Judgement ORDER :- This revision application by the defendants is directed against the order dated 2nd February, 1968, of the learned District Judge, Bharatpur whereby issues Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were decided against the petitioners. 2. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Dholpur having been appointed as an officer to take over the management of the State Bank of Dholpur (hereinafter called the Bank) to wind up its affairs and distribute its assets, by the Central Government in exercise of the powers vested in it by Section 5(1)(a) of Act No. 56 of 1962 (hereinafter called Act of 1962) instituted a suit against the petitioners in the court of the District Judge, Bharatpur for recovery of the amount of loan alleged to have been advanced by the Bank to them on 12-12-1947. The suit was instituted on 16th February, 1966 and was stated to be within limitation as having been instituted within five years from the date of the first appointment of the officer, i.e., the Manager, vide clause (d) of Section 5 of the Act. 3. It may be stated that the first appointment of the officer under Section 5(1)(a) of the Act was made by the Central Government vide its Order No. F-8/ 85/62-BB dated 1-3-1963 with effect from 1-4-65. Clause (1)(d) of Section 5 of the Act is as follows :- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or in any order or other instrument - "The period of limitation for any suit or application relating to any payment due to the Dholpur Bank which has accrued before or may accrue on or after the date of the first appointment of the officer in charge of winding up of the bank shall be twelve years from the date of the accrual of the claim or five years from the date of such first appointment of the officer aforesaid, whichever may end later." 4. The petitioners contested the suit and inter alia pleaded that the suit was time barred, the plaintiff was not entitled to bring the suit and Act No. 56 of 1962 was ultra vires of the Constitution of India. On these objections the following three issues amongst others were framed by the learned District Judge :- 4. Whether the suit is time barred? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to bring this suit? 6. On these objections the following three issues amongst others were framed by the learned District Judge :- 4. Whether the suit is time barred? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to bring this suit? 6. Whether the impugned Act No. 56 of 1962 is ultra vires of Constitution and in what respect? 5. The learned District Judge after hearing the parties and considering the relevant facts found all these issues in favour of the plaintiff. 6. Being aggrieved by the said order the petitioners have come to this Court in revision and the learned counsel appearing on their behalf has urged that : 1. The State Bank of Dholpur Act No. 1915 was never in force in Dholpur and that it was never published. 2. The so-called State Bank of Dholpur was not doing any banking business, inasmuch as it did not accept deposits and as such the Parliament could not make Act of 1962 under Entry No. 45 of List 1 and only the State Legislature could do it under Entry No. 30 of List 2. 3. By virtue of Section 5(2) of the Act of 1962 Section 5 would apply only to Dholpur State Bank which at the commencement of that section was governed by the State Bank of Dholpur Act, 1915 and as the State Bark of Dholpur Act, 1915 never came into force, Section 5 could not apply to the Bank. 4. Act No. 56 of 1962 was discriminatory inasmuch as it provided a different period of limitation for recovery of loans given by the bank. 7. It may be pointed out that the objections whether the State Bank of Dholpur Act, 1915 had not been published or was not in force at the commencement of the Act of 1962 or that the bank was not doing any banking business, were not urged before the learned District Judge because there is no reference of these objections in the order under revision. It is true that such objections were taken in the written statement, but they do not appear to have been pressed before the lower court as no issue has been framed about them. Similarly, these objections do not seem to have been urged at the time of the decision of issues Nos. 4, 5 and 6. It is true that such objections were taken in the written statement, but they do not appear to have been pressed before the lower court as no issue has been framed about them. Similarly, these objections do not seem to have been urged at the time of the decision of issues Nos. 4, 5 and 6. These objections do not relate to purely questions of law but require investigation into the facts, and as such they cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in revision. However, on the materials on record there does not appear to be any force in these objections either. 8. On behalf of the non-petitioner a printed copy of the Act entitled as law of State Bank of Dholpur has been placed on record which shows that it was enacted by the then ruler of the State of Dholpur and had received the assent of the ruler on 25th June 1915. There is no denying of the fact that in the year 1915 the ruler was the sovereign authority in the State and as such was competent to enact the law for the State. The Preamble of the Act says that the Bank was established in Dholpur in 1894 with the monies donated by late Her Highness in accordance with the wishes of late Shri Maharaja Rana Nihal Singh for the purpose of earning interest until a sufficient sum was collected for erection of a public memorial to Her Highness and because other purpose i.e., the interest of the State employees, cultivators and members of the public was also in view, the State was associated with it and it was