JUDGMENT B. D. Singh, J.-- In this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner obtained rule against the respondents to show cause as to why the order dated 3-7-1969 passed by the Block Development Officer-cum-Election Officer (respondent no. 3) contained in Annexure-4 to the application be not quashed. 2. The said Annexure is a letter purported to have been issued by respondent no. 3 addressed to Panchayat Sevak, Shri Pashupati Jha of Baghari Panchayat in the district of Muzaffarpur. There in it is mentioned that according to the direction of the Sub-divisional Officer, Sitamarhi, under his letter no. 156 dated 27.6.1969, the symbols allotted to the persons noted in the letter are being altered. It is further directed in the letter that after giving information to the relevant persons the same should be published in the office of the Panchayat. By the said letter the election symbol "Cultivator winnowing grain" which was allotted on 21.6.l2.69 to Pramod Bihari Pandey (respondent no. 4) was changed to that of "Charkha" whereas symbol of "Charkha" which was allotted to the petitioner was changed to "Cultivator winnowing grain". In other words the symbol allotted to petitioner and respondent no. 4 were interchanged. Learned counsel Mr. Jogendra Mishra, appearing for the petitioner has assailed the order directing change of the symbols. Such change of symbols at the instance of the Sub-divisional Officer, he contended, is void and without jurisdiction. 3. In order to appreciate his submissions, it will be necessary to state the facts in short. The petitioner and four others, namely, Pramod Bihari Pandey (respondent no. 4), Rameshwar Pandey (respondent no. 5), Gajadhar Pd. Mishra (respondent no. 6) and Shukdeo Rai, who is not a party to this application, filed nomination paper for election as Mukhiya of Baghari Gram Panchayat on 3.6.1969 before the Election Officer (respondent no. 3). The date for filing the nomination paper was 3.6.1969. On 8.6.1969 the names of contesting candidates including the petitioner after the withdrawal by other candidates, were published. 10.6.1969 was the date fixed for filing objection regarding the publication of names. 21.6.1969 was the date for allotment of symbols by the Election Officer under Rule 34 of Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as "Rules"). Accordingly, on this date respondent no. 3 allotted to the petitioner as per Schedule II, serial no. 10.6.1969 was the date fixed for filing objection regarding the publication of names. 21.6.1969 was the date for allotment of symbols by the Election Officer under Rule 34 of Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as "Rules"). Accordingly, on this date respondent no. 3 allotted to the petitioner as per Schedule II, serial no. 2 "Charkhba" and serial no. 3 "Cultivator winnowing grain" to respondent no. 4 as mentioned earlier, whereas respondent no.5 was allotted serial no. 4 "Elephant". The said allotment of symbols made by respondent no. 3 was, accordingly published as required under Rule 34 (vide Annexure 3). Thereafter no one made objection to the said allotment and the petitioner and the respondents began taking steps for the election. According to the petitioner he was suddenly informed through Annexure 4 regarding change of his election symbol from "Charkha" to that of "Cultivator winnowing grain". 4. Learned counsel, Mr. Mishra, for the petitioner has assailed the change of election symbol per direction contained in the letter of the Election Officer, and has made following submissions for consideration by this Court; (i) The change of symbol at the instance of the Sub-divisional Officer is without jurisdiction. He contended that the Sub-divisional Officer, having delegated his power to the Block Development Officer (respondent no. 3) under Rule 2 (g) of the Rules had no power to alter the allotment of symbols made by respondent no. 3. (ii) The Election Officer had rightly allotted the symbols to the petitioner and respondent no. 4 according to alphabetical order as required under Rule 34 read with Schedule II. Therefore, there was no necessity for their re-allotments subsequently. 5. I will take up for consideration point (I) first. Mr. Mishra referred to Annexure-4, and contended that it clearly indicates that symbol was changed according to the direction of the Sub-divisional Officer as per his letter no. 156 dated 27.6.1969, the Election Officer was simply communicating the change so made by the Sub-divisional Officer. According to him it was the Election Officer, alone, who could have changed the symbol after giving notice to the petitioner and the parties concerned. 