JUDGMENT M.U. Isaac, J. 1. The appellant and the respondent are the same in both these cases. The appellant is the first plaintiff in L.A.R. Nos. 54 and 260 of 1954 on the file of the District Court, Kottayam, while the respondent is the second plaintiff therein. L.A.R. 54 related to the acquisition of 42.700 cents of land in Sy. No. 166/3A in Manjoor Village, and L.A.R. 260 related to the acquisition of 23.500 cents of land in the same survey number. In both cases, the appellant claimed that the acquired lands belonged to his illom, that the respondent was in possession of them under a lease deed, dated 30th Makaram 1083 executed by his father in favour of the appellant, and that he was, therefore, entitled to the whole compensation awarded for the two lands. He also contended that he had filed O.S. No. 46 of 1122 in the Munsiff's Court, Ettumanoor for evicting the respondent and others from the leased property and for arrears of rent, that the defendants in that suit were denying the lease and contending that the property belonged to the respondent, and that the said suit may, therefore, be tried along with these references, or the compensation amounts may be directed to be paid in accordance with the decision in the suit. The respondent contended that he was the absolute owner of the acquired lands and he was entitled to the whole compensation. He also claimed enhanced compensation. These references were tried along with some other references; and the District Court disposed all of them by a single judgment. We are concerned in these appeals only with the question who is entitled to the compensation awarded for the lands acquired in the above two cases. 2. Survey No. 166/3A in Manjoor Village has an extent of 1.76 acres. In his statements of claim submitted in the District Court, though the appellant claimed that the lands concerned in both cases were held by the respondent under the lease deed, dated 30th Makaram 1083, he shifted his ground during the trial. Ext. D is a copy of a lease deed produced by him. It relates only to 35 cents of land in Sy. No.166/3A. In the light of this document, he claimed that the respondent held only 35 cents under Ext. Ext. D is a copy of a lease deed produced by him. It relates only to 35 cents of land in Sy. No.166/3A. In the light of this document, he claimed that the respondent held only 35 cents under Ext. D, and that he was holding the remaining part of the above survey number under a subsequent oral lease. The respondent in his turn put forward many contentions. He contended that Sy. No. 166/3A belonged to one Konthuruthy Illom, and not to the plaintiff's illom, that Ext. D did not relate to this survey number, but to a neighbouring property bearing Sy. No.166/2, and that Ext. D did not take effect. The learned District Judge held that according to the Settlement Register the whole of Survey No. 166/3A belonged to the appellant, that Ext. D related to a part of the said survey number, and that the appellant failed to establish a subsisting title to the remaining part of the said property. He further held that it was not possible without further enquiry to fund the exact portion of the land acquired out of the said 35 cents, that in respect of that portion, the compensation should be apportioned between the appellant and the respondent in the ratio of 2:1, and that the whole of the balance compensation should be paid to the respondent. Accordingly, he directed the Land Acquisition Officer to award compensation to the rival claimants on the above basis. The appeals are directed against the above decision. The respondent has also filed cross-objections in both appeals claiming the whole compensation for himself. 3. The parties repeated before us all the contentions put forward in the trial court. Survey No. 166/3A in Manjoor Village having an extent of 1.76 acres stands in the name of Konthuruthy illom in the Settlement Register. The respondent's contention was that the appellant's illom was Mattapally, and that the appellant had no right to this property, which stood registered in the name of Konthuruthy illom. According to the appellant, his illom was known by both the above names; and the property belonged to his illom. Ext. C is a lease deed executed by one Lookka on 14th Makaram 1081 in favour of the grand-mother of the Appellant as his guardian in respect of Survey No. 166/2, which lies adjacent to Sy. No.166/3A. According to the appellant, his illom was known by both the above names; and the property belonged to his illom. Ext. C is a lease deed executed by one Lookka on 14th Makaram 1081 in favour of the grand-mother of the Appellant as his guardian in respect of Survey No. 166/2, which lies adjacent to Sy. No.166/3A. In that document the name of the appellant's illom is stated Mattapally, while the property leased is described as belonging to Konthuruthy illom of the appellant. Ext. J, dated 1st Meenam 1077 is counter-part of a kanam deed relating to Sy. No. 166/5A executed by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent in favour of the appellant's grandmother acting as his guardian. In this document, the name of the appellant's illom is stated as Mattapally, while the property is described as belonging to the Konthuruthy illom of the appellant. These two documents clearly establish that the plaintiff's illom was known by both the above names; and there is also the evidence of the appellant's son, who was examined as P.W. 5 in support of the said case. The respondent's contention to the contrary is devoid of any merit. 