JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - In this revision Petitioners pray for quashing the orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner in A.C. No. 1 of 1966 dated 12-2-1966 and restoring the orders passed in O.T.R. Appeal No. 32 of 1964. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the disputed lands measuring about 80.09 belong to the deity opp. party No. 1 Petitioners allege that they have all along been in possession of the said lands as raiyats and hereditary Archakas. One Gangadhar Parida was appointed by the Endowment Commissioner as interim trustee of opp. party No. 1. He tried to evict the Petitioners from the disputed lands on which the latter moved the O.T.R. Collector, Kodala for protection which was registered as M.P. No. 6 of 1962. After coming into force of the amended Section 11-A of the O.T.R. Act, Petitioners in M.P. No. 6 of 1962 filed a further petition on 27-11-1962 praying for 80 decision on the question of the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between them. Orders in M.P. No. 6 of 1962 were passed by the O.T.R. Collector on 3-12-1962 in favour of the Petitioners. Against this order, the interim trustee preferred an appeal to the Collector, Ganjam which was registered as O.T.R. Appeal No. 5 of 1963. This appeal was disposed of on compromise in which Petitioners were admitted to De permanent tenants and the raj-bhag payable by them was fixed at 1/6th, out of which, after meeting the daily bhog expenses of the deity, they were to pay the balance to the interim trustee. In addition, Petitioners also agreed to pay the rent of the lands and contribution payable by the institution. Thus, the said proceeding became final as no further appeal or revision was preferred against the same. On 24-1-1964, the then interim trustee Gangadhar Parida was removed, and in his place, opp. parties Nos. 1/80 and 1/b were appointed as interim trustees. The interim trustees in execution of a writ of delivery of possession issued u/s 68 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act took possession of the disputed lands on 26-5-1964 and granted temporary leases of the disputed lands to opp. parties Nos. 2 to 21. Thereupon, on 23-7-1964. Petitioners filed a petition before the O.T.R. Collector under section, 14 of the Act which was registered as M.P. No. 1 of 1964. parties Nos. 2 to 21. Thereupon, on 23-7-1964. Petitioners filed a petition before the O.T.R. Collector under section, 14 of the Act which was registered as M.P. No. 1 of 1964. The O.T.R. Collector by his order dated 7-9-1964 held that the petition was not maintainable. Against this order, Petitioners preferred an appeal registered as O.T.R. Appeal No. 32 of 1964 before the Collector u/s 15 of the Act. The Collector by his order dated 2-12-1965 allowed the appeal. Opposite parties preferred a second appeal to the R.D.C. which was registered as A.C. No. 1 of 1966. On 12-2-1966, the B.D.C. purporting to assume jurisdiction u/s 11-A(5) of the O.T.R. Act, allowed the appeal and set-aside the order of the Collector in O.T.R. Appeal No. 32 of 1964. Petitioners in this revision assail this order of the R.D.C. as illegal and not sustainable. 3. Learned Counsel for Petitioners assails the impugned order on the following three grounds : (1) the R.D.C. had no jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal, as no second' appeal lies against an order u/s 14 : of the O.T.R. Act; (2) the R.D.C. acted illegally in assuming powers u/s 11-A(5) of the O.T.R. (amendment) Act, 1962 and (3) the R.D.C. had no jurisdiction to hold absence of relationship of landlord and tenant as the orders passed in the previous proceeding in M.P. No. 6 of 1962 had become final and conclusive. 4. It is not disputed by learned Counsel for opposite parties that no second appeal lies against an order passed under Section, 14 of the O.T.R. it Act. He, however, contends that the amended Section 11-A vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Collector to decide all disputes relating to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant which arise in the course of a proceeding under the Act. Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 11-A provide for an appeal and second appeal. In the present case, it is contended that treating the original order as one u/s 11-A(1) and the Collector's order as one under Sub-section (4), the R.D.C. was competent to assume jurisdiction and entertain the second appeal. Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 11-A provide for an appeal and second appeal. In the present case, it is contended that treating the original order as one u/s 11-A(1) and the Collector's order as one under Sub-section (4), the R.D.C. was competent to assume jurisdiction and entertain the second appeal. Secondly, it is argued by him that the order passed in M.P. No. 6 of 1962 did not decide the question of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, and in any view of the matter, the order of the O.T.R. Collector in that proceeding merged in the appellate order passed in O.T.R. Appeal No. 5 of 1963 which was disposed of on compromise. The appellate order in O.T.R. Appeal No. 5 of 1963 did not consider or decide the question relating to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, and as such., the contention that such a question is concluded by previous orders is not tenable. Lastly, it is argued by him that permanent or occupancy tenants not being entitled to any protection under the provisions of the O.T.R. Act, the order in M.P. No. 6 of 1962 and the order passed in appeal there from cannot be construed as amounting to determination of the question of existence of landlord and tenant under the Act, and as such, there was no lack of jurisdiction for the R.D.C. in second appeal to come to the finding which is being challenged. 5. The first contention of Petitioners is that the R.D.C. had no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal against an order u/s 14 of the O.T.R. Act. It is conceded by learned Counsel for opposite parties that no second appeal lies against an order under Section, 14 of the Act. Therefore, it is not necessary to further consider this aspect. The only other points that remain for consideration are whether the B.D.C. was competent to construe the order in M.P. No. 1 of 1964 as one u/s 11-A(1), the order in O.T.R. Appeal No. 32 of 1964 as one under Sub-section (4) of Section 11-A and entertain the second appeal under Sub-section (5) and whether the order in M.P. No. 6/62 is conclusive on the question. No doubt, u/s 11-A(1), the Collector is entitled to decide all disputes regarding the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant arising in the course of any proceeding under the Act, in which case, Sub-sections (4) and (5) of that section will be attracted. In this case, however, it is argued on behalf of Petitioners that the question of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant having already been decided in the previous proceeding and become conclusive, it was not be open to the Collector, even if he wanted to assume jurisdiction u/s 11-A(1) to reopen the same. Mr. Mohanty, learned Counsel for opposite parties does not dispute that if in the previous proceeding this is found to have been decided, the contention of Petitioners will prevail. He however, contends that in the previous proceeding, i.e., M.P. No. 6 of 1962 and the appeal therefrom registered as O.T.R. Appeal No. 5 of 1963, the question of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant was not decided, and secondly, the appellate order passed on compromise purports to confer permanent rights of tenancy on the Petitioners which is outside the purview of the O.T.R. Act, and as such, cannot be construed as one amounting to determination of the question of existence of landlord and tenant under the Act. 6. I am unable to accept the validity of the contentions advanced on behalf of opposite parties. There is no dispute that Petitioners filed an application under Section, 9 of the O.T.R. Act on 27-7-1962 when the interim trustee threatened to evict them and that was registered as M.P. No. 6 of 1962. White the said petition was pending, the amended Section 11-A of the O.T.R. Act was enacted and came into force on 10-10-1962. Thereupon, Petitioners in M.P. No. 6 of 1962 filed a petition on 27-11-1962 specifically praying to the O.T.R. Collector to decide the question of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant this petition was ordered to be put up at the time of final disposal of the case, and on 3-12-1962, orders were passed in favour of Petitioners. By this order, the petitions of the Petitioners filed on 27-7-1962 as well as 27-11-1962 were disposed of. In the course of the order, the learned O.T.R. Collector has observed as follows: The Petitioners have also put in a petition saying that the issue of tenancy be decided first. By this order, the petitions of the Petitioners filed on 27-7-1962 as well as 27-11-1962 were disposed of. In the course of the order, the learned O.T.R. Collector has observed as follows: The Petitioners have also put in a petition saying that the issue of tenancy be decided first. Accordingly, I am to decide the tenancy first. The Respondents also agreed to this. Thus, it is clear that the learned O.T.R. Collector applied his mind and proceeded with the question of existence of tenancy claimed by Petitioners. Though he has not in the course of his order specifically expressed that existence of tenancy is proved, be has dealt with the evidence relating to the payment of raj-bhag by the Petitioners and their being in possession. On a consideration of the evidence, he rejected the contention of the interim trustee and decided the proceeding in favour of the Petitioners. When specifically he posed the question about the existence of tenancy, proceeded to decide and ultimately allowed the Petitioners, in substance, it amounts to a decision in favour of the Petitioners who claim to be tenants and prayed for determination of the said question. 