JUDGMENT 1. - Both these writ petitions are directed against the award dated 26th of November, 1964 of the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur and because in these petitions common questions of facts and law are involved, I propose to dispose them of by one judgment. 2. Writ Petition No. 614 of 1965 is filed by the Cement Works Karmachari Sangh, Sawai-Madhopur (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as the `union') at whose instance the industrial dispute was referred by the State Government under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the Tribunal. Writ Petition No. 305 of 1968 has been filed by an industrial workman Baij-nath Singh of the cement factory of the Jaipur Udyog Limited established at Sawai-Madhopur. 3. The facts giving rise to these writ petitions, in a nutshell, may be given as follows : 4. The Jaipur Udyog Ltd., is a public limited company and is running a cement factory at Sawai-Madhopur. It also operates the limestone quarries at Phalodi in District Sawai-Madhopur. According to the petitioner, the quarries are the main source of supply of limestone for the running of the cement factory. Somewhere in the year 1958, the Government of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment, appointed a Central Wages Board for the cement industries which was headed by Shri M. R. Mehar, I.C.S. (Retd.) as its Chairman. This Central Government (sic) whereby it recommended certain uniform rates of wages to be paid to the workmen in all the cement factories in India. It is alleged that the Government of India accepted the recommendations of the said Wage Board. While prescribing certain grades for the workmen, the Wage Board also suggested certain principles according to which the workmen of the cement factories were to be fitted in the various grades recommended by it. 5. Cement Works Karamchari Sangh, Sawai-Madhopur is a trade union registered under the Trade Union Act and according to the petitioner's claim, it is the only trade union of the workmen employed by the management of the Jaipur Udyog Limited in the cement factory and in quarries. The union raised a dispute regarding the fixation of the various types of workmen in the factory as well as at the quarries in the grades recommended by the Wage Board, but it so appears that no accord could be reached between the management and the union. The union raised a dispute regarding the fixation of the various types of workmen in the factory as well as at the quarries in the grades recommended by the Wage Board, but it so appears that no accord could be reached between the management and the union. The allegation of the union against the management is that in disregard of the principles laid down by the Wage Board, the workmen were arbitrarily tried to be fixed in the grades inferior to those to which they were entitled according to the recommendations of the Central Wage Board and, therefore, a dispute was raised by the union before the Conciliation Officer appointed by the Government of Rajasthan. The Conciliation Officer submitted his failure report whereupon the Government of Rajasthan by issuing a notification dated 27th of December, 1969, in exercise of the powers vested in it under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) referred the industrial dispute to the Tribunal in the following term: "How the workman of Jaipur Udyog Limited. Sawai-Madhopur should be fixed in the various grades proposed by the Central Wage Board on Cement Industry?" While the dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, a settlement was arrived at between the union and the management which was recorded on 17th of November, 1964. This settlement was signed on behalf of the union by Parmanand, President, Chittar Singh, Vice-President, Vinod Shanker Pareek, Office Secretary and Devilal Sandilya, Joint Secretary, whereas Messrs. R. N. Chaturvedi Works Manager and M. L. Rathi, Secretary appended their signatures on behalf of the management. Both the parties, who sought various adjournments from the Industrial Tribunal, and requested to give an award on the basis of the settlement. The learned Judge presiding over the Tribunal by his order dated 26th November, 1964, gave his award on the strength of the aforesaid settlement and observed that the settlement will be deemed to be a part of the award. 6. According to the respondent, the workmen drew all benefits out of the settlement and the company was required to pay to the workmen under the said award wages from retrospective effect and the company had to pay arrears wages to the extent of rupees seven lacs. After the settlement was finally arrived at, the management got the settlement published in the daily Hindi `Rajasthan Patrika' dated 18th November, 1964. After the settlement was finally arrived at, the management got the settlement published in the daily Hindi `Rajasthan Patrika' dated 18th November, 1964. In a public meeting called at Sawai-Madhopur on 18th November, 1964, the terms of the settlement were announced to the workmen who attended the meeting. The copies of the settlement were also sent to the appropriate authorities, both of the State of Rajasthan as well as of the Central Government, for the purposes of registration of the same in terms of Section 2 (p) of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment, registered this settlement as is evident from the letter of the Conciliation Officer (Central), Ajmer dated 25th January, 1965 (Appendix 4 attached with the reply). The memorandum of settlement was also separately registered with the Government of Rajasthan at serial No. 5 of 1965 as is evident from the copy of the letter dated 26th November, 1964, received from the Regional Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ajmer and Kota Division, Jaipur (Appendix 5 with the reply). The contention of the management is that the memorandum of settlement duly signed by the parties was filed jointly by the parties before the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan on 26th of November, 1964 with a prayer that an award may be passed in terms of the settlement and it was on this request of both the parties that the Industrial Tribunal passed an award in terms of the said settlement. 7. It so appears that the parties acted upon the terms of the award up to October, 1965. 