JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - This is a judgment-debtor's appeal directed against an order dated June 1, 1968 made by the learned First Additional Civil Judge, Agra issuing a fresh writ of possession to the respondent decree-holders for execution by a Commissioner appointed for that purpose. 2. The litigation involving the property in dispute dates back to 1919. There were a number of suits, of which the latest is suit No. 30 of 1945. The suit was filed by the decree-holder respondents for partition of their 314th share in certain properties and for possession of their separated share. On February 21, 1952 a preliminary decree for partition of the 314th share and for possession thereof was made under Order 20, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was followed by a final decree on August 24, 1966. On may 15, 1967 the decree-holders filed an application for execution of the decree. Meanwhile, the judgment-debtors preferred an appeal in this Court against the final decree and made an application on May 18, 1967 for stay. of execution. The stay application was dismissed on the same day by B. Dayal, J. On the next day, they presented another stay application, this time before Seth, J., and obtained an ex parte stay of execution in respect of one of the properties, namely, a Haveli in which the present judgment-debtor appellant, Ragho Prasad, is admittedly resident. The stay application was finally heard in the presence of the parties on October 5, 1967 when certain conditions were imposed for the Continuance of the stay during the pendency of the appeal. Those conditions were not fulfilled by the judgment-debtors and accordingly on December 5, 1967 the stay order lapsed. On October 17, 1967 the judgment-debtors filed an objection under Section 47 of the Code. Another objection under section was filed by them on November 4, 1-967. On December 22, 1967 both objections were dismissed. Then on January 5, 1968 the judgment-debtors filed an execution first appeal, which was dismissed on the same day. A stay application filed with it was also rejected. Thereafter, on January 8, 1968, the judgment-debtors filed another objection under Section 47 and on the next day filed an application for stay of execution. The objection was registered as Misc. case No: 1 of 1968, but the stay application was rejected. A stay application filed with it was also rejected. Thereafter, on January 8, 1968, the judgment-debtors filed another objection under Section 47 and on the next day filed an application for stay of execution. The objection was registered as Misc. case No: 1 of 1968, but the stay application was rejected. An application for amendment of the objection was made on January 27, 1968, and we are informed that the objection dated January 8, 1968 and the amendment application filed thereafter have since been rejected by the executing court. 3. On the dismissal of the first two objections under Section 47 on December 22, 1967 the executing court appointed a Commissioner for effecting delivery of possession. The Commissioner, accompanied by Pratap Narain Agarwal, one of the decree-holder respondents before us, proceeded to execute the commission for delivery of possession of the Haveli. On reaching the premises he was met by Shanket Prasad, son of the said Ragho Prasad, who handed him an application stating that he with his mother, brothers and sisters were living in the Haveli in their own right and were not liable to ejectment. The Commissioner, however, proceeded to execute his commission, but resistance was offered by Shanker Prasad who obstructed the Commissioner in his task of effecting delivery. The Commissioner decided to postpone the execution of the commission to a future date after obtaining the help of the police, and he submitted a report accordingly to the executing court on January 9, 1968 and prayed for suitable orders from the court. On the same date an application was made by the decree holder respondents requesting the executing court for adequate police aid to the Commissioner to enable him to execute the commission. The latter application was rejected by the court on the same date on the ground that the General Rules (Civil) did not provide for giving police aid in such a matter. Then on January 27, 1968 an application was made by the decree-holders under Section 151 of the code praying that the Court should reconsider its order of January 9, 1968 and allow adequate police aid to the Commissioner for delivering possession. It will be noted that so far the Commissioner did not return the Parwana of Dakhal but was waiting merely for appropriate order to enable him to proceed again to the property and effect delivery of possession with police aid. It will be noted that so far the Commissioner did not return the Parwana of Dakhal but was waiting merely for appropriate order to enable him to proceed again to the property and effect delivery of possession with police aid. No progress appears to have been made in the execution for some time. On April 10, 1968, the Commissioner returned the warrant executed stating that as further proceedings were pending decision in the executing court there was no likelihood of the commission being executed in the near future and he was, therefore, returning the papers. On May 1, 1968 an application was made again by the decree-holders in continuation of their application dated January 27, 1968 praying that in case the court was of opinion that police aid could not be given, the Senior Superintendent of Police should be informed of the situation as there