JUDGMENT : Shah, J. Mangli Prasad grand-father of the first appellant agreed to purchase, under an agreement dated August 3, 1927, Sir rights in three plots of land aggregating in area to 6.88 acres for Rs. 500/- from Jagannath and Mangayee. The appellants contend that Mangli Prasad paid Rs. 250/- and possession of the lands was delivered to him, and on April 21, 1928, his name was entered in the revenue records. The appellants claim that Mangli Prasad paid the balance of the price, but no sale deed was executed by the vendors; that Mangli Prasad, and after his death, they have been in possession of the property continuously since August, 1927, but in 1953 the descendants of the original vendors purported to transfer the rights in the lands to the Mahabir Temple, Lal Singh, s/o Prem Singh and Sitaram son of Atmaram; and that they had on that account "encroached upon the rights" of the appellants. The appellants accordingly instituted an action and claimed an injunction against the representatives of the original transferors and the purchasers restraining them from "going to the" fields in dispute. By an amendment made in the plaint it was claimed that if it be found that the appellants are found not to be in possession, they may be put into possession of the lands. 2. The suit was dismissed by the Tribunal Court holding that the appellants were never put in possession of the lands, that the lands were ancestral lands in the hands of Jagannath and Mangayee and that the alienation of the lands by Jagannath and Mangayee was not supported by legal necessity and was on that account not binding upon their descendants. In appeal, the District Court reversed the decree of the Court of First Instance. The District Court held that the appellant's ancestor had been put in possession of the property under a valid agreement of sale, that the appellants had perfected their title by adverse possession and that the defendants in the suit could not dispossess them that the defendants had led no satisfactory evidence that the sale was not for legal necessity, and the agreement of sale was binding on the defendants and that the equity under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was available to the appellants as against the defendants. In second appeal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh reversed the decree of the District Court. The High Court was of the view that in dealing with the question of possession the District Court had "not at all touched the reasons and comments stated in the judgment of the trial Court", and "on that account it would have been necessary to remand the case of the District Court for reconsideration of the evidence and for determination of the appeal according to law." But that, in the view of the High Court, was not necessary because the "suit having been filed on a supposed, right under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was not maintainable." The High Court observed :- "Assuming as correct the finding of the first appellate Court that Mangli Prasad was put in possession in the year 1927 and continued to be so upto 1946, and further that the plaintiffs thereafter continued to remain in possession, that finding by itself does not entitle the plaintiffs to an injunction." After referring to a large number of decisions, the High Court observed that it was settled law that the right conferred by Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was a "shield and not a weapon of attack". The High Court also observed that where a person enters into an agreement to purchase property and is put into possession thereof, his possession is permissive and continues to be so until there is assertion of a title hostile to the owner. On that account, the possession of the appellants could not be adverse, since, in the view of the High Court, possession of the appellants was "permissive to begin with" and the appellants had failed to plead and prove the occasion when they altered the nature of their possession. 3. Counsel for the appellants contends that the High Court was in error in holding that a person who relies upon the equity of part performance in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act may only defend an action filed against him, and he can never set up or rely upon the equity of part performance as a plaintiff in an action. Counsel invites our attention to the statement of the law made at P. 296 of Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 1882, 5th Edn., and to the observations made by Subba Rao, C.J., Achayya v. Venkata Subba Rao, A.I.R. (1957) A.P. 854. Counsel contends that it is an unwarranted conclusion that a person who is in possession of the property, pursuant to an agreement of sale which is not registered but of which the terms have been carried out, is not entitled to defend his possession by an action for injunction relying upon the equity of part performance. He contends that a person lawfully in possession of property cannot be deprived of the protection of the equity of part performance by the transferor so manoeuvring that the transferee is obliged to seek the assistance of the Court to protect his possession. 4. It is at this stage unnecessary to deal with this question, because, in our judgment, the High Court has recorded no finding on the question whether the appellants were in possession of the lands in dispute at the date of the institution of the suit. The Trial Court held that the appellants and their predecessors-in-interest were never in possession of the lands. The District Court held otherwise. Even if in the view of the High Court, the judgment of the District Court was not satisfactory, the conclusion recorded by the District Court was apparently on a question of fact and was binding upon the High Court. If the High Court was of the view that in reaching the conclusion, the District Court had misconceived or misread the evidence or had ignored important evidence bearing on the question to be decided, or had otherwise acted contrary to law, the High Court was bound to decide the question for itself. The High Court had no power to remand the case to the District Court for "writing a more satisfactory judgment" after considering the contentions which may appeal to the District Court. It was for the High Court first to consider whether in reaching the conclusion that the appellants were in possession at the date of the suit, any error of law had been committed, and if in the view of the High Court any error of law was committed, the High Court had to decide the question. It was for the High Court first to consider whether in reaching the conclusion that the appellants were in possession at the date of the suit, any error of law had been committed, and if in the view of the High Court any error of law was committed, the High Court had to decide the question. Until the question whether the appellants were in possession at the date of the institution of the suit was decided, the claim of the appellants to the protection of the equity of part performance cannot be determined. 5. We may also observe that the suggestion thrown out by the High Court that when a person is put in possession of property pursuant to an agreement of sale, his possession is permissive, and unless he is able to establish by definite evidence the point of time from which his possession became adverse against the owner, his possession must continue to remain permissive, cannot be regarded as accurate. 6. Before we are able to decide the appeal we must have a finding of the High Court on the question whether the appellants were in possession of the lands in dispute at the date of the institution of the suit. 7. The case is remanded to the High Court. The High Court will determine the issue whether the appellants were, at the date of the institution of the suit, in possession of the property, pursuant to the agreement of sale executed by Jagannath and Mangayee in the year 1927. After the finding of the High Court is received, the other questions arising for determination in this appeal will be decided. Appeal accepted.