JUDGMENT This Rule was issued calling upon the Opposite Party to show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court. The facts leading to the intiation of this proceeding are briefly as follows :- 2. The petitioner, Dr. Haripada Poddar, is employed in the West Bengal Health Service and at the relevant time he held the post of lecturer, Department of Surgery, R. G. Kar Medical College, Calcutta. By an order dated September 27, 1958 which was communicated to the petitioner on October 9, 1968 the petitioner was appointed "to act until further orders as lecturer, Department of Surgery, Bankura Sammilani Medical College, Bankura, with effect from the date on which he joined the post........." According to the petitioner this order though purported to be one of transfer was really an order of demotion and was Bengal, arbitrary and malafide. On the very day the order was communicated to him, the petitioner had a letter addressed by a learned Advocate on his behalf to the opposite party who is the Secretary, Department of Health Government of West Bengal, demanding justice and asking him to recall or rescind the order. This was the usual notice preceding an application for a writ in the nature of Mandamus and it is not disputed that the opposite party received the notice also on October 9, 1968. The portion of the letter addressed by the petitioner's learned Advocate which is relevant for the present purpose is as follows: "In the circumstances I have instructions to give you notice, which I hereby do for justice calling upon you to recall/rescind the said order of transfer dated 27th September, 1968 within 24 hours of the receipt of the notice and inform me or my client of your action in that regard failing which I have further instructions to move the Hon'ble High Court for redress and relief and you will be liable for costs incidental thereto." 3. The requisition made in the said notice not having been com• plied with, on October 11, 1968 the petitioner moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing, among others, the Government of West Bengal through the Secretary, Department of Health, not to give effect to the said order of transfer. The requisition made in the said notice not having been com• plied with, on October 11, 1968 the petitioner moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing, among others, the Government of West Bengal through the Secretary, Department of Health, not to give effect to the said order of transfer. On the application that was moved before the Vacation Bench during the Durga Puja holidays, A.C. Sen, J. issued a Rule calling upon the Opposite Party to show cause why a writ as prayed for should not issue. The Rule numbered civil rule 7126 (W) of 1968 was made returnable two weeks after the holidays. His Lordship, however, did not pass any interim order to restrain the Opposite party from giving effect to the impugned order of transfer but gave the petitioner liberty to renew his prayer for an interi morder in the presence of the respondents on the returnable date. After the rule was issued on October 11, 1968 the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner wrote to the Secretary, Department of Health, Government of West Bengal, on the same day informing him of the terms of the Rule. According to the petitioner, he also personally informed the Secretary on the telephone that a Rule had been issued. 4. It appears that on October 11, 1968 while this Court issued the Rule under Article 226 of the Constitution at the instance of the petitioner, the Government of West Bengal, Department of Health, also issued an order over the signature of the Opposite Party placing the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect because he had served on the opposite party the notice dated October 9, 1968 asking the Government to rescind the order of transfer. The material part of this order is as follows :- "Whereas it bas been made to appear to the Government that Dr. The material part of this order is as follows :- "Whereas it bas been made to appear to the Government that Dr. Haripada Poddar of the West Bengal Health Service............has attempted to disobey Government order.........dated 27.9.1968 transfering him from the R.G. Kar Medical College Calcutta to the Bankura Samilani Medical College, Bankura as a lecturer, Department of Surgery and whereas the said public servant has served a pleader's notice calling upon Government to rescind the aforesaid order of his transfer within 24 hours of the receipt of the said notice, failing which his pleader has threatened Government to move the Hon'ble High Court for redress and relief. And Whereas a disciplinary proceeding in aforesaid circumstances is contemplated against the said public servant; New, therefore, the Government is pleased to place the said public servant Dr. Haripada Poddar under suspension with immediate effect until further orders pending drawing up of formal proceeding against him." 5. A copy of the order of suspension was served on the petitioner by Special Massenger on October 13, 1908. In the meantime the petitioner bad applied for leave for two months from October, 12, 1968 on the ground of his wife's illness. The original order of suspension was sent to the petitioner by registered post and he received it on October 15, 1968 while he was on leave. Thereafter on November 20, 1968 the petitioner made an application in the said Civil Rule No. 7126 (w) of 1968 praying for interim stay of the order of transfer dated September 27, 1968 and served copies of this application on all the respondents including the present opposite party. This application has not yet been disposed