7. It so appears that the parties acted upon the terms of the award up to October, 1965. Thereafter the union thought that the union acted erroneously to have entered into a settlement and, therefore, the present writ petition was filed by the union challenging the award, inter alia, on the grounds (1) that the settlement was not a proper settlement; (2) that the reference that was made by the State of Rajasthan to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act was misconceived as the Rajasthan Government was not an appropriate Government for making any reference in respect of the workmen working in the mines; (3) that the award is vitiated because of mandatory provisions of Rule 20(2) of the Rules made under the Act by the State of Rajasthan were not complied with by the Tribunal; and (4) that the Tribunal acted mechanically in giving its award on the strength of the settlement without scrutinising whether the settlement was a proper one and thus it abdicated its function to the will of the parties and this procedure vitiates the award. 8. The second writ application challenging the award has been filed by Baijnath Singh who is a workman in the Jaipur Udyog Limited working as a welder. This writ application was filed in the year 1968 stating that as a result of the award the petitioner had been very badly affected. His contention is that according to the recommendation of the Central Wage Board, he ought to have been fixed in the grade 60.40-3-.90-93.60, but according to the settlement he was placed in the grade 57.20-2-08-73.84. It may be mentioned here that before this writ application was filed, one Rajhans, who was also a workman in the factory, had filed a writ application before this Court in the year 1965 but later on that writ application was withdrawn by him and it was after the withdrawal of that writ application that Baijnath Singh has come forward as a petitioner to challenge the award given by the Tribunal. 9. 9. The respondent No. 5 company has filed reply to the writ applications wherein it has been averred that since the recommendations of the Central Wage Board were published by the Central Government, the respondent company was trying its level best to fix up the workmen of the company in the various grades as recommended by the Wage Board by mutual consent. As a result of their efforts, the union agreed to refer the matter to the board of arbitrators on 10th February, 1963, consisting of one representative each of the parties and Shri M. R. Mehar, I.C.S. (Retd.) as an independent member of the board who was the author as Chairman of the Central Wage Board of the recommendations which were to be implemented by the management. The allegation of the company is that after attending two meetings of the Board of arbitrators the union did not co-operate in the proceedings of the Board and with the result that the proceedings of the arbitration had to be abandoned. It is further alleged that when the dispute was referred to the Tribunal, the company in spite of the dispute pending before the Tribunal, laid great emphasis on mutual settlement between the parties in the matter of fixation of its employees in the various grades and as a result of that effort, the company ultimately persuaded the union to sit together and find out a solution by mutual consent. According to the company, the cases of workmen were discussed at length by the representatives of the union and the management and with the mutual consent of both the parties, a settlement was arrived at which was beneficial for both the parties. That settlement was presented jointly before the Tribunal and it was prayed that an award in terms of the settlement may be given. It was on the request of both the parties that the Tribunal was pleased to make the impugned award. It is further averred that after having taken all the benefits of the settlement the union has challenged the validity of the award on very flimsy grounds which shows a bad faith of the union. While defying all the objections raised by the union, the company further added a ground for dismissing the petitioner's claim that the writ petitions have been filed after a considerable delay and on that ground alone these petitions stand to be rejected. While defying all the objections raised by the union, the company further added a ground for dismissing the petitioner's claim that the writ petitions have been filed after a considerable delay and on that ground alone these petitions stand to be rejected. It was also urged that this Court should not entertain the writ petition of the petitioners who show want of good faith on their part. Any relief to such parties under an extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court would, according to the respondent, encourage the mala fide actions of the parties. 10. The first argument of Mr. Mridul is that the reference to the Industrial Tribunal was made in this case by the Government of Rajasthan which was not an appropriate Government as the award deals with the fixation of the workmen working in the factory as well as in the mines managed by the same management. According to Mr. Mridul, the appropriate Government for making any reference under Section 10 of the Act is the Central Government as the respondent No. 3 is managing the limestone mines for carrying on its trade activities in the factory. In this connection, reference has been made to the definition oi "mine" given in Section 2(lb) of the Act. According to this definition, "mine" means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on, and includes - xx xx xx (vi) all adits, levels, planes, machinery, works, railways, tramways and sidings, in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine: (vii) all workshops situated within the precincts of a mine and under the same management and used solely for purpose connected with that mine or a number of mines under the same management. 11. The contention of Mr. Mridul further is that the raw material which is used in the factory owned by. the company is the limestone which is undoubtedly a mineral extracted by the management of the company from the mines, and since the factory is not situate far off from the mines, clauses (vi) and (vii) of Section 2 (lb) would bring the entire complex, namely, the mines and the cement factories within the definition of "mine" and as such it is only the Central Government which is an appropriate Government for making a reference of an industrial dispute to the Tribunal. 12. Mr. C. N. Sharma. 12. Mr. C. N. Sharma. appearing on behalf of the respondent company, on the other hand, contended that the dispute referred by the Rajasthan Government to the Tribunal does not relate to the question of fixation of the wages of workmen working in the mines but the dispute only referred to the fixation of wages of the workmen working in the cement factory. He also contended that the dispute was raised by the union itself before the Conciliation Officer appointed by the Government of Rajasthan and, therefore, in these circumstances, the only appropriate Government that can refer the dispute to the Tribunal is the Government of Rajasthan. He further urged that clauses (vi) and (vii) of Section 2(lb) cannot be attracted to this case as the factory is situate away from the mines and the factory cannot be taken to be a workshop for purposes connected with the mines. 