named as State Bank. High revenue, military and judicial officials continued to be members of this Bank so that the recovery of the bank monies may not depend upon legal proceedings and they may easily take benefit from the Bank and from time to time rules and regulations were issued by the Secretary of the Bank and now it had become necessary that all those rules and regulations may be reviewed and collected and be given the shape of an Act of the Bank and be published so that everybody may come to know of the said rules of the State Bank and may avail of it whenever needed, therefore, this law of State Bank after having received the assent of His Highness was published in the year 1915. The preamble bears the signature and seal of Kameshwar Nath, Secretary, State Bank, Dholpur. The above preamble clearly indicates that the Act was made with the assent of His Highness the Maharaja of Dholpur and was published in the year 1915 so that every one might come to know of its provisions. In the face of the aforesaid preamble containing a statement of the publication of the Act, 1915 for the knowledge of the public, it is difficult to accept the argument that the Act was not published in Dholpur State. The Act being an Act of the sovereign authority of then State of Dholpur, is a public document. The statement contained in the Act is admissible in evidence without requiring any further proof. There is besides a presumption that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. So once it is proved that the Act was made by His Highness the Maharaja of Dholpur and the Act contained a recital that it was published for being known to the public, there will be presumption that it was duly published in compliance with the normal usual manner of publishing laws in the State. It was open to the petitioners to give evidence to the contrary to rebut this presumption. But they did not seem to have agitated this point in the lower court. It will, therefore, be assumed that the Act which was made by His Highness the Maharaja of Dholpur came into force after its due publication. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel in Harla v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1951 SC 467 is clearly distinguishable. But they did not seem to have agitated this point in the lower court. It will, therefore, be assumed that the Act which was made by His Highness the Maharaja of Dholpur came into force after its due publication. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel in Harla v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1951 SC 467 is clearly distinguishable. In that case their Lordships were dealing with a penal statute and in that context it was held that- "It would be against the principles of natural justice to permit the subject of a State to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge." Again in that case it was not shown at all that the resolution passed by the Council of State, Jaipur was published in any manner whatsoever. Besides the same Council had enacted another law i.e. Jaipur Laws Act, 1923 which required publication of laws in the official gazette. Section 3(b) of which provides : "3. Subject to the prerogative of the Ruler the law to be administered by the Court of Jaipur State shall be as follows : (b) All the regulations now in force within the said territories and the enactments and regulations that may hereafter be passed from time to time by the State and published in the Official Gazette." 9. It is next contended that even if the Act came into force in 1915 it did not remain in force after May, 1942 because it does not find place in the list of local Acts in force in the State which was published in the Dholpur State Gazette Vol. 28 No. V dated May, 1942. This again is an objection which the non-petitioner had no opportunity to meet in the lower court. However, it has not been shown that the Act was at any time repealed before 1942 or even after that. In the absence of any law or notification which had the effect of repealing the Dholpur State Bank Act, 1915, it cannot be held that the law had ceased to remain in force after 1942 simply because it was not included in the list of local Acts published in 1942. In the absence of any law or notification which had the effect of repealing the Dholpur State Bank Act, 1915, it cannot be held that the law had ceased to remain in force after 1942 simply because it was not included in the list of local Acts published in 1942. On the other hand it is not disputed that the Bank which was established under the law continued to function even after 1942. 10. An Act expires at the end of the period if it is so fixed by the legislature. If no period is fixed the Act would be a perpetual Act and it would not become inoperative by mere non user, however long the time may, have been since it was actually put in force. A statute in other words is not abrogated by disuse. See Jatindra Nath v. Province of Bihar, AIR 1949 FC 175 at page 178. The Act, therefore, in my view continued to be in force until the Parliament enacted Act No. 56 of 1962 because by Section 3 of the Rajasthan Administration Ordinance No.1 of 1949, all the laws in force in any covenanting State immediately before the commencement of the Ordinance until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature, were continued in force in the State of Rajasthan. Another contention of the learned counsel is that the Parliament was not competent to enact Act 56 of 1962 because the Bank was not doing any banking business as is envisaged in Item 45 of the List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. It is contended that the Bank was doing money lending business only which was a State subject falling within item No. 30 of List II. It is pointed out that the expression 'banking' had been defined in the Banking Companies Act, 1949 as : "Banking means the accepting for the purpose of lending or investment, of deposits or money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise; and withdrawal by cheque, draft, order or otherwise." and it must have been in that very sense that the term banking has been used in Item No. 45 of List I. It is contended that the Dholpur State Bank did not contain any provision for accepting deposits of money from the public and as such it cannot be said to have been doing banking business. 