JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the validity of an order of reversion. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a constable in December, 1941 in the Special Armed Constabulary Force. In 1950 he was promoted and confirmed as a Head-Constable. In 1960 the petitioner was selected for training for the post of sub-Inspector, Armed Police. He underwent the requisite training for one year. On completion of the training he was posted as Sub-Inspector, Armed Police, in 15th Provincial Armed Constabulary Battalion. On 22nd July, 1966, the petitioner received a notice requiring him to explain the charges mentioned in it. The petitioner submitted an explanation but the same was not found satisfactory and a misconduct entry was made in his character roll. Then oil 12th August, 1968, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kanpur Range, passed the impugned order. This order stated that the petitioner who was holding the post of Sub-Inspector temporarily was reverted to his substantive rank of head-constable. The petitioner challenges this order on the following grounds : (i) That he was holding the post of Sub-Inspector in a substantive capacity and that the Deputy Inspector General of Police in error in treating him to be holding that post in an officiating capacity. (ii) That the process of recruitment by selection in law conferred a right on the petitioner to hold the post of Sub-Inspector. The impugned order of reversion amounted to reduction in rank within meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. (iii) That the order violated Article 16 (1) of the constitution. 3. In respect of the first ground it is noticeable that beyond saying that the petitioner is holding the post substantively the petitioner has not given any further facts material to substantiate his allegation. In the supplementary counter-affidavit it has been stated that there were 147 temporary posts of Sub-Inspectors and two permanent posts of Sub-Inspectors. The petitioner was appointed on the temporary post in an officiating capacity. The respondents have filed a copy of the order dated 21st March, 1961 which shows that the petitioner was allotted to the Provincial Armed Constabulary for posting as Officiating Platoon Commander, i.e. a post equivalent to Sub-Inspector. No rejoinder affidavit has been filed. The facts stated in this counter affidavit can, therefore, be accepted as correct. The respondents have filed a copy of the order dated 21st March, 1961 which shows that the petitioner was allotted to the Provincial Armed Constabulary for posting as Officiating Platoon Commander, i.e. a post equivalent to Sub-Inspector. No rejoinder affidavit has been filed. The facts stated in this counter affidavit can, therefore, be accepted as correct. The position appears to be that the petitioner was appointed to officiate on temporary post in the rank of Sub-Inspector. He was never declared permanent. He cannot, therefore, say that he was holding the post permanently or substantively. 4. In respect of the second ground it was stressed that the petitioner was promoted to the post of Sub-Inspector after undergoing a process of selection by a Board. The impugned order of reversion affects him adversely by reducing his emoluments as also by jeopardising his future chances of promotion. These facts would make the impugned order of reversion an order of reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. For this submission the learned counsel relied upon Shambhooji Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1964 A.L.J. 331. In that case Shambhooji was a confirmed clerk in the Collectorate. Recruitment to the temporary post of Panchayat Inspector was advertised. Shambhooji applied for it. The Selection Committee selected him and he was appointed as Panchayat Inspector. He was charge-sheeted for certain misconduct and was asked to explain why he should not be properly punished. The charges having been established, he was by an order removed from the post of Panchayat Inspector. On appeal the State Government modified the order of removal into reversion. The Government took the view that since Shambhooji was holding a permanent post in the Collectorate he should be reverted to it. The Bench held that on facts it was clear that the order was based on findings of misconduct arrived at an enquiry, and it was passed by way of punishment. It attracted Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, but since a proper opportunity to show cause was not given, the order was bad. This is the main basis of the decision. It was argued that ' Article 311 was not attracted because he was holding the post of Panchayat Inspector temporarily and was reverted to his substantive post. It attracted Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, but since a proper opportunity to show cause was not given, the order was bad. This is the main basis of the decision. It was argued that ' Article 311 was not attracted because he was holding the post of Panchayat Inspector temporarily and was reverted to his substantive post. The Bench considered this submission on the alternative grounds of the two post's being treated as comparable from the point of view of rank, and as not so comparable. It held that if the two posts are comparable then, the post of Inspector was higher in rank because, appointment to it was by a selection which implies that it was a better post. This post carried a higher salary than the post of clerk. It was also found that the Inspector's duties were in the nature of an officer of the executive, while the clerk in the Collectorate was entrusted with clerical or a ministerial work. In view