156 dated 27.6.1969, the Election Officer was simply communicating the change so made by the Sub-divisional Officer. According to him it was the Election Officer, alone, who could have changed the symbol after giving notice to the petitioner and the parties concerned. He further referred to the definition of Election Officer in Rule 2(g) of the Rules which reads:- "Election Officer" means the Sub-divisional Magistrate exercising jurisdiction over the Sub-division within the local limits of which the Gram Panchayat in which the election or the bye-election is to be held is situated, and includes any other officer who may be specially appointed by the Election Officer to discharge any of his functions under the rules." He urged that after respondent no. 3 was so appointed as Election Officer under Rule 2(g) no power was left with the Sub-divisional Officer to act as an Election Officer for pet forming the function under Rule 34. Whenever such power is to be retained by the Sub-divisional Officer is clearly indicated in the Rules itself. According to him in the entire Rules, the Sub-divisional Officer retains such power in Rule 23(4), Rules 31 and 50(2)(b). He argued that it is well established that after power is delegated, the same power cannot be exercised by delegator without withdrawing the power from the delegate. In order to substantiate his contention, he has relied on a Bench decision of this Court reported in (I) 1964 B.L.J.R. 773 (Hanuman Mishra and others vs. Bachan Mishra) where their Lordships were considering the provisions contained under Rule 2(g) including the point whether after such delegation the Sub-divisional Officer retains any power as an Election Officer. In Paragraph no. 4 their Lordships observed as follows: "If the Sub-divisional Magistrate has residuary authority as an Election Officer even after he had appointed a special Election Officer under Rule 2(g) as contended for on behalf of respondent no. 2, there would be no need for providing special power for the Sub-divisional Magistrate in the circumstances contemplated in Rule 23(4), Rule 31(1)(2) and (3), and Rule 50 (2) (2)(b)." 6. On the other hand Mr. Hari Kishore Thakur appearing on behalf of respondent no. 4 submitted that the order directing the change of the symbols in Annexure 4 was really passed by Election Officer (respondent no. 3). Incidentally he has mentioned that it was done at the suggestion of the Sub-divisional Officer. On the other hand Mr. Hari Kishore Thakur appearing on behalf of respondent no. 4 submitted that the order directing the change of the symbols in Annexure 4 was really passed by Election Officer (respondent no. 3). Incidentally he has mentioned that it was done at the suggestion of the Sub-divisional Officer. According to him it was a mere advice of the Sub-divisional Officer. It was up to the Election Officer either to accept it or not to accept it. After having considered it proper, he accepted the advice of the Sub-divisional Officer, and passed the final order for change of the election symbols. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in it. Under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897) power to grant any order also includes power to rescind or modify the order. It is well established that power to fix the date for election must be taken to include the power to postpone any dates so fixed. On the same analogy if the Election Officer has power to grant symbol under Rule 34, though the Rule does not give him power to modify or change the symbol, such power shall be deemed to be included in the said rule. In my opinion, it is true that the Election Officer has power to amend the allotment of symbols. But the whole question to be decided in this case is whether it could have been done at the instance of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, who had already delegated his power to the Block Development Officer as an Election Officer within the meaning of Rule 2(g) to function as an Election Officer under Rule 34. Mr. Thakur Prasad drew my attention to certain paragraphs of the counter-affidavit which has been filed on behalf of respondent no. 4, in order to show the circumstances under which the symbol was changed. In Paragraph no. 3 it is stated that when the indents for printing ballot papers were sent to the Directorate of Gram Panchayat, it was discovered that the allotment of symbols was not made in accordance with the Hindi alphabetical order and there were other defects and the same was sent back to Sub-divisional Officer for rectification. In Paragraph no. 3 it is stated that when the indents for printing ballot papers were sent to the Directorate of Gram Panchayat, it was discovered that the allotment of symbols was not made in accordance with the Hindi alphabetical order and there were other defects and the same was sent back to Sub-divisional Officer for rectification. He submitted that there was a discussion in the office of Sub-divisional Officer with the Election Officer as it will be evident from the letter dated 26-6-1969 issued from the office