of. 6. On November 23, 1968 the petitioner received a registered cover containing an order dated......November 16, 1968 signed by the Opposite Party and stating that the petitioner had been found prima facie guilty of a two fold charge set out in the order and directing him to appear before the enquiring officer who had been appointed to inquire into the charges against him. The first of the two charges against the petitioner states that be bad "Contravened rule 21 of the West Bengal Government Servants" a notice through his Advocate on the Secretary, Department of Health, to rescind the order of transfer within 24 hours of receipt of the notice and threatening to move the High Court for redress and relief if this was not done. The second charge slates that "by bolding out a threat" to the Secretary, Health Department, as stated above, the petitioner had "behaved in a manner which was improper and unbecoming of a public servant and derogatory to the prestige of Government" contravening Rule 4 of the said Conduct Rules. A statement of allegations forming the basis of the charges which accompanied the order makes it further clear that the petitioner's alleged act of disobedience to the order of transfer was in sending the lawyer's notice containing threat of legal action against the Government instead of submitting a representation to the Government regarding his grievance as required by the said Rule 21, and that the improper and unbecoming behaviour alleged against the petitioner which is forbidden by rule 4 also lay in the threat of legal action conveyed on his behalf by his learned Advocate to the Opposite Party. 7. The petitioner thereafter on January 15, 1969 moved this court alleging that the Opposite Party was guilty contempt of this court and on his application the instant Rule was issued. 8. Mr. Amar Prosad Chakrabortti, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the conduct of the opposite Party in issuing the order of suspension dated October 11, 1958 when he had knowledge from the notice that was served on him on October 9, 1968 that a Writ petition challenging the validity of the order of transfer was imminent and further in making the subsequent order dated November 16, 1968 when he certainly had intimation of the Rule issued by the High Court clearly amounted to contempt of court. According to Mr. Chakraborti the said orders were made only to coerce the petitioner and compel him to abandon or withdraw the legal measures that he was taking for the redress of his grievance. In support of his contention that such a conduct would constitute contempt of court, Mr. Chakraborti referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court namely. (1) Pratap Singh and Anr. In support of his contention that such a conduct would constitute contempt of court, Mr. Chakraborti referred to two decisions of the Supreme Court namely. (1) Pratap Singh and Anr. Appellants v. Gurbaksh Singh-Respondents, AIR 1962 SC 1172 and (2) Govind Sahai and Anr. Appellants v. State of U. P. and Anr. Respondents, AIR 1968 SC 1513 . 9. The facts of Pratap Singh's case, AIR 1962 SC 1172 are as follows :- By an order of the Government of Punjab a certain sum was sought to be recovered from the salary of the respondent in that appeal who was a Government servant. The said respondent instituted a suit for a declaration that the order for recovery of the amount was illegal and void. There was a circular of the State Government to the effect that it was improper for a Government servant to lake recourse to a court of law before exhausting the normal official channels of redress. On the basis of this circular a departmental proceeding was initiated against the respondent for having instituted the suit in violation if the instruction contained in the circular. Upon the petition of the respondent, the Punjab High Court held that the action of the Government in starting the disciplinary proceeding amounted to a contempt of court and that the officers ordering and conducting the inquiry were guilty of an offence under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The Nigh Court directed the contemners to abandon the departmental proceeding against the respondent and let them off with a warning. On appeal the Supreme Court by a majority affirmed the order of the High Court holding that the institution of the departmental proceeding at a time when the suit was pending could have "only one tendency namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it", and that as such "there can be no doubt that in law the appellants have been guilty of contempt of court, even though they were merely carrying out the instruction contained in the circular letter". The majority Judgment observes that "there are many ways of obstructing the c0un" and quotes with approval a passage from Osward's Contempt of Court, 3rd Edition, page 87 that" any conduct by which the course of Justice is perverted either by a party or a stranger is a contempt; thus the use of threats, by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit is pending......have been held to be contempts." The majority Judgment goes on to hold "The question is not whether the action in fact interfered, but it had a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. The majority Judgment also refers to another passage at page 6 of Oswald's book that any conduct that "tends to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant their witnesses during the litigation" constitutes a contempt of court. 