of these factors it was held that the post of Inspector was of a higher and better rank, and sending a person from such a post to that of clerk would be reduction in rank. It is to be noted that the Bench nowhere held that because he was appointed by a Selection, he acquired a right to hold the post. 5. Having seen that the ranks of the two posts were different, the Bench went on to find that the order was passed on accepting the findings of misconduct and hence it amounted to imposing the punishment of reduction in rank. The Bench,then considered the alternative ground. It held that if the two posts are not comparable, then it was a case of an appointment to a new post. His services on the new post were terminated. Since the termination was by way of punishment Article 311 was attracted. This case is an authority for the proposition ghat termination or reduction in rank based on findings of misconduct amounts to punishment within the meaning of Article 311. It is not an authority for the view that simply because an appointment or promotion is made through a "Selection" the person gets any right to hold that post, so that termination or reversion from it would perse became removal or reduction in rank under Article 311. It is not an authority for the view that simply because an appointment or promotion is made through a "Selection" the person gets any right to hold that post, so that termination or reversion from it would perse became removal or reduction in rank under Article 311. In that case the order was held to be reduction in rank only on the ground that it was passed as a punishment. The Bench noticed that it had been argued before the single judge that the order did not visit him with penal consequences like forfeiture of pay or allowances or loss of seniority in his substantive post or stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion. But the Bench did not deal with this submission. It did not hold that the order entailed such consequences. The observations that he would get lower salary, that he would work on a post of lower status and that he.was deprived of the benefits of the higher post, were made while considering whether one post was better and superior in rank. So this case is not an authority for the view that the reversion from a 'higher to a lower ranking post would involve penal consequences. Indeed it could not say so because the Supreme Court has in many cases held to the contrary. 6. In Dhingra's case it was held that a simple termination or reversion did not entail penal consequences. 7. In Shyam Lal's case, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 369 it was emphasised that in order to be visited with evil consequences, the loss must be of a benefit already earned or accrued; the loss must be of a benefit which is present and certain and not pragmatic or uncertain. 8. In Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 8 it was emphasised that : "In every case of reversion from an officiating higher post to his substantive lost, the civil servant concerned is deprived of the emoluments of the higher post. But that cannot by itself be a ground for holding that the second test in D'nngra's2 case, namely, whether he has been visited with evil consequences, can be said to have been satisfied. But that cannot by itself be a ground for holding that the second test in D'nngra's2 case, namely, whether he has been visited with evil consequences, can be said to have been satisfied. Hence, mere deprivation of higher emoluments as a consequence of reversion cannot amount to the "evil consequences" referred to in the second test in Dhingra's case, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36 they must mean something more, than mere deprivation of higher emoluments. That being so, they include, for example, forfeiture of substantive pay, loss of seniority etc." In other words, such loss of emoluments of the higher post is the natural and not a penal consequence of an order of reversion. 9. In G. S. Ramaswamy v. The Inspector General of Police, Mysore State, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 176 the Supreme Court emphasised that the placing of a person on the eligibility list from which appointment to the promotion posts were made did, not confer any indefeasible right on the individual. This decision would show that the mere fact of being selected for appointment to a particular post does not by itself confer any right to the post. He, therefore, cannot say, that on being reverted he was being deprived of the right to hold that post within the meaning of the first test prescribed in Dhingra's case. 10. The third point related to Article 16 of the Constitution. This was based upon the allegation in paragraph 20 of the writ petition that out of 400 Sub-Inspectors at least 200 Head-Constables had taken training as Sub-Inspectors after the applicant and were all junior to the applicant. There is no specific ..]legation that these 200 Head-Constables who were junior to the petitioner are till continuing on the post of Sub-Inspectors. It cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner was treated in a discriminatory fashion. Further, there is no allegation that the other junior persons also had the same service record and were considered to be as inefficient as the petitioner. In the absence of any allegation on this aspect it cannot be said that the petitioner and those other persons belonged to the same class. The reversion of the petitioner, therefore, does not violate Article 16 (1) of the Constitution. 11. The various points urged in support of the writ petition have no merit. The petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.