JUDGMENT Dwivedi, J. - Two questions arise in this appeal : (1) What is the true construction of Section 3 (1) (a) of the U. P, Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction, Act and (2) whether the landlord should be deemed to have waived his right to sue for ejectment of the tenant. 2. It is necessary to state only a few material facts for the decision of these questions. The respondent is the landlord of a certain accommodation. The appeallants are his tenants. The tenants were in arrears of rent for much more than three months. On April 21, 1965 the landlord gave notice to them demanding payment of rent up to March 31, 1965, within a month of the service of the notice. This notice of demand was issued under Section 3 (1)(a). The tenants did not pay the rent within the said period. But on May 27, 1965, rent not only for the period demanded by the landlord but also for the subsequent two months of April and May 1965 was remitted by a money order. On May 31, 1965, the landlord received the money order amount. On June 15, 1965 he served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the tenants to quit the accommodation on account of their default to pay the arrears of rent within one month of service of the notice of demand. Thereafter he instituted the suit out of which this appeal has arisen for their ejectment. The courts below decreed his suit for ejectment. They decided against the tenants on both questions. 3. Section 3 (1) (a), in so far as it is material provides ".......no suit shall............be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds :- (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more then three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand....." On the first question, the argument is that the language of clause (a) shows that the tenant should be in arrears of rent for more than three months not only at the time of the service of the notice of demand upon him but also at the time of the institution of the suit. This interpretation is pegged on the word 'is' in clause (a). But this interpretation misses the significance of the latter part of clause (a). The clause, read as a whole, lifts the ban against the institution of a suit on the tenant's failure to pay three months' arrears within one month of the service of the notice of demand. In the context of the latter part of clause (a) it seems to us that 'is' should be interpreted as 'was' to indicate that the tenant was in arrears of rent for more than three months at the time of the service of notice on him, Zareefshan v. Mukhtar Ahmad, 1964 A.L.J. 148. 4. It may be noticed that after their failure to pay the arrears of rent within one month of the service of the notice of demand on them, the appellants remitted the said arrears as well as the rent for the months of April and May, 1965 by a money order on May 27, 1965. This money order was received by the landlord on May 31, 1965. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that as the landlord received not only the arrears of rent demanded by him but also the rent for April and May, 1965, it should be deemed that he waived his right to sue them for ejectment. The conduct of the landlord relied on in proof of waiver should be clearly inconsistent with his right to sue : but that is not so here. The landlord did not simultaneously issue a notice to quit along with the notice of demand under Section 3 (1) (a) : so the tenancy of the appellants was subisiting on the date on which he received the money order amounts. The rent for April had fallen due much before May 31, 1965 ; the rent for May would definitely fall due on June 1, 1965. He received rents for these months on May 31, 1965. Futhermore, the time mentioned In the notice of demand expired on May 22, 1965. On June 15, 1965 he served the notice to quit on the appellants. The notice to quit was served on them 23 days after the expiry of the period mentioned in the notice of demand issued under Section 3 (1) (a) and 14 days after the receipt of the money order amount by him. On June 15, 1965 he served the notice to quit on the appellants. The notice to quit was served on them 23 days after the expiry of the period mentioned in the notice of demand issued under Section 3 (1) (a) and 14 days after the receipt of the money order amount by him. There was little delay in issuing the notice to quit In these circumstances it is difficult to impute any intention to the landlord of continuing the tenancy of the appellants, 5. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, relies on Bitti Kuer v. Banarsi Baboo, 1949 A.L.J. 132. It is a decision of a Division Bench. In this case the tenant was in arrears of rent for two months, June and July, 1945. She applied to the Town Rationing Officer for permission to institute a suit for his ejectment. Permission was granted on account of the default in payment of rent for the said two months. After the permission but before the suit was instituted the tenant paid all the rents due to the landlord. In the suit for ejectment it was urged on behalf of the tenant that as the landlord had accepted all the rents due before instituting the suit, she should be deemed to have waived her right to sue. Accepting the argument, the court said :- "The basis of the permission granted by the Town Rationing Officer was that the rent was in arrears. By the time that the permission was granted the rent had not been paid. The permission, therefore, conferred a privilege upon the plaintiff-appellant to bring a suit for ejectment of the defendant in conformity with that "permission", on the ground that the defendant had defaulted in payment of the rent. This privilege the plaintiff-appellant could waive, if she so desired. It appears to us that, if she accepted the rent due from the defendant respondent before she utilised the privilege obtained by her under the permission of the Town Rationing Officer, she waived that privilege because when she came to court and filed the present suit, she could no longer maintain that the defendant was in arrears. There is nothing to show that she accepted the rent under protest or that in accepting the rent she reserved her right to bring the suit for defendant's ejectment. There is nothing to show that she accepted the rent under protest or that in accepting the rent she reserved her right to bring the suit for defendant's ejectment. In the circumstances, it must be held that she clearly waived her right to bring the suit for ejectment of the defendant." 