was an apprehension of breach of the peace when possession was delivered. Then on June 1, 1968 the order under appeal was made by the executing court. It was contended by the judgment-debtors before him that the court had no jurisdiction to issue a fresh writ of possession and all that the decree-holders could do was to apply under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code or to file a suit. The court expressed the view that, while the contention may have force where obstruction was made or resistance offered by -a person who claimed to be in possession in his own right, it did not hold true where the obstruction was caused by the judgment-debtor or any person claiming through him, and observed that in the instant case the obstruction was caused by the own son of Ragho Prasad who apparently claimed, through his father and not independently. In the circumstances, he ordered that a fresh writ for delivery of possession he issued for execution by the Commissioner. The judgment-debtors also urged that the Commissioner could not be appointed for executing a warrant for possession but the court pointed out that he had been appointed by an earlier order dated January 1, 1968 and that order had not been set aside by any superior court. As regards the grant of police aid sought by the decree-holders the court declined to make a specific direction in that behalf but made an order that intimation be. As regards the grant of police aid sought by the decree-holders the court declined to make a specific direction in that behalf but made an order that intimation be. sent to the Senior Superintendent of Police that from the Commissioner's report and the circumstances of the case there would be breach of peace when possession was delivered. 4. Admittedly, the principal question arising in this appeal is whether the decree-holders were entitled to a fresh warrant for possession and were not obliged to proceed under Order 21, Rule 97 or to file a suit. 5. Order 21 .Rule 35 (1) provides for the mode of executing a decree for deli-very of possession of immoveable property. It declares that possession shall be delivered to the decree-holder or his agent in that behalf, and the delivery may be effected, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property. It is significant that the power extends to the removal of any person, but that person must be a person bound by the decree. The executing court has proceeded on the basis that Shanker Prasad, who was the son of Ragho Prasad, and admittedly in residence with the other members of Ragho Prasad's family in the Haveli, claimed a right of possession through Ragho Prasad and not independently. An attempt was made before us by the appellant to show that this basis was erroneous, but I am not satisfied from the material produced before us that the executing court was in error. Significantly, no attempt has been made by Shanker Prasad to challenge the impugned order. If he was indeed in possession of the property in his own right, one would have expected him to feel aggrieved by the order dated June 1, 1968 holding that he was merely claiming through Ragho Prasad and directing the issue of a fresh writ of possession. But he has apparently chosen to accept the finding of the executing court that he was not in possession in his own right. Proceeding on the basis that Shanker Prasad was in possession of the property through Ragho Prasad, the question is whether the view taken by the executing court is right that a fresh.writ of possession could be issued in the circumstances, and it was not necessary for the decree-holders to resort to Order 21, Rule 97 or to a suit. 6. Proceeding on the basis that Shanker Prasad was in possession of the property through Ragho Prasad, the question is whether the view taken by the executing court is right that a fresh.writ of possession could be issued in the circumstances, and it was not necessary for the decree-holders to resort to Order 21, Rule 97 or to a suit. 6. It will be appropriate, I think, to notice first the relevant cases cited be-fore us. 7. In Ramasekar Pilkci v. Dharamarayi Goundon, (1882) 5 I.L.R. Mad. 113 the facts were these. The decree-holders applied for a warrant of possession on September 20. 1880. Resistance was offered on September 24 and the warrant was not executed. The decree-holders applied for a second warrant and that was granted. There was resistance again on January 25, 1881. Then an application was made under Section 328 of the Code of 1887 (which corresponds to Order 21, Rule 97 of the present Code) . The question was raised whether limitation should run from the first obstruction or the second, and the Madras High Court held that it ran from the second. Specifically, the question whether a fresh warrant could be issued was not raised but it seems clear that the learned Judges were not in doubt on the point. Had the decree-holder not been entitled to obtain a second warrant, the learned Judges would have held that limitation ran from the first obstruction. This decision was considered by our Court in Narain Das. v. Hazari La1, (1896) 18 ILR Alld. 233. In that case also the question was whether limitation for proceeding under Section 328 of the Code of 1887 fell to be determined by reference to the resistance and obstruction offered to the first warrant of possession or with reference to the second warrant of possession. Knox and Blair, B. who decided the case, held that the period of limitation provided in Section 328 covered a cause of action arising out of a particular resistance or obstruction, and so-far as that resistance or obstruction was concerned the decree-holder, if he' wished to take proceedings under Section 328, had to do so within one month from the time when such resistance was offered. They proceeded to say :- "But the bar created by the limitation imposed by the section does not, in our opinion, extend to and hold good so as to bar complaints against acts of resistance or obstruction made upon fresh proceedings taken by the decree-holder." 