JUDGMENT G.D. Sahgal, J. - There is a house No. 227 in Mohalla Mahajani Tola in the city of Faizabad of which the appellants are the owners. They were in the occupation of a portion of that house, whereas a portion of it had been let out to one Roshan Lal Gulati. The appellants had succeeded to the ownership of the building from one Ram Adhin Singh and, according to the allegations in the petition filed by them before this Court, it was with the consent of Ram Adhin Singh that Gulati was inducted into the other portion of the building as a tenant. An application was moved by respondent No. 5 on the 23rd of April, 1962 before the District Magistrate for the allotment of the portion in the occupation of the said Gulati on the allegation that it had fallen vacant. An order was passed by the District Magistrate thereon directing that it be allotted to respondent No. 5. When the appellants came to know about it, they moved an application on the 26th of April, 1962 for the release of that portion on the ground that they required it for their own use. The application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, respondent No. 2, on the 8th of May, 1962 and on the 9th of May, 1962 he passed an order under Section 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (Act III of 1947) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) directing the appellants to let out the disputed portion of the house to respondent No. 5. An objection was then filed against that allotment order on the ground that in accordance with Rule 7 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949 framed under Section 17 of the Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules) the disputed portion could not be allotted without the consultation of the appellants by the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, as the case may be, as they were the owners and were in the occupation of the other portion of the same accommodation. This application was rejected by the City magistrate, Faizabad on the 7th of December 1964. This application was rejected by the City magistrate, Faizabad on the 7th of December 1964. An application was then preferred by the appellants under Section 7-F of the Act to the State Government which was also rejected by an order dated the 22nd of January, 1966. The appellants then filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying that the order of allotment dated the 9th of May, 1962, the order dated the 7th of December, 1964 and also that dated the 22nd of January, 1966 be quashed. The petition was opposed by respondent No. 5 who was opposite party No. 5 in the petition also. The learned single Judge (Hon'ble Lakshmi Prasad, J.), before whom the matter came up for hearing, dismissed the petition holding that in view of the finding of the rent control authorities and also in view of the affidavit filed in the case it was impossible to hold that the portion allotted to respondent No. 5 was a portion of the accommodation in the occupation of the appellants. It is against that order that an appeal was filed and when it came up before a Bench of which one of us was a member, it was referred to a Full Bench on account of a conflict of authority of this Court in the two Division Bench cases of Ram Gopal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 Allahabad 438 : 1953 ALJ 54 and Dr. A.C. Dass v. T.R.O. and D.S.O. Lucknow, 1962 ALJ 553. The former case was decided by Malik, C.J. and V. Bhargava, J. (as he then was), while the latter was decided by Desai, C.J. and S.D. Singh, J. 2. The case involves the interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules which reads as follows :- "7. Where a portion of accommodation falls vacant and the owner is in occupation of another portion thereof, the District Magistrate shall, before making the allotment order, consult the owner and shall so far as possible make the allotment in accordance with the wishes of the owner." A perusal of the rule shows that it requires that there should be an accommodation, that a portion of that accommodation should fall vacant and that the owner should be in occupation of another portion of that accommodation. It is only when these conditions are satisfied that it is obligatory on the District Magistrate to consult the owner and after so consulting him to allot, so far as possible, the portion that has fallen vacant, in accordance with the wishes of the owner. 3. In Ram Gopal's case the Bench which decided the case appears to have held that when an owner lives in a portion of a building and another portion of that building in which he does not reside falls vacant, then he has to be consulted in accordance with this rule. According to this interpretation, therefore, the whole building would be an "accommodation". 4. In Dr. A.C. Dass's case, however, a much narrower view has been taken which would appear from the following observations made therein : "In connection with rule 7 two things are to be noted, (1) that it comes into application when a portion of an accommodation falls vacant and (2) that another portion of it is in occupation of the owner (and not the landlord). The owner can be in occupation of one portion of an accommodation, another of which falls vacant only when the owner was previously in occupation of the whole accommodation. Unless the owner was himself in occupation of the whole accommodation one cannot speak of a portion of the accommodation falling vacant and the other being in occupation. If before the vacancy in question there were two accommodations, one in occupation of the owner and the other in occupation of any other person, either an owner or a tenant or a sub-tenant, and one of them falls vacant, it cannot be said, to be a case of a portion of an accommodation falling vacant. There is no reference to the building at all in this rule and there is no justification whatsoever for assuming that it was meant to apply in a case of two accommodations in a building, one in the occupation of the owner and the other falling vacant. There is no reference to the building at all in this rule and there is no justification whatsoever for assuming that it was meant to apply in a case of two accommodations in a building, one in the occupation of the owner and the other falling vacant. There cannot be a portion of an accommodation falling vacant unless first just previously the entire accommodation was one accommodation." It would thus appear that, according to this latter case, Rule 7 will apply when a portion of an accommodation, the whole of which was in the occupation of the owner, falls vacant for the first time, for as soon as the tenant is let into a portion of what at one time was in possession of the owner, then according to this view that portion becomes a new accommodation and ceases to form part of any other accommodation and when at a later stage it falls vacant it is the case of the falling of an entire accommodation vacant and not the falling vacant of a portion of another accommodation. 5. As the matter has been referred to a full Bench, let us examine the matter at first hand taking assistance from the various provisions of the Act itself. 6. The word "accommodation" has been defined in Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Act as meaning residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building and includes : (i) gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building; and (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. Under Clause (c) of the same section "landlord" means a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir or assignee of such person. Under Clause (g) "tenant" means the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation. Under Clause (c) of the same section "landlord" means a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation and includes the agent, attorney, heir or assignee of such person. Under Clause (g) "tenant" means the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation. Sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 7 of the Act provide as follows :- "7(1)(a) Every landlord shall, within seven days after an accommodation becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the tenant vacating it or otherwise ceasing to occupy it or by termination of a tenancy or by release from requisition or in any other manner, whatsoever, give notice of the vacancy in writing to the District Magistrate. (b) Every tenant occupying accommodation shall within seven days of vacation of such accommodation or ceasing to occupy it give notice thereof in writing to the District Magistrate. (c) ........... (2) The District Magistrate may by general or special order require a landlord to let or not to let to any person any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is vacant or is about to fall vacant. (3) No tenant shall sub-let any portion of the accommodation in his tenancy except with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate previously obtained." Section 7-B(1) provides that when any tenant, who is in occupation of an accommodation in pursuance of an order made under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 7, is in arrears of rent or any instalment thereof. (where it is payable in instalments) for more than three months, the landlord may make an application to the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction for an order of ejectment of the tenant from the accommodation. Sub-section (1) of Section 7-C provides that when a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully paid to him by a tenant in respect of any accommodation the tenant may in the prescribed manner deposit such rent and continue to deposit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of such accommodation unless the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept. Sub-section (1) of Section 7-E provides that every landlord shall be bound to keep the accommodation in the occupation of a tenant wind proof and water-proof and to carry out other repairs which he is bound to make by law, contract or custom. 7. A perusal of the above provisions would show that what is contemplated by the term "accommodation" in the Act is one unit of accommodation. A whole building may be an accommodation or it may not be an accommodation and only a part of it may be an accommodation or it may consist of a number of accommodations being in the occupation of several persons of residential or non-residential purposes. An accommodation is vacated by the landlord by his ceasing to occupy it. When a landlord who was occupying an accommodation stops occupying it and leaves it unoccupied or vacant or lets it out to a tenant, it is the case of its falling vacant. When he ceases to occupy only a portion of it and lets it out to a tenant, there is a case of an accommodation coming into existence, though it will be a portion of the previous accommodation. Thus a portion of the building in the occupation of an owner becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it and his letting it out to a tenant, that portion becomes an accommodation. 8. Under the definition of the terms "landlord" and "tenant" even a tenant may be a landlord of a sub-tenant if the accommodation is let out by him to a sub-tenant. A tenant qua his sub-tenant is the landlord, because rent is payable to him. If a portion of an accommodation in the occupation of a tenant is under sub-section (3) of Section 7 let out by the tenant to a sub-tenant with the permission in writing of the landlord and the District Magistrate, then qua that portion of the accommodation the tenant becomes the landlord and his sub-tenant, the tenant and the portion of the accommodation an accommodation between the tenant and the sub-tenant who are its landlord and tenant. In such a case, therefore, there will be two accommodations, one which has been let out by the owner to the tenant and the other a portion of it which has been let out by the tenant to the sub-tenant. The latter accommodation will be a part of the former accommodation. In such a case, therefore, there will be two accommodations, one which has been let out by the owner to the tenant and the other a portion of it which has been let out by the tenant to the sub-tenant. The latter accommodation will be a part of the former accommodation. As to the latter accommodation, the tenant would be the landlord and the sub-tenant the tenant. So far as the owner and the tenant are concerned, the whole accommodation will be an accommodation and as between the tenant and the sub-tenant the portion sub-let actually will be an accommodation. In the case of the accommodation which is in the occupation of the tenant let out by the owner, the accommodation can be vacated only upon the tenant vacating it as a whole. If the tenant vacates only a portion of it, then it will not be an act of the vacating of the accommodation but only be an act of vacating a portion of the accommodation. 9. From what has been said above, we would see that a whole house may be an accommodation if it is let out to a tenant and a portion of it also may be an accommodation if it is let out by the tenant to a sub-tenant. The whole house, however, will not cease to be an accommodation, for as between the tenant and the owner it is the whole house which is an accommodation but as between the sub-tenant and the tenant it is only a portion of the house which is an accommodation. Thus the possibility of one accommodation being part of another accommodation cannot be ruled out and if an accommodation which is part of another accommodation is vacated inspite of a complete accommodation being vacated, it will still be the case of a part of an accommodation being vacated, the other part of which is in the possession of the landlord. 10. The view taken in the full Bench case of N.C. Agarwal v. Krishan Lal Mehra, 1960 ALJ 755, supports the above conclusion that one accommodation may be part of another accommodation. 10. The view taken in the full Bench case of N.C. Agarwal v. Krishan Lal Mehra, 1960 ALJ 755, supports the above conclusion that one accommodation may be part of another accommodation. In that case the greater accommodation of which the lesser accommodation was a part was vacated on the ejectment of the tenant and as such the lesser accommodation went along with it and so the whole of the accommodation had to be let, for it was not the case of two accommodations being vacated but only the case of the greater accommodation being vacated, though the smaller accommodation formed part of it. In the circumstances, two accommodations could not be let out separately and the allotment order could relate only to the greater accommodation which only was vacated. 11. We have so far dealt with the case of an accommodation let out by an owner to a tenant and of an accommodation let out by that tenant to a sub-tenant out of that accommodation and forming part of it to show that one accommodation may be part of another accommodation without the greater accommodation of which the lesser accommodation is a part ceasing to be an accommodation. The question, however, arises whether if an owner of a building is in the occupation of the building and lets out a portion thereof to a tenant, can there be any circumstances in which it could be said that the accommodation let out to the tenant will continue to form part of the greater accommodation which was at one time in the occupation of the owner ? According to the view taken in Dr. A.C. Dass's case, referred to above, it will cease to be a part of the accommodation from which it has been carved out and there would come into being two accommodations independent of each other. According to the view taken in Dr. A.C. Dass's case, referred to above, it will cease to be a part of the accommodation from which it has been carved out and there would come into being two accommodations independent of each other. The result of this view is that Rule 7 would apply only once when the owner vacates a portion of the accommodation in his possession without any desire on his part to let it out, for the rule that will apply in case of an owner vacating a portion of the accommodation in his possession with a desire to let it out would be Rule 8(1) and not Rule 7 for Rule 8(1) provides that in case a landlord desires to let out a portion of an accommodation, any portion of which was not let out before, the District Magistrate shall make the allotment, if the landlord happens to be living in any portion of the accommodation, in accordance with the wishes of the landlord and if the landlord does not live in the accommodation in accordance as far as may be with his wishes. Thus if the "owner" which term is included in the term "landlord" used in Rule 8(1), ceases to occupy a portion of an accommodation in his possession but has no desire to let it out, then Rule 7 will apply with the result that the District Magistrate may still allot it to a tenant but only so far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the owner. But if the owner wants to let out that portion and that portion had not been let out earlier, then under Rule 8(1) the District Magistrate shall have to make an allotment thereof in accordance with the wishes of the owner. In either case after once this letting has been done it becomes an independent accommodation and either of the rules will cease to apply to it whenever it happens to fall vacant. This interpretation does not appear to be in consonance with the purpose of the Act. 12. The purpose of rule 7 seems to be to protect the interest of the owners of accommodations and at the same time to encourage them to let out portions of accommodation they themselves may be occupying by providing for the respecting of their wishes in the matter of allotment of such accommodation. 