6. This passage apparently supports the argument of counsel for the appellants. It may be observed that the basic reasoning in this passage is that, as the landlord could not maintain that the defendant was in arrears on the date of the institution of the suit, there was waiver. We felt some difficulty in discerning the relevant nexus between waiver and the existence of arrears of rent on the date of the institution of the suit. Accordingly, we sent for the record of the appeal. It appears from the judgment of the lower appellate court that the Town Rationing Officer had granted permission to the landlord under the House Rent Control Order. The order provided that a landlord could sue for ejectment if the tenant was wilfully in arrears of rent or that the landlord obtained the permission of the District Magistrate. So a suit for ejectment could then be instituted if the tenant was wilfully in arrears for the land lord obtained permission of the District Magistrate. The Town Rationing Officer did give permission but on the ground that the tenant was wilfully in arrears of rent. The language of the order suggests that for instituting a suit on the ground of arrears, the tenant should be wilfully in arrears even on the date of the institution of the suit. As permission was granted only on the ground of arrears, the Court perhaps took the view that it could go behind the permission and find for itself whether the tenant was actually in arrears on the date of the institution of the suit. It is for this reason that the Court held in the case that there was waiver of permission because the tenant was not in arrears on the date of the institution of the suit. The provisions of Section 3 (1) (a) are quite different from that of the House Rent Control Order. It is for this reason that the Court held in the case that there was waiver of permission because the tenant was not in arrears on the date of the institution of the suit. The provisions of Section 3 (1) (a) are quite different from that of the House Rent Control Order. It appears to us that the Division Bench decision may be an authority for the proposition that where the District Magistrate grants permission to sue on the basis of any ground which, without more, entitled a landlord to sue for ejectment, it will be open to a court to go behind the permission and to find for itself whether the ground does in fact exist or not. The decision will not help the appellants in view of the different language of Section 3 (1) (a) and different circumstances. 7. It appears to us that the case of Shri Devi Prasad v. Shri Janki Prasad, 1963 A.L.J. 403, has got a bearing on the case before us. In this case the landlord obtained permission to sue for ejectment from the District Magistrate. After obtaining the permission but before instituting the suit for ejectment he accepted rent from the tenant. In the suit it was argued on behalf of the defendant that the acceptance of rent after the permission put an end to it. The Chief Justice Malik, while rejecting the argument; said : "The other argument that the acceptance of rent for the months of July, August and September. 1947, put an end to this permission has also no substance. The defendant was a month-to-month tenant. Under the Transfer of Property Act the landlord was entitled to terminate the tenancy by a notice in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. By reason of the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, however, this notice could be of no avail unless the District Magistrate's permission had been taken to file a suit. By reason of the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, however, this notice could be of no avail unless the District Magistrate's permission had been taken to file a suit. The defendant was liable to pay rent to the plaintiff every month the rent as it became due and by accepting rent for the months of July, August and September it cannot be said that the plaintiff had done something disqualify himself from claiming his legal right to eject." If acceptance of rent after the permission of the District Magistrate and before the institution of the suit does not amount to waiver of the permission granted at d the consequential right to sue, we fail to understand why the acceptance of rent after the default under Section 3 (1) (a)has become a fact and before institution of the suit based on that default should amount to waiver of the default and the consequential right to sue. 8. It may also be noted that in the case before us the landlord did not procrastinate but quickly issued a notice of quit on the basis of the tenant's default under Section 3 (1) (a). From the mere circumstance that he accepted the rent for April and May which was legitimately due to him on account of subsistence of the tenancy, it cannot be inferred that he waived his right to sue on the basis of the default of the tenants under Section 3 (1) (a). 9. In Deo Narain Pershad v. Ramdhari Chowdhary, Indian Law Report Vol XXXV Calcutta 402 a certain person was the owner of a share in certain prtperty. He mortgaged the share to another person. Therefore he sold the redemption to a third person. The vendor deposited the mortgage money in the Court under the Transfer of Property Act for payment to the mortgagee. I he mortgagee withdrew the amount. Thereafter he instituted a suit for pre-emption of the sale. It was urged on behalf of the vendee in the suit for pre-emption that having withdrawn the mortgage amount the mortgagee could not claim pre-emption. The Privy Council did not accept the argument and said :- ''Their Lordships is cannot agree with this contention. Until a decree for preemption was made, Nirohoy owned the land as purchaser, and had a tight to redeem. The Privy Council did not accept the argument and said :- ''Their Lordships is cannot agree with this contention. Until a decree for preemption was made, Nirohoy owned the land as purchaser, and had a tight to redeem. The taking out of the money by the plaintiffs, as mortgagees, was no recognition of anything more than this and was quite consistent with the claim to preempt." 10. It seems to us that this observation also supports the view that we have taken. The mere acceptance of rent which was due to the landlord particularly when it is soon followed by a notice to quit based on the default of the tenants under section 3 (1) (a) cannot be held to amount to waiver on his part to sue. Both the questions are accordingly decided against the appellants. 11. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.