of the Directorate of Gram panchayat, a true copy of which is marked as Annexure A to the counter-affidavit. Among other defects it is mentioned therein that allotment was not made according to the rules. Therein some other defects are also mentioned, but they are not relevant for the decision in this case. In the letter it is mentioned that indent was being returned with the request to send it back after removing the defects, for the publication of ballot papers. He submitted that since the previous allotment of the symbols was not in accordance with the provisions contained under Rule 34, the Election Officer rightly changed the symbols. According to the learned counsel even under Rule 2(g) the Sub-divisional Magistrate does not cease to be an Election Officer. Rule 2(g) clearly states that Election Officer means the Sub-divisional Magistrate and includes any Officer who may be specifically appointed by the Election Officer to discharge any of his functions under those rules. He laid stress upon the word "includes" which according to him clearly indicates that the Sub-divisional Magistrate does not cease to be an Election Officer, even after the Block Development Officer is specially appointed by him to discharge any of his function. 7. No doubt his interpretation of Clause 2(g) prima facie appears to be attractive, but on closer scrutiny, it cannot be accepted. In my judgment Election Officer is so defined under Rule 2(g), because Rule 23 (4), Rule 31 (1) and (2) and Rule 50 (2) clearly provide that the Sub-divisional Officer in those eases shall retain the power of Election Officer. Rule 2 (g) being a definition clause it has to define "Election Officer" giving wider connotation so as to include the Sub-divisional Magistrate, who retains the power of Election Officer under Rules 23 (4) and 31(1) and (2) and 50(2) of the Rules. Rule 2 (g) being a definition clause it has to define "Election Officer" giving wider connotation so as to include the Sub-divisional Magistrate, who retains the power of Election Officer under Rules 23 (4) and 31(1) and (2) and 50(2) of the Rules. The framers of the Rule had in view those rules, while giving meaning of Election Officer under Rule 2(g). That apart, his interpretation cannot be accepted in view of the Bench decision of this Court reported in (I) 1964 B.L.J.R. 773 (Supra), which was also referred to by another Bench decision of this Court reported in (2) 1968 P.L.J.R. 251 (Ram Pravesh Prasad & others vs. Kailash Singh & others). In that case also Rules 2(g), 23 (4), 31 (2) and 50(2)(b) came up for consideration. It was urged there that Sub-divisional Officer after having delegated his power as Election Officer to the Block Development Officer, lost his power to appoint Presiding Officer under Rule 31. R. L. Narasimham, the then learned C.J. and B.N. Jha, J. after surveying provisions under the aforesaid rules observed in Paragraph 6 at page 254:- "The general principle that the statutory authority is not completely divested of its functions after delegating the same to another authority will always prevail; but the authority, to whom the functions are delegated, is not, in exercise of the functions delegated, a subordinate authority, of the delegating authority, and in the absence of express provisions in the rule, the delegating authority will have no power to revise, modify or cancel any valid order passed by the delegated authority; but with a view to confer such express powers of supervision Rule 31 (2) and Rule 50(b)..........These provisions, therefore, do not in any way weaken the principle that delegation does not amount to denudation. They are special provisions made to confer additional power on the Sub-divisional Magistrate". Mr. Sarwar Ali, Government Pleader appeared on behalf of the State to assist this Court. He adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Thakur and added that the Sub-divisional Officer after having delegated his power to the Block Development Officer is not completely divested of his power to act under Rule 34. 8. In my opinion, no doubt, the general principle is that the delegation does not amount to denudation as observed above in (2) 1968 P.L.J.R. 251 (Supra). Thakur and added that the Sub-divisional Officer after having delegated his power to the Block Development Officer is not completely divested of his power to act under Rule 34. 