12. The purpose of rule 7 seems to be to protect the interest of the owners of accommodations and at the same time to encourage them to let out portions of accommodation they themselves may be occupying by providing for the respecting of their wishes in the matter of allotment of such accommodation. If the rule is so narrowly interpreted as has been interpreted in Dr. A.C. Dass's case, then no owner would feel encouraged to release any accommodation in his possession for the purpose of letting it out even though he may not need it for himself, for though he may be consulted when the accommodation is let out for the first time, he will not be required to be consulted thereafter if the tenant later on vacates it and a tenant who may prove to be a nuisance to him may be forced upon him. The idea of the rule seem to be that when an accommodation in the occupation of the owner is split up into two portions which are occupied by two different persons, the owner and the tenant and the two portions are so situated that each occupier can enjoy his portion which may not be completely separate from the other, only in a spirit of give and take, the wishes of the owner should be respected in the matter of the choice of the tenant. By putting a narrow interpretation to the rule a tenant who may prove to be a nuisance to the landlord may be forced upon him. Such an interpretation would discourage the owner of an accommodation even to think of letting out a portion of the accommodation in his possession to a tenant even though he may not need it. It would thus frustrate the very purpose of the Act, which according to the preamble, has been enacted to solve the problem of the shortage of accommodation. The view taken in Dr. A.C. Dass's case, therefore, with respect, in much too narrow and appears to be incorrect. 13. It would thus frustrate the very purpose of the Act, which according to the preamble, has been enacted to solve the problem of the shortage of accommodation. The view taken in Dr. A.C. Dass's case, therefore, with respect, in much too narrow and appears to be incorrect. 13. The question is whether the view taken in Ram Gopal's case is correct, which is the other extreme, for it that view is correct, then an accommodation once in the occupation of the owner would never cease to be an accommodation and would for all time continue to be an accommodation and every time there is a change of a tenant in occupation of a portion of the accommodation which had once been let out from out of that accommodation, the owner shall always have to be consulted, even though he might have structurally completely divided the two portions in a manner that one has nothing to do with the other. The Act has been enacted to solve the problem of shortage of accommodation. The interests of the owner of an accommodation also no doubt have to be taken into consideration but a balance has to be struck between the competing interests of the owner and the tenant and between the interests of the owner and the purpose of the Act. If the wide interpretation put in Ram Gopal's case is put on Rule 7, then it will put a fetter on the discretion of the rent control authorities in the matter of allotment without any corresponding advantage to the owner. Apart from it, the definition of the term "accommodation" itself contemplates that it need not necessarily be a whole building that may be called an accommodation. By approving the decision in Ram Gopal's case, we shall be widening the scope of the definition by applying Rule 7 to every building a portion of which may be in the occupation of the owner himself. 14. In that case the petitioner before the Court was the owner of a small three storeyed house, the second storey of which consisted of two rooms, one kitchen, one verandah, a latrine and a bath-room. Brij Kishore Sub-Registrar was in occupation of the whole of his second storey except one room which was in the occupation of Ram Gopal, the owner. Brij Kishore was transferred and another Sub-Registrar was posted in this place. Brij Kishore Sub-Registrar was in occupation of the whole of his second storey except one room which was in the occupation of Ram Gopal, the owner. Brij Kishore was transferred and another Sub-Registrar was posted in this place. The accommodation in occupation of the earlier sub-Registrar was allotted to the one who came in his place without consulting the owner of the premises, who was the petitioner before the Court. It was urged in that case that the rule did not apply as the owner was not sharing that part of the accommodation which had been allotted to Brij Kishore. This contention was repelled and it was held that the rule was not intended to cover cases in which the owner of a premises shared a portion allotted to a tenant by the Rent Control Officer. Such a case, it was observed, would hardly ever arise. The observation that such a case of sharing would hardly arise, with respect, does not appear to be correct. There may be an accommodation consisting of, any, four rooms, one kitchen, one latrine and a bathroom. The owner may be in the occupation of them all. But a situation may arise such as his children may have ceased to live with him having become independent or obtained employment elsewhere and he may like to remain in occupation of a smaller accommodation and earn some rent from a portion of the accommodation in his possession. He may take a tenant in two rooms but allow him the common use of the kitchen, bath-room and the latrine. It would be such a case of sharing where it may be said that the accommodation, which has remained with the owner, is another part of the accommodation let out to the tenant. It is in such a case the Rule 7 can apply and should apply. 15. V. Bhargava, J., who was a party to this view, not stick to this view but took somewhat modified a view in another case when he sat with G.C. Mathur, J. (Vide Sri Krishna Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, 1964 ALJ 710). In that case the appellant was the owner of a building which included within it a shop which was on rent with M/s Bata Shoe Company as tenants. The appellant himself was residing in a portion of the same building which was used for residential purposes. In that case the appellant was the owner of a building which included within it a shop which was on rent with M/s Bata Shoe Company as tenants. The appellant himself was residing in a portion of the same building which was used for residential purposes. On the ground floor there were two shops and it was one of those shops which was in the occupation of M/s. Bata Shoe Company. The question arose as to whether the owner also ought to have been consulted when the shop in possession of the Bata Shoe Company fell vacant. It was held that no consultation was necessary. The Bench was of the opinion that it was not necessary for the landlord being consulted under Rule 7 as it did not agree with the view that the shop was a part of one single accommodation a part of which was actually used for residential purpose by the appellant-landlord. It was pointed out that the object of Rule 7 itself shows that a case of that type would not be covered by that rule. The appellant was living on the first floor of the house and was using it for residential accommodation, while the shop on the ground floor was an entirely separate accommodation which was being used for quite a different purpose. Rule 7, in the opinion of the Bench, being not meant to cover such cases. The shop, therefore was not treated as part of the same accommodation which was also being partly occupied by the appellant-landlord even though the shop and the portion occupied by the landlord formed part of the same building. 16. Thus the extreme view taken in Ram Gopal's case itself was thought untenable by one of the Judges who decided that case when a similar question arose in another case, though Ram Gopal's case was not specifically referred to. 17. There are a number of cases of this Court in which the middle course seems to have been adopted. 18. Thus the extreme view taken in Ram Gopal's case itself was thought untenable by one of the Judges who decided that case when a similar question arose in another case, though Ram Gopal's case was not specifically referred to. 17. There are a number of cases of this Court in which the middle course seems to have been adopted. 18. In Bhakat Shiromani v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, AIR 1954 Allahabad 118 : 1953 ALJ 553, the building was sub-divided into two parts described as 11-A and 11-B. It was a two storeyed building and the petitioner in the case, who was the owner, occupied the whole of 11-A and the first floor of 11-B. The premises which were the subject of the allotment order were the ground floor of 11-B. The complaint of the owner was that he was consulted before the allotment order was made. The argument that premises 11-A and 11-B constituted separate accommodations and that Rule 7 had no application was repelled. It was pointed out that it was not possible to lay down any general test by which it could be determined whether the accommodation which had fallen vacant was part of the accommodation occupied by the owner, and that each case must depend upon its own facts. It was held that 11-B was not a separate building but was part of one building which had been sub-divided into two parts. The Bench consisting of Mootham, J. (as he then was) and Sapru, J. was satisfied on the evidence that it was not the whole of the part 11-B which had been allotted to the new tenant but only a portion of that part namely, the ground floor, and that the first floor was in the occupation of the owner. Rule 7 was in the circumstances made applicable. The test in the case was that there had in fact been no separation though the two portions of the same building may have been described as 11-A and 11-B separately and it was a case of the whole accommodation continuing as one. It was in these circumstances that it was remarked that no general test could be laid down which could determine whether the accommodation which had fallen vacant was part of the accommodation occupied by the owner. 19. It was in these circumstances that it was remarked that no general test could be laid down which could determine whether the accommodation which had fallen vacant was part of the accommodation occupied by the owner. 19. In Shrimati Shyam Devi v. The Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra the petitioner was herself occupying one of the tenements, while the rest which were between 15 to 20 in number, were in the occupation of different tenants. One of those tenements in the occupation of lone Lachmi Narain was vacated. The question arose where Rule 7 applied. The Rent Controller, who inspected the site, found, after looking at the details, that the quarters were independent of one another and could not be said to be portions of the same accommodation. The contention raised before the Court that inasmuch as the quarters were part of the same building they must be deemed to be portions of the same accommodation for the purposes of Rule 7, was repelled. Each one of them was a separate accommodation which comprised of a part of a building also. In view of the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller that the disputed quarter was not part of the same accommodation as was in the occupation of the petitioner, Rule 7 placed no obligation upon him to consult the petitioner before making the allotment. 20. In Shiama Shankar Sharma v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Ghaziabad, the two portions of the premises were distinct portion independent of each other except that there appears to be a common opening between the two court-yards to the west and a common verandah to the east. It was held that it could not be said that when the tenant vacated the part occupied by him, a portion of the accommodation fell vacant and the petitioner was in the occupation of another part. Rule 7, it was observed, would apply where an accommodation occupied by a tenant was also occupied in part by the owner. In other words, it would refer to an accommodation where a portion of it was in the joint use of the owner and the tenant. 21. After what has been said above, I am of the view that neither the view taken in Ram Gopal's case nor the view taken in Dr. A.C. Dass's case is correct. In other words, it would refer to an accommodation where a portion of it was in the joint use of the owner and the tenant. 21. After what has been said above, I am of the view that neither the view taken in Ram Gopal's case nor the view taken in Dr. A.C. Dass's case is correct. The correct view is to adopt the middle course and decide each case on the facts of that case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when on allotting to a tenant portion of an accommodation in the occupation of an owner the whole accommodation ceases to be one accommodation and when it continues to remain one accommodation. In the latter case the two portions consisting of the portion in which the tenant had been inducted and the portion which continues to remain in the possession of the owner can be said to be part and parcel of the same accommodation with the result that when the accommodation in the possession of the tenant falls vacant, the other portion which is in the occupation of the owner is another part of the same accommodation. Illustrations, however, can be given to make out this point clearer. For instance, an owner may occupy a whole building. The whole building is an accommodation. But when he lets out a part of it to a tenant, that portion which has been let out to a tenant becomes an accommodation. I have already given an illustration as to how the matter should be treated if the house consists of four rooms, one kitchen, one latrine and a bathroom and two rooms are allotted by the owner to a tenant and the kitchen, latrine and the bathroom have to be shared by the owner and the tenant. In such a case the accommodation continues to be one whole and each accommodation is a part of that accommodation. 22. Let us take another illustration. The whole of the first floor of a building is in the occupation of an owner. A portion of it is let out to a tenant. There is a common staircase for the approach to both the parts. 22. Let us take another illustration. The whole of the first floor of a building is in the occupation of an owner. A portion of it is let out to a tenant. There is a common staircase for the approach to both the parts. The staircase shall have to be used both by the owner and the tenant after a portion of the first floor had been let out in such a way that if either of them arrives late at night, he may be able to use it for the purpose of going to his portion of the accommodation. In such a case it will not be unreasonable if the rent control authorities come to the conclusion that both the accommodations form part of the same accommodation and if one in possession of the tenant was vacant, the other portion of that accommodation in terms of Rule 7 remains in possession of the owner. 23. As already pointed out above, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case shall have to be decided on its own facts and as the authorities under the Act have to take the decision, that decision will prevail. They have to apply their mind to the fact as to whether the two accommodations can be treated as part of the same accommodation or they should be treated as separate accommodations. The Court will not interfere with the finding arrived at by the rent control authorities unless the finding is vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record such as taking into consideration the factors which are not germane for coming to the conclusion, or the conclusion is based on evidence which does not exist or on admissible evidence. 