8. The learned Judges referred to Ramasekra Pillail and observed :- "In that case a decree had been returned unexecuted owing to the resistance of the judgment-debtors. Fresh warrant for possession was afterwards applied for and granted, and fresh. resistance took place. The learned Judges who decided that case have held that the 'period of limitation for an application of this nature commences to run from- the date of the resistance, obstruction or dispossession and that resistance, obstruction. or dispossession can -hardly be any other resistance. obstruction or dispossession than that mentioned forming the subject of complaint. They held that such was the plain interpretation of the terms of the fact and we agree with them in that view." 9. Muttia v. Appasami, (1890) 13 ILR Mad. 504 was a case where the Madras High Court held that the purchaser of property at an action sale in the execution of a decree was entitled to make a fresh application for delivery without being compelled to make a complaint under Section 334 of the Code of 1887 where his attempt to get possession of the property purchased was resisted. 10. In Kesari Narain v. Abul Hasan, (1909) 26 ILR Alld. 365 Knox and Blair, JJ., had before them a case where property was purchased by the applicants at a sale held in execution of a decree. On confirmation of the sale the applicants applied to the court for an order sip for delivery of possession. The court ordered the Amin to put the applicants in possession of the property but the Amin returned the warrant unexecuted reporting that a person other than the judgment debtor resisted the purchaser in getting the possession. The applicants, instead of applying to the court under Section 335 of the Code of 1887 to enquire:into the matter of resistance, made a fresh application to be put in possession. The application was rejected. Against that order the applicants applied in revision to this Court. The applicants, instead of applying to the court under Section 335 of the Code of 1887 to enquire:into the matter of resistance, made a fresh application to be put in possession. The application was rejected. Against that order the applicants applied in revision to this Court. Blair, J. decided in favour of rejecting the revision application on the view that an auction purchaser who failed, within the period allowed by law, to apply to the court for a summary enquiry into the matter of resistance to his obtaining possession must be relegated to his remedy of a civil suit against the person resisting him. He distinguished the case of Muttia on the ground that there the purchaser was resisted not by a third party but by the judgment-debtor. Knox, J., was of the view that no distinction could be drawn between a case where resistance was offered by the judgment-debtor and a case where it was offered by a third party. But in view of the expression of opinion of Blair, J. he concurred. with the order rejecting the revision application. It seems from the reasoning of Blair, J. that if the case had been one where execution of the warrant was resisted by the judgment-debtor a second warrant could have been issued and the learned Judge would not have held the decree-holder compelled to adopt the remedy by way of suit. 11. In Bara Nagore Jute Factory Co. Ltd. v. Rajkumar Rai, (1909) IPC 785 : 13 CWN 724 the Calcutta High Court expressed the view that a decree-holder was entitled to a fresh warrant for possession upon the first remaining unexecuted because of resistance to it, and that if the second warrant was also resisted he could complain against the second resistance. 12. A large number of cases were collected and discussed by a Full Bench of the. Patna High Court in Raghunandan Prosad Mara v. Ram Charan Manda, A.I.R. 1919 Pat. 425. Coutts, J., who delivered the main judgment, traced the history of the relevant provisions from the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859 to the Code of 1908, and then referred to the several cases decided since, including those to which I have referred above. He expressed the view, to which the other learned Judges also subscribed, that even in the case of an auction purchaser who is not. He expressed the view, to which the other learned Judges also subscribed, that even in the case of an auction purchaser who is not. a decree-holder, if an application for delivery of possession has become infructuous by reason of obstruction he is entitled to make an application for a fresh writ of possession without applying under Order 21, Rule 97 of the present Code. 13. The case of a decree-holder was considered by a Full Bench of the Bombay High 'Court in -Mukund Babu Jadhav v. Tanu Sakhu Pawar, A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 457. Beaumont, C. J. who delivered the leading judgment and with whom the other learned Judges agreed, laid down that it was not incumbent upon the decree-holder, upon obstruction to the first warrant for possession to apply under Order 21, Rule 97 and that it was open to him to make an application under Order 21, Rule 35 to obtain a fresh warrant for possession. 