8. In my opinion, no doubt, the general principle is that the delegation does not amount to denudation as observed above in (2) 1968 P.L.J.R. 251 (Supra). In (3) Huth vs. Clark (1890 25 Queen's Bench Division 391) Wills, J. at 395 pointed out; "Delegation, as the word is generally used, does not imply a parting with powers by the persons who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself. The best illustration of the use of the word is afforded by the maxim, Delegatus non potest delegars, as to the meaning of which it is significant that it is dealt with in Broom's Legal Maxims under the Law of Contracts: it is never used by legal writers, so far as I am aware, as implying that the delegating person parts with his power in such a manner as to denude himself of his rights. It is correct to use the ward in the way in which it is used in the maxim, as generally understood, the word "delegate", means little more than an agent. The notion, therefore, that the use of the word "delegates" implies that the executive committee parted with their own authority is misconceived." 9. In (4) Godavari S. Parulekar vs. State of Maharashtra (1966 S.C. 1405) their Lordships relying on the portion of the above observation while dealing with the provisions under Rule 30 of Defence of India Rules (1962), where the State Government delegated its power to District Magistrate held in Paragraph 6 at page 1405 that the State Government had not denuded itself of the power to act under Rule 30 relying on the above observation. 10. In (5) C.W.J.Cs. 197 and 234 of 1968, I myself sitting with S.C. Misra, learned Chief Justice, while dealing with the provisions under Section 7 (2) (e) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, whereby the State Government delegated the power to the Board of Revenue by Notification no. 47 dated 15.1.1909 (Sic), held on 6.12.1968, that State Government in spite of delegation, did not denude its power to act under Section 22 of the said Act. 11. 47 dated 15.1.1909 (Sic), held on 6.12.1968, that State Government in spite of delegation, did not denude its power to act under Section 22 of the said Act. 11. In my judgment whether statutory authority is completely divested of its function after delegating the same to another authority, will depend upon the language of the section and the rules. Therefore one has to find out the intention of the Legislature or the rule making authority to come to the conclusion. Therefore, in (1) 1964 B.L.J.R. 773 (Supra) their Lordships have rightly held that having regard to the scheme and the language of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, the Sub-divisional Magistrate has no concurrent power of appointing a second set of Presiding Officer, after be had delegated his power as Election Officer under Rule 2 (g) to another officer and after such officer had already appointed one set of presiding officers, in my opinion, since power of Sub-divisional Officer as an Election Officer is retained specifically in Rules 23 (4), 31 (2) and 50 (2) and since no such specific provision retaining such power was made in the other Rules of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 1959, the intention of the rule making authority is clear to convey that the Sub-divisional Magistrate was completely divested of his function to act as an Election Officer for allotment of symbols under Rule 34. In (2) 1963 P.L.J.R. 251 (Supra) also their Lordships while accepting the general principle that the statutory authority is not completely divested of its function after delegating the same to another authority, observed that where there is special provisions as contained under Rules 23 (4), 31 (2) (b), the general principle did not apply. Their Lordships held that the provisions contained under these rules were made specifically to confer additional power on the Sub-divisional Magistrate. 12. In that view of the matter the wide definition of Election Officer as given under Rule 2 (g) cannot be extended to Rule 34 to establish that the Sub-divisional Magistrate did not completely divest his function after the delegation to the Block Development Officer for allotment of symbols. Since there is no specific provision under Rule 34, retaining the power of the Sub-divisional Officer to act as an Election Officer, in my opinion, he had no power to alter the symbol under Annexure 4. 13. Now I turn to consider the contention of Mr. Since there is no specific provision under Rule 34, retaining the power of the Sub-divisional Officer to act as an Election Officer, in my opinion, he had no power to alter the symbol under Annexure 4. 