13. Mr. Sharma submits that the factory is at a distance of more than 15 miles from the actual location of the mines. Looking to the location of the factory it is difficult for learned counsel for the union to establish that the factory is situate within the precincts of the mines. Mr. Sharma admitted that it is true that the product of the mines is used for manufacturing cement in the factory but this admission of learned counsel by itself would not bring the factory within the definition of word "mine" in Section 2(lb), clause (vii), firstly, because the factory cannot be termed as a workshop and, secondly, because it cannot be said that it was established solely for purpose connected with that mine. A workshop which has been established within the precincts of the mines and for purposes connected with the mines can be that workshop which is used only for facilitating the working of the mines. In the present case, the working of the mines is quite independent of the manufacture, of cement from the products of the mines and, therefore, it is difficult to accept the proposition put by Mr. Mridul that the factory should be taken to have been established for the purposes connected with the mines. 14. Similarly, Mr. Sharma contends that clause (vi) of Section 2(lb) of the Act cannot be attracted to bring the factory within the term "mine". According to the argument of Mr. Mridul that the factory should be taken to have been established for the purposes connected with the mines. 14. Similarly, Mr. Sharma contends that clause (vi) of Section 2(lb) of the Act cannot be attracted to bring the factory within the term "mine". According to the argument of Mr. Mridul, the works in or adjacent to and belonging to the mine under clause (vi) is a mine and the manufacture of cement at the factory must be taken to be a work carried on by the company which manages the mine and therefore the work must be deemed to have been belonging to the mine. I fail to understand the logic behind this argument as to how the cement factory, which has been established for manufacturing cement from the limestone extracted from the mines can be taken to be a work belonging to a mine because the mines are also operated by the same management. In this view, the objection of the union that for purposes of making the reference of an industrial dispute to an Industrial Tribunal, the Central Government was an appropriate Government as it deals with the mines cannot be accepted. 15. Mr. Sharma submits that as the dispute was first of all referred by the union to the Conciliation Officer appointed by the Government of Rajasthan and as it mainly relates to the fixation of the workmen of the factory in the grades suggested by the Wage Board, the appropriate Government for referring the dispute to the Tribunal was the Government of Rajasthan. He further contended that if the settlement arrived at (sic) workmen working in the mines, then such a reference would not by itself change the complexion of the dispute as the award given by the Tribunal is an award mainly relating to the workmen working in the factory and it cannot therefore be taken that the award covers the workmen in the mines also. I find force in the submission of Mr. Sharma that the dispute as raised by the union related only to the workmen in the factory as union itself chose to refer the matter to the Conciliation Officer of the Rajasthan State and when he failed to bring about, the conciliation the matter was referred at the instance of the union to the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan. Sharma that the dispute as raised by the union related only to the workmen in the factory as union itself chose to refer the matter to the Conciliation Officer of the Rajasthan State and when he failed to bring about, the conciliation the matter was referred at the instance of the union to the Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan. At no stage this objection was ever raised by the union that the dispute concerned the workmen of the mines also and therefore the State Government was not competent to refer the dispute to the Tribunal. The award given by the Tribunal also does not say that it would govern the workmen of the mines also. In these circumstances, the argument of Mr. Mridul that the Rajasthan Government was not competent to refer the dispute to the Tribunal cannot be accepted. 16. It was next urged by Mr. Mridul that the so-called settlement arrived at between the parties on 17th of November, 1964, cannot be a valid settlement under the Act. His contention is that the term "settlement" has been defined by the Act under Section 2(p) and according to that definition, settlement means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer. As the formalities as given in the definition of "settlement" have not been duly complied with, the document filed before the Tribunal as settlement cannot be treated as settlement within the purview of the law. 17. As the formalities as given in the definition of "settlement" have not been duly complied with, the document filed before the Tribunal as settlement cannot be treated as settlement within the purview of the law. 17. Rule 58 of the Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958, prescribes that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings or otherwise, shall be in form 'H' and the settlement shall be signed by (a) in the case of an employer, by the employer himself or by his authorised agent, or when the employer is an incorporated company or other body corporate, by the agent, manager or other principal officer of the corporation: (b) in the case of workmen, either by the President and Secretary of a trade union of workmen, or by five representatives of the workmen duly authorised in this behalf at a meeting of the workmen held for the purpose. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 58 further provides that where a settlement is arrived at between an employer and his workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding before a Board or Conciliation Officer, the parties to the settlement shall jointly send a copy thereof to the Government and the Labour Commissioner, Rajasthan and to the Conciliation Officer concerned. Mr. Mridul contends that the parties did not comply with the requirement of Rule 58 which is mandatory and, therefore, this settlement cannot be taken as a valid settlement to form a base for giving an award. 