4. There is also no substance in the contention that Ext. D did not relate to Sy. No. 166/3A; and that it did not take effect. A story which the respondent put forward in support of this contention was examined in detail by the trial court and rejected. Exts. AA, AB, AC, AD and AE are counterfoils of receipts given by the appellant's illom to the respondent's father for rents paid as per Ext. D. They have been duly proved by P.W. 8 who was one of the Kariasthas of the illom from 1092 to 1108. We are satisfied from the evidence of P.W. 8 and a perusal of these documents that they are genuine, and that Ext. D was acted upon by the parties, and that the respondent's father was paying rents to the appellant as per the lease deed. We also fully endorse the reasons stated by the learned District Judge for rejecting the respondent's case that Ext. D related to Sy. No.166/2 and for holding that it related to part of Sy. No.166/3A. 5. Regarding the remaining part of Sy. We also fully endorse the reasons stated by the learned District Judge for rejecting the respondent's case that Ext. D related to Sy. No.166/2 and for holding that it related to part of Sy. No.166/3A. 5. Regarding the remaining part of Sy. No.166/3A namely 1.41 acres, the appellant's learned counsel contended that the whole of Survey No. 166/3A belonged to the appellant and the appellant was entitled to get the compensation awarded for any part of the said 1.41 acres, in so far as the respondent failed to establish title thereto by adverse possession. Originally, the appellant's case was that the whole of Survey No.166/3A was held by the respondent under the lease deed, dated 30th Makaram 1083, namely Ext. D. At the trial, he put forward the case that only 35 cents were held under Ext. D, and that the remaining portion of 1.41 acres were held under an oral lease of 1101. There is no evidence worth consideration in support of the oral lease. Admittedly, the respondent and his predecessor were in possession of this part of the property from 1101. In the absence of proof that the said possession was permissive, the appellant ceased to have a subsisting title to that property after twelve years from the date on which he lost possession of the same. Hence the appellant has no right to get any compensation for the acquisition of any part of Sy. No.166/3A, except in respect of the 35 cents covered by Ext. D. 6. It is now necessary to refer to the suit instituted by the appellant against the respondent and others in the Munsiff's Court, Ettumanoor, as O.S. 46 of 1122 for eviction of the respondent from the whole of Sy. No.166/3A and for arrears of rent. The suit was contested by the respondent, denying the, appellant's right, and claiming that the property belonged absolutely to the respondent. The suit was transferred to the Vaikom Munsiff's Court and registered as O.S. 56 of 1956. The judgment of the District Court in the land acquisition references was pronounced by the District Court on 25th March 1960. The present appeals were originally filed on 3rd January 1961 as Civil Miscellaneous appeals. At that time, O.S. 56 of 1956 was pending; and it was decreed ex parte on 1st November 1961. The judgment of the District Court in the land acquisition references was pronounced by the District Court on 25th March 1960. The present appeals were originally filed on 3rd January 1961 as Civil Miscellaneous appeals. At that time, O.S. 56 of 1956 was pending; and it was decreed ex parte on 1st November 1961. Eviction was disallowed in the light of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1961; but a decree was given for the arrears of rent claimed, subject to the tenant's right under the above Act. No appeal was filed from the above decree. Copies of the judgment and the decree therein were produced in this Court on 1st November 1962 with C.M.P. 7600 of 1962 praying that they may be accepted as additional evidence. Subsequently the C.M.As. were amended and registered as appeal suits. Now a contention is raised by the appellant that the decree for arrears of rent amounts by implication, to decision on the issue relating to the title of the property, and that this issue is res judicata by virtue of the aforesaid ex parte judgment of the. Munsiff's Court, which has become final. In other words, the decision of the District Judge pending in appeal has become infructuous and inoperative by virtue of a subsequent decision of the Munsiff, which became final, and this Court is bound to follow and give effect to the Munsiff's decision, ignoring the-earlier decision of the District Judge. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant in the first instance submitted that section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code would apply to the case. This section reads as follows:- "11. Res judicata.- No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation I.-The expression "former suit" shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto."� (Explanations II to VI are omitted being not relevant to the controversy.) The reference to the District Court was made under the Travancore Land Acquisition Act, 1089; and section 37 thereof reads:- "37. Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the District Court under this Act." So section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, as it is not inconsistent with anything contained in the above Act, must also apply to the proceedings before the District Judge. The question for consideration is whether the decision of the Munsiff is res judicata on the issue of title to the property. As the references were decided by the District Judge, when the suit was pending, the references would be "former suit" within the meaning of Explanation I to section 11 C.P.C. though the suit was instituted much earlier. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the decision of the Munsiff's Court is res judicata in the appeals before us; and this court is bound to give effect to that decision, though it is contrary to the earlier decision of the District Court. Section 11 of the Civil Procedure does not prevent an appellate court from deciding an issue raised for decision in the appeal, by virtue of the fact that the same issue has been decided finally by an inferior court during the pendency of the appeal. That section has, therefore, no application to the case. 8. The learned counsel next contended that section 11 C.P.C. is not exhaustive of the circumstances in which an issue may be res judicata, and that under the general principles underlying the said rule, an appellate court is prevented from deciding any issue, which has been already decided by another court and which has become final, even if the said decision a was by an inferior court and during the pendency of the appeal. These principles are well settled, though their application to the particular facts of a case may sometimes be difficult. These principles are well settled, though their application to the particular facts of a case may sometimes be difficult. The following classic passage from the judgment of Sir William de Grey in the Duchess of Kingstone's case, 2 Smith's L.C. 13th Ed. 644, 645 is a statement of the leading principle of res judicata, and it also summarises the law enacted in section 11 C.P.C. "first that judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, as a plea, a bar, or as evidence conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another Court; secondly that the judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly on the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another court, for a different purpose. But neither the judgment of a Court, of concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction nor of any matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment." Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 15, page 185 states the principles as follows:- "The doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine applicable only to records; it is a fundamental doctrine of all courts that there must be an end of litigation"� Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 50, section 592 contains the following statement: - "Res judicata is a rule of universal law pervading every well regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put on two grounds, embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation" interest republica ut sit jinis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that, he should be vexed twice for the same cause "nemo debet bis vexari pre eadem causa."� The rule of res judicata may thus be put on two grounds. One is the hardship to the individual that he would be vexed twice for the same cause, and the other is public policy, that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation. The principles enunciated in the above statements have been adopted by the Supreme Court and the High Courts in India in their several decisions. The principles enunciated in the above statements have been adopted by the Supreme Court and the High Courts in India in their several decisions. Vide Lakshmi Dasi v. Banamali Sen, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 33; Raj Daryae v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457; Gulab v. Manphool, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 214 and Bhagwan Dayal v. Reoti Devi, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 287. In our opinion, the principles of res judicata have no application to the instant case. It is inconceivable that a decision of a Munsiff contrary to a decision already given by a District Judge on an issue would prevail over the latter decision, and would be final and conclusive in an appeal pending in the High Court from the decision of the District Judge. The decision of an inferior court on an issue cannot become final, so long as it is pending in decision in a superior court. 9. The next question that arises for consideration is whether a tenant at will is entitled to get any compensation for the land, when it is acquired by the Government. The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 grants fixity of tenure to every tenant in Kerala, subject to the provisions contained therein; and section 112 of the said Act provides that when the land comprised in a holding is acquired, the compensation for the same shall be apportioned among the land owner, the intermediaries and the tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land immediately before such acquisition. The land concerned in this case is situate in the erstwile State of Travancore, where there was no fixity of tenure except for kanam tenants In 1950, the Travancore-Cochin Legislature passed the Holdings (Stay of Eviction Proceedings) Act, 1950, which proceedings in execution of a decree for recovery of possession of a holding shall be stayed for a period of one year. The protection granted by this Act was continued until the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 came into force, by other statutes enacted from time to time. The respondent was admittedly entitled to the above protection for his tenure, when the land was acquired in 1953. The protection granted by this Act was continued until the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 came into force, by other statutes enacted from time to time. The respondent was admittedly entitled to the above protection for his tenure, when the land was acquired in 1953. According to the appellant, a tenant like the respondent has no interest in the land, as he was liable for eviction at will, and even the statutory protection granted to him against eviction did not create any interest in the land in his favour, as the said protection was only temporary in character. 