JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The tenants are the Petitioners. The disputed lands constitute 18 gunths in Debottar Khata No. 3 in Village Kantol in the Subdivision of Athgarh in the district of Cuttack. Opposite party No. 1 is admittedly the owner of the disputed land. The Petitioners alleged that opposite party No. 1 disturbed their possession on 12.3.1960. They filed an application u/s 9(1)(a) of the Orissa Tenants Relief Act, 1955 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) for a declaration that the tenants were in possession of the disputed land, as bhag tenants on 1.7.1954 and subsequently thereto and that opposite party No. 1 cannot disturb their possession. They made a prayer to be put in possession. Opposite party No. 1 filed a written statement, denying the claim of the Petitioners that they were bhag tenants in respect of the disputed lands. According to them, the Petitioners trespssed on the land on 24-5-1960. On 24-11-1961 the O.T.R. Collector (Sub-Deputy Collector), Athgarh, declared that the Petitioners were the bhag tenants of the disputed land. Opposite party No. 1 preferred an appeal before the Sub-divisional Officer, Athgarh, u/s 15 of the Act, read with Rule 25(1)(i) made under the Act. On 30-10-1962 Section 11-A was inserted in the Act by Orissa Act 29 of 1962 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Amending Act). On that date the appeal before the Sub-divisional Officer was pending. The Sub-divisional Officer dismissed the appeal on 12-2-1964. Opposite party No. 1 filed a revision before the Additional District Magistrate, Cuttack, u/s 15 of the Act read with Rule 25(2)(1). The Additional District Magistrate remanded the case for further enquiry and pending final decision a Receiver was directed to be appointed. 2. Mr. Mohanty on behalf of the Petitioners contends that the Sub-divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to dispose of the O.T.R. appeal (No. 3 of 1961-62) after the insertion of Section 11-A by the Amending Act, and similarly, the Additional District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision (No. 229 of 1963-64). According to him, the forum for appeal and revision after the Amending Act, came into force, would be governed by Section 11-A. This contention;, requires careful examination. 3. In order, to appreciate the aforesaid contention, it would be profitable to trace the history of this legislation prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act. According to him, the forum for appeal and revision after the Amending Act, came into force, would be governed by Section 11-A. This contention;, requires careful examination. 3. In order, to appreciate the aforesaid contention, it would be profitable to trace the history of this legislation prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act. Section 9(1) of the Act enumerates J the various disputes between the tenant and the, landlord. Section 9(1)(a) is to the effect that any dispute between the tenant and the landlord as regards the tenants possession of the land on the first day of July 1954, or at any time thereafter, and his rights to the benefits under the Act shall be decided by the Collector on the application of either of the parties. Section 7(1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act which corresponds to this section came up for consideration, in Pandab Bissoyi v. Magati Sasmal 22 C.L.T. 479. This Court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question relating to the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant and that such a question is to be determined exclusively by the O.R.T. Collector. In Magati Sasmal v. Pandab Bissoyi 1962 S.C.D. 83 : 28 C.L.T. 85 (S.C.), the Orissa decision was reversed. A close analysis was made of the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, be Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was neither expressly nor impliedly barred. To get over the Supreme Court decision Section 11-A. was introduced by the Amending Act with a view to bring in the determination of the question of relationship of landlord and tenant within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court. 4. Section 11-A runs: 11-A (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any of the other provisions of this Act, the Collector shall decide an disputes regarding the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant arising in the course of any of the proceeding under this Act. (2) Where a dispute of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) is raised or is pending before the Collector, no proceedings relating to such dispute shall be maintainable or be continued in any Civil Court and the decision of the Collector shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (4) and (5) be final. (2) Where a dispute of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) is raised or is pending before the Collector, no proceedings relating to such dispute shall be maintainable or be continued in any Civil Court and the decision of the Collector shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (4) and (5) be final. (3) The Collector for the purposes of this section shall proceed in the prescribed manner and so far as may be in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and shall have powers vested in a Court under the said Code when trying a suit in respect of the following matters: (a) discovery and inspection; (b) enforcing attendance of witnesses and requiring the deposit of their expenses; (c) compelling production of documents, (d) examining witnesses on oath; (e) granting adjournments; (f) reception of evidence taken on affidavit; and (g) issuing of commissions for examination of witnesses. and may summon and examine suo motu any person whose evidence appears to him to be material; and shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of Sections 480 & 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. (4) An appeal from any order made under Sub-section (1) shall, if presented within thirty days froth the date of such order, lie: (a) if, the order was made by any officer below the rank of a Collector of a district, to the Collector of the district, having jurisdiction; or (b) if the order was made by the Collector of the district, to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner having jurisdiction. (5) Any person aggrieved by an appellate order of the Collector of the district may, within thirty days from the date of such appellate order, file a second appeal before the Revenue Divisional Commissioner having jurisdiction. (6) The High Court may, on any question of law raised in an application for revision by any person aggrieved by an order of the Revenue Divisional Commissioner under Sub-section (4) or under Sub-section (5) filed within six days from the date of the said order, revise the same and confirms, reverse or modify the said order according as the Court thinks proper. (7) For removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of this section shall, mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the proceedings continued under clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 19 and pending on the date of coming into force of the Orissa Tenants Relief (Amendment) Act, (11)62. 