18. In this connection, I may refer to clause (v) of para 12 of the reply filed by the respondent company wherein it has been specifically mentioned that after the settlement was arrived at, the copies thereof were sent to the appropriate authorities both of the State of Rajasthan as well as of the Central Government for purposes of registration of the same in terms of Section 2(p) of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. Shri R. N. Chaturvedi the Works Manager of Messrs. Jaipur Udyog Limited has verified the contents of this para on oath. There is no reason to disbelieve the averments made in clause (v) of para 12 of the reply of the respondent company. Shri R. N. Chaturvedi the Works Manager of Messrs. Jaipur Udyog Limited has verified the contents of this para on oath. There is no reason to disbelieve the averments made in clause (v) of para 12 of the reply of the respondent company. From these averments, it is also clear that compliance to the requirements of Rule 58 and Section 2(p) of the Act was made by parties before the settlement was produced before the Tribunal for making an award in terms thereof. From appendix 4 and 5 appended to the reply, it is clear that the memorandum of settlement was received by the Conciliation Officer (Central). Ajmer and the Regional Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ajmer and Kota Division. As far as the compliance of clause (4) of Rule 58 of the Rules is concerned, the parties took sufficient care to see that it was done and immediately after the settlement was drawn and signed by the authorised persons representing the parties, it was despatched for registration with the appropriate authorities mentioned in the Act. 19. Settlement, as is evident from Annexure 3, was signed on behalf of the management by Shri R. N. Chaturvedi, Works Manager and by M. L. Rathi, Secretary of the company. On behalf of the union, Parmanand, President, Chittar Singh, Vice-President, Vinod Shanker Pareek, Office Secretary and Devilal Sandilaya, Joint Secretary of the union had appended their signatures to the settlement. It is not denied that the signatories to this document did not represent the union at the time when they put their signatures thereon. While drawing the settlement, the provisions of Rule 58(2) were in the mind of the parties and the signatures were taken on this document in accordance with the requirements of the said rule. In my opinion, the settlement does not suffer from any infirmity and, therefore, it is difficult to accept the contention of the union that this settlement is not a settlement in the eye of law. 20. The award has been challenged by the union also on the ground that the Tribunal mechanically accepted the settlement without scrutinising whether the settlement was fair or not and passed an order to make the award in terms of such a settlement. This procedure, according to Mr. 20. The award has been challenged by the union also on the ground that the Tribunal mechanically accepted the settlement without scrutinising whether the settlement was fair or not and passed an order to make the award in terms of such a settlement. This procedure, according to Mr. Mridul, is nothing short of abdication of its function by the Tribunal in favour of the contending parties and, therefore, on that ground he submits that the award stands vitiated. Mr. Sharma, on the other hand, contended that in order to maintain an industrial peace and harmony, much stress has been laid by the legislature on the agreements between the parties and, according to him, when the parties agreed to certain solution the Tribunals, though they have ample powers even to vary the terms of the contract between the parties, should not normally interfere unless the agreement has been arrived at under some misrepresentation, fraud or mistake. Mr. Sharma contended that from the very beginning the company was trying to order the fixation of its workmen in the grades recommended by the Central Wage Board by taking the workmen or their union in confidence and it was from that point of view that an attempt was made first to refer the matter to the Board of arbitrators which was to be presided over by no less a personality than the ex-Chairman of the Central Wage Board itself. But it was unfortunate that no fruitful result could be achieved through that effort. He also urged that it was after long discussion between the representatives of the management and the representatives of the union that a solution was arrived at and, therefore, both the parties, namely, the union and the management, jointly presented their settlement for getting an award in terms thereof. In this connection, he referred to certain decisions of the High Courts and of the Supreme Court wherein settlement has been given preference even over an award given by the Tribunal. 21. It may be noted here that it is not the case of the union that the settlement was arrived at under misrepresentation or fraud but the contention of Mr. 21. It may be noted here that it is not the case of the union that the settlement was arrived at under misrepresentation or fraud but the contention of Mr. Mridul is that even the parties are likely to commit a bona fide error and fall in trap and it is therefore necessary that before giving an award on the basis of a settlement the Tribunal should go into the merits of the settlement and convert it into award only when it is found to be quite fair to the parties. According to learned counsel, this aspect of the question was totally overlooked by the Tribunal while giving the award and therefore the award stands vitiated. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on a Madras case in Workers of 32 Textile Mills in Coimbatore v. Dhanalakshmi Mills Ltd., Tiruppur, A.I.R. 1961 Mad 212 . 22. In the Madras case, the award was passed by the Tribunal in terms of a compromise entered into between the parties without recording any finding whether that settlement was a fair and just settlement. The learned single Judge who decided that case observed: "The Tribunal had merely adopted the agreement between the parties. Section 15, which prescribes the duties of the Tribunal, directs it to hold its proceedings expeditiously, and submit its award to the appropriate Tribunal. There is no power in the Industrial Tribunal similar to one conferred under O. 23, R. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code to record a compromise. What the Industrial Tribunal is empowered, is to pass an award which is defined as interim of final determination." According to the learned Judge, since there was no determination of the dispute by the Industrial Tribunal, the award was defective. 23. As against this decision, Mr. Sharma has placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in State of Bihar v. D. N. Ganguly, A.I.R. 1958 SC 1018 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that case, while discussing the policy of the Act as to how the disputes between the parties must be settled, observed as follows: "It is clear that the policy of the Act is to secure and preserve good relations between the employers and their workmen and to maintain industrial peace and harmony. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that case, while discussing the policy of the Act as to how the disputes between the parties must be settled, observed as follows: "It is clear that the policy of the Act is to secure and preserve good relations between the employers and their workmen and to maintain industrial peace and harmony. It is with this object that Section 3 of the Act contemplates the establishment of the Works Committees whose duty it is to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employers and the workmen. If the Works Committee is unable to settle the disputes arising between the employer and his workmen, conciliation officers and the boards of conciliation offer assistance to the parties to settle their disputes. Sections 3, 4, 5, 12 and 13 refer to the working of this machinery contemplated by the Act. It is only where the conciliation machinery fails to bring about settlement between the parties that the Act contemplates compulsory adjudication of the industrial disputes by labour courts and tribunals as the last alternative." 24. While dealing with the powers of the Industrial Tribunals when a compromise is arrived at between the parties during the course of the adjudication of disputes, their Lordships said: "It is, however, urged that if a dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) is settled between the parties, the only remedy for giving effect to such a compromise would be to cancel the reference and to take the proceedings out of the jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal. This argument is based on the assumption that the industrial tribunal would have to ignore the settlement by the parties of their dispute pending before them and would have to make an award on the merits in spite of the said settlement. We are not satisfied that this argument is well-founded. It is true that the Act does not contain any provision specifically authorising the industrial tribunal to record a compromise and pass an award in its terms corresponding to the provisions of O. XXIII, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it would be very unreasonable to assume that the industrial tribunal would insist upon dealing with the dispute on the merits even after it is informed that the dispute has been amicably settled between the parties. But it would be very unreasonable to assume that the industrial tribunal would insist upon dealing with the dispute on the merits even after it is informed that the dispute has been amicably settled between the parties. We have already indicated that amicable settlements of industrial disputes which generally lead to industrial peace and harmony are the primary objects of this Act. Settlements reached before the conciliation officers or boards are specifically dealt with by Ss. 12(2) and 13(3) and the same are made binding under Section 18. There can, therefore, be no doubt that if an industrial dispute before a tribunal is amicably settled, the tribunal would immediately agree to make an award in terms of the settlement between the parties." 25. In view of these clear observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. I find it extremely difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Mridul that even after the settlement has been arrived at between the parties, the Tribunal must go into the merits of the dispute and must pass an award after adjudicating the points of difference between the parties. 26. In Sirsilk Ltd. v. Govt, of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1964 SC 160 , it so happened that after the award was made by the Tribunal and before it was published in the Gazette, the employer and its workmen entered into a settlement and it was requested that the award may not be published under Section 17(1) of the Act. The difficulty was experienced in that case because according to the Tribunal, Section 17(1) was of mandatory nature and, therefore, the Tribunal was bound to publish the award in spite of the settlement arrived at between the parties. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court and their Lordships, in the circumstances of that case, observed as follows: "The contention on behalf of the appellant in the alternative is this. It is said that the main purpose of the Act is to maintain peace between the parties in an industrial concern. Where therefore parties to an industrial dispute have reached a settlement which is binding under Section 18(1) the dispute between them really comes to an end. It is said that the main purpose of the Act is to maintain peace between the parties in an industrial concern. Where therefore parties to an industrial dispute have reached a settlement which is binding under Section 18(1) the dispute between them really comes to an end. In such a case it is urged that the settlement arrived at between the parties should be respected and industrial peace should not be allowed to be disturbed by the publication of the award which might be different from the settlement. There is no doubt that a settlement of the dispute between the parties themselves is to be preferred where it can be arrived at industrial adjudication, as the settlement is likely to lead to more lasting peace than an award, as it is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between them. Even though this may be so, we have still to reconcile the mandatory character of the provision contained in Section 17(1) for the publication of the award to the equally mandatory character of the binding nature of the settlement arrived at between the parties as provided in Section 18(1). Ordinarily there should be no difficulty about the matter, for if a settlement has been arrived at between the parties while the dispute is pending before the Tribunal, the parties would file the settlement before the tribunal and the tribunal would make the award in accordance with the settlement. Ordinarily there should be no difficulty about the matter, for if a settlement has been arrived at between the parties while the dispute is pending before the Tribunal, the parties would file the settlement before the tribunal and the tribunal would make the award in accordance with the settlement. In 1959 SCR 1191 : A.I.R. 1958 SC 1018 dealing with an argument urged before this Court that where a settlement has been arrived at between the parties while an industrial dispute is pending before a Tribunal, the only remedy for giving effect to such a settlement would be to cancel the reference, this Court observed that though the Act did not contain any provision specifically authorising the industrial Tribunal, to record a compromise and pass an award in its terms corresponding to the provisions of O. XXIII, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would be very unreasonable