ORDER T.C. Raghavan, J. The petitioner is the same in all these crises ; and the first respondent in the first two cases and the sole respondent in the last case is the Revenue Inspector, Palai Municipality and the second respondent in the first two cases is the State of Kerala. The questions raised in these cases are also the same. In the last case the petitioner requested the lower court to state a case and refer the same to this court under section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prayer was refused by the lower court. The petitioner owns properties within the Municipality of Palai; and he was assessed to property tax. He failed to pay the tax and he was prosecuted. In the first two cases he has been convicted and sentenced to fine; and in the last case a similar prosecution is pending before the lower court, and the petitioner has failed in his, attempt to bring up the case to this court under section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under section 150 of the Kerala Municipalities Act rules were framed. They are contained in Schedule II of the Act Taxation and Finance Rules. Under rule 32 (2) the petitioner has been prosecuted as a distraint or a sufficient distraint of the petitioner's property was impracticable. The power of a municipality to tax properties is contained in section 99 of the Act. Section 99 (1) provided that if the municipal council by a resolution determines that a property tax shall be levied, such tax shall be levied on all buildings and lands within the municipal limits save those exempted by or under the Act or any other law. Section 99 (4) (a) applies to the cases before us; and this clause provides that the municipal council shall, in the case of lands used exclusively for agricultural purposes, levy the taxes at such percentage as it may fix of the annual value of such lands. The proviso to this clause then provides that the percentage shall not exceed the maximum if any fixed by the Government. The first contention of the counsel of the petitioner is that this provision gives unbridled and uncanalised power to the municipality to fix the rate of property tax. The proviso to this clause then provides that the percentage shall not exceed the maximum if any fixed by the Government. The first contention of the counsel of the petitioner is that this provision gives unbridled and uncanalised power to the municipality to fix the rate of property tax. In other words, the contention is that the rate of the property tax is not indicated by, the legislature itself, and leaving it to the municipal council is excessive delegation and hence void. The counsel has drawn our attention to a few decisions as well on the question. But, we do not think that it is necessary to refer to those decisions in view of the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1232). Section 150 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was challenged in that case on the ground that there was excessive delegation by the legislature to the Municipal Corporation. Of the seven Judges that constituted the Bench, Wanchoo, C. J. and four other Judges expressed the opinion that there was no excess delegation, while Shah and Vaidialingam, JJ. took a different view. Several earlier decisions of the Supreme Court were considered; and the majority Judges of the Supreme Court indicated the principles that should be applied in considering whether a delegation is unguided or excessive. What can be gathered from the judgment of Wanchoo, C. J., is that the legislature must retain in its hands the essential legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the Act; that where the, legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, courts should not interfere ;that what guidence should be given and to what extent and whether guidence has been given at all in a particular case depends on the provisions of the particular Act; that the nature of the body to which the delegation is made is also a factor to be considered in determining whether there is sufficient guidance in the scatter of delegation; and that what form the guidance should take is again a matter which should depend upon the particular statute under consideration. The learned Chief Justice has then indicated that, the guidance may take the form of fixing maximum rates, or providing for consultation with the people of the local area, or subjecting the rates fixed by the local body to the approval of the government which " acts as a watch-dog ". Wanchoo, C.J., has also indicated quite a number of circumstances providing the guidance. They are, for example, that the delegation is to an elected body responsible to the tax-payers, that the taxing power is only limited since the power is circumscribed by the need of the delegate (the local body) to finance its functions, that the delegate has to adopt budget estimates, etc. Similarly, the judgment of Hidayatullah, J., repeals the following. In the opinion of His Lordship, the proper test is not the existence of safeguards, but whether the legislative will to impose the tax is adequately expressed so as to bind the tax-payers; and that requires an examination the policy and the provisions of the Act with a view to see whether the legislative will is fully expressed to invest the delegate with the power to tax subject to a proper procedure being evolved. Hidayatullah, J., has pointed out that such self-governing bodies as municipalities must have resources for their own administration and duties; and that there are only two methods by which money can be made available, one, by grant and two, by allowing them to raise funds by fees and taxes. The learned Judge has also pointed out that the second method has been followed in India on times out of number ; that the doctrine that Parliament cannot delegate its powers must therefore be understood in a limited way; and that it only means that the Parliament must not efface itself, but must keep the control in its own hands. Again, Hidayatullah, J., has