10. In said decision the Supreme Court proceeded on the footing that the Government circular referred to above contained only executive instruction and did not embody a rule governing the conditions of service of the respondent. The Supreme Court did not consider that the position would be if such a rule were made a condition of employment for the government servants but observed that other considerations would then arise, such as, the authority of the rule making power to make such a rule. The Supreme Court however expressed no opinion on those other considerations. In the instant case the petitioner is alleged to have violated rules 4 and 21 of the West Bengal Government Servants' Conduct Rules 1959. Mr. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee appearing for the Opposite party did not contend that the fact that in the instant case the petitioner is charged with violation of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules made a difference in the legal position. In my opinion it is also difficult to maintain such an argument. The power of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue appropriate writs for the enforcement of the fundamental or other legal rights of a person cannot certainly be taken away by incorporating in the conditions of service of a Government servant a rule similar to the one contained in rule 4 or rule 21 of the West Bengal Government Service Conduct Rules 1959. The power conferred by Article 226 upon the High Courts ensures a corresponding right to the persons-affected to move the said Court for relief, and any condition of service that seeks to curtail or abridge this constitutional right would be invalid and of no consequence. As no argument was advanced on this aspect, it is not necessary to dilate on this point. 11. The view taken in Pratap Singh's case was reiterated by the Supreme Court in (2) Govind Sahai and Anr. Appellants v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. Respondents, AIR 1968 SC 1513 . The second respondent in that appeal, one V.P. Singh, who was a member of the Congress Party residing at Azamgarh in Uttar Pradesh having lost in an election for membership to the Primary Congress Committee, brought a suit in the City Munsif's Court for having the election of his opponent declared as void and inoperative. The Working Committee of the Indian National Congress bad passed a resolution in 1950, the substance of which was that any member of the party having any grievance in respect of any action taken, or decision given, by a Congress Organisation must go to the tribunals set up by the party to seek redress and such matters should not be taken to law courts. The resolution further provided that any member going to law courts against the decision of any Congress Committee or official would do so at the risk of being considered guilty of gross indiscipline and of being summarily removed from membership of the Congress Party. The two appellants who respectively were the General Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee and the General Secretary of the District Congress Committee. Azamgarh, expelled the second respondent and removed his name from the membership of the party during the pendency of the suit. The second respondent moved an application in the Allahabad High Court for taking proceeding in contempt against the two appellants. The High Court found them guilty of contempt and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and also directed them to pay the costs of the respondents. The second respondent moved an application in the Allahabad High Court for taking proceeding in contempt against the two appellants. The High Court found them guilty of contempt and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and also directed them to pay the costs of the respondents. On appeal the Supreme Court found that the High Court was justified in holding the appellants guilty of contempt and following the decision in Pratap Singh's case, observed that the passing of the order of expulsion when the suit was pending was a deliberate attempt by the appellants to interfere with or prejudice the second respondent, in the conduct of litigation instituted by him. It is no answer that the action by way of expulsion was taken on the basis of the Resolution of the All India Congress-Working Committee, and to enforce discipline in the Congress Organisation. 12. In the instant case, the conduct of the Opposite Party in passing the two orders, one dated October 11, 1968 suspending the petitioner, and the other dated November 16, 1968 drawing up a charge-sheet against him and asking him to face a departmental enquiry appears to me clearly to be similar to that as in the case of the Supreme Court referred to above, I shall take the order first for consideration. As already stated this Court issued a rule on October 11, 1968 on the petitioner's writ petition challenging the validity of the order of transfer. The petitioner has stated that he informed the opposite party of this fact on that very day over the telephone and also sent a letter under certificate of posting adressed to him. The opposite party has denied having received any such telephone call but does not deny having received the letter before October 16, 1968 when he draw up the charge sheet against the petitioner. It is curious to note that the said order purported to have been made on November 16, was actually sent by registered post to the petitioner on November 22 and the petitioner received it the next day. This shows that the opposite party allowed the order to be communicated to the petitioner inspite of his knowledge of the proceeding pending in this court. This shows that the opposite party allowed the order to be communicated to the petitioner inspite of his knowledge of the proceeding pending in this court. I am