24. In the light of these observations let us examine as to what has been done by the rent control authorities in this case. 25. The decision of the City Magistrate, who happens to be the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in this case, has been confirmed by the Government without assigning any reasons. So we have to examine the reasons given by the City Magistrate himself. The City Magistrate has taken into consideration the report of the Rent Control Inspector who had inspected the house as indicating that the accommodation was a completely separate and independent portion of the house. So we have to examine the reasons given by the City Magistrate himself. The City Magistrate has taken into consideration the report of the Rent Control Inspector who had inspected the house as indicating that the accommodation was a completely separate and independent portion of the house. The appellants examined witnesses before him in an effort to show that the accommodation was not independent, but, according to him, they had failed to do so. He further goes on to remark that it had been admitted that even water and electric connections were separate and both had separate entrances and exists. It was tried to be shown before him that there was a common passage for the Sweeper who came to clean the latrines of the house, but it was remarked that this fact alone could not prove that the two portions were not independent of one another. The approach of the City Magistrate, to my mind, does not appear to be wrong, but the learned counsel for the appellants has pointed out that there was no admission at all in the case that the water and electricity connections were separate, an admission on which the City Magistrate relies. He refers to paragraph 21 of his petition where it is stated that the order of the City Magistrate does not correctly state the position when it says, "It has been admitted that even water and electricity connections are separate and both have separate entrances and exists." No such admission was made on behalf of the petitioners. There is no specific denial of this assertion contained in paragraph 21 in the counter affidavit filed in this case. Certain facts are stated in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit, but not this fact of there being or not being an admission of the kind and it is stated that the rest of the contents were denied. When there was a specific assertion in the petition supported by an affidavit that there was no such admission before the City Magistrate on which the latter relies, there ought to have been a specific denial in the counter-affidavit if this fact was sought to be challenged. There being no such denial I take it that it has been proved that even though there was no admission that even water and electric connections were separate, the City Magistrate has relied on such an admission. There being no such denial I take it that it has been proved that even though there was no admission that even water and electric connections were separate, the City Magistrate has relied on such an admission. It is one of the pieces of evidence on which he has relied. But the question is whether, if this admission is taken out of account, can it be said that the conclusion of the accommodations being separate could still have been arrived at by the City Magistrate ? A reading of the order of the City Magistrate as a whole shows that, apart from the report of the Rent Control Inspector, he had before him this admission only and that in the face of this evidence the evidence produced in the case consisting of the statements of the witnesses was not considered by him to be sufficient to show that the accommodation was not separate and independent. We cannot in these circumstances say as to what the decision of the City Magistrate would have been if he had not relied upon such an admission. The decision has, therefore, been influenced by some thing which does not exist on the record and the order based on such a decision must be set aside. 26. I would, therefore, order that the order of allotment shall be set aside and the matter shall be decided afresh from the evidence on record whether the two accommodations are separate and independent of each other. This means that the orders contained in annexures VII and VIII must be quashed. As a result of the setting aside of these orders the application made by the appellants for the house being released in their favour also shall be open, for when once the order of allotment is cancelled, the appellants will be entitled to press for the release of the accommodation in their favour also. 27. I would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and quash the orders contained in annexures VII and VIII and direct that the City Magistrate will rehear the matter and decide it in accordance with law. He shall also take into consideration the application of the appellants under Rule 6 of the Rules for the release of the accommodation in their favour. In the circumstances of the case parties should bear their own costs. He shall also take into consideration the application of the appellants under Rule 6 of the Rules for the release of the accommodation in their favour. In the circumstances of the case parties should bear their own costs. G.S. Lal, J. - 28. This special appeal against the order of dismissal of a writ petition filed by the appellants involves the interpretation of Rule 7 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules. The case has been referred by a Division Bench to full Bench because of conflicting interpretations of the rule in certain decisions of this Court. 29. The appellants are owners of house No. 227 Mahajni Tola, Faizabad, on succession from Ram Adhin, father of appellant Nos. 1 and 2. They are residing in the ground floor except for three rooms, a small court yard, a kitchen and a latrine and are also in occupation of three rooms in the first floor of the house. The remaining part of the house is in the tenancy of others in portions. One Roshan Lal Gulati was the tenant of the portion of the house consisting, on the ground floor, of the aforesaid rooms, etc., not in the occupation of the appellants and, in the first floor, two rooms and one latrine. Roshan Lal secured for himself by allotment a house elsewhere. Opposite Party No. 5 Jagdish Chandra Sethi a relation of Roshan Lal Gulati, made an application (annexure 1 to the writ petition) on 23.4.1962 for allotment of the accommodation which was in the tenancy of Roshan Lal Gulati and the same day the District Magistrate passed a one word order 'allot' (vide annexure 2 to the writ petition). Coming to know of that order and before the issue of a formal allotment order by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in pursuance of the District Magistrate's direction, appellant Nos. 1 and 2 made an application on 26.4.1962 for the release of the accommodation for their personal use. That application was rejected on 8.5.1962 (vide Annexure 3 to the writ petition). An allotment order was issued on 9.5.1962 in favour of Sri. Jagdish Chandra Sethi (vide Annexure 4 to the writ petition). Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 then filed an objection stating that the allotment had been made without consulting them in violation of Rule 7 (vide Annexure 5 to the writ petition) and should be cancelled. An allotment order was issued on 9.5.1962 in favour of Sri. Jagdish Chandra Sethi (vide Annexure 4 to the writ petition). Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 then filed an objection stating that the allotment had been made without consulting them in violation of Rule 7 (vide Annexure 5 to the writ petition) and should be cancelled. The objection was kept pending whereupon appellant Nos. 1 and 2 then filed a writ petition in this Court. That writ petition was dismissed by order dated 19.11.1962 (vide annexure 6 to writ petition) but with the observation that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was hoped to give prompt attention to the petitioners' objection and to decide it as early as possible. The objection was thereafter considered and dismissed on 7.12.1964 (vide annexure 7 to the writ petition). The City Magistrate who decided the objection was of the opinion that the accommodation allotted to Jagdish Chandra Sethi was completely a separate and independent portion and Rule 7 was not applicable by reason of the mere fact that accommodation allotted and the accommodation in the occupation of the owners were structurally joined together or were adjacent. Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 thereupon approached the State Government under Section 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') but the State Government dismissed their revision application by order dated 22.1.1966 (vide annexure 8 to the writ petition). The appellants thereupon filed thee present writ petition in this Court challenging the validity of the order of the City Magistrate. The writ petition was heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court and was dismissed on 3.8.1967, giving rise to this special appeal. It was held by the learned single Judge that Rule 7 could be invoked only in cases where it is found that what is sought to be allotted is in fact a portion of the accommodation in the occupation of the landlord whereas in the case before him there was a big building consisting of several flats of which some were in the occupation of the owners and the others in the occupation of tenants. The contention on the side of the appellants is that Rule 7 covers all cases where one portion of a building is in occupation of the owner thereof and another portion thereof is proposed to be allotted to a tenant. They draw support for his proposition of law from a Bench decision of this Court in Ram Gopal v. State of U.P., which no doubt helps them. On the side of Jagdish Chandra Sethi, on the other hand, the contention is that Rule 7 has no application to any case where a portion of building already let out is on vacation proposed to be allotted to another tenant irrespective of the fact that the landlord is in occupation of another portion of the building and in whatever manner the two portions may be situated with reference to each other. For this view support is available from a Bench decision of this Court. Dr. A.C. Dass v. T.R.O. and D.S.O. Lucknow. This conflict led to the reference of the special appeal to a Full Bench by the Division Bench before which it came up for hearing. 30. The decided cases of this Court in which the scope of Rule 7 came up for consideration reveal that in several cases a sort of a middle course was adopted between the two extreme views taken in the above mentioned two cases. Boardly speaking, this third view is that Rule 7 will not apply for the mere reason that the owner is in occupation of a portion of a building of which any other portion falls vacant and is to be allotted. On the other hand the interpretation which regards the word 'accommodation' in Rule 7 to mean the larger accommodation which includes both the portions falling vacant and the portion in the occupation of the owner is more in accord with the language of Rule 7 and conducive to reason and carries out the purpose behind the rule in a much larger way that in Dr. A.C. Dass's case which, as already stated, has the effect of virtually negativing the benefit intended to be conferred by the framing of Rule 7. For these reasons I clearly find myself unable to subscribe to the interpretation in Dr. A.C. Dass's case hand the two portions must be so connected with each other that they cannot be regarded as accommodations independent of each other. For these reasons I clearly find myself unable to subscribe to the interpretation in Dr. A.C. Dass's case hand the two portions must be so connected with each other that they cannot be regarded as accommodations independent of each other. The learned Single Judge has been guided by this third view in dismissing the appellant's writ petition. It as to be determined as to which of the three kinds of interpretations may be regarded as the more correct interpretation. The earlier cases may be noticed in this connection. 31. In the earliest case Ram Gopal v. State of U.P. referred to above there was a small three storeyed house of which the second storey except one room was in the occupation of a tenant. On the tenanted accommodation falling vacant the same was allotted to another person without consulting Ram Gopal, the owner of the house, who was in occupation of the aforesaid room in the second storey. It is not clear from the report of the case whether Ram Gopal was in occupation of the first and third storeys. It was urged on the side of the State that Rule 7 did not apply as Ram Gopal was not sharing that part of the accommodation which had been allotted to the vacating tenant. About this argument it was observed in the judgment of the Division Bench consisting of Malik, C.J. and V. Bhargava, J. :- "We do not think that the rule was intended to cover cases in which the owner of a premises shared the portion allotted to a tenant by the Rent Control Officer. Such a case would hardly ever arise. If the interpretation put by the learned Standing Counsel is accepted, the rule would apply only to a case where the owner of the premises was sharing the same accommodation with the tenant in whose favour the allotment order had been made and the two had vacated the premises together. The rule clearly means that, where a portion of a building has fallen vacant, a part of which building is occupied by the owner himself, then the wishes of the owner might like to exclude a troublesome tenant whose presence in another part of the building might seriously inconvenience him. The rule clearly means that, where a portion of a building has fallen vacant, a part of which building is occupied by the owner himself, then the wishes of the owner might like to exclude a troublesome tenant whose presence in another part of the building might seriously inconvenience him. The word 'accommodation' has been defined in the Act as meaning "residential and non-residential accommodation in any buildings or part of the building....." Reading the rule as a whole, we feel satisfied that this was a case where the Magistrate was bound to give notice to the owner and consult his wishes before making the allotment order." This was a case in which the second storey consisted of two rooms, one kitchen, one verandah, a latrine and a bathroom and one of the two rooms was in the occupation of the owner. This was not a case where the tenant was in occupation of a portion of a building quite independent of that portion of the building which was in the occupation of the owner. As to what would have been the reaction of the Bench if such a case were before them, need not be guessed, but it seems clear that even if the rule is not held to apply to parts, of any kind of buildings, still the reason behind the rule as stated in the judgment will provide the guide in interpreting its scope. 32. The next case is Ram Narain Tewari v. Ram Chander Sharma, 1953 ALJ 83 decided by Sapru and M.L. Chaturvedi, JJ. In this case, about the purpose behind the rule it was observed :- "The purpose behind this rule appears to be to provide an opportunity to the landlord to have his say in regard to any proposed allotment of his house. In this case, about the purpose behind the rule it was observed :- "The purpose behind this rule appears to be to provide an opportunity to the landlord to have his say in regard to any proposed allotment of his house. Possibly, this rule has been enacted as it is intended that a person, who is unacceptable to the landlord, should not be forced upon him if he i.e., the landlord is occupying a portion of the house himself." A portion of the house in this case was in the occupation of the agents of the trust which owned the house, on behalf of the trust landlord, while the remaining portion which was in the occupation of the tenant was allotted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to another person on its being vacated by the tenant, without consulting the landlord. It was held that such consultation was obligatory. 33. The next case is Bhakat Shiromani v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer decided by Moothan and Sapru, JJ. In this case as well the purpose behind Rule 7 was enunciated to be to avoid, as far as possible the friction and difficulties which may arise in those cases in which an owner has, in effect, to share his house with a tenant of whom for some reason he may disapprove. In this case the building had been separately assessed by the Municipality in two parts as 11A and 11B and it was urged that the two parts 11A and 11B constituted separate accommodation and Rule 7 had no application. About the general proposition placed before the Bench it was observed that it was not possible to lay down any general test by which it could be determined whether the accommodation which had fallen vacant was part of the accommodation occupied by the owner. It was however found that actually it was only the ground floor of 11B which had been allotted and the first floor thereof was in the occupation of the landlord. In those circumstances Rule 7 was held to apply. 34. The next case in chronological order. Shrimati Shyam Devi v. The Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, 1958 ALJ 913 was decided by Tandon, J. There the building was a big Ahata with open space in the centre and a number of quarters existing on the three sides. In those circumstances Rule 7 was held to apply. 34. The next case in chronological order. Shrimati Shyam Devi v. The Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, 1958 ALJ 913 was decided by Tandon, J. There the building was a big Ahata with open space in the centre and a number of quarters existing on the three sides. These quarters were well marked and the front place pertaining to each was also demarcated. The landlord was residing in one of the quarters. It was held that the mere fact that two or more apartments or tenements are joined together structurally or happen to exist adjacent to each other does not render them as portions of one accommodation and each one of them was a separate accommodation which can comprise of a part of a building also. Rule 7 was held to be inapplicable in such a case. The same learned Judge observed in the later case Nawal Kishore v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer Balundshahr, 1959 ALJ Journal Section p. 66 not reported in full but noted that the purpose and intention of Rule 7 is that the convenience of the owner who is in occupation of a part of the accommodation should be considered in the interest of all concerned including the person who actually is introduced on the premises. 