SEN, J.: The writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution out of which Civil Rule No. 7/69 has arisen, has been filed by one Zatia. He was a constable under the Government of Assam and was dismissed from service by an order of the Governor dated the 3rd January 1969 as per Annexure T of the petition. It is prayed in this petition that the impugned orders passed by the Governor of Assam and the order No. D. O. 1817 dated 30-11-68 passed by the Superintendent of Police. Special Branch, Assam, Shillong dismissing the petitioner with effect from 8-11-67 should be quashed. He has also prayed for reinstatement to the post which he was holding. 2. Mr. D. M. Sen, learned Advocate General of Nagaland appearing for the petitioner has urged that the order of dismissal passed by the Superintendent of Police was void on the face of it as no immediate effect thereon was given. We are not impressed by this contention, as everything was done in terms of the order of the Governor, although no immediate effect thereto was given. 3. The most important point for consideration is whether the order of the Governor as per Annexure '!' was passed in terms of the appropriate provision of the Constitution. It runs as follows: "The Governor of Assam is satisfied that D. S. B. Const. Zatia of the Mizo Hills D. E. F. is unfit to be retained in the Public Service and that he should be dismissed from service. 2. The Governor is further satisfied under Sub-clause (c) of the proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to give the said D. S. B. Const. Zatia an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him as stated above. 3. Accordingly the Governor hereby dismisses the said D. S. B. Const. Zatia from service with immediate effect." 4. It appears from the contention raised by Mr. D. M. Sen that the order of the Governor only exempts the requirement of being given an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to the petitioner and does not exempt the holding of the inquiry, as is required under proviso (c) to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution.
D. M. Sen that the order of the Governor only exempts the requirement of being given an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to the petitioner and does not exempt the holding of the inquiry, as is required under proviso (c) to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. Previous to the 15th Amendment of the Constitution clause (2) read as follows: "No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him." Under the 15th Amendment it was explicitly provided for in Article 311 (2) that "No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges against him and where it Is proposed, after inquiry, to Impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry." The 15th Amendment envisages two methods of notice and such notices must, therefore, be required to be served when an inquiry is held. The inquiry can be dispensed with only under provisos (a), (b) and (c). The amended proviso (c) of clause (2) runs as follows: "Provided that this clause shall not apply- * * * * * (c) where the President or Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the Interest of the security of the State It is not expedient to hold such inquiry." The Governor in terms of this proviso may dispense with an inquiry as contemplated by clause (2) if he is satisfied that Inquiry should not be embarked upon in the interest of the security of the State. In the instant case we have already shown from the order of the Governor quoted before, that he was satisfied under proviso (c) of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution that in the interest of the security of the State it was not expedient to give to the petitioner Zatia an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken.
It appears to us that the Governor's satisfaction as to proviso (c) after the 15th Amendment was not, on the face of the order, complied with, but it seems that such an order was passed on the basis of proviso (c) of Clause (2), which existed prior to the 15th Amendment. It is provided therein that clause (2) shall not apply "where the' President or Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the Interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to give that person such an opportunity". The latter part of the Governor's order quotes this proviso, although the 15th Amendment was in existence at the time when the impugned order by the Governor was passed. Accordingly if we may say so, this was done inadvertently by the officer who had drawn up the order. Whether it was done advertently or inadvertently Is not a question for us to decide. The order on the face of it purports to show that presumably in the first instance an inquiry was ordered to be made, in which notice as per terms of the amended clause (2) is required to be served and the second show cause notice was dispensed with in the interest of the security of the State. This however cannot be the affection in law in view of the clear terms of the amended clause and the Governor's satisfaction must be the satisfaction to the effect that no Inquiry was necessary as contemplated by Article 311 (2). From the order it does not appear that resort to proviso (c) was taken as stated above. 5. Mr. G. Talukdar, appearing for the State has argued that the condition of holding an inquiry as laid down in clause (2) of Article 311 is required to be dispensed with under proviso (c). It is also stated that it was absolutely incorrect to say that the Governor's order only exempts the requirement of giving an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken and does not exempt the holding of the inquiry. He further contends that when the proviso (c) cl.
