a licence up to the date of the communication of the order granting or refusing a licence is granted. The fiction is that the licence applied for has been granted and issued in accordance with R.42. That means that the licence deemed to be issued is for the period specified in R.42. If that is the fiction in R.41 (2), then the person may be deemed to be the 'holder of a licence issued to him' under the Act, the rules and the bye-laws; and the period during which he will be holding the licence will be till the last day of the Market Committee's official year: but R.41 (2) says that he is entitled to act only until the order granting or refusing the licence is communicated to him. That period need not be coterminus with the period of the licence issued in accordance with R.42. So he cannot be said to be the holder of a licence issued in accordance with R.42. 8A. I am not presumptuous enough to think that these arguments are impeccable and determinative of the question that the accused are not 'licensees' within the meaning of the definition of the term 'licensee' in the bye-law. I am stating these arguments only to show that the definition of the word 'licensee' in bye-law 2 (9) is reasonably susceptible of being construed in the manner suggested by the learned Magistrate. There is latent ambiguity in the definition. "Certain ambiguities are present and imply opposing consequences for the accused. There are cases and usages to support both meanings. A liberal interpretation would hold the conduct in issue within the statute. There is latent ambiguity in the definition. "Certain ambiguities are present and imply opposing consequences for the accused. There are cases and usages to support both meanings. A liberal interpretation would hold the conduct in issue within the statute. Bat the canon of strict interpretation of penal statutes requires the judge to select that meaning which favours the accused". (See 'General Principles of Criminal Law by Jerome Hall," page 36.) Strict construction has long been a corollary of the principle of legality. Though the judge is not required to take the attitude of "an intelligence fired with a desire to pervert" the meaning of the term'licensee' in bye-law 2 (9), he must definitely confine himself to the ordinary plain meaning of the words used. In McBoyle v. United States 283 U.S. 25,27 the Supreme Court of America reversed a conviction for transporting a stolen air-plane inter-State, although the term 'motor vehicle' in the statute in question there included the words "or any other self propelled vehicle". Justice Holmes said: "Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used." I think, the words in bye-law 2(9) will evoke in the common mind only the case of a person to whom a licence has actually been granted under S.5 (1) of the Act. To the ordinary mind they will not conjure up the picture of a person to whom no licence was actually issued. Merely because a similar policy must apply to a person entitled to act as if a licence in accordance with R.42 has been granted is no ground to hold that he is within the definition of by-law 2 (9). To the ordinary mind they will not conjure up the picture of a person to whom no licence was actually issued. Merely because a similar policy must apply to a person entitled to act as if a licence in accordance with R.42 has been granted is no ground to hold that he is within the definition of by-law 2 (9). We cannot, on the speculation that if the makers of the bye-laws have thought of it, very likely, apt words would have been used, hold that he will come within the ambit of the definition. Seeing that the definition will apply to all persons to whom the licence applied for has actually been granted, I perceive no reason why I should indulge in a tortuous process of ratiocination based on analogy, and resort to the procrustean method of accommodating a deemed licensee in the bed of an actual one. Moidu, J: 1B. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by Raghavan, J. in his judgment. I may, however, add a few words in support of the reasoning in that judgment. The only question that may arise ultimately in the instant case is whether a deemed licensee under sub-rule (2) of R.41 of the Madras Commercial Crops Market Rules, 1948 can be proceeded against for an offence under bye-law 25 (18) on his failure to comply with the provisions of bye-law 25 (6) of the bye-laws framed by. the Malabar Market Committee. The answer to this question depends upon a consideration of the relevant sections of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws. 2B. S.5(1) of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, 1933, which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act, provides that no person shall conduct trade in commercial crops in a notified area except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted to him by the Collector. Sub-section (3) of S.5 of the Act provides that no person in the said notified area shall set up any place for storage, weighment, pressing or processing of any notified commercial crop except under a licence granted to him by the Collector. Sub-section (4) of that section provides the conditions under which a licence may be refused by the Collector. Sub-section (3) of S.5 of the Act provides that no person in the said notified area shall set up any place for storage, weighment, pressing or processing of any notified commercial crop except under a licence granted to him by the Collector. Sub-section (4) of that section provides the conditions under which a licence may be refused by the Collector. The proviso to that Section states that the aggrieved party has a right of appeal to the Revenue Board and Government against the refusal to grant a licence. Sub-section (5) of S.5 provides that every person to whom a licence is granted under this section shall comply with the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws made thereunder and the conditions specified in the licence. 