35. Then came the decision Dr. A.C. Dass v. T.R.O. and D.S.O. decided by Desai, C.J. and S.D. Singh, J. as aforesaid. In this case it was held that Rule 7 applies when a portion of an accommodation falls vacant and not when a portion of a building falls vacant. It was observed that the definition of 'accommodation' in Section 2 of the Act is not a definition in the real sense as it does not explain what is meant by accommodation but simply lays down what is included in its ordinary meaning which the Court had been left to ascertain. It was also observed :- "'Accommodation as used in the Act is not synonymous with building; a whole building may be one accommodation or more accommodations. When a part of a building is an accommodation, is an exclusive occupation whether in the whole of a building or in a part of it, by a person with his licensees, such as members of his family, other relations, guests and servants. When a part of a building is an accommodation, is an exclusive occupation whether in the whole of a building or in a part of it, by a person with his licensees, such as members of his family, other relations, guests and servants. If an owner of a building occupies the whole of it, the whole is an accommodation. If two owners jointly owning a building occupy separate portions of it, each portion becomes an accommodation. If an owner himself occupies part of a building and lets out the other part to a tenant, he and the tenant are each in possession of an accommodation. If a building owned by a person is let out to two different tenants, occupying different portions of it, each portion is an accommodation." In the light of the above observations it was held that when the whole of the accommodation falls vacant it cannot be said to be a portion of an accommodation falling vacant merely because the accommodation is in a portion of a building and that Rule 7 applies when a portion of an accommodation falls vacant and not when a portion of a building falls vacant. 36. The accommodation to be let out in this case was the front portion of the ground floor of a building of which the upper floor was in the occupation of the owner. The entire ground floor was in the occupation of a tenant but the tenant withdrew from the front portion of the ground floor to accommodate her brother. It was held that the rule did not call for consultation with the owner as she was not in occupation of a portion of that accommodation of which a portion had fallen vacant. 37. It will appear that according to this decision once a part of a building is let out, it becomes an accommodation in itself and therefore if that accommodation falls vacant there will be no right in the owner who is occupying another portion of the building to be consulted by virtue of Rule 7 as the rule contemplates consultation in that case where portion of an accommodation falls vacant and the other portion is in the occupation of the owner. It follows that the only possible case where an owner will be required to be consulted under Rule 7 will be where the owner wants to let out a portion of the premises in his occupation or withdraws from the occupation of a portion thereof, thereby creating vacancy in the portion. 38. The above line of reasoning was followed in the two later cases decided by a Division Bench consisting of Desai, C.J. and R.S. Pathak, J. These are Girja Devi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi, 1964 ALJ 1054 and Smt. Malika Bai v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, 1964 ALJ 1089. 39. In another case decided in the same year by V. Bhargava and G.C. Mathur, JJ., Sri Krishna Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur the scope of Rule 7 was considered with reference to the allotment of a shop on the ground floor of a building of which the first floor was in the occupation of the owner for residence. It was held that the shop was not a part of one single accommodation, a part of which was actually used for residential purposes by the landlord. It was observed that the object of Rule 7 itself shows that a case of a present type will not be covered by that rule as the owner was living on the first floor and using it for residential accommodation while the shop on the ground floor was entirely a separate accommodation which was being used for quite a different purpose. 40. The only other case brought to our notice is the Single Judge decision Shiama Shankar Sharma v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1967 ALJ 460. In this case Pathak, J. interpreted the rule to apply where the accommodation occupied by a tenant is also occupied in part by the owner, that is to say, the rule refers to an accommodation where a portion of it is in the joint use of the owner and the tenant. Rule 7 runs as follows :- "7. Allotment of a Portion of Accommodation. Rule 7 runs as follows :- "7. Allotment of a Portion of Accommodation. - Where a portion of accommodation falls vacant and the owner is in occupation of another portion thereof, the District Magistrate shall before making the allotment order, consult the owner and shall as far as possible, make the allotment in accordance with the wishes of the owner." It is apparent that the rule has been framed for the benefit of the owner, though to the extent friction between the owner and his tenant occupying portions of the same building is avoided, it will be to the benefit of the tenant as well. Section 7(2) of the Act provides for placing a restriction, in the discretion of the District Magistrate on an owner's right to let or not to let the whole or part of his building and to choose his tenant. The object is two fold; one, to make accommodations available for tenants on account of scarcity conditions and, secondly, to make the same available to prospective tenants according to priority in respect of their needs as determined by the District Magistrate. The Act is primarily meant for the benefit of tenants but on account of the restrictions if imposed on the freedom of the owner to deal with his property in the manner he likes it also makes some provisions to reduce the hardship on owner of accommodations in certain respect. Thus the restriction against eviction of a tenant by his landlords placed by Section 3 is relaxed in case any ground mentioned in Section 3(1) exists, or the District Magistrate grants permission for some proper reason. The control over rent imposed by Section 5 of the Act has also an exception and where there is an agreement between the landlord and the tenant about the rate of rent, the same is required to be honoured. Section 7-B provides a speedy remedy for the landlord getting rid of a tenant who fails to pay rent. The State Government has in exercise of its powers under Section 7 of the Act framed rules known as 'The Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949' most of which are intended to minimise the hardships of owners. Section 7-B provides a speedy remedy for the landlord getting rid of a tenant who fails to pay rent. The State Government has in exercise of its powers under Section 7 of the Act framed rules known as 'The Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949' most of which are intended to minimise the hardships of owners. Rule 7 is one of them and the obvious object behind the rule, as enunciated in some of the decisions noted above, is to enable the owner who is himself occupying a portion of an accommodation to have a say in the matter of the tenant who is to be inducted into another portion thereof in order that he may avoid a troublesome tenant or have a tenant with whom he can afford to live in a portion of the same accommodation. The interpretation of the rule made in Dr. A.C. Dass's case will have the effect of almost negativing the purpose of the rule, for its benefit will be available to an owner only once that is to say, when he wants to let out a portion of the premises in his occupation. Once such letting has taken place, then according to the said interpretation, he will have no say in the matter of the person to whom the rented out portion into be let on its falling vacant again. Obviously there could be no point in accommodating the owner in the matter of the person to be made his tenant only once, having regard to the reason for such accommodation. The same considerations would exist again when allotment of the rented portion of the former single accommodation is to be made. Learned counsel for the respondents has vigorously argued that Rule 7 does not apply at all to a case where a landlord wants to let out a portion of the accommodation in his possession and that it is Rule 8 which applies to such a case. It is not possible to accept this contention. It may be noted that originally the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949 consisted of only seven rules Rules 8, 9 and 10 were added to them after more than two years. Rule 8 is confined to a case where no portion of an accommodation was let out before and the landlord wants to let out a portion of such accommodation. Rule 8 is confined to a case where no portion of an accommodation was let out before and the landlord wants to let out a portion of such accommodation. The landlord may be living or not living in any portion of such accommodation and yet Rule 8 gives the choice to the landlord in the matter of the person to whom the portion proposed to be let out is let out and also entitles him to get permission under Section 3 for the ejectment of such tenant and to get a release of the rented accommodation for his own residence upon the same falling vacant. The benefit under Rule 7 is very much limited and is available only when the owner is occupation of a portion of the accommodation and it applies even to cases where the whole or part of the accommodation was let out at some earlier time. Learned counsel was asked to cite some illustrations when Rule 7 would apply according to him. He could cite as illustration only a case where a house has a garden appertaining to it which is in the common use of the tenant of a portion of that house and of the owner occupying another portion of that house. On a literal interpretation of the rule, as if I may say so with respect, has been done in Dr. A.C. Dass's case, the illustration cited by the learned counsel for the respondents will not fulfil the requirement of Rule 7 because Rule 7 speaks of the owner being "in occupation of another portion thereof" and not joint occupation of any portion. If the rule is not held confined to a case where portion of an accommodation falls vacant by reason of the owner ceasing to occupy that portion while he retains occupation of the other portion, then the rule will carry sense only if the word 'accommodation' is interpreted to mean the larger accommodation one part of which falls vacant either by reason of the owner in occupation thereof ceasing to occupy it or a tenant in occupation thereof ceasing to continue in occupation and the other portion is in the occupation of the owner. It is true that the portion in occupation of the tenant will itself be also an accommodation for the purpose of the Act and so will be the portion in the occupation of the owner. It is true that the portion in occupation of the tenant will itself be also an accommodation for the purpose of the Act and so will be the portion in the occupation of the owner. But the word 'accommodation' used in the rule is intended to mean the accommodation by taking together the portion in the occupation of the tenant and the portion in the occupation of the owner. There is absolutely no difficulty in putting this interpretation for according to the definition of 'accommodation' in Section 2 clause (a), 'accommodation' means residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or a part of a building. If a building is let out in two portions, it does not cease to be an accommodation in itself, though the two portions will also themselves be an accommodation each. Similarly if a portion of a bigger accommodation is in the owner's occupation and the other portion is let out to a tenant, the bigger accommodation does not lose the character of an accommodation within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act by reason of a portion thereof having been let out. There is nothing in the definition itself to relate it to letting and therefore there is no reason to think that once a portion of a larger accommodation is let out and the larger accommodation is split into two accommodations, the larger accommodation itself goes out of the definition of 'accommodation'. Even if that were so, there would be no difficulty in interpreting the word 'accommodation' in Rule 7 to mean the large accommodation, for as soon as the tenant vacates the portion of the larger accommodation and the letting comes to an end, that portion will for the time being howsoever small, be no longer accommodation in itself and the whole will be one accommodation. The rented out portion will again become accommodation upon its being let out to another tenant. It is thus obvious that there is nothing in Rule 7 which compels, by reason of the definition of accommodation in Section 2(a) of the Act, to make that interpretation of Rule 7 as has been done in Dr. A.C. Dass's case. The rented out portion will again become accommodation upon its being let out to another tenant. It is thus obvious that there is nothing in Rule 7 which compels, by reason of the definition of accommodation in Section 2(a) of the Act, to make that interpretation of Rule 7 as has been done in Dr. A.C. Dass's case. On the other hand the interpretation which regards the word 'accommodation' in Rule 7 to mean the larger accommodation which includes both the portions falling vacant and the portion in the occupation of the owner is more in accord with the language of Rule 7 and conducive to reason and carries out the purpose behind the rule in a much larger way that in Dr. A.C. Dass's case which, as already stated, has the effect of virtually negativing the benefit intended to be conferred by the framing of Rule 7. For these reasons I clearly find myself unable to subscribe to the interpretation in Dr. A.C. Dass's case. 41. The next question which arises is whether the word 'accommodation' in rule 7 is to be taken to be synonymous with the word 'building', so that if there is one building owned by the same person or persons then the rule will apply when any portion in that building falls vacant while any other portion in the building is in the occupation of the owner. To my mind it would be outstripping the object of Rule 7 and also the purposes of the Act to hold that Rule 7 will apply even in the case of such a building which may be called a 'building' just because of structural contiguity of several partes thereof otherwise independent for all practical purposes, such as a number of flats built by one person, one by the side of and contiguous to another. It would then be overlooked altogether the significance of the word 'portion' used in Rule 7. There will hardly be any difference between the owner occupying one of such flats and an owner who is in occupation of a building situated at a small distance from such a building. It would then be overlooked altogether the significance of the word 'portion' used in Rule 7. There will hardly be any difference between the owner occupying one of such flats and an owner who is in occupation of a building situated at a small distance from such a building. Having regard to the facts of that case it cannot be said that the Bench which decided the case Ram Gopal v. State of U.P. meant to cover even such a case in lying down that where a portion of a building has fallen vacant a part of which building is occupied by the owner himself, then the wishes of the owner should be ascertained. What they had in mind was 'a building' of which a portion was let out and the other was in the owner's occupation, and not a group of independent type of buildings joined together structurally, one of which was in the owner's occupation. The rule itself is suggestive of the fact that the premises falling vacant and the premises in the owner's occupation should be such that they may be regarded as portions of one accommodation or building. This must be regarded as an essential requisite for the application of Rule 7. I, therefore, find myself in complete agreement with the view taken by Tandon, J. Shrimati Shyam Devi v. The Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra. The diversity of cases in which the question of application of the rule will arise will be vast and therefore no hard and fast test can be laid down for determining when the portion falling vacant and the portion in the occupation of the landlord can be regarded as portions of one accommodation, but the guiding principle will no doubt be the underlying idea behind the framing of the rule namely, that the two portions should be so situated or should be governed by such circumstances that the owner is likely to be seriously inconvenienced if he is not allowed