13. Now I turn to consider the contention of Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for respondent no. 4, that the Sub-divisional Magistrate had simply given an advice to the Block Development Officer to alter the allotment of symbols as the previous allotment was not in alphabetical order, as required under Rule 34 and it was up to the Block Development Officer either to accept it or not to accept it. In the instant case, the Block Development Officer, he argued, accepted the advice of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, and himself passed the order contained under Annexure-4. According to the learned counsel, the advice of the Sub-divisional Officer to the Block Development Officer was merely an internal matter with which the parties were not concerned. In my judgment this submission of the learned counsel is not acceptable. The language of Annexure-4 clearly indicates that the Block Development Officer did not apply his mind while passing the alleged order, as he has given prominence to the letter of the Sub-divisional Officer directing change of allotment of symbols. Further I find that in Paragraph 58 the affidavit filed on 7.11.1969 sworn by the petitioner himself in reply to the counter-affidavit of respondent no. 4, the petitioner has stated that Shri Sheonandan Prasad Gupta panchayat Supervisor, was on inimical terms with the petitioner, and he wanted to ruin the prospect of the petitioner in the election by change in the allotted symbol. Further in Paragraph 7 of the said affidavit, the petitioner stated that the symbol was changed by the said Gram Panchayat Supervisor in the office of Sub-divisional Officer in the absence of Block Development Officer (respondent no. 3) who was on leave during the alleged period. Hence Sheonandan Pd. Gupta, Gram Panchayat Supervisor got opportunity to render help to his friend respondent no. 4 and changed the symbol of the petitioner. These facts were not controverted on behalf of any respondent, In course of argument learned counsel for the petitioner produced before me the certified copy of the report of the said Gram Panchayat Supervisor) which he later filed along with the supplementary affidavit dated 28.11.1969. 4 and changed the symbol of the petitioner. These facts were not controverted on behalf of any respondent, In course of argument learned counsel for the petitioner produced before me the certified copy of the report of the said Gram Panchayat Supervisor) which he later filed along with the supplementary affidavit dated 28.11.1969. In that report which is addressed to the Block Development Officer, the Gram Panchayat Supervisor among other things, clearly mentioned that in the absence of the Election Officer who was on leave, according to' the letter no. 156 dated 27.6.1969 of the Sub-divisional Officer) the Gram Panchayat Supervisor had altered the symbols as the matter was urgent. This report clearly establishes what the petitioner had stated in Paragraph 7 of the reply to the counter affidavit of respondent no. 4 that it was the Gram Panchayat Supervisor, who had made the alteration of the symbols in the absence of the Block Development Officer. The direction contained under Annexure-4 is also bad, because, in my opinion, the Election Officer ought to have mentioned in the letter the reasons for making the alteration. Further, it was desirable that before making the alteration, he ought to have informed the parties concerned. In that view of the matter I am constrained to hold that the alleged order passed by the Block Development Officer in Annexure-4 is not a valid order, and it has got to be quashed. 14. Now I turn to consider point no. (iii). Learned counsel for the petitioner urged, that allotment of the symbols which was made by respondent no. 3 on 21.6.1969 was in alphabetical order, as required under Rule 34, read with Schedule II. Rule 34 reads as follows:- "Out of the symbols specified in Schedule II, the Election Officer shall allot one symbol to each of the duly nominated candidates for the offices of Mukhiya, Sarpanch, Panch and Members of the Executive Committee, strictly in accordance with the alphabetical order of the names of the candidates, and the seriatum of the symbols as given in the said Schedule. The same symbol may be allotted for different offices. The same symbol may be allotted for different offices. Thereafter, the names of candidates duly nominated under Rule 25, along with the symbols allotted to them, shall be published in the office of the Election Officer and the office of the Panchayat, and also at a conspicuous place in each word of the Panchayat." Therefore he urged that there was no necessity for their re-allotment subsequently, or for making any alteration. In my judgment--in view of the conclusion which I have arrived at under point no. 1, no decision is required on this point. But since the learned counsel for the parties have argued at length, on this point also, I propose to deal with it in brief. It may be noted that the symbols in the order given under serial no. 1 to 15 in Schedule II are allotted in that order to the candidates, in accordance with the Hindi letter in alphabetical order. While allotting it, in that order the initial Hindi letter of the names of different candidates, is taken into account. For example, in the instant case one of the candidates, is Gajadhar Prasad Mishra (respondent no. 6). His initial according to Hindi alphabets will be ^^x** . Among the candidates his initial being ^^x** in the Hindi alphabetical order finds first place. Therefore the serial number