It is also stated that it was absolutely incorrect to say that the Governor's order only exempts the requirement of giving an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken and does not exempt the holding of the inquiry. He further contends that when the proviso (c) cl. (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution has been clearly mentioned in the second paragraph of the order, that would impliedly show that the Government dispensed with the inquiry and the expression "an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard .to him as stated above", is a superfluity and does not in any way affect the satisfaction of the Governor that no inquiry was to be made. 6. Upon hearing the learned counsel of both the sides it appears to us that as long as the Governor acted in good faith, his satisfaction cannot be determined by this Court by any objective test and inquired into by it. There is no dispute about this proposition of law. But we are concerned to see whether the true letters of the Constitution have been followed by the Governor in passing the impugned order. We have already stated that this order prima facie purports to show that in the first instance an opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause, but in the interest of public security the second show cause notice was dispensed with. This is not the spirit of proviso (c) of clause (2) of Article 311 and as such since we find that the constitutional provisions have not been adopted regarding the satisfaction of the Governor under proviso (c) (ibid), we cannot say that by implication it should be deemed to have been passed under this clause. 7. In this connection Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee appearing for Mr. D. M. Sen has referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 SC740, Ram Manohar Lohiay. State of Bihar. The ratio of the decision in the matter of Rule 30 (1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules is that 'law and order cannot mean the same thing as 'public order' as used in the impugned order stated in that decision and as such the only course open to the court was to hold that the roles were not strictly observed and the order did not justify detention.
As for the purpose of justifying the detention, such compliance with the rule by itself was enough, a non-compliance necessarily had a contrary effect. We may quote the relevant observation as stated at paragraph 11 of the judgment:- "I am not impressed by the argument that the reference in the detention order to R. 30 (1) (b) shows that by law and order what was meant was public order. That is a most mischievous way of approaching the question. If that were right, a reference to the rule in the order might equally justify all other errors in it. Indeed it might with almost equal justification then be said that a reference to the rule and an order of detention would be enough. That being so, the only course open to us is to hold that the rules have not been strictly observed. If for the purpose of justifying the detention such compliance by itself is enough, a non-compliance must have a contrary effect" From this decision it is absolutely clear that mere reference to proviso (c) of clause (2) of Article 311 and inappropriate application of the old clause and the proviso, cannot impliedly show that the Governor had his satisfaction regarding dispensing with the inquiry, and unless the provisions of the Constitution in their true letters are complied with in the order itself, we may conclude that the Governor's satisfaction in this regard was not obtained. Therefore, the argument of Mr. Talukdar that mention of the aforesaid proviso is enough, cannot stand and we consider that it is of no substance. 8. In the above premises we are of opinion that since the constitutional provision regarding satisfaction of the Governor under proviso (c) of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution was not recorded, the impugned order and the subsequent orders as passed by the Superintendent of Police dismissing the petitioner cannot have any legal validity. We accordingly quash the order passed by the Governor as per Annexure T of the petition and direct that the petitioner shall be deemed to be continuing in his appointment as a Constable from the date of the order of his dismissal by the Superintendent of Police. We, however, observe that 4he petitioner may be proceeded against afresh, if so advised, according to law. The rule is made absolute in the above terms with costs, advocate's fee being assessed at Rs.
We, however, observe that 4he petitioner may be proceeded against afresh, if so advised, according to law. The rule is made absolute in the above terms with costs, advocate's fee being assessed at Rs. 100 (one hundred). 9. Civil Rule No. 8/69 is disposed of In terms of our order in Civil Rule No. 7/69 above. The petitioner Chalbunga will get costs, advocate's fee being ed at Rs. 100 (one hundred). 10. S. K. DUTTA. C, J.: I agree. Rule made absolute