5. An analysis of the aforesaid Section is necessary to find out the changes that were brought about by the amendment. u/s 9(i)(a) of the Act, prior to the Amending Act any dispute regarding the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant was to be decided by the Civil Court, though if such a dispute was raised incidentally before the Collector, he had in the first instance jurisdiction to determine his own jurisdiction; but his decision was subject to final decision by the Civil Court which had jurisdiction to decide such a question-as was ruled by the Supreme Court. Section 11-A(1) introduced a radical change in this regard. A new jurisdiction was conferred on the Collector to decide disputes regarding' the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. In terms, the Section was not expressly made retrospective. Provision had therefore to be made as to matters that were pending in the Civil Court by the date the Amending Act came into force. Sub-section (2) laid down that if 'a dispute of the nature was either raised or was pending before the Collector, no -proceeding relating to such dispute shall be maintainable or continued in any Civil Court and the decision of the Collector is to be final subject to provisions regarding appeal or revision filed under Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6). Thus, by the Amending Act the legal position was reversed. Though the Civil Court can incidentally decide its own jurisdiction in a dispute of the aforesaid nature, it would be subject to the decision of the Collector in exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction after the Amending Act. If a suit of the aforesaid nature was pending in the Civil Court, such a suit would be stayed if a dispute regarding the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is raised and is pending before the Collector, If the Collector ultimately determines that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant, the Civil Court would proceed with the trial of the suit-See Bhima Padhi v. Venkateswara Swamy Varu 33 (1967) C.L.T. 177. By Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) new appellate and revisional forums were prescribed. u/s 15 of the Act, any person aggrieved by the order of the Collector was entitled to appeal to the prescribed superior Revenue authority whose decision thereon was final subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the prescribed superior Revenue authority. Under Rule 25(1) an appeal Jay to the Sub-divisional Officer where the order was passed by an officer of the rank of Sub-Deputy Collector or by a Grama Panchayat but where the order was passed by an officer of the rank of Deputy Collector the appeal lay to the District Collector. If the order was passed by the Sub-divisional Officer or the Additional District Collector, the appeal lay to the Collector of the district. Corresponding provisions were made regarding revisional jurisdiction under Rule 25(2). By Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 11-A inserted by the Amending Act, completely new forums were created. 1? the order was made by an officer below the rank of a Collector of a district, appeal lay to the Collector of the District. If the order was made by the Collector of the district appeal lay to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner. By Sub-section (5) a second appeal was provided to the Commissioner when the Collector of the district passed the appellate order. By Sub-section (6) revisional jurisdiction was vested in toe High Court but only if the matter involved any question of law. 6. The main question mooted in this writ application is whether when new forums vesting appellate and revisional jurisdiction in higher authorities were created, the appellate and revisional forums provided u/s 15 of the Act would be protanto repealed, in respect of the determination of any dispute regarding the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. This contention stands repelled by Sub-section (7) of Section 11-A and Section 11-B(1), Section 11-A(7) lays down that the provisions of this Section shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the proceedings continued under Clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 19 and pending on the date of coming into force of the Amending Act. This contention stands repelled by Sub-section (7) of Section 11-A and Section 11-B(1), Section 11-A(7) lays down that the provisions of this Section shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the proceedings continued under Clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 19 and pending on the date of coming into force of the Amending Act. Section 19(2)(ii) says that notwithstanding such repeal and save as expressly provided in the Act, any legal proceeding in respect of any such benefit, right, protection or privilege or obligation or lability or anything done or suffered before the commencement of the Act shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act, had not been passed. It would thus he apparent that by Section 11-A(7) a clear provision was made regarding pending actions under the Orissa Tenants Protection Act 1948, but no corresponding provision was made that the appellate and revisional forums prescribed in Sub-sections (4)(5) and (6) of Section 11-A would be available to appeals or revisions pending on the date the Amending Act came into force. Thus, Section 11-A(7) furnishes intrinsic material in support of the conclusion that the Section was not made retrospective. Section 11-B(1) also leads to the same conclusion. It runs thus: 11-B(1) : Any person aggrieved by an order passed in any proceedings under this Act may within sixty days from the date of commencement of the Orissa Tenants Relief (Amendment) Act, 1962, file an application of review before the authority making the order only if: (a) in making the order the authority had failed to exercise jurisdiction solely on the assumption that he had no power to decide a dispute of the nature specified in Sub-section of Section 11-A; (b) such failure as aforesaid the rights and interests provisions of this Act; (c) the order was made on or after the twentieth day of September 1961, but prior to the date of