first of Schedule II "Camel" was allotted to him as symbol. According to the petitioner since initial of petitioner's name is ^^c** it found second place among the other candidates, and therefore, serial no. 2 "Charkha" was allotted to him. While in case of respondent no. 4, his initial of the name in Hindi begins with ^^i** and ^^j** together i.e. ^^iz** , since ^^i** is joined with ^^j** , the letter ^^j** will be taken into account, and in that view of the matter, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, in the Hindi alphabets ^^j** comes after ^^c** . Therefore respondent no. 4 was rightly allotted serial no. 3 "Cultivator winnowing grain". It is here that there is controversy between the petitioner's counsel and the counsel of respondent no. 4. According to Mr. Thakur phonetically the initial ^^i** appears first, and in the order of Hindi Dictionary also the joint letter ^^iz** come under heading ^^iz** and not under heading where ^^j** begins. He has referred to Dictionary of Hindi "Brihat Hindi Kosh" edited by Kalika Prasad. 4. According to Mr. Thakur phonetically the initial ^^i** appears first, and in the order of Hindi Dictionary also the joint letter ^^iz** come under heading ^^iz** and not under heading where ^^j** begins. He has referred to Dictionary of Hindi "Brihat Hindi Kosh" edited by Kalika Prasad. No doubt it shows that ^^iz** comes under the heading ^^i** in the alphabetical order of the Dictionary. Therefore the learned counsel for respondent no. 4 contended that the allotment of symbols which was made by Election Officer by order dated 22-6-1969 was bad as ^^iz** comes before the initial ^^c** therefore "Charkha" serial no. 2 ought to have been allotted to respondent no. 4, and serial no. 3 "Cultivator winnowing grain" ought to have been allotted to the petitioner. In my opinion, this may be true but none of the respondents raised any objection after the said allotment. If respondent no. 4 was aggrieved by the said order, he ought to have filed a writ application before this Court, but he did not do so. It seems that no prejudice was caused to him. It further appears that this submission of the learned counsel is only to support the subsequent alteration in the allotment of symbols as contained in Annexure-4. Too much stress in my judgment cannot be given on the alphabetical order, as there may be cases in which there may be same initial of two or more candidates. For example, two candidates' names starting with initial ^^i** (Sic) then in that situation the Election Officer, will have to allot some other serial of symbol contained under Schedule II in his own discretion or he may have to allot by means of drawing lot. Besides, from the Rule 34 quoted earlier, it appears that the same symbol may be allotted for different offices. Therefore, the whole issue turns out on the question of prejudice. If the respondent no. 4 did not raise any objection, earlier regarding the previous allotment, if does not lie in this month in the circumstances of the case to raise objection at this stage. 15. Mr. Sarwar Ali, Government Pleader and the other counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos. 4 and 5 also contended that in view of the provisions contained under Rule 90, the application of the petitioner has become infructuous. 15. Mr. Sarwar Ali, Government Pleader and the other counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos. 4 and 5 also contended that in view of the provisions contained under Rule 90, the application of the petitioner has become infructuous. The said rule provides that if the election of the Panchayat is not held for some reason or the other, within a period of six months from the date of filing of nomination papers, the election shall be held after calling for fresh nomination papers. Learned counsel submitted that in the instant case the date of nomination was 3.6.1969, and about six months have now elapsed, and since no election has taken place so far, due to some reason or the other, the election will be held after calling for fresh nomination papers. I find that the petitioner had filed the application in this Court on 15.7.69, and the application was admitted on 17.7.1969. If there has been delay in disposal of this application, the petitioner is not solely responsible. In that view of the matter the contention of learned counsel on this score cannot be accepted. Mr. Arun Kumar Sinha appearing on behalf of respondent no. 6 has adopted the arguments advanced on behalf of respondent no. 4 and similarly learned counsel for respondent no. 5 adopted the argument advanced on behalf of respondent no. 4. No other point has been urged on their behalf, which calls for any consideration. 16. In the result, this application is allowed and the direction contained in Annexure 4 is quashed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.