11. 11. It is difficult to accept the argument that the banking business must necessarily include the acceptance of deposits of money from the public because in modern times commercial banks do not serve as mere depositories but render many other services such as lending of money, transferring it from one place to another, issuing of various forms of credit, underwriting of capital issues, acceptance of bills of exchange, furnishing guarantees on behalf of customers etc. There are certain banks which specialise in one or more of these activities. In agricultural countries, there are land mortgage banks. In Industrial countries, there are banks which specialise in the financing of certain industries and it cannot be said that such banks are not doing banking business. 12. However, assuming that the contention raised is correct, the Act contains several provisions about acceptance of deposits by the Bank of Dholpur. 13. Section 17 of the Act authorises the members of the Committee of the Bank to deposit their money in the Bank on interest. Section 24 says that members of the committee will have no authority to pay money of persons deposited in trust or for interest in the Bank be paid towards any other demand whether of the court of the State (sic). S. 28 permits persons other than members to deposit their money in the Bank with the approval of the Committee and opinion of its Secretary. Section 49 envisages opening of current accounts of respectable persons and members of the Bank. Section 60 also envisages the acceptance of deposit on reasonable rate of interest from persons other than the members of the committee with the concurrence of 'Jalsa Kamil'. 14. From the above provisions of the Act it would be abundantly clear that acceptance of deposits from the public was also one of the functions of the Bank. Under such circumstances it can be safely said that Dholpur State Bank was doing 'banking' business and Parliament was quite competent to enact law by virtue of Entry No. 45 in List 1. 15. The last contention of the learned counsel is that the Act No. 56 of 1962 is ultra vires as it contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. 16. 15. The last contention of the learned counsel is that the Act No. 56 of 1962 is ultra vires as it contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. 16. This contention can be rejected straightway on the ground that in the written statement it has not been shown on what ground the Act is discriminatory and the discrimination is not based on any reasonable classification. It was observed by the Supreme Court in V. S. Rice and Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1781 that : "When a citizen wants to challenge the validity of any statute on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14, specific, clear and unambiguous allegations must be made in that behalf and it must be shown that the impugned statute is based on discrimination and that such discrimination is not referable to any classification which is rational and which has nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the said statute". 17. I may however, deal with the argument which has been made at the bar viz., that Cl. (d) of Section 5 of Act of 1962 which provides a longer period of limitation for institution of suits and application for recovery of the dues of the Bank discriminates between the Dholpur Bank and other Banks which have to bring similar suits for recovery of its dues within the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act. 18. For a proper appreciation of the contention I may refer to the Preamble of the Act and the Statement of Objects and Reasons which can be considered for the purpose of ascertaining conditions prevailing at the time which necessitated the making of law. Preamble to the Act of 1962 is as follows :- "An Act further to amend the State Bank of India Act, 1955, the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959, and the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, and to provide for the winding up of certain minor State associated banks and for matter connected therewith". Preamble to the Act of 1962 is as follows :- "An Act further to amend the State Bank of India Act, 1955, the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959, and the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891, and to provide for the winding up of certain minor State associated banks and for matter connected therewith". Statement of Objects and reasons at page 1010 of Part I of the Gazette of India Extraordinary is as under :- "It has been decided, in connection with the State Bank of India and the Reserve Bank that the State Bank of Bikaner, which has been constituted as a subsidiary of the State Bank of India under Section 3 of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959, should take over the undertakings, assets and liabilities of the State Bank of Jaipur, another subsidiary of the State Bank of India, in accordance with the provisions of Section 38 of the Act. The State Bank of India and the banks concerned have indicated that they would like the name of the transferee institution after the amalgamation