10. The above question arose for decision before Velu Pillai, J. in Joseph v. Ayamkudi Devaswom, 1965 K.L.J. 896 and the learned Judge stated as follows:- "Ext. C was not a permanent lease as suggested at the hearing. It was not a lease for a specific term either and the absence of a provision in it for eviction is immaterial, the liability to eviction being an ordinary incident of a lease. So on the dates of the acquisitions, the respondent had the right to evict the appellant. The provision in Act VIII of 1950 made no inroad on the quality or extent of the respondent's right to property, except that it imposed a temporary procedural bar for a period against recovering possession in execution of a decree. It is too much to view this, as even a temporary immunity against eviction in any event, I am not prepared to hold, that this bar or immunity has curtailed the respondent's right in property and enlarged the rights of the appellant. The bar was no doubt continued by later legislations, but this is irrelevant."� The above decision was followed by Madhavan Nair, J. in Kumaranalloor Devaswam v. Varkey Antony and others, (A. S. No. 780 of 1960 unreported). 11. Apparently, a different view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Kurien Chacko and others v. State of Kerala and another, 1966 K.L.J. 434. M.S. Menon, C. J., delivering the judgment of the court stated:- "The appellants, it is agreed, were still in possession of the land on the date of the declaration. The question for determination, however, is not merely whether the appellants because they were holding over after the expiry of the term of years granted by Ext. M.S. Menon, C. J., delivering the judgment of the court stated:- "The appellants, it is agreed, were still in possession of the land on the date of the declaration. The question for determination, however, is not merely whether the appellants because they were holding over after the expiry of the term of years granted by Ext. P-7 are entitled to make a claim for enhancement of the land value awarded in the land acquisition proceedings. The more difficult question is whether, quite apart from the right, if any, that would stem from such holding over, the appellants are entitled to agitate the matter because of Act I of 1957 which as amended by Act VII of 1957, Act I of 1958 and Act XXX of 1958 was in force on the relevant date. We are inclined to hold that the provisions of the enactments mentioned above, quite apart from the other contentions raised on behalf of the appellants, entitle the appellants to agitate the claim for enhancement made by them."� The Division Bench did not express any opinion as to what exactly the value of the interest that the tenants possess in the land; and that matter was left to be decided by the trial court after taking evidence. The decisions of Velu Pillai, J. and Madhavan Nair, J. were not considered by the Division Bench. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the ruling of the Division Bench on this question is lacking in clarity; and that it has not laid down any proposition contrary to the above Single Bench decisions. We are unable to agree with this submission. The Division Bench has clearly held that a tenant holding over after the expiry of the period of the tenancy by virtue of the Statutes which stayed execution of proceedings for eviction of a tenant from his holding, has got an interest in the land, and that consequently he is entitled to claim enhancement of compensation in respect of that interest in a proceeding relating to the acquisition of the said land. It was for the determination of the value of that interest that the Division Bench remitted the case to the trial court. 12. It was for the determination of the value of that interest that the Division Bench remitted the case to the trial court. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that, if the view of the Division Bench is considered to be contrary to the view taken in the aforesaid two Single Bench decisions, it required reconsideration, as it does not lay down the correct law. According to the learned counsel, a tenant like the respondent is evictable at any time, and such a person has no interest in the land. He also submitted that the statutory protection given to him from eviction did not create any interest in the land in his favour, as the protection was only temporary. We shall in this context examine the character of the lease created by Ext. D. It relates to a garden land; it fixes an annual rent, and it provides that the tenant would surrender the property, if he committed default in paying the rent. The Transfer of Property Act came into force in the Travancore area of Travancore-Cochin State with effect from 1st May 1952. As defined in that Act, a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time or in perpetuity; and it is axiomatic that such a transfer creates an interest in the property so transferred in favour of the transferee. The same is the position under the common law or the general law. Therefore, it follows that a tenant is en-titled to get value for his interest in the land, on its acquisition by the State. It is true that on acquisition of the property, the tenancy is determined. That is because the interest of the lessee and lessor both vest in the State. The interest of the lessee is not extinguished by acquisition; but it is transferred to the State for which the State has to pay compensation; and compensation that the lessee is entitled to get is the amount which his interest in the property, namely his right to enjoy it would fetch, if sold in the open market. The value of that interest depends on the character of the lease, and the leasehold property. Suppose the rent payable is very low, when compared to its income, and