not referring to the fact that the opposite party made no attempt on November 22 to stop the registered cover containing the charge-sheet against the petitioner from going out inspite of his knowledge bf the pending proceeding because I am not in any doubt as to whether the opposite party had information on November 16 of the said Rule issued on October 11, 1968 upon the petitioner's writ petition. I refer to this fact only as an additional and aggravating circumstance. It is quite clear from the facts already stated, that the opposite party had information of the proceeding pending in this court when he made the order dated November 16, 1968, In the circumstances of the case, I have no doubt that the conduct of the opposite party in seeking to proceed with the departmental inquiry in spite of his knowledge of the writ petition pending in this court was a calculated more to put pressure on the petitioner not to proceed further with the case; it was also meant as a threat that if the petitioner disregarded the warning he must be prepared to face the consequence of the disciplinary proceeding, That such conduct amounts to a contempt of court is clear in view of the law stated by the Supreme Court in the said two decisions. No argument was addressed before me on behalf of the opposite party to show that his action in issuing the order dated November 16, 1968 during the pendency of the writ proceeding in this court on which he had knowledge did not constitute a contempt. The order dated November 16, 1968 was a sequel to the order of suspension passed on the petitioner on October 11, 1968 when no proceeding was pending in court. According to Mr. Banerjee the earlier order could not therefore constitute a contempt. I shall refer to this argument presently. But from the nature of the contention it seems possible that it was thought that all the earlier order did not constitute a contempt its sequel also caused no offence. If this was the idea it was a gross misconception. According to Mr. Banerjee the earlier order could not therefore constitute a contempt. I shall refer to this argument presently. But from the nature of the contention it seems possible that it was thought that all the earlier order did not constitute a contempt its sequel also caused no offence. If this was the idea it was a gross misconception. Whether or not the order of suspension passed on the petitioner amounted to a contempt the opposite party by seeking to proceed with the departmental inquiry against the petitioner when the writ matter was pending in this court and he had knowledge, he was certainly guilty of contempt. 13. The submissions of Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the opposite party were directed almost entire1y to emphasize the distinction between a pending proceeding and a proceeding that. as Mr. Banerjee put it, is 'imminent' any action which amounts to a threat held out to a person who has approached a law court for redress of his grievance to coerce or compel him to withdraw or abandon his cause, constitutes a contempt if any such action were taken before the proceeding in court had actually commenced. According to Mr. Banerjee, in the absence of any pending proceeding before a court, no question of contempt of court would arise. In other words, the question is whether there can be a contempt of court when a cause of proceeding is not actually pending before it but is imminent and the person responsible for the principle it is difficult to see how the question can be answered except in the affirmative. The stream of Justice, it is often said, must be allowed to flow free and any obstruction to its passage bas been held to be an act of contempt. This being the position it is hardly consistent with reason or logic to think that an attempt to choke this stream at the source would not construe a contempt. The following often quoted lines from the Judgment of Wills. J. In the case of (3) Rex v. Parke (1903) 2 KB 532 at page 437 states the point clearly and effectively. "Great stress has been laid by Mr. Danckwerts upon an expression which has been used in the Judgments upon questions of this kind-that the remedy exists when there is a cause pending in the court. We think undue importance has been attached to it. "Great stress has been laid by Mr. Danckwerts upon an expression which has been used in the Judgments upon questions of this kind-that the remedy exists when there is a cause pending in the court. We think undue importance has been attached to it. It is true that in very nearly all the cases which have arisen there has been a cause actually begun, so that the expression, quite natural under the circumstances, accentuates the fact, not that the case has been begun, but that it is not at an end. That is the cardinal consideration. It is possible very effectually to poison the fountain of justice before it begins to flow. It is not possible to do so when the stream bas ceased." 14. This passage from the Judgment of Wills, J. was quoted apparently with approval by Lord Heward CJ in (4) Rex v. Daily Mirror (1927), 1 K. B. 845 at page 851. The view of Wills, J. has been endorsed by different High Courts in this country a number of decisions including two Full Bench of the Madras and the Lahore High Courts respectively. It was held by the Leach, C. J. in (5) Tulasarama Rao v. Sir James Taylor Governor of Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1939 Madras 257, that "to comment on a case which is about to come before the court with knowledge of the fact is just as much a contempt as comment on a case actually launched." In the other Full Bench case, (6) In Re-Subrahamnya, Editor, Tribune, AIR 1943 Labore 329. Harries C.J., referring with approval to the said two English cases and the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court held that "the offence of contempt may be committed even if there is no proceeding or cause actually pending" and that "it is sufficient that proceedings ale imminent to the knowledge of the person charged with contempt". This view has been also approved and affirmed in (7) AIR 1954 Orissa, I (State v. Radhagobinda Das) in (8) AIR 1959 Punjab, 182 (Gurbakhsh Singh v. S. Pratap Singh) and in (9) AIR 1968 Kerala 301 (K. P. P. Noordeen Mohammed v. A. K. Gopalant). 