to be changed so as to include a reference therein to both Bikaner and Jaipur. As the existing provisions of the law do not provide for a change in the name of any of the statutory subsidiaries of the State Bank of India - it is proposed to amend the State Bank of India - (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 suitably, so as to provide for any such change in the name. 2. The opportunity provided by the amendment is also being utilised to clarify the provisions of the State Bank of India Act, 1955, relating to voting by the directors of the State Bank, to modify the provisions of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 so as to make it applicable to the Reserve Bank of India, the State Bank of India and other statutory banking corporations, and to provide for the orderly winding up of two minor State-associated banks, namely the State Bank of Dholpur and the State Bank of Kurundwad (Junior), which were under statutes enacted by the former Indian rulers but have not been functioning for some time." 19. It would appear from the above that The Parliament while enacting law for amending the State Bank of India Act, 1955 and other Acts mentioned in the Preamble utilised the opportunity and incorporated provisions in the Act for the orderly winding up of the State Bank of Dholpur and the State Bank of Kurundwad which were two minor State-associated banks established under statutes enacted by the former Indian rulers and had not been functioning normally for some time. 20. There were these two banks namely the State Bank of Dholpur and the State Bank of Kurundwad for whose winding up relevent provisions including Sec. 5(d) were made. 21. The underlying principle of Art. 14 of the Constitution is that all persons and things similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. So what is forbidden is discrimination between persons and things having similar circumstances and conditions. It forbids class legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of distinction and for this purpose even one person or group of persons can be a class. 22. In order to satisfy the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled namely :- 1. that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes persons or things that are to be put together from others left out of the group, and 2. that the differentiation must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. See State of Rajasthan v. Mukhan Chand, AIR 1964 SC 1633 . 23. Thus the Bank of Dholpur and the State Bank of Kurundwad was a class by itself and it was within the power of the Parliament to enact a law for recovery of its dues for the purpose of its orderly winding up. 24. The differentiation between these two banks and the other banks has a rational bearing on the object of the legislation. No other bank has been shown to be similarly situated. These two banks were State associated banks and had not been functioning normally for sometime. It was therefore, in the public interest that the dues of the banks be recovered and distributed amongest its depositors. If the dues of these banks became barred by limitation the loss was to fall upon the people in general. These two banks were State associated banks and had not been functioning normally for sometime. It was therefore, in the public interest that the dues of the banks be recovered and distributed amongest its depositors. If the dues of these banks became barred by limitation the loss was to fall upon the people in general. Even if the dues consisted of the State moneys as appearing from Section 5(1)(e) its loss was loss to the community in general. Therefore, to prescribe a different and longer period of limitation for the recovery of the dues of these banks does not militate against there being a rational basis for a distinction being drawn between the claims of these banks and the other banks regarding the bar of limitation. Reference in this connection may be made to a few decisions of the Supreme Court. In Nav Rattanmal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704 validity of Art. 149 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 which provides a period of sixty years for suits by the Central or any State Government was challenged on the ground that it was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, it was held that :- "The generally accepted basis that statutes of limitation are designed to effectuate a beneficent public purpose viz., to prevent the taking away from one what he has for long been permitted to consider his own and on the faith of which he plans his life, habits and expenses, does not militate against there being a rational basis for a distinction being drawn between the claims of the State and the claims of the individual in the matter of a provision of a bar of limitation for enforcing them. In considering this matter two points have to be kept separate (1) whether a distinction could be drawn or a classification supported between the provision of any variation in the time that should be available for enforcing claims by private individuals and claims by the State, (2) whether, if such a classification were good, the period of 60 years provided by Art. 149 of the Limitation Act is such a long period of time as to be unreasonable. The fact that in the case of the Government, if a claim becomes barred by limitation, the loss falls on the public i.e. on the community in general and to the benefit of the private individual who derives advantage by the lapse of time, in itself, would appear to indicate a sufficient ground for differentiating between the claims of an individual and the claims of the community at large. Next, it may also be mentioned that in the case of governmental machinery, it is a known