3B. In consonance with the above provisions, a party shall be entitled to apply for a licence by an application accompanied by a receipt for payment of the requisite fee as required by sub-rule (1) of R.41 of the rules. Sub-rule (2) of R.41 states that if an applicant has complied with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of R.41, he shall be entitled to act as if the licence applied for has been granted to him in accordance with R.42. R.42 provides only the duration of the licence. According to that rule, every licence issued by the Collector or the Market Committee and every registration shall expire on the last day of the Market Committee's official year in which it was issued. That rule also indicates that full fee shall be payable even for a part of the year. Proviso to R.42 is to the effect that a licence under S.5 may be issued with retrospective effect from the commencement of the Market Committee's official year during which the application for the licence is made. That rule also indicates that full fee shall be payable even for a part of the year. Proviso to R.42 is to the effect that a licence under S.5 may be issued with retrospective effect from the commencement of the Market Committee's official year during which the application for the licence is made. The other two provisos of S.42 are as follows: 'Provided further that any licence under S.5 which has not been renewed before the date of its expiry may be renewed with retrospective effect from the commencement of the Market Committee's official year during which the application for renewal is made: "Provided also that any person who had not applied for a licence or for the renewal of a licence-under S.5 at any time before the 19th October 1948 may, in case, he applies for the same before the 19th January 1949 be granted a licence or renewal of licence under S.5 with retrospective effect from such date as the Collector may deem fit." 4B. It is seen that the rules have been framed by the rule making body by virtue of the powers under S.18 of the Act and the bye-laws by virtue of the powers under S.19 of the Act. It is, therefore, evident that rules and bye-laws are to be read as if they are contained in the Act. The rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation. That is the line of reasoning in a ruling reported in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Babu Ram Upadhya AIR. 1961 Supreme Court 751. At page 761 the relevant portion from "On the Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition page 50-51" is quoted as follows: "Rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as it contained in the Act, and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation." 5B. If there is any conflict between a provision of a rule or a bye-law with a section of the Act, it is pointed out that it must be dealt with in the same spirit as a conflict with two sections of the Act would be dealt with. In this regard, the following passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition at page 49-50 may be seen. It is as follows: "If there is a conflict between one of these instruments and a section of the Act, it must be dealt with is the same spirit as a conflict between two sections of the Act would be dealt with. If reconciliation is impossible, the subordinate provision must give way and probably the instrument would be treated as subordinate to the section. If a statutory instrument contains words identical to those used in the Act under which it is made, those words must be construed in the same way as they are construed is the Act". 6B. That the rule or the bye-law can be treated only as subordinate to a section is found acceptance in a decision reported in Loitongban Chaomacha Singh and others v. Chief Commissioner of Manipur AIR. 1958 Manipur 1. Regarding the rules and the provision of the Act which were in conflict, the following observation is made in the above decision: "The rules in question were made subject to there being nothing repugnant in the subject or context. Again it is well settled that if reconciliation between a section and a rule made under the Act is not possible then the rule which is a subordinate provision must give way." 7B. In that case a lease for more than one year gave the lessee the rights of a land holder under R.1 (d) of the rules framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Manual, while S.8 (1) (b) of the Assam Land and Revenue Manual fixed a period of 10 years for getting similar rights. The contention was that the term of 10 years in S.8 (1) (b) could be made out by a claimant adding up the terms of several continuous leases for the purpose of that term of 10 years. The contention was that the term of 10 years in S.8 (1) (b) could be made out by a claimant adding up the terms of several continuous leases for the purpose of that term of 10 years. But, that contention was negatived on the basis that if the reconciliation between the Act and the rules made under the Act is not possible, the rule which is a subordinate provision must give way. 8B. Applying the above test to the instant case, I am of the opinion that a deemed licensee under R.41 (2) is also a licensee for all purposes under the Act, rules and bye-laws. Provisions of S.5 (5) of the Act, which is already referred to, have shown that every person to whom a licence is granted shall comply with the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws made thereunder. There is also a provision under R.42 for payment of fee in full even for a part of the year for which licence is granted. That provision predicates that a licence for a part of the year can also be issued under the Act, rules and bye-laws. Under these circumstances, a licensee as defined by bye-law 2 (ix) has no relevancy in determining whether a licence has been granted under sub-rule (2) of R.41 or not. If a licensee is entitled to all the benefits of the licence by virtue of R.41 (2), he shall also be deemed to be under all obligations attached to the licence. In this view of the matter, I hold that if a deemed licensee under R.41 (2) fails to comply with the provision of bye-law 25(6) after a demand, he is liable to be proceeded against under bye-law 25 (18) and he will be liable under the penal provision of that bye-law.