15. This view has been also approved and affirmed in (7) AIR 1954 Orissa, I (State v. Radhagobinda Das) in (8) AIR 1959 Punjab, 182 (Gurbakhsh Singh v. S. Pratap Singh) and in (9) AIR 1968 Kerala 301 (K. P. P. Noordeen Mohammed v. A. K. Gopalant). 15. The question was raised before a Special Bench of this Court in (10) Emperor v. J. Choudhuri, AIR 1947 Cal, 414, Biswas J. in his judgment discussed the topic but did not think it necessary to decide the point on the facts of that case. 16. The only decision cited before me that appears to take a contrary view on the point is (11) Dwarka Prosad v, Krishna Chandra, AIR 1953 Allahabad 600 where a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the "extending of the punishment for contempt to cases which are only imminent, in our opinion, is not justified on the circumstances as they exist in this country". The circumstances referred to in the Judgment on which the conclusion is based are that "In many cases, the citizen will have to take the risk of the court coming to the conclusion that the case had become imminent, while he himself thought that it was not so imminent. It is a matter of every day occurrence that a civil suit is thought of but, ultimately for various reasons the idea has to be given up and the case is never taken to the court at all. Similarly in criminal cases, the accused persons are arrested by the police and at one stage the police is of the opinion that it would prosecute the arrested person; but subsequently on the disclosure of some further fact or event; they decide not to take the case to the court at all. At one time the case my appear to the imminent and subsequently it may transpire that it was not fit for he charge sheet to be submitted to court". With respect it is not easy to see bow the circumstances stated in the quoted extract quoted above ca a be said to be existing in the this country alone so as to justify confining the offence of contempt to cases where proceedings have been actually launched. With respect it is not easy to see bow the circumstances stated in the quoted extract quoted above ca a be said to be existing in the this country alone so as to justify confining the offence of contempt to cases where proceedings have been actually launched. When a proceeding can be called imminent may sometimes be a disputed question and will have to be decided on the facts of a particular case but that, in my opinion is hardly a valid reason for holding that there can be no contempt if no proceeding is pending in court. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the view expressed in the Allahabad case which is also not shared by any of the other High Court as would appear from the decisions I have referred to above. 17. Thus both on reason and on the authorities, it is clear that the offence of contempt may be committed also in respect of proceedings that are imminent but not actually commenced provided the person charged with contempt had knowledge that proceedings were about to be launched. In the instant case, the opposite party had knowledge of the fact from the notice demanding Justice served on him that the petitioner was about to move a Writ petition in this court, and yet he passed the order dated October 11, 1968 suspending the petitioner, and that also because of the very fact that he was informed of the intended proceeding. This is a conduct which, in my opinion, clearly constitutes a contempt. I therefore, find the opposite party guilty of the offence of contempt of court for both the orders issued by him the one dated October 11, 1968 suspending the petitioner and the other dated November 16, 1968 directing him to face the departmental enquiry. There remains the question of sentence. The affidavits filed by the opposite party contain no expression of regret, nor did his learned Advocate convey anything in course of his submissions to indicate that the contemner was repentent for what he had done. The plea all through has been one of justification. I, therefore, sentence the opposite party to pay a find of Rs. 500/- and further direct him to cancel or withdraw the order of suspension dated October 11, 1968 passed on the petitioner and abandon the departmental enquiry started against him. The fine may be realised according to law. The plea all through has been one of justification. I, therefore, sentence the opposite party to pay a find of Rs. 500/- and further direct him to cancel or withdraw the order of suspension dated October 11, 1968 passed on the petitioner and abandon the departmental enquiry started against him. The fine may be realised according to law. (To be mentioned). 26.8.69 Mr. Subhash Kumar Banerjee for Petitioner. Mr. S.C. Das Gupta for opposite party. Mr. Das Gupta appearing for the contemner prays for a direction as to where the contemner should pay the amount of fine. The contemner is directed to deposit the amount with the Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court within a fortnight from this date, In default, the fine will be realised in accordance with law.