fact that it does not move as quickly as in the case of individuals. It is in this background that the question of the special provision in Article 149 has to be viewed. On these principles as well as on the ratio underlying the decisions upholding the validity of the special provisions for the recovery of the Governments claims, it must be held that there is a rational basis for treating the Government differently as regards the period of limitation and therefore Art. 149 does not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. As there is a rational basis of classification, the period of that should be allowed to the Government to file a suit would be a matter of legislative policy and could not be brought within the scope or purview of challenge under Art. 14 or indeed of any other article in the Constitution." In Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 222 where provisions regarding Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act (4 of 2002 BK) were challenged as it provided a special procedure for recovery of dues from customers of State Bank on the ground that it contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution, it was held per majority that : "While Art. 14 prohibits discriminatory legislation directed against one individual or class of individuals it does not forbid reasonable classification and for this purpose even one person can be a class. The Patiala State Bank is a class by itself and it will be within the power of the State to enact a law (Example Patiala Recovery Act of State Dues Act, 4 of 2002 (BK)), under which dues to the Bank were expressly included in the definition of 'State dues' with respect to it. The differentia between the Patiala State Bank and the other Banks has a rational bearing on the object of the legislation. The differentia between the Patiala State Bank and the other Banks has a rational bearing on the object of the legislation. If the funds of the Patiala State Bank are State funds, a law which assimilates the procedure for the determination and recovery of amounts due to the Bank from its customers to that prescribed for the determination and recovery of arrears of revenue must be held to have a just and reasonable relation to the purpose of the legislation. A law which provides for State funds being advanced to customers through State Bank can also provide for its being recovered in the same manner as revenue." It is also worthy of note that Section 41 of the State Bank of Dholpur Act, 1915 provided that no suit shall be required to be instituted in any court for the recovery of the dues of the Bank. In Section 53 it was provided that members of the committee will be entitled to have the dues of the bank recovered like other dues of the State. It cannot therefore, be said that at the commencement of the Act of 1962, there was no remedy left for the recovery of the dues of the bank from its debtors. Even if it be assumed that the right of the Bank to recover its loan by instituting suits had become barred the object of the Act of 1962 could only be achieved by extending the period of limitation for collecting its dues and its payment to the depositors. Though the contention of the petitioners before the lower court was that Section 5(d) of the Act of 1962 had no retrospective operation and could not revive a debt which had already become barred at its commencement, yet this contention was not pressed in this Court. However, from the language of Section 5(1)(d) and (e) and the object of legislature in enacting Act of 1962 it can clearly be gathered that it applied to all claims of the Bank which had accrued before or after the date of the first appointment of the officer-in-charge regardless of the question whether remedy by way of suit for recovery of such claims had become barred. Reference in this connection may be made to Sree Bank Ltd. v. Sarkar Dutt Roy and Co., AIR 1966 SC 1953 where Section 45-O (1) was introduced in the Banking Companies Act, 1949 and was in these terms : "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application by a banking company which is being wound up, the period commencing from the date of the presentation of the petition for the winding up of the banking company shall be excluded." The Supreme Court observed with regard to the retrospective operation of an Act that : "It is a firmly established rule that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, except as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. An enactment ought to be construed as prospective only when it is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation. Where, however, a statute is passed with the object of protecting the public against some evil or abuse, it may be allowed to operate retrospectively, even if by such operation it will deprive some person or persons of a vested right. For the retrospective operation of the provision of an Act it is not necessary that it must be stated that its provisions would be deemed to have always existed. That is one of the modes and may be an effective mode of providing that the provisions would have retrospective effect. Retrospective effect can also be gathered from the language of the enactment and the object and intent of the legislature in enacting it and it was held that the above provision has retrospective operation. 25. Having regard to all the circumstances mentioned above it is apparent that Section 5(d) of the Act of 1962 cannot be said to contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and is a valid piece of legislation, and applies to those claims also for whose recovery the suits might have already become barred. This contention also has no force. 26. The revision application is accordingly rejected with costs in two sets.