7. Mr. Mohanty for opposite parities further contended that even if the order of the O.T.R. Collector is construed in favour of Petitioners' contention, it is no longer in force as it merged in the appellate order which was passed in terms of the compromise. Under the terms or compromise, it has been stated that the Archakas (Petitioners) being permanent raiyats, they will be liable to pay raj-bhag in future at a particular rate. Relying on the decisions reported in Jagannath Behera and Others Vs. Raja Hari Hara Singh Mardaraj Bhramarabara Roy, and Jagannath Brahmachari Vs. Jogi Sahu and Others it is argued by Mr. Mohanty that as the provisions of the O.T.R. Act were enacted for giving protection to temporary tenants other than those having permanent or occupancy rights, the latter category is outside the purview of the Act. Therefore, the order of the appellate Court cannot be treated as one determining the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the interim trustee and Petitioners within the purview of the provisions of the Act. 8. In my opinion, the two decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for opposite parties are not strictly relevant to the question which arises for consideration, in the present case. 8. In my opinion, the two decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for opposite parties are not strictly relevant to the question which arises for consideration, in the present case. In the aforesaid decisions, the question arose whether protection under the O.T.R. Act was available to persons claiming permanent or occupancy rights. It was held that the provisions of the Act were intended for giving protection to temporary tenants other than those having permanent or occupancy rights. In the present case, the question is not whether Petitioners have permanent tenancy rights but the question is whether in the previous proceedings their status as tenants was determined. In this case, what the appellate Court was required to decide was whether the finding of the O.T.R. Collector about existence of relationship of landlord and tenant was correct or otherwise. The fact remains that by the appellate order passed on compromise, the O.T.R. Collector's order was not reversed, but in substance, it was confirmed though the terms of the compromise purport to proceed a step further of acknowledging permanent rights in the Petitioners. To the extent the appellate order was outside the jurisdiction, the decision may not be conclusive or binding, but to the extent the appellate order affirmed the order of the O.T.R. Collector that Petitioners were liable to pay raj-bhag which is payable only by tenants, it cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Therefore, it is futile now to contend that in the previous proceeding the question of relationship of landlord and tenant was not decided so long the O.T.R. Collector's order was not set aside. Admittedly, there was no appeal or revision against this order, and as such, this decision has become conclusive. This having become conclusive, in my opinion, it was not available to the R.D.C. to reopen the question and proceed to decide the matter afresh. Hence, I reject the contentions of opposite parties and agreeing with learned Counsel for Petitioners hold that the order of the R.D.C. purporting to decide the question of existence of landlord and tenant practically amounts to reopening of the matter which had already become conclusive. As such, the order is without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. 9. During the course of argument, it was mentioned before me that the Tahsildar who has been appointed as receiver has made collections from the disputed lands and the same are in deposit. As such, the order is without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. 9. During the course of argument, it was mentioned before me that the Tahsildar who has been appointed as receiver has made collections from the disputed lands and the same are in deposit. It is, therefore, necessary to give appropriate directions for apportionment of the amount in deposit. Considering the above circumstances, I allow the revision, set aside the order of the R.D.C. dated 12-2-1966 in A.C. No. 1 of 1966 and restore the orders passed in O.T.R. Appeal no 32 of 1964 and give the following directions for distribution of the amount collected from the disputed lands by the receiver and kept in deposit. One sixth of the amount in deposit be paid to the interim trustees opposite parties Nos. 1/a and 1/b and half of the amount in deposit to the Petitioners. Out of the balance the receiver will pay the rent or such portion of it that remains to be paid for the disputed lands as well as the amount of contribution, if any, still due by opposite party No. 1. The litigation expenditure, if any, incurred for realisation of the usufructs of the disputed lands are to be borne in the proportion of 5/6th by Petitioners and 1/6th by opposite parties Nos. 1/a and 1/b.