to have a tenant of his choice either because the proposed tenant is troublesome or otherwise unacceptable to the landlord or because the common living in portions of the accommodation is likely to bring about friction between the owner and the tenant unless both are accommodative. I may recall in this connection the case Bhakat Shiromani v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, where also it was observed that it was not possible to lay down any general test by which it could be determined whether the accommodation which had fallen vacant was part of the accommodation occupied by the owner and in which the suggestion appeared to be that it has to be seen whether the case is of an owner having, in effect, to share his house with a tenant. Whether there is a case for the convenience of the owner in respect of his own occupation of a part of the accommodation will be an important relevant consideration in deciding if the case falls under Rule 7 or not. 42. To illustrate how a hard and fast test cannot be laid down the case of a two storeyed building may be cited. The upper portion may be so constructed that it has nothing in common with the lower portion and can be used without affecting the convenience of the occupant of the lower portion, or vice versa. In such a case even though there is one building but the two storeys may not be regarded as portions of one accommodation having regard to the purpose of the rule and the rule may be inapplicable whether the owner occupies the upper storey or the lower storey. A case of this kind was that in Sri Krishna Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, in which an owner occupying the first floor of a building for his residence was held not entitled to consultation under Rule 7 in respect of the allotment of a shop on the ground floor of a building. On the other hand there may be a two-storeyed building in which the lower part, for example, is overlooked from the upper part by reason of an open inner courtyard. Having regard to considerations of privacy the right to which is recognised in law as well, this will turn into a case where the owner may be regarded as, in effect, sharing his house with the tenant and for his convenience he should have a say in the matter of the tenant. Having regard to considerations of privacy the right to which is recognised in law as well, this will turn into a case where the owner may be regarded as, in effect, sharing his house with the tenant and for his convenience he should have a say in the matter of the tenant. A numerous class of cases coming within the four corners of Rule 7 will be where the owner and his tenant have to use in common one or more portion or portions of the larger accommodation, such as an inner courtyard or a room or a verandah not completely partitioned. 43. The jurisdiction to decide if there is a case covered by Rule 7 will of course be of the District Magistrate or any other authority exercising the powers of the District Magistrate under the Act and the proper procedure for the District Magistrate or such authority, whenever the question of the allotment of part of a building as distinguished from the whole, comes before him, will be to apply his mind to the question whether Rule 7 is applicable (unless this has already been done on some earlier occasion) and then to consult the owner before making the allotment if the rule is found by him to be applicable. He may have to make a local inspection or to secure other material such as a plan of the building, to form his opinion. 44. Coming to the instant case, the portion of the house in controversy, formerly occupied by Roshanlal Gulati, consists of both a part of the ground floor and a part of the first floor and it does not appear that the learned City Magistrate properly applied his mind after taking into consideration relevant circumstances in giving the finding that the disputed portion was an independent portion. He did not take into consideration if there was a common passage for the latrine and if it had any bearing on the question of the convenience of the owner. He took it as admitted that water and electricity connections of the disputed portion were quite separate, though there is nothing on the record to show that there was any such admission. He took it as admitted that water and electricity connections of the disputed portion were quite separate, though there is nothing on the record to show that there was any such admission. His findings is therefore vitiated on the apparent errors mentioned above and accordingly his order rejecting the appellants' application against the allotment without consulting him (Annexure 7) cannot be sustained and must be quashed along with the order of the State Government in revision. The appellants have also sought in their writ petition the issue of a direction to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to dispose of the release application according to law and the ground advanced for the same is that the release application was rejected on the report of the Inspector given behind the back of the appellants and never disclosed to them. There is justification for the prayer for rehearing of the application by giving an opportunity to the appellants to have their say on the report of the Inspector. There is a further prayer for quashing the allotment order but since as yet a case for the application of Rule 7 has not been made out and the release application was made after the allotment order there can be no order for the quashing of the allotment. The matter will abide the findings of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 45. I would therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and quash the orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer contained in annexure 7 to the writ petition and of the State Government contained in annexure 8 to the writ petition and also quash the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer contained in Annexure 3 to the writ petition rejecting the application for release, and direct the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to rehear both the release application and the application regarding the applicability of rule 7 and to decide afresh whether there is a case for release and if there is no such case, whether rule 7 is applicable. If he finds that there is a case for release or that Rule 7 is applicable, he shall cancel the allotment order and proceed according to his findings. O.P. Trivedi, J. - 46. If he finds that there is a case for release or that Rule 7 is applicable, he shall cancel the allotment order and proceed according to his findings. O.P. Trivedi, J. - 46. I have seen the judgments of my learned colleagues and I need not therefore repeat the facts of the case giving rise to this appeal except to the extent necessary for my purpose. 47. The question which arises in this case and upon which turns the decision of the appeal relates to the interpretation to be put on the wordings of Rule 7 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Rules 7 of the Rules is as follows :- "Where a portion of accommodation falls vacant and the owner is in occupation of another portion thereof, the District Magistrate shall, before making the allotment order, consult the owner and shall so far as possible make the allotment in accordance with the wishes of the owner." The question as to the circumstances under which the owner is entitled to be consulted by the District Magistrate in the matter of allotment of an accommodation and the interpretation to be put on Rule 7 has arisen in a number of decisions of this Court. They are : Ram Gopal v. State of U.P.; Bhakat Shiromani v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer; Shrimati Shyam Devi v. The Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra; Dr. A.C. Dass v. T.R.O. and D.S.O., Lucknow; Sri Krishna Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur; Girja Devi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi, 1964 ALJ 1054; Smt. Malika Bai v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, 1964 ALJ 1089 and Shiama Shankar Sharma v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Ghaziabad. 48. Ram Gopal's case was decided by Malik, C.J., and Bhargava, J. (as he then was), being the earliest case on the subject. The view expressed in that case was that the words 'portion of accommodation' used in the rule mean portion of a building and observed : "The rule clearly means that, where a portion of a building has fallen vacant, a part of which building is occupied by the owner himself, then the wishes of the owner should be ascertained." In support of this view they referred to the wide definition of the word 'accommodation' given in the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. It appears that a broad and wide interpretation was given to the language of Rule 7 and it was held in effect to apply to every case where an accommodation in the whole building or any part of a building whether the same was in the occupation of the owner, tenant or sub-tenant falls vacant. 49. The next case of Bhakat Shiromani was decided by Mootham and Sapru, JJ. A building owned by the petitioner was sub-divided into two parts known as 11-A and 11-B and had been separately assessed by the Municipality. The owner occupied the whole of 11-A and the first floor of 11-B. The dispute related to the ground floor of 11-B in respect of which an allotment order had been passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer without previously consulting the owner. The contention of the owner before the High Court was that he was entitled to be consulted under Rule 7 above. This contention was resisted by the counsel for respondent on the ground that premises 11-A and 11-B constituted separate accommodations and that consequently Rule 7 had no application. He relied upon the fact that the premises had been separately assessed by the Municipality and was conclusive as regards separateness of the accommodation. This argument was not accepted by the bench. It was held that rule 7 applied and that the owner was entitled to prior consultation before allotment. In that connection following observation was made : "It is clear that 11-B is not a separate building but is part of one building which has been sub-divided into two parts. We are also satisfied on the evidence that it is not the whole of the part 11-B which has been allotted to respondent 2, but only a portion of that part, namely, the ground floor, and that the first floor is in the occupation of the petitioner. We are, therefore satisfied that the facts are such as make applicable the provisions of Rule 7. We are, therefore satisfied that the facts are such as make applicable the provisions of Rule 7. We hold, therefore, that the petitioner ought to have been consulted before the allotment order in favour of respondent 2 was made......" It is therefore clear that in this case also the same wide interpretation was put on the wordings of Rule 7 as was done in Ram Gopal v. State of U.P. In other words, the decision in this case also proceeded on the basis that the accommodation 11-B which had fallen vacant for allotment was a portion of the same building in another portion of which building the owner had been in occupation. In arriving at that decision no such consideration as the structural separateness or independence of the accommodation falling vacant and the portion in the owner's occupation, entered their mind. 50. It is convenient here to deal with Dr. A.C. Dass's case. That case was decided by M.C. Desai, C.J., and S.D. Singh, J. and represents another extreme of the view, on the meaning of Rule 7. In that case a narrow interpretation was placed on the rule and contrary to what was held in Ram Gopal's case expression was given to the view that 'accommodation' as used in the Act is not synonymous with building; that rule 7 applies when a portion of an accommodation falls vacant and not when a portion of a building falls vacant. Unless the owner was himself in occupation of the whole accommodation one cannot speak of a portion of the accommodation falling vacant and the other being in occupation. They held that Rule 7 applies only to a case where the entire accommodation was one accommodation previously in the occupation of the owner and a portion of it falls vacant either on account of the owner ceasing to occupy or making in available for letting or for allotment to a tenant. It follows from this narrow interpretation of the rule that rule 7 does not apply where an accommodation in the occupation of a tenant or sub-tenant falls vacant. 51. It follows from this narrow interpretation of the rule that rule 7 does not apply where an accommodation in the occupation of a tenant or sub-tenant falls vacant. 51. The case of Girja Devi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi was decided by M.C. Desai, C.J. and R.S. Pathak, J. In that case portion of a building was in the occupation of a representative of the owner and another portion of it had fallen vacant which was allotted by the District Magistrate to respondent No. 3 of the case. In the High Court the contention of the owner was that she was entitled to be consulted by the District Magistrate under Rule 7. This contention was over-ruled on the ground that the whole of the accommodation had fallen vacant and not a portion of it and because Rule 7 speaks of falling vacant of a portion of the accommodation the rule did not apply to the case. It was observed in that connection : "When the whole falls vacant, it is impossible to predicate that a portion of it is in the occupation of another person. If a portion is in another's occupation the whole does not fall vacant at all." This shows that this case was also decided upon the view which was expressed in Dr. A.C. Dass's case earlier by Desai, C.J. while therefore the stand taken in the case of Dr. A.C. Dass was reiterated and not modified an alternative consideration was also taken note of as appears from the following passage reported at page 1055 of the report : "Not only is she not occupying a portion of the accommodation that has fallen vacant, but also she is not occupying the remaining portion of the building of which the accommodation is a part." It is this alternative consideration which, with respect, to my mind represents the correct approach and which was the underlying approach in Ram Gopal's case, viz., the rule was interpreted to apply to portion of a building falling vacant when another portion of that building is in the occupation of the owner. In Dr. A.C. Dass's case on the contrary the view that the rule applied to portion of a building falling vacant had been earlier discounted. 52. In Dr. A.C. Dass's case on the contrary the view that the rule applied to portion of a building falling vacant had been earlier discounted. 52. Then come a series of cases beginning from the case of Shrimati Shyam Devi v. The Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, which may now be taken up, and in which a common view was taken. Shyam Devi's case was decided by J.K. Tandon, J. This case is said to mark the beginning of what is described as the middling view on the meaning of Rule 7. The petitioner in that case was the owner of an Ahata bearing a municipal number which consisted of a number of tenements existing on three sides with a big open courtyard in the centre. The owner herself occupied one of the tenements while the rest were in the occupation of different tenants. One of such tenements fell vacant and the same was allotted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to respondent No. 3 of the case without consulting the owner. The contention for the allottee before the High Court was that Rule 7 did not apply as the disputed quarter was not part of the same accommodation as was in the occupation of the owner. This contention was not accepted for the reason that the quarters were independent of one another and could not be said to be portions of the same accommodation. By implication Rule 7 was interpreted to apply only to those cases where the accommodation falling vacant and the portion in the occupation of the owner are not structurally separate and independent. 