14. Then, there is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in The Official Trustee of West Bengal v. Monmothonath Sadhukhan, AIR 1953 Calcutta 499 where P. B. Mukherji, J. referring to the earlier case law on the point observed that the decree-holder had the right to take out a fresh writ of possession and every resistance or obstruction to such writ gave a fresh period of limitation for the purpose of Order 21, Rule 97 from the time of that particular resistance or obstruction. 15. We have been referred by the appellant to Shobha Ram v. Tursi Ram, A.I.R. 1924 Alld. 495 (FB). It was a case Where the auction purchaser of property in execution of a decree attempted after confirmation of the sale, to obtain possession of the property under Order 21, Rule 95, but was resisted in that attempt. It was found that the person who offered resistance were in possession of the property in their own right and not on behalf of or through the judgment-debtor, and that, therefore, their removal could not be contemplated. Sulaiman, J. pointed out the difference between a case where the property was in the possession of the judgment-debtor (and, what is the same, a person claiming through the judgment-debtor) and a case where the property was in the possession of a person holding it in his own right. Sulaiman, J. pointed out the difference between a case where the property was in the possession of the judgment-debtor (and, what is the same, a person claiming through the judgment-debtor) and a case where the property was in the possession of a person holding it in his own right. He said :- "There can be no doubt that after an auction sale has taken place and it has been confirmed, the property vests in the auction purchaser. The auction purchaser can take delivery of possession against his judgment-debtor. For this, remedy is provided under the Code, If, however, there is some person other than the judgment-debtor, who is not his representative and not holding the property on his behalf and who resists or obstructs his possession, there are two remedies open to the auction-purchaser, namely, either to bring a regular suit for possession against that person, or to have recourse to a summary remedy by way of an application as provided in Order 21, Rule 97". (Emphasis mine) . 16. The Assam High Court has in the United Bank of India v. J.C. Mitra, A.I.R. 1962 Assam 150 held that where delivery of possession of property ordered under Order 21, Rule 95 has been obstructed and a dispute arises then whether the person causing obstruction is a sub-tenant of the judgment-debtor or not the execution court cannot determine the question under Order 21, Rule 35 and the proper investigation could be made only under Order 21, Rule 97. It was a case where resistance was offered by persons who were held not bound by the decree, and consequently whose removal was not sanctioned by Order 21, Rule 35. 17. An examination of the provisions of Rules 35, 97, 98 and 99 of Order 21 appears to me to indicate the following scheme of execution. Under Rule 35, the executing court directs delivery of possession of the property to the decree-holder, or to his agent in that behalf, and, if necessary, it will direct the delivery of possession by removal of the judgment-debtor or any other persons bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property. A "person bound by the decree" includes a person claiming through the judgment-debtor. A "person bound by the decree" includes a person claiming through the judgment-debtor. The provision for removal of the persons bound by the decree who does not vacate takes into account a situation where resistance to possession is offered or obstruction is made by the judgment-debtor or any other persons bound by the decree on a ground which is patently without substance. It will include the case of a person who claims to be in possession in his own right and independently of the judgment-debtor but whose claim is on the face of it unacceptable and cannot be said to be made in good faith. In such a case, there is, in my opinion, no bar to the issue of a fresh warrant for possession. Such a bar, it seems to me, cannot be spelled out either from Rule 35 or Rule 97. Where, how ever, resistance is offered or obstruction is made by a judgment-debtor on a ground which appeals to necessitate investigation, the proceeding will be under Rule 97. So also, where resistance or obstruction proceeds from a person claiming to be in possession in his own right and independently of the judgment-debtor and whose claim cannot be rejected as not being made in good faith without investigation, the decree-holder must proceed under Rule 97. While an ex facie consideration of the ground for resistance or obstruction can be had under Rule 35, a ground or claim which cannot be disposed of as obviously without foundation needs to be investigated under Rule 97. In Shobha Ram v. Tursi Ram, when an auction purchaser applied for a warrant for possession and delivery of possession was directed under Order 21, Rule 95 (broadly corresponding to Order 21, Rule 35 in the case of a decree-holder) Kanhaiya Lal, J. observed: "Rule 95 authorises the Court, which held and confirmed the sale, to order delivery to be made to the auction-purchaser, on his application by putting such purchaser, or any person whom he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, in possession of the property purchased, and, if need be, by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same. The person who refuses and is to be removed may be the judgment-debtor or a person holding possession on his behalf, or a person claiming under a title created by the judgment-debtor subsequently to the ejectment which resulted in the sale. The person who refuses and is to be removed may be the judgment-debtor or a person holding possession on his behalf, or a person claiming under a title created by the judgment-debtor subsequently to the ejectment which resulted in the sale. Before a Court can pass an order for his removal, the Court has, however, to be satisfied that he be-longs to one or other of the categories above mentioned; and in order to satisfy itself that he does belong to one or other of these categories the Court may have to make such prima facie enquiry as the circumstances of case may require." 