pointed out that if the delegate acts contrary to the wishes, of the legislature, the legislature can undo what the delegate has done. Another observation of Hidayatullah, J., is that the observations and theories culled out from American cases should not be applied in our country without reflection. And the learned Judge has concluded by observing that unless the Parliament has lost its control over the action of the delegate, it cannot be said that it has effaced itself or abdicated its powers. Sikri, J., has gone even further. And the learned Judge has concluded by observing that unless the Parliament has lost its control over the action of the delegate, it cannot be said that it has effaced itself or abdicated its powers. Sikri, J., has gone even further. The learned Judge has said that if the Act has pointed out the objectives or the results to be achieved and if taxation can be levied only for the purposes of achieving the objectives or the results it is sufficient guidance to a self-governing body like a municipality. In his opinion, no further safeguards are necessary. In the light of these principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it is clear that there is no excessive delegation or absence of guide-lines in these cases, since the position is the same under section 99 of the Kerala Act too. Particularly, the proviso to section 99 (4) (a) shows that the Government is acting as a watch-dog. The next contention urged by the counsel of the petitioner is that, rule 32 violates Article 14 of the Constitution as it violates the principle of equality before the law. The argument may be elaborated thus : Rule 32 (1) confers a power of distraint on the municipality, rule 32(2) authorises the municipality to prosecute a defaulter and rule 32 (3) confers a power on the municipality to resort to a civil court as well for the recovery of the tax : no indication is given as to the exercise of these powers, against whom each right (the right to distraint and prosecute and the right to file a suit in a civil court) can be exercised : there is no reasonable classification as to which defaulters can be proceeded against by criminal prosecutions and against whom civil suits can be instituted. Putting the contention differently, the argument is that the municipal council may discriminate between defaulter and defaulter in the exercise of these powers, prosecuting one person and filing a suit against another similarly situated In this connection the counsel has drawn our attention to the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in S. M. Nawab Ariff v. Corporation of Calcutta A.I.R. 1960 Cal 159. Das Gupta, C.J. and Lahiri, J., held that, where out of the two different laws to which the same person or same class of persons was subjected one law was more burdensome than the other, the law which was more burdensome would be struck down as the discriminating law. Their Lordships observed that the procedure of distraint was more onerous and prejudicial to a defaulting rate payer than the procedure of suit, and therefore, the provision for distraint was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution since it was discriminatory. We do not think that this decision can be applied to the cases before us, whatever be its correctness. Rule 32 (2) confers a power on the municipality to prosecute a defaulter if a distraint or a sufficient distraint of the defaulter's property was impracticable. This is the only power conferred under the rule; and the provision in rule 32 (3) is not any new power conferred by the rule on the municipality. The right of the municipality to resort to a civil court for realising the arrears of tax due to it is already there even under the common law; and what sub rule (3) of rule 32 says is only that nothing in the rule shall preclude the council from suing in a civil court for any tax due to it under the Act that the common law right is not taken away. Evidently, no two separate powers are conferred on the municipality without indicating against whom each of them can be used. Of course, if the petitioner is able to establish that the power under rule 32 (2) is used against him mala fide, that is a different matter. We might then set such action at naught. But, it cannot be said that rule 32 (2) is discriminatory and thus offends Article 14 of the Constitution. It is then urged that the prosecutions are barred by limitation. Section 387 of the Act provides, inter alia, that no distraint shall be made and no prosecution shall be commenced in respect of any sum due to the municipality under the Act after the expiry of a period of three years from the date on which distraint might first have been made or prosecution might first have been commenced as the case may be. In these cases, there is no complaint that the prosecutions were started more than three years after the distraints which were the starting points of limitation for prosecutions. We may also point out that the distraints themselves were within three years of the dates when distraints could have first been effected. Thus, there is no limitation either. In the last of these cases, the contention raised is that the lower court should have referred the case to this court under section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 432 (1) lays down that a subordinate court shall state a case and refer the same to the High Court, if it is of opinion that an Act, Ordinance or Regulation or any provision therein is invalid or inoperative: and the court should also set out its reasons in support of its opinion. It is not enough that a party (the petitioner in this case) raised a question of unconstitutionality: the court must also entertain the opinion that the Act, Ordinance or Regulation or any provision therein is unconstitutional. The lower court has not entertained any such opinion in this case: and therefore, its failure to refer the case is not illegal or erroneous. The revision petitions are dismissed.