53. The case of Sri Krishna Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur was decided by V. Bhargava and G.C. Mathur, JJ. The owner of the disputed building had two shops in the ground floor. The owner was living on the first floor of the house. It was held that Rule 7 did not apply because the shop which had fallen vacant was situate on the ground floor and it was entirely separate accommodation being used for quite a different purpose and that Rule 7 "is not meant to cover such a case. The owner was living on the first floor of the house. It was held that Rule 7 did not apply because the shop which had fallen vacant was situate on the ground floor and it was entirely separate accommodation being used for quite a different purpose and that Rule 7 "is not meant to cover such a case. The shop is not to be treated as part of the same accommodation which was also being partly occupied by the appellant." It will appear that this case was decided on the basis of the view which was taken on the interpretation of Rule 7 by Tandon, in Shyama Devi's case. 54. Smt. Malika Bai v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, 1964 ALJ 1089 was decided by M.C. Desai, C.J. and R.S. Pathak, J. the appellant in that case was the owner of two houses bearing Nos. 56-A to 310. Rahat Bai was her tenant in house No. 56-A. It was proved in the case that the owner was not in occupation of any portion of house No. 56-A and that she was occupying the other house No. 310. She filed a suit for the ejectment of Rahat Bai and before the date was fixed for hearing the tenant wrote to the District Magistrate that she was intending to vacate the accommodation in the near future; whereupon the District Magistrate allotted the premises to the respondent and the tenant handed over possession to the allottee. The owner came to the High Court and challenged the order of allotment on the ground, amongst others that the order had infringed Rule 7. This contention was over-ruled on the ground that Rule 7 did not apply because the owner did not occupy any portion of the accommodation which had fallen vacant and because the remaining portion of the house was not a portion of that accommodation. That was a case which presented no difficulty in determining whether Rule 7 applied or not because Nos. 56-A and 310 were two separate and distinct houses and Rule 7 clearly had no application because the entire house No. 56-A formed one accommodation in the complete occupation of the tenant and because no part of it was in the owners possession. 56-A and 310 were two separate and distinct houses and Rule 7 clearly had no application because the entire house No. 56-A formed one accommodation in the complete occupation of the tenant and because no part of it was in the owners possession. Therefore, the decision in that case does not provide any assistance to the present discussion and besides it cannot be said that it represents any modification of the view which was expressed earlier by Desai, C.J. in the case of Dr. A.C. Dass. 55. The last case of Shiama Shankar Sharma v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Ghaziabad, was decided by R.S. Pathak, J. In that case the owner resided in one part of a house and the other part was let out to a tenant, A.B. Hajela. The accommodation fell vacant and was allotted by the authorities to the respondent of the case. The owner applied to the High Court for quashing of the allotment order on the ground inter alia that he was entitled before allotment to be consulted under Rule 7 of the Rules. This contention was not accepted on the ground that there were two distinct portions of the premises independent of each other except that there was a common opening between the two courtyards to the west and a common verandah to the east. It was observed : "It would, therefore, appear that there are two distinct units of residence. It cannot be said that when Hajela vacated the part occupied by him a portion of it fell vacant and the petitioner was in occupation of another portion of that part Rule 7 would apply where the accommodation occupied by a tenant is also occupied in part by the owner. In other words, it would refer to an accommodation where a portion of it is in the joint use of the owner and the tenant. It appears that this case was also based on the view which was taken by Tandon, J. in Shyam Devi's case. 56. In other words, it would refer to an accommodation where a portion of it is in the joint use of the owner and the tenant. It appears that this case was also based on the view which was taken by Tandon, J. in Shyam Devi's case. 56. With all respects, I am of opinion that the view on the meaning of Rule 7 which was taken in Ram Gopal's case and which appears to have been followed in Bhakat Shiromani's case was the correct view for reasons set out in the following paragraphs : Rule 7 requires the fulfilment of the following conditions : (1) That which falls vacant is a portion of accommodation. (2) The owner is in occupation of another portion thereof. Both these conditions must be fulfilled before the rule can apply in a given case. The rule cannot be applied if only one of the aforesaid conditions is satisfied. Before proceeding further it may be stated that the general rule of construction as observed in Attorney General v. Lockwood, 1942(9) M&W 378, 398 is that all statutes should be construed literally, i.e. according to the plain ordinary, grammatical and literal meaning of the words, if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Pollock, C.B., pointed out in Waugh v. Middle on, 1853(1) Hud. and Bro. 352, 356 : "It must, however, be contended that where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail, unless there be some strong and obvious reasons to the contrary." The same rule was better stated by an Irish Judge, Burton, J. in Warburton v. Loveland, 1828(1) Hud. and Bro., 632, 648 and quoted with approval by Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, 1883(8) App, Cas. 354, 384, viz : "I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." 57. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." 57. The canon as to departure from the grammatical meaning was thus stated by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson, 1857(6) HLC 61, 106 : "I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted atleast in the Courts law in Westminster Hall - that in construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no further." 58. To my mind Dr. A.C. Dass's case was decided according to the rule of literal construction and by giving to the word 'accommodation' its ordinary and plain meaning. Upon literal interpretation of Rule 7 result is bound to be as pointed out in that case with only this modification that the rule will apply also to cases where at successive stages the owner chooses not to continue in occupation of portion of the accommodation which were in his possession previously and makes them available for letting out or allotment so that Rule 7 will apply only to those cases where any portion of a building previously in the occupation of the owner becomes vacant either by his ceasing to occupy it or by his making the same available for letting out or allotment to another person. This will be the inevitable result of a literal interpretation being placed on the wordings of Rule 7 for reasons given in Dr. A.C. Dass's case. The Rent Control and Eviction Act deals with units of accommodation or entire accommodation and does not deal with portions of an accommodation as pointed out in Dr. A.C. Dass's case. That being so, there cannot be a portion of accommodation falling vacant unless first just previously the entire accommodation was one accommodation. A.C. Dass's case. The Rent Control and Eviction Act deals with units of accommodation or entire accommodation and does not deal with portions of an accommodation as pointed out in Dr. A.C. Dass's case. That being so, there cannot be a portion of accommodation falling vacant unless first just previously the entire accommodation was one accommodation. Upon a literal interpretation, the rule cannot possibly apply to the vacancy of an accommodation which was in the occupation of a tenant firstly, because a portion of such an accommodation cannot fall vacant. There is one unit of accommodation in the occupation of a tenant and if he ceases to occupy it or notifies his intention to vacate it then the entire accommodation which was in his occupation must fall vacant. It is not open to a tenant to retain possession of a part of the accommodation which was let out or allotted to him and to cease to occupy the remaining part of it to notify the vacation by him of another part. This is so because the allotment relates to one unit of accommodation and therefore unless he vacates or surrenders his interest in the entire unit which was let out or allotted to him he will continue to be treated as a tenant of the entire accommodation and continue to be liable for payment of rent for the entire accommodation to his landlord irrespective of whether he ceases to occupy a portion of it. It was held by a full Bench of this Court in the case of N.C. Aggarwal v. Krishan Lal Mehra on the basis of observations contained in the case of Brij Kishore v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer and Magistrate, 1954 ALJ 172 in the following words reproduced with approval : "The disuse by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation let to him does not amount to the tenant's vacating that portion of the accommodation and does not, therefore, give any right to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to allot such portion of the accommodation to another person." In the case of Brij Kishore v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer and Magistrate, 1954 ALJ 172 another observation was made which has relevance for the present discussion. It was observed : "The vacancy of an accommodation referred to in Section 7 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act means the vacancy of entire accommodation in the tenancy of any person and cannot refer to the tenant's not using, for the time being, part of the accommodation which had been let out to him." In that case the question arose whether the District Magistrate was competent to allot portion of an accommodation which was in the possession of a sub-tenant and had been vacated by him. It was held that the District Magistrate had no power to split up an accommodation which was let out or allotted to an tenant and consequently could not make an allotment in respect of a portion of an accommodation which was originally let out to a tenant and had subsequently been vacanted. He has to consider the entire accommodation as one unit just as it had been a unit of tenancy from before. He cannot create several accommodations out of one unit of accommodation and then order the landlord to let out those divided portions of the accommodation to different persons. It is therefore clear that if the rule is given a literal interpretation then it will not apply to a portion of accommodation which was in the possession of a tenant or sub-tenant falling vacant because such an accommodation can only fall vacant in its entirety and a portion of such accommodation cannot fall vacant. Here I would like to note that Rule 7 will not apply to a case where the owner and the tenant are in joint possession. When a portion of a building the whole of which was formerly in the occupation of the landlord falls vacant and that portion is let out to a tenant then a separate unit of accommodation is created. If the tenant sub-lets a portion of the said accommodation under sub-section (3) of Section 7 with the consent of the landlord and the permission of the District Magistrate then a third unit of accommodation is created which is in the occupation of the sub-tenant. Thus, three independent and separate accommodations are created in the building and none of these accommodations can be regarded as portion of the other accommodation out of which it was carved out. Thus, three independent and separate accommodations are created in the building and none of these accommodations can be regarded as portion of the other accommodation out of which it was carved out. That being so, it cannot be said that so far as owner and the tenant are concerned the whole accommodation will be an accommodation; inasmuch as the whole house ceases to be one unit of accommodation when a portion of it was let out to the tenant. Thereafter, the remaining portion which continued to be in the occupation of the owner became one accommodation and the portion in the exclusive occupation of the tenant will be another accommodation. The two accommodations will therefore be separate and independent and the tenant's accommodation cannot be regarded, having regard to the definition of 'accommodation' in Section 2(a) of the Act which implies exclusive occupation and having regard to the scheme of the Act which deals with independent units of accommodation, as portion of the accommodation in the occupation of the owner. 59. In the case of Girja Devi v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Varanasi, Desai C.J., and R.S. Pathak, J. observed at page 1055 : "When the whole falls vacant, it is impossible to predicate that a portion of it is in the occupation of another person. If a portion is in another's occupation the whole does not fall vacant at all." This can be possible only if we construe the word 'accommodation' occurring in Rule 7 to mean a building for in that case every accommodation in the occupation of a tenant or a sub-tenant will be portion of the building. That being so, as between the tenant and the owner the whole house cannot be treated as an accommodation which, on leasing out allotment ceases to be an accommodation and only that part of it which remains in the owner's occupation becomes accommodation. It follows therefore upon literal interpretation being placed on the word 'accommodation' in Rule 7 that there can be no question of one accommodation being portion of another. One or more accommodations can be portions of the same building only but not of each other. Any other interpretation is not acceptable as the rule does not say "When the owner is in occupation of a portion of the previous accommodation". One or more accommodations can be portions of the same building only but not of each other. Any other interpretation is not acceptable as the rule does not say "When the owner is in occupation of a portion of the previous accommodation". In Girja Debi's case also Desai, C.J. and R.S. Pathak, J. gave expression to the above view. For the above reasons, with due respects, I differ from the following observations made by Sahgal, J. when he says : "Thus the possibility of one accommodation being part of another accommodation cannot be ruled out and if an accommodation which is part of another accommodation is vacated in spite of complete accommodation being vacated, it will still be the case of a part of no accommodation being vacated, the other part of which is in the possession of the landlord." Nor to my mind, with due respects to Sahgal, J. will Rule 7 apply to a case when an accommodation occupied by a tenant was also occupied in part by the owner. In other words, when an accommodation is in the joint use of the owner and the tenant Rule 7 does not apply. I am led to this conclusion by the following portion of Rule 7 : "The owner is in occupation of another portion thereof." This, to my mind, implies that the owner is in exclusive occupation of another accommodation. If it were a case of joint possession between the owner and the tenant and if a portion of such accommodation had fallen vacant then the wordings of the rule should have been to the effect : "and the owner was in joint possession of another portion thereof." The existing words clearly seem to point to exclusive possession of the owner and not sharing of possession by him with the tenant. This was also the view taken in Ram Gopal's case. It was specifically urged in that case by the Standing Counsel that this rule does not apply as the applicant of that case was not sharing that part of the accommodation which had been allotted to Brij Kishore. This was also the view taken in Ram Gopal's case. It was specifically urged in that case by the Standing Counsel that this rule does not apply as the applicant of that case was not sharing that part of the accommodation which had been allotted to Brij Kishore. This contention was rejected with the following observations : "We do not think that the rule was intended to cover cases in which the owner of a premises shared the portion allotted to a tenant by the Rent Control Officer." Another reason which swayed this view was : "If the interpretation put by the learned Standing Counsel is accepted, the rule would apply only to a case where the owner of the premises was sharing the same accommodation with the tenant in whose favour the allotment order had been made and the two had vacated the premises together." Such an interpretation, according to their Lordships deciding Ram Gopal's case, was likely to defeat the object of enactment of Rule 7. This may perhaps be argued of the original accommodation of the tenant, a portion of which has been sublet, continuing to be a whole or one unit of accommodation, but in that case while one condition of the rule, may be satisfied, namely, that it would be a case of portion of an accommodation falling vacant, the other condition of the rule, namely, that another portion of the accommodation should be in the occupation of the owner, will remain unsatisfied for in the other portion of such accommodation it is the tenant and not the landlord who will be in occupation. The rule speaks of occupation of the owner rather than that of the landlord in another portion of the accommodation. 60. In Girja Debi's case at page 1055 it was observed :- "When the whole (accommodation) falls vacant, it is impossible to predicate that a portion of it is in the occupation of another person. If a portion is in another's occupation the whole does not fall vacant at all. With due respect this was expression of a correct view. This literal interpretation adopted in Dr. If a portion is in another's occupation the whole does not fall vacant at all. With due respect this was expression of a correct view. This literal interpretation adopted in Dr. Dass's case therefore cannot be accepted as it would lead to a manifest contradiction of the purpose of Rule 7 and inconsistency and repugnance with the definition of the word 'accommodation' given in Section 2(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter called the Act). 