18. If upon investigation under Rule 97, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation, it will act under Rule 98 and direct the decree-holder to be put into possession, and upon further resistance or obstruction order the judgment-debtor, or any person acting at his instigation, to be detained in the civil prison. If, on the other hand, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned by any person (other than the judgment-debtor) . claiming in good faith to be in possession on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor the Court IA/ill act under Rule 99 and dismiss the ,application made under Rule 97. 19. In the instant case, the executing Court found that the claim of Shanker Prasad was obviously without substance and it was quite apparent that he was in possession through his father, Ragho Prasad. 20. It was clearly a case where the claim could not be said to have been made in good faith and therefore was liable to be ignored outright when applying the provision of Rule 35. The executing Court did not reach the stage when Rule 97 could come into play, and it was open to it to issue a fresh warrant for possession. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the history of the litigation and has attempted to raise a number of other questions also. One contention is that inasmuch as the objections of the judgment-debtor were pending under Section 47 the executing Court should have decided them first and then issued the fresh writ of possession. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the history of the litigation and has attempted to raise a number of other questions also. One contention is that inasmuch as the objections of the judgment-debtor were pending under Section 47 the executing Court should have decided them first and then issued the fresh writ of possession. It does not appear from the record before us that any attempt was made by the judgment-debtors to obtain a decision upon those objections at the time when the executing Court was considering the issue of a fresh writ of possession. The judgment-debtors should have invited the attention of the court to their pending objections but it does not appear that they did. The mere circumstance that the objections remained pending when the order for a fresh writ of possession was made cannot, in my opinion, vitiate that order. 22. The next submission of the appellant is that the limitation for applying for a fresh writ of possession is thrity days from the date of resistance to the preceding writ and that period was exceeded when the second writ for possession was applied for. Reliance is placed on Article 129 of the Limitation Act, 1963 but that provision prescribes a period of limitation for an application under Order 21, Rule 97, and, as I have pointed out already, the stage for applying Rule 97 had not yet been reached. 23. It was also contended that there was no decree for possession and therefore a writ for possession should not have been issued, and that in any event some of the judgment-debtors had prescribed title by adverse possession. As to the first there is no substance whatever, and as to the second that is a question which has already been decided during the trial of the suit. 24. It is contended further by the appellant that the impugned order amounted to a review of the earlier order dated January, 9, 1968 rejecting the application of the decree-holders and that the executing court had no power of review. By the order dated January 9, 1968 the executing court merely rejected the prayer for police aid to the Commissioner at the time of effecting delivery of possession. The question whether a fresh writ of possession could be issued was not before the executing court at that time. By the order dated January 9, 1968 the executing court merely rejected the prayer for police aid to the Commissioner at the time of effecting delivery of possession. The question whether a fresh writ of possession could be issued was not before the executing court at that time. In fact, the Commissioner had not yet returned the original writ unexecuted. The order dated January 9, 1968 could, if at all, operate as a bar to a subsequent order granting police aid to the Commissioner. But from the facts narrated above, there was no subsequent order granting such police aid. Indeed, the executing court maintained throughout that there was no power in it to make a direction for police aid. It was in those circumstances that it directed instead that intimation of an apprehension of breach of peace should be communicated to the Senior Superintendent of Police. 25. The decree-holder respondents contended that the instant appeal was not maintainable, but in the view I am taking on the merits of the case, I consider it unnecessary to enter into that question. 26. The appeal fails and is dismissed with Costs R.L. Gulati, J. - I agree.