to assume that the industrial Tribunal would insist upon dealing with the dispute on the merits even after it is informed that the dispute has been amicably settled between the parties, and there can be no doubt that if a dispute before a tribunal is amicably settled, the tribunal would immediately agree to make an award in terms, of the settlement between the parties. In that case this Court dealt with what would happen if a settlement was arrived at while the matter was pending before the tribunal. The difficulty arises in the present case because the proceedings before the tribunal had come to an end, and the tribunal had sent its award to Government before the settlement was arrived at on October 1, 1957. There is no provision in the Act dealing with such a situation just as there was no provision in the Act dealing with the situation which arose where the parties came to an agreement while the dispute was pending before the tribunal. This Court held in Ganguly's case, 1959 SCR 1191 : A.I.R. 1958 SC 1018 that in such a situation the settlement or compromise would have to be filed before the tribunal and the tribunal would make an award thereupon in accordance with the settlement. Difficulty however arises when the matter has gone beyond the purview of the tribunal as in the present case. Difficulty however arises when the matter has gone beyond the purview of the tribunal as in the present case. That difficulty in our opinion has to be resolved in order to avoid possible conflict between S. 18(1) which makes the settlement arrived at between the parties otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding binding on the parties and the terms of an award which are binding under S. 18(3) on publication and which may not be the same as the terms of the settlement binding under S. 18(1). The only way in our view to resolve the possible conflict which would arise between a settlement which is binding under S. 18(1) and an award which may become binding under S. 18(3) on publication is to withhold the publication of the award once the Government has been informed jointly by the parties that a settlement binding under S. 18(1) has been arrived at. It is true that S. 17(1) is mandatory and ordinarily the Government has to publish an award sent to it by the tribunal; but where a situation like the one in the present cases arises which may lead to a conflict between a settlement under S. 18(1) and an award binding under S. 18(3) on publication, the only solution is to withhold the award from publication. This would not in our opinion in any way affect the mandatory nature of the provision in S. 17(1), for the Government would ordinarily have to publish the award but for the special situation arising in such cases." 27. These observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court make it abundantly clear as to how much importance is attached by the Courts to settlement of the parties. In order to bring real peace and harmony between the employer and the workmen, the will of the parties which ultimately brings and understanding between them, must prevail over the adjudication by the third person. Even when the Tribunal had given its award and had sent it for publication to the Government and if thereafter any settlement had been arrived at between the parties then the Supreme Court thought it proper that such a settlement must be given preference over the adjudication of the Tribunal. 28. Even when the Tribunal had given its award and had sent it for publication to the Government and if thereafter any settlement had been arrived at between the parties then the Supreme Court thought it proper that such a settlement must be given preference over the adjudication of the Tribunal. 28. In Workmen of Harrisons and Cros-field Ltd., Quilon v. Harrisons & Cros-field Ltd., (1969) 1 Lab LJ 61 (Ker) , the learned Judge relying on Amalgamated Coffee Estate Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1965-2 Lab LJ 110 (SC) , held that it is the duty of the Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute referred to him in accordance with the settlement, if any even if it be one arrived at during the course of the adjudication proceedings. 29. In another Supreme Court case in Hindustan Times Ltd., New Delhi v. Their Workmen, A.I.R. 1963 SC 1332 an interim order was passed on the basis of certain agreement between the workmen and the employer but the Tribunal later on modified that order. Dealing with that situation, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, observed: "While it is true that industrial adjudication can and often has to modify existing contracts between an employer and his workmen, there can be no justification for modification of an agreement of this nature pending final settlement of a dispute. Such a direction that the solemn words of the workmen's representatives that interim relief which may be given will be adjusted against the relief finally given need not be complied with, is not only unfair to the employer but is also not calculated to serve the best interest of the workmen themselves. For one thing, an order of this nature in one case by a Tribunal that such an undertaking need not be carried out is likely to hamper interim settlements generally; it is also not desirable that workmen should be encouraged to treat their undertakings as of no value. Industrial adjudication must be careful not to encourage bad faith on the part of the workmen or the employer." 30. If the argument advanced by Mr. Mridul is accepted that in spite of the settlement between the workmen and the employer, the Tribunal must adjudicate the points of difference between the parties, then it would tend to encourage bad faith on the part of the workmen and their employer. If the argument advanced by Mr. Mridul is accepted that in spite of the settlement between the workmen and the employer, the Tribunal must adjudicate the points of difference between the parties, then it would tend to encourage bad faith on the part of the workmen and their employer. In order to bring about peace and harmony in industrial matters, it is, therefore, necessary that highest priority should be given to the method of solving their problems by entering into agreements. 31. The award has also been attacked on the ground that the agreement on the basis of which the award is based relates to some such matters which were never referred to the Tribunal for adjudication and since the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited only to the dispute referred to it, it cannot base an award on those matters which were not the subject of dispute before it. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to para 3 of the agreement which deals with the payment of bonus to the operatives and staff both at the factory and the quarries for the years 1959-60 to 1963-64 and also the overtime payment. Para 3 deals with the right of the workmen to receive the overtime wages and therein it was agreed that the workmen shall not claim the increase of the overtime wages from 1st January, 1960 to 31st October, 1964 on account of the increase in their wages and salaries as a result of the settlement. It may be mentioned here that the settlement arrived at between the parties was made operative with retrospective effect and the workmen thereunder were to get their fixation from the back date. The bonus and overtime wages had already been paid to the workmen in accordance with the wages they had drawn during that period and therefore the employer had to enter into an agreement both the workmen that due to the increase in the wages under this settlement, the overtime wages and bonus which had already been received by the workmen shall not be Increased. Mr. Mridul submits that the settlement with regard to overtime wages and bonus cannot form part of the award. Mr. Mr. Mridul submits that the settlement with regard to overtime wages and bonus cannot form part of the award. Mr. Sharma, on the other hand, contends that these are incidental matters which were to be agreed between the parties before the increase in wages was accepted by the employer and, therefore, such incidental matters can form a part of the award under Section 10(4) of the Act. In this connection, reliance has been placed on (1969 Ker LR 309). In that case the reference that was made was with respect to revision of salaries. A settlement was arrived at between the parties in which the employer agreed to the revision of salary on the condition that the gratuity shall be scaled down. The question that arose before the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court was whether scaling down of gratuity could be the subject-matter of the award. In this connection, the relevant observations of the learned Judge are as follows: "The learned Government Pleader supported the petitioner but the learned counsel for respondent 1 joined issue with them. He supported the view of the Tribunal, and contended that the question whether the adjudication of one matter is incidental to the adjudication of another matter depends on the facts of the case, the pleadings of the parties, and the issues which properly arise for determination on the pleadings. He submitted that salary and gratuity both depend on the financial ability of the employer; that both are interrelated, and that, in view of the fact that a vast majority of the workmen had accepted the increase in salary subject to the scaling down of the gratuity, and the contention of the employer that the salary could not be revised, except on the above basis, an adjudication on the question of gratuity was incidental to the adjudication on the revision of salary. I am inclined to accept the above contention. The fact that a question can by itself be the subject-matter of an adjudication does not mean that it cannot arise incidentally in the adjudication of another question. A matter, which is independent in one context, may become subsidiary to another matter in a different context. It all depends how and under what circumstances it arises. The fact that a question can by itself be the subject-matter of an adjudication does not mean that it cannot arise incidentally in the adjudication of another question. A matter, which is independent in one context, may become subsidiary to another matter in a different context. It all depends how and under what circumstances it arises. I am, therefore, of the view that on the facts of the case and in the nature of the contention raised by respondent 1, the question of gratuity arose as a matter incidental for the proper and just adjudication on the revision of salary." 32. These observations are very relevant to the circumstances of the present case where the question before the Tribunal was regarding the adjustment of the workmen in the different grades which were recommended by the Central Wage Board and the effect to that fixation was to be given with retrospective effect as is apparent from the settlement itself. In this background, it became very necessary for the employer to raise this issue that if the workmen are to get the benefits of the new grades with retrospective effect, then whatever the overtime wages and the bonus that they had already received, shall not be increased according to the increase in the wages under the agreement. This matter was undoubtedly incidental to the increase of wages in accordance with the new grades in which workmen were to be fixed up and, therefore, it cannot be said that these two conditions which are incorporated in paras 3 and 4 of the agreement are not relevant to the issue that was referred to the Tribunal. On that account, the award cannot stand vitiated. 33. Another contention on the basis of which the validity of the award has been challenged is that the award has been given by the Tribunal without issuing a general notice under Rule 20(2), of the Rules which is mandatory in character and the non-compliance whereof invalidates the award. Rule 20 reads as follows: "R. 20. 33. Another contention on the basis of which the validity of the award has been challenged is that the award has been given by the Tribunal without issuing a general notice under Rule 20(2), of the Rules which is mandatory in character and the non-compliance whereof invalidates the award. Rule 20 reads as follows: "R. 20. Manner of service in the case of numerous persons as parties to a dispute; - (1) Where there are numerous persons as parties to any proceeding before a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or an arbitrator and such persons are members of any trade union or association, the service of notice on the Secretary, or where there is no Secretary, on the principal officer, of the trade union of association shall be deemed to be service on such person. (2) Where there are numerous persons as parties to any proceeding before a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or an arbitrator and such persons are not members of any trade union or association, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or arbitrator, as the case may be, shall, were personal service is not practicable, cause the service of any notice to be made by affixing the same at or near the main entrance of the establishment concerned. (3) A notice, served in the manner specified in sub-rule (2) shall also be considered as sufficient in the case of such workmen as cannot be ascertained and found." 34. From the perusal of this rule, it is evident that this rule is applicable only when there are numerous persons as parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal and it is only in that contingency that a procedure has been prescribed by the rule-making authority to serve the notices on such parties. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 20 envisages a situation where the parties are numerous but a registered trade union exists to represent certain workmen. If the persons who are parties to the dispute are the members of the trade union then under that sub-rule service of notice on the Secretary or where there is no Secretary, on the principal officer of the trade union or association, is deemed to be a proper service on the parties. In the present case, the dispute was raised by the union. In the present case, the dispute was raised by the union. The petitioner has not placed any data before the Court whether this union represents all the workmen of the factory or not. This is, however, clear that there is only one trade union registered to represent the workmen employed by the Jaipur Udyog Limited. The dispute was referred to the Tribunal at the instance of the union and it was the union alone that was representing the cause of the workmen. Under the -scheme of the Act if an industrial dispute is raised by the union regarding the grievances of individual workman and reference is made by the Government, the dispute is between the management and the individual workman concerned. The individual workman has no locus standi in that matter. In the instant case, except the union nobody was a party to the proceedings which were going on before the Tribunal and, therefore, no workman could have come forward to say that he ought to have been given a notice of the proceedings before the Tribunal. Rule 20(2) is attracted only when there are numerous parties in the proceedings before the Tribunal. If union is a party to the dispute then it is not necessary for the Tribunal to issue notice to the workman under R. 20(2) of the Rules. I am supported in this view of mine by the Patna High Court in Employers in relation to M/s. Eastern Manganese and Mineral Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (Central), Dhanbad, 1968 Lab IC 1430 - Pat. . 35. Mr. Sharma urged that the union in good faith entered into an agreement with the management and as a result of the agreement the workmen have reaped the fruits of the settlement and have taken advantage under the said agreement by getting payment of the increased wages with retrospective effect. In the absence of any circumstances such as fraud, duress, victimisation, etc., it is not open to the union now to challenge the award which is based on an agreement. In this connection, he cited a Andhra Pradesh case in S. Joseph v. Panyam Cements and Mineral Industries Ltd., Kurnool, A.I.R. 1966 Andh Pra 147 . 36. In that case, certain workmen were discharged by the company for participating in an illegal strike. In this connection, he cited a Andhra Pradesh case in S. Joseph v. Panyam Cements and Mineral Industries Ltd., Kurnool, A.I.R. 1966 Andh Pra 147 . 36. In that case, certain workmen were discharged by the company for participating in an illegal strike. After the strike was over, the Conciliation Officer of the State brought about a settlement between the management and the workmen except 16, whose case was referred to the Labour Commissioner. Out of those 16, 10 were also retained in employment and the remaining six were to be discharged with some monetary relief. This decision was accepted by the management and five of the workers received ex gratia payment in lieu of discharge. The remaining one workman, who was not a member of the union, refused to accept payment in spite of the settlement. The Government, at the instance of the union, referred an industrial dispute under Section 10(1) (d) of the Act with regard to the discharge of six workmen. The management moved the High Court for the issue of a writ of prohibition against the Labour Court on the ground that the Government had no jurisdiction to make a reference in view of binding settlement arrived at between the parties. It was in this manner that the case went to the High Court. An argument was raised that applying the doctrine of estoppel by conduct, the workmen were precluded from raising a dispute with regard to their removal in the absence of any vitiating circumstances such as fraud, duress, victimisation, etc. especially when they had already accepted the benefit out of the settlement. While dealing with this question, their Lordships observed as follows: "The decision has been implemented so far as these 5 workers were concerned. This was possible only by reason of the reciprocal acts of the parties. All these operations meant an expenditure of good. deal of money. Having thus made the management act and part with its money and having accepted the terms of settlement, the decision in consequence thereof and the ex gratia payment in lieu of their removal, can it be open to them to raise dispute with regard to removal in the absence of any vitiating circumstances such as fraud, duress, victimisation etc.? Certainly, a person who has made another party act in faith of his representation cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent position. Certainly, a person who has made another party act in faith of his representation cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent position. He cannot be permitted to play loose and fast, blow hot and cold. When they have abide by the decision of their removal by accepting the payment they are estopped from raising dispute in relation thereto. The Government could not be legitimately called upon to take cognizance of any such dispute and refer the same for adjudication on the assumption that the memorandum of settlement was far from being perfect in its form, executed though as it is on a form purporting to be in accordance with the prescribed form H having full regard to its headings, and is duly subscribed by the representatives of the parties bearing also the signature of the Labour Officer who is a Conciliation Officer which must mean that he had full notice of the same." 37. The present case stands on a still higher footing. Here, the settlement was arrived at between the parties on 17th of November, 1964. For almost complete one year, the workmen took the full advantage of the settlement and also got the arrears under the terms of the settlement. There is no allegation that the settlement was entered into by the union under any vitiating circumstances, e.g., fraud, misrepresentation or victimisation. In such circumstances, the union cannot be permitted on behalf of the workmen to take an inconsistent position and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to seek the cancellation of the award on technical grounds. 38. For the reasons mentioned above, both these writ petitions fail and they are, therefore, dismissed. I, however, pass no order as to costs.Petitions dismissed. *******