'Accommodation' has been defined in Section 2 to be so wide as to apply not only to the whole building in occupation of the owner as also to parts of the building in exclusive occupation of a tenant or sub-tenant; but the interpretation given in Dr. A.C. Dass's case narrows down the scope of the rule in portions of such accommodation falling vacant the whole of which was previously in the occupation of the owner. Thus, there would be inconsistency and repugnance with a portion of the Act contained in Section 2. Another result of this narrow interpretation will be that the owner would be deprived of the right of consultation in the case of accommodation occupied by tenants or sub-tenants falling vacant. This will be self-defeating so far as the object of enactment of this rule is concerned, namely, to avoid friction between the owner and the tenants by excluding persons who are regarded by the owner to be undesirable. If the narrow interpretation of Dr. A.C. Dass's case is adopted then one would be acting on the assumption that a tenant who may prove to be undesirable or a nuisance to the owner can be brought into the building only in those cases where portion of an accommodation the whole of which was previously in the occupation of the owner falls vacant and not in cases where portion of an accommodation which was previously in the occupation of the owner falls vacant and not in cases where portion of an accommodation which was previously in the tenant's occupation falls vacant. This would be proceeding on a wrong as well as wholly ungrounded assumption. Therefore, a narrow interpretation will cause not only an inconsistency and repugnance with the definition given in Section 2 but also lead to a contradiction of the purpose of Section 7. This would be proceeding on a wrong as well as wholly ungrounded assumption. Therefore, a narrow interpretation will cause not only an inconsistency and repugnance with the definition given in Section 2 but also lead to a contradiction of the purpose of Section 7. There is consensus of authority that the object of Rule 7 was to provide facility to the owner of the building to exclude from the building a tenant who may prove to be a nuisance to him. 61. In Ram Gopal's case one meets with the following observations in this connection : "The reason is obvious. The owner might like to exclude a troublesome tenant whose presence in another part of the building might seriously inconvenience him." 62. In the case of Shri Ram Narain Tewari v. Ram Chander Sharma etc., it was observed : "The purpose behind this rule appears to be to provide an opportunity to the landlord to have his say in regard to any proposed allotment of his house. Possibly, this rule has been enacted as it is intended that a person, who is unacceptable to the landlord, should not be forced upon him if he i.e. the landlord is occupying a portion of the house himself." 63. In the case of Bhakat Shiromani v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, we have the remarks : "In our opinion the purpose of this rule is to avoid as far as possible, the friction and difficulties which may arise in those cases in which an owner has, in effect, to share his house with a tenant of whom for some reason he may disapprove." 64. In the case of Jangi Lal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, AIR 1954 Allahabad 126 Malik, C.J. and Chaturvedi, J. delivered themselves of the following remarks which were in line with the above : "The rule provides that the wishes of the landlord are to be consulted so that the unwelcome or a troublesome tenant may not be forced on the landlord and thus cause him inconvenience when he is occupying a part of the house." It is clear to me that Rule 7 was made for the exclusive benefit of the owner and not for the benefit to both the owner and the tenant. Therefore, broadest interpretation should be placed on Rule 7 so that the above purpose of the enactment of this rule can be achieved and a narrow interpretation which defeats, in a large measure, this object should be avoided. 65. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition at page 221 quoting from English Reports states : "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collection, or by rejecting them altogether, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilful or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used." The conditions under which the ordinary rule of literal interpretation should be departed from were thus stated by Burton, J. in the case of Warburton v. Loveland quoted in terms with approval by Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, which bears reproduction in this context : "I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." To the same effect were the observations of Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson quoted above already in a different connection : "I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted - at least in the Courts of law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills, and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no further." The rule of interpretation which was adopted in Dr. A.C. Dass's case, for reasons above stated, clearly leads to repugnance and inconsistency with the rest of the provisions of the Act as also produces a contradiction of the manifest purpose of Rule 7. That interpretation should therefore be discarded and an interpretation which will lead to the fulfilment of the intentions behind the rule should be adopted even though it may involve the giving of unusual meaning to the word 'accommodation'. In my view, this purpose can be achieved only by adopting the broad interpretation which was given to the rule in Ram Gopal's case. In my view, this purpose can be achieved only by adopting the broad interpretation which was given to the rule in Ram Gopal's case. I am further of the view that the word 'accommodation' in the rule should be understood in the sense of "building in which an accommodation exists." If that meaning is given to the word then the rule will read some what as follows :- "Where a portion of a building in which accommodation exists falls vacant and the owner is in occupation of another portion thereof the District Magistrate, shall before making the allotment order consult the owner and shall so far as possible make the allotment in accordance with the wishes of the owner." Upon this interpretation both the conditions of the rule will be satisfied whether it is an accommodation in the occupation of the tenant or the sub-tenant which falls vacant or whether it is part of the accommodation which was occupied by the owner. There will be no inconsistency or repugnance with any provisions of the Act and the purpose behind the rule that those persons who for reasons best known to the owner, may prove troublesome and undesirable to him will be excluded by prior consultation with him before allotment. 66. I pass now to the case of Ram Gopal v. State of U.P., in which the view was expressed that the rule clearly means that where a portion of building has fallen vacant a part of which building is occupied by the owner himself, then the wishes of the owner should be ascertained. This was based on the fact that the definition of 'accommodation' given in Section 2 was very wide in terms. In Dr. Dass's case it was observed that the word 'accommodation' as used in the Act is not synonymous with building. This was based on the fact that the definition of 'accommodation' given in Section 2 was very wide in terms. In Dr. Dass's case it was observed that the word 'accommodation' as used in the Act is not synonymous with building. In justification of rejecting the broad view another observation was made in that case to the effect : "There is no reference to the building at all in this rule and there is no justification whatsoever for assuming that it was meant to apply in a case of two accommodations in a building, one in the occupation of the owner and the other falling vacant." It is true that 'accommodation' as used in the Act is not synonymous with building as the whole building may be one accommodation and it may contain several accommodations; but neither this fact nor the fact that the rule itself did not use the word 'building' provided justification for not interpreting the rule to imply that it referred to a portion of building falling vacant a part of which building is occupied by the owner and another part by the tenant etc. especially because the word 'building' has been used in the definition of 'accommodation' in Section 2. The view taken in Ram Gopal's case is supported by observations contained in the full Bench case of N.C. Aggarwal and Krishan Lal Mehra. In that case arose a question of interpretation of the word 'accommodation' with reference to sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act. At page 757 their Lordships observed that the definition as given in Section 2 is very wide. However, it should be given some specific meaning and "such a definite meaning, according to our view, should be that 'accommodation' means an accommodation in building or part of a building" etc. Thus, we are placed between two interpretations; the broad one which was expressed in Ram Gopal's case and the narrow one expressed in Dr. A.C. Dass's case. With respect, I am of the view that the broad interpretation given in the former case is the correct one as it will fulfil the intention which was behind the enactment of the rule. 67. A.C. Dass's case. With respect, I am of the view that the broad interpretation given in the former case is the correct one as it will fulfil the intention which was behind the enactment of the rule. 67. At page 7 of his book 'Interpretation of Statutes" Maxwell cites a large number of English authorities in support of his comments in these words : "At the same time, if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the holder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result." I can think of no sound reason for considering that the interpretation of the rule in Ram Gopal's case was unsound. The main argument against the acceptance of this interpretation is that it will enlarge the rights of the owner to claim consultation in the event of vacancy of any accommodation in his building whether occupied by the tenant or sub-tenant and that it will cramp the powers of the District Magistrate to make allotment in favour of any person of his choice without having to consult the owner. 68. This brings me to the authorities in which the so-called middle of the road view on the meaning of Rule 7 was taken. The first of these cases in Shyam Devi's case which was decided by Tandon, J. By implication Rule 7 was interpreted to apply only to those cases where the accommodation falling vacant and the portion in the occupation of the owner are not structurally separate and independent. This view was followed in the cases of Sri Krishna Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur and Shiama Shankar Sharma v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Ghaziabad. These rulings did not attempt a solution of the main problem viz., what meaning should be given to the words "portion of accommodation falls vacant" and the owner is in occupation of another portion thereof". No attempt was made in Shiama Devi's case or in the rulings which followed it to show what meaning should be given to the knotty and vexing words "portion of accommodation falls vacant" if not the literal interpretation which was given to those words in Dr. A.C. Dass's case. No attempt was made in Shiama Devi's case or in the rulings which followed it to show what meaning should be given to the knotty and vexing words "portion of accommodation falls vacant" if not the literal interpretation which was given to those words in Dr. A.C. Dass's case. Nothing was said to show how the facts of Shayam Devi's case; Sri Krishna Khanna's case or Shiama Shankar Sharma's case satisfied the condition of the rule that portion of the accommodation had fallen vacant when another portion of it was in occupation of the owner. It will be recalled that in Shayam Devi's case which was decided by Tandon, J. the petitioner was the owner of an Ahata which consisted of a number of tenements with an open court yard in the centre. The owner occupied one of the tenements while the rest were in the occupation of different tenants. One of such tenements fell vacant. The question was whether Rule 7 applied when the question of allotment of that tenement arose. The argument in the case for the petitioner was inasmuch as the quarters were part of the same building they must be deemed to be portions of the same accommodation for purposes of Rule 7 of the Rules. This argument was evidently based on the view taken in Ram Gopal's case. This argument was rejected with these words. "I do not think a building containing a large number of tenements distinct from one another is the same thing as accommodation used in Rule 7. This is clear from the definition of the word accommodation itself which is that accommodation means residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of the building. The mere fact, therefore, that two or more apartments or tenements are joined together structurally or happen to exist adjacent to one another does not render them as portions of one accommodation. Each one of them is a separate accommodation which can comprise of a part of a building also. The mere fact, therefore, that two or more apartments or tenements are joined together structurally or happen to exist adjacent to one another does not render them as portions of one accommodation. Each one of them is a separate accommodation which can comprise of a part of a building also. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the quarter in question must be held to be a part of the accommodation, which in the present case should be the Ahata, cannot be sustained." With due respects, the ruling does not appear to give any reasons for expressing the view that Rule 7 does not apply to a building containing a large number of tenements distinct from one another or why an accommodation which is separate and not joined together structurally with another cannot be regarded as portions of the same building. Equally, it is difficult to see why in that case the quarter in question could not be held to be part of the same Ahata. This was certainly possible on the basis of the interpretation in Ram Gopal's case. Ram Gopal's case was not even referred to in Shyam Devi's case and no reason was given at all why the view expressed in that case that the words "portion of accommodation" used in Rule 7 mean portion of a building was not correct. The problem which called for solution in that case was the interpretation of the rule with a view to determine the conditions and circumstances which attracted the rule. This problem was left untouched. Instead an arbitrary test was provided by laying down that the rule will apply if and when an owner and the tenant lived in portions of accommodation which were not structurally separate and independent from each other but no reason or justification was stated for laying down such a test. The wordings of the rule do not contain any indication at all to justify the interpretation that it applied only to those cases when two accommodations one of which was in owner's occupation, were not structurally separate and independent. On the other hand the word 'accommodation' used in the phrase "the owner is in occupation of another portion thereof" is so wide and general that it must apply to all cases irrespective of whether there is structural unity or separation inter se the accommodations. On the other hand the word 'accommodation' used in the phrase "the owner is in occupation of another portion thereof" is so wide and general that it must apply to all cases irrespective of whether there is structural unity or separation inter se the accommodations. It is not permissible to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it has been found in the provisions of the Act. 69. In the case of Vickers v. Evans, 1910 AC 444 Lord Loreburn, L.C., observed :- "We are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself." 70. The Thompson v. Goold Lord Mersey delivered himself of similar remarks thus : "It is a wrong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do." To my mind, therefore, it is not permissible, in interpreting this rule, to read therein such words as structurally not independent or separate between the words 'portions' and 'thereof' so as to narrow down the scope of the rule. In the absence of any clear indication that the scope of this rule was intended to be restricted to those cases only where the owner and the tenant live in accommodations not open to this Court to indulge in conjectures in an exercise to discover the meaning of the rule. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, at page 16, reads : "In a case where the technical language used was precise and unambiguous, but incapable of reasonable meaning, the Court held that it was not at liberty, on merely conjectural grounds, to give the words a meaning which did not belong to them." Shyam Devi's case and those cases which followed it afterwards appear to me to present instance of an attempt to give meaning to the word 'portion' in the rule, on merely conjectural grounds to the effect that it applied to only those accommodations not structurally separate and independent. This is not legally possible. If the literal interpretation adopted in Dr. This is not legally possible. If the literal interpretation adopted in Dr. A.C. Dass's case were taken then Shayam Devi's case was not a case of portion of an accommodation falling vacant and equally it was not a case where the owner could be said to be in occupation of another portion thereof. It was the tenant's accommodation which had fallen vacant and therefore in any case even on the interpretation in Dr. A.C. Dass's case Rule 7 could not apply but the rule would have applied to the case on the interpretation adopted in Ram Gopal's case. But the case gave no reasons why that interpretation should not have been adopted. The word 'portion' found in the rule is plain and unambiguous and must therefore be given a literal interpretation. Interpretation is sought to be put on this word to mean those portions which are structurally separate and independent. I fail to see what justification can there be for placing such a narrow interpretation on the word 'portion' and how any such artificial test as structural separateness or independence can be imagined for construing this word in the rule. This will be a trespass on the function cases of Legislature. If the Legislature intends a narrow interpretation to be put on the rule then it is for it to amend the rule or to add an explanation to the rule expressing such intention. So long as that is not the case there appears to be no reason why the plain and popular meaning should not be given to the word "portion" in the phrase "another portion thereof" occurring in the rule. 71. In construing rule 7 as already stated the purpose of the rule also has to be borne in mind. So long as that is not the case there appears to be no reason why the plain and popular meaning should not be given to the word "portion" in the phrase "another portion thereof" occurring in the rule. 71. In construing rule 7 as already stated the purpose of the rule also has to be borne in mind. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition at page 6 quoting from specified English cases writes : "Judges are not called upon to apply their opinions of sound policy so as to modify the plain meaning of statutory words." W.F. Craies in 'A treatise on Statute Law.' 4th Edition at page 88 gives expression to the view that a Judge is not competent to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it in accordance with his own views as to what is right or reasonable, that is to say, the statutes should not be moulded by the Judges according to their own conceptions of justice or expediency. The rule was made solely for the benefit of the owner of the building and to exclude such persons who may be troublesome to him or may be regarded by him undesirable. If that intention is to be any guide in the interpretation of this rule then we should strive to ascertain the intention which underlay the enactment of this rule rather than look to the preamble of Act which provides the key to the object for enactment of the Act. There can be no two opinions that the rule in question was made for the benefit and convenience of the owner of a building solely. It would not be correct to say that the Act was one-sided in its objective viz. to provide protection to the interest of the tenant only. On the other hand, it contains provisions safe-guarding the interest of both the landlord and the tenant. To mention only a few, the provisions contained in Sections 7(3), 7(4) and 7-B of the Act and Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Rules framed under Section 17 of the Act are all intended to protect the interest of the landlord. To mention only a few, the provisions contained in Sections 7(3), 7(4) and 7-B of the Act and Rules 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Rules framed under Section 17 of the Act are all intended to protect the interest of the landlord. From the ratio of Shyam Devi's case that the rule will apply where the accommodations in the owner's and tenant's occupation were structurally separate it follows inferentially that the rule will apply to accommodations in the occupation of the owner and the tenant which are not structurally separate, but no reasons were given how this could be so. It was not indicated what meaning should be given to the word 'accommodation' in the rule so as to lead to this result. There were only two possibilities : either to give to the word 'accommodation' in the rule a literal interpretation as in Dr. Dass's case or to understand it to imply a building as done in Ram Gopal's case. For reasons stated at length if a literal interpretation is given to that word then neither of the two conditions of the rule will be satisfied when an accommodation in the tenant's occupation falls vacant for that will neither be a case of portion of an accommodation falling vacant nor a case of owner being in occupation of another portion thereof. That being so, if the word 'accommodation' is given its plain and ordinary meaning and not understood as implying a building then it is hard to see how the rule can apply to the case of vacancy of an accommodation in tenant's occupation even though the owner's and the tenant's accommodations may not be structurally separate or some thing may be common between them. Upon these cogitations, to my mind, the choice here lies between the broad interpretation of Ram Gopal's case and the narrow one of Dr. A.C. Dass's case and there is no question of any half-way house or a compromise formula in interpretation of Statute. In this case there is no indication that the Legislature intended to restrict the application of this rule to accommodations which were not structurally separate. For the above reasons having regard particularly to the purpose behind the enactment of Rule 7, I am of the view, with respects that the meaning of this rule was not correctly interpreted in Shyam Devi's case. For the above reasons having regard particularly to the purpose behind the enactment of Rule 7, I am of the view, with respects that the meaning of this rule was not correctly interpreted in Shyam Devi's case. Having regard to this object of the rule if one were to confine the scope of the rule to those accommodations alone which are no structurally independent or separate then it would be proceeding on the assumption that under no other conditions can a tenant prove undesirable for troublesome to the owner. There may be a person on inimical terms with him or a profligate given to drunken orgies at his residence. For this and numerous other reasons which can be easily imagined the owner may reasonably consider a proposed tenant undesirable or may reasonably apprehend friction or trouble at his hands. Chances of trouble or nuisance from the prospective tenant need not necessarily be confined to cases where two accommodations are structurally separate or insular or having something like a common passage, kitchen, bath or closets existing between the owner and the tenant for even in cases where there may be nothing in common in the building between the owner and the tenant trouble may yet arise between them from the fact of common compound. Therefore, it will not be correct to assume that friction and trouble may arise between the owner and the tenant in those cases only where they occupy parts of a building not structurally separate. In these circumstances the matter must be left to the judgment and subjective satisfaction of the owner rather than to an objective test or criterion. This can be achieved only by interpreting the rule widely as in Ram Gopal's case. 72. It may be pointed out here that the language of the rule is "consult the owner and shall so far as possible make the allotment in accordance with the wishes of the owner" which shows that even after consultation the District Magistrate is not bound to act in accordance with the wishes of the owner. He may accommodate him when he considers the desire of the owner to be reasonable. He may accommodate him when he considers the desire of the owner to be reasonable. such being the discretion of the District Magistrate, there is hardly any ground for the fear that if too wide an interpretation is given to Rule 7, as was done in Ram Gopal's case, then it would place needless fetters on the powers of the allotment authorities, but no such thought should shrink us from the duty of interpreting the statute widely even if it does not conform to our notions of public policy. Nor is it for the Courts to doubt the wisdom of Legislature if it intended that the owner should be consulted in every case in which an accommodation lying in a portion of the building which is in his own occupation falls vacant. 73. To come to the next case of Bhakat Shiromani which was otherwise decided along the lines of the interpretation given in Ram Gopal's case, a passing observation was made to the following effect. "In our opinion it is not possible to lay down general test by which it can be determined whether the accommodation which has fallen vacant is part of the accommodation occupied by the owner. We think each case must depend upon its own facts." In that case the argument was that the premises 11-A and 11-B were separately numbered and that it was conclusive as regards the separateness of the two accommodations and therefore the accommodation falling vacant could not be regarded as part of the accommodation in the owner's occupation. This argument was not accepted. No attempt was made to determine whether accommodations 11-A and 11-B had anything in common or whether the owner and the tenant had been in joint occupation of any portions of these two accommodations and yet the conclusion was that Rule 7 applied to the case. This conclusion clearly shows that the case was decided by adopting the interpretation of Ram Gopal's case for this conclusion could be reached only on the premise that the phrase "portion of accommodation" meant portion of the building and the rule applied to a case where a portion of building fell vacant another part of which was in owner's occupation. This conclusion clearly shows that the case was decided by adopting the interpretation of Ram Gopal's case for this conclusion could be reached only on the premise that the phrase "portion of accommodation" meant portion of the building and the rule applied to a case where a portion of building fell vacant another part of which was in owner's occupation. Therefore, no importance can be attached to the above extracted general observation made in the case regarding the test for determining whether the accommodation falling vacant was part of the accommodation occupied by the owner or not. Their Lordships in respect of this observation appear to have by implication laid down one test by their decision and it was this that the accommodation falling vacant and the accommodation in the owner's occupation must be situated in and be parts of one and the same building. In making the observation with regard to the general test they seemed to have implied, and very rightly, that it was impossible to lay down any general test to determine when an accommodation falling vacant should be regarded as part of the same building in another portion of which the owner is in occupation. This must undoubtedly depend on the facts of each case. To take an example, a person may be having an Ahata bearing a Municipal number as in the case of Shyam Devi, the Ahata may be having a number of separate buildings and each such building may be having tenements let out to tenants. In a portion of one of the buildings lying in the Ahata the owner may be residing and another portion of it may be in the occupation of a tenant. In such a case Rule 7 will apply only to that particular building in the Ahata in a part of which the owner resides and another portion of which let out to a tenant falls vacant and cannot apply to the other buildings although they may be comprised in the same Ahata. Therefore, it must depend upon the facts of each case whether an accommodation which has fallen vacant is part of the same building in another part of which the owner is residing. It is a question of fact in each case. It is in this sense that the above observations regarding the difficulty in laying down a general test were, to my mind, made. 74. It is a question of fact in each case. It is in this sense that the above observations regarding the difficulty in laying down a general test were, to my mind, made. 74. In the case of Sri Krishana Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur no reasons were given for holding why Rule 7 did not apply simply because the appellant was living on the first floor of the house, using it for residence, while the shop in dispute was in the ground floor. In other words, as in Shyam Devi's case, it was not indicated what meaning should be given to the word 'accommodation', used in Rule 7 and why the rule would not apply to a case where the owner lives in a portion of the same building in which another accommodation which was in the tenant's possession had fallen vacant when the two accommodations were separate. Thus, no light was shed on the problem of interpretation of this rule. 75. In the last case of Shiama Shankar Sharma v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Ghaziabad there were two distinct portions of the premises independent of each other except for a common opening between the two courtyards to the west and a common verandah to the east. It was held that Rule 7 would apply where the accommodation occupied by a tenant is also occupied in part by the owner or where a part of it is in the join use of the owner. With this view I respectfully differ for reasons which I have already given in detail while discussing Dr. A.C. Dass's case and Shyam Devi's case. In this case also it was not indicated what meaning should he given to the word 'accommodation' in Rule 7 and why its operation should be confined only to those cases in which accommodations in the occupation of the owner and the tenant are not separate and independent. 76. To sum up Rule 7 was correctly interpreted in Ram Gopal's case, and accepting that interpretation I conclude that Rule 7 applied to the present case and the owner was entitled to prior consultation by the District Magistrate before making an allotment of the disputed portion which had fallen vacant. 76. To sum up Rule 7 was correctly interpreted in Ram Gopal's case, and accepting that interpretation I conclude that Rule 7 applied to the present case and the owner was entitled to prior consultation by the District Magistrate before making an allotment of the disputed portion which had fallen vacant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer in passing an allotment order on 9.5.1962 (Annexure 4) in respect of the disputed portion of the premises without prior consultation of the petitioners who are owners of house No. 227, Mahajni Tola, Faizabad, and in occupation of part of the said building, another portion of which building fell vacant, in accordance with Rule 7 of the Rules : the City Magistrate in rejecting the petitioners' objection by order dated 7.12.1964 (Annexure 7) and in holding that Rule 7 did not apply to the case and finally the State Government by its order dated 22.1.1966 (Annexure 8) rejecting the application of the petitioners committed manifest error apparent on the face of the record and therefore in my opinion Annexures 4, 7 and 8 deserves to be quashed and the District Magistrate, respondent No. 3, should be directed to dispose of the release application of the petitioners according to law and in the event of rejection of the said application pass an order of allotment of the disputed portion of the accommodation in accordance with Rule 7 of the Rules. I would pass no order as to costs. 77. By the Court - 77. The appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single Judge set aside, the writ petition shall stand allowed and the orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the State Government contained respectively in Annexures 7 and 8 quashed. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to reconsider the application contained in Annexure 5 as to the applicability of Rule 7 in the light of the observations made by the majority in the above judgment. In case he comes to the conclusion that the rule does not apply, the application in Annexure 5 shall be rejected. In case he thinks that the rule does apply, the application shall be allowed and the order contained in Annexure 4 set aside. In case he comes to the conclusion that the rule does not apply, the application in Annexure 5 shall be rejected. In case he thinks that the rule does apply, the application shall be allowed and the order contained in Annexure 4 set aside. The order contained in Annexure 3 shall also as a consequence thereof be set aside and the application for the release of the accommodation shall be considered afresh and in case it is rejected, fresh allotment order shall be passed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 7. 78. The parties shall, in the circumstances of the case, bear their own costs throughout.