the lease is one in perpetuity or it has got statutory protection from evictability. The value of that interest depends on the character of the lease, and the leasehold property. Suppose the rent payable is very low, when compared to its income, and the lease is one in perpetuity or it has got statutory protection from evictability. The value of the lessee's interest would be a major part of the value of the land, and the value of the lessor's interest would be very small. The reverse would be the position in the case of tenancy at will. 13. The value that a tenant at will would get for his interest in the land, if sold in the open market, is a matter which can be determined only on evidence. The proposition that such a tenant would not be entitled to any value at all is opposed to common knowledge. Even a tenant at will can be evicted from the property, if he is not willing to surrender it, only by getting a decree for eviction and executing it; and if he puts forth any claim for improvements, that claim has to be adjudicated, and the value, if any adjudged, has to be paid to him before eviction. Take the case of a garden land held by a tenant at will, in which there are improvements of considerable value belonging to the tenant, and another garden land not subject to any lease and in the possession of the land owner. Assume that both properties are of the same quality and the land value would be the same for both of them. If the land owner sells these properties, he may not get for the property in the possession of the tenant even fifty per cent of what he would get for the property in his possession, for the obvious reason that the purchaser of the property in the tenant's possession would not get it except by a litigation and on paying the value of the tenant's improvements in which sometimes the purchaser may be not interested. The quantum of the difference between the prices that the land owner would get on selling the above properties represents the value of the interest of the tenant in the property. This value depends to a large extent on the delay, the expenses and the difficulties that a landlord has to suffer in the ordinary course to evict the tenant and get possession of the property. This value depends to a large extent on the delay, the expenses and the difficulties that a landlord has to suffer in the ordinary course to evict the tenant and get possession of the property. The value of the tenant's interest became considerably enhanced by the passing of the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act, 1950, and the subsequent statutes enacted from time to time staying proceedings for the eviction of tenant. The passing of these statutes left little room for doubt that they were preludes to giving fixity of tenure and settling agrarian relations by permanent legislation. The value of a tenant's interest in a land held by him on a tenancy at will, has, therefore, to be determined in the light of the abovesaid factors. We are unable to agree with the view expressed in the Single Bench decisions of this Court to the effect that a tenant of an agricultural property is not entitled to any compensation for his interest in the property, when it is acquired and that the position remained the same in spite of the protection given to such a tenant by the statutes which stayed proceedings for eviction. 14. The learned District Judge has not stated any reason whatsoever for apportioning the land value between the appellant and the respondent in the ratio 2:1. When a property held on lease is acquired the landlord and the tenant are entitled to get the value for their respective interests in the land; and the value of the land is the value of those two interests. The land value has, therefore, to be apportioned between the appellant and the respondent in proportion to the value of their respective interests on the relevant date. This is a matter which has to be decided after taking evidence. There is no justification for remitting the case to the Land Acquisition Officer to find out the exact portion acquired from the 35 cents of land covered by Ext. D. This is also a matter which has to be decided by the trial Judge after taking necessary evidence. 15. There is no justification for remitting the case to the Land Acquisition Officer to find out the exact portion acquired from the 35 cents of land covered by Ext. D. This is also a matter which has to be decided by the trial Judge after taking necessary evidence. 15. In the result, we confirm the decision of the court below that the respondent is a lessee from the appellant in respect of 35 cents of land in survey No. 166/3A in Manjoor Village, and that the appellant has failed to establish his title in respect of the remaining part of the land in the said survey number. The direction of the learned trial Judge in remitting the cases to the Land Acquisition Officer is set aside. The cases are remitted to the District Judge to decide the portion of land acquired from the 35 cents covered by Ext. D, and apportion the compensation awarded on account of land value for that portion between the appellant and the respondent in proportion to the value of their respective interest on the relevant date, in the manner stated herein. The respondent would be entitled to the whole of the balance compensation awarded in these cases. The parties will be at liberty to adduce all necessary evidence in the lower court. The appeals and cross objections are disposed of in the manner stated above. Considering the nature of the contentions raised by the parties and the extent of their respective success, the appellant is directed to pay one-half of the costs of the respondent in both the appeals; and there will be no order as to costs in the cross-objections.