commencement of the Orissa Tenants Relief (Amendment) Act, 1962; and (d) no proceedings' in the Civil Court bad been started after the date of the said order for the decision of the dispute referred to in clause (a). The marginal note of the section refers to "Restoration of certain proceedings". Provision was made to file an application of review before the authority making the order, within a period of 60 days from the date of commencement of the Amending Act in certain contingencies. The marginal note of the section refers to "Restoration of certain proceedings". Provision was made to file an application of review before the authority making the order, within a period of 60 days from the date of commencement of the Amending Act in certain contingencies. Thus, opportunity was given to re-agitate matters which bad been finally disposed of in any proceeding under the Act, by virtue of the aforesaid Sub-section provided the application was filed within the period of limitation. This was done with a view to give relief to persons who might have been adversely affected by the decision of the Supreme Court that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide disputes regarding the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. It is however noteworthy that under cause (d) a condition was imposed that if no proceedings in the Civil Court had been started after the date of the said order, for decision of a dispute of the nature referred to in Section 11-A(1). It is not necessary to discuss the other conditions prescribed in other clauses of Section 11-B(I) under which a review can be granted, as they are not relevant to the question in issue. It would be sufficient to say that by this Sub-section an opportunity was given for re-agitation of rights in respect of matters which had been made final in a previous proceeding. Sections 11-A(7). & 11-B(1) thus clearly indicate that the Legislature did not intend to make Section 11-A retrospective in operation. 7. In Garikapatti Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhury their Lordships observed thus: The legal pursuit of a remedy suit, appeal anti second appeal are really but stops in a series of proceedings, all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. The right of appeal is not a mere matter or procedure but is a substantive right. The institution of the Emit carried with it the implication that all rights of appeal then is force are preserved to the parties there to, till the rest of the career of the suit. The right of appeal is not a mere matter or procedure but is a substantive right. The institution of the Emit carried with it the implication that all rights of appeal then is force are preserved to the parties there to, till the rest of the career of the suit. The right of appeal is a vested right; such a right to enter superior Courts accrues to the litigant and exists as and from the date t his lis commences, (sic) although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced, such a right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent 'enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. Thus, unless the legislative intention either expressly, or by necessary intendment appears on the face of the enactment, the appellate and revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised u/s 15 of the Act in respect of proceedings started prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act. 8. The legislative intention is, however, clear that Sub-sections (4) to (6) of Section 11-A of the Act would apply to cases where an order is passed by the O.T.R. Collector in the original proceeding subsequent to the coming into force of the Amending Act, even though the proceeding had started earlier. This can be inferred by necessary implication for two reasons. Firstly, before the Amending Act the jurisdiction exercised by the O.T.R. Collector was subject to the final decision of the Civil Court on the same matter. But after the Amending Act his decision is final subject to appeal and revision. Thus, there was a radical change in the amplititude of the jurisdiction of the O.T.R. Collector. Though the nature of the jurisdiction is not different, his decision arrived at in exercise of the new jurisdiction was given the status of finality. Secondly, the appellate and revisional forums prescribed u/s 11-A are of a higher status and larger in number. The ultimate revisional power vests even in the High Court. Though the nature of the jurisdiction is not different, his decision arrived at in exercise of the new jurisdiction was given the status of finality. Secondly, the appellate and revisional forums prescribed u/s 11-A are of a higher status and larger in number. The ultimate revisional power vests even in the High Court. It is, therefore, legitimate to infer that the order of the O.T.R. Collector passed after the coming into force of the Amending Act would be subject to the appellate and revisional jurisdictions prescribed u/s 11-A. To this limited extent, the Appellate and revisional jurisdiction prescribed u/s 15, in respect of matters passed by the O.T.R. Collector subsequent to the Amending Act would be inapplicable with reference to disputes of the nature mentioned in Section 11-A(1). This view gains support from the following observations in Mohammad Abu Ahmad v. Collector of Cuttack and Ors. ILR 1964 Cutt. 425. The new Section 11-A introduced by Orissa Act 29 of 1962 came into force only a few days prior to the date of delivery of the order of the O.T.R. Officer and it may be urged that if the controversy between the parties can be held to come within the scope of Sub-section (1) of Section 11-A the District Collector cannot exercise the powers of revision, nor could the Additional District Magistrate have exercised the powers of an appellate Court. 9. Section 15 of the Act which initially provided appellate and revisional forums has not been repealed. In fact, all disputes u/s 9(1) clauses (b) to (e) are to be governed by Section 15 read with Sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 25. 10. That apart, a bare comparison of the appellate and revisional jurisdiction provided under Sections 15 and 11-A would make it clear that appeals or revisions pending before the authorities u/s 15 cannot automatically be transferred to the authorities created under Sub-sections (4) to (6) of Section 11-A. To take an illustration, an appeal against an order of the Sub-Deputy Collector u/s 15 read with Rule 25(1)(i) lies to the Sub-divisional Officer while u/s 11-A(4)(a) such an appeal lies to the Collector of the district. The question is whether an appeal which was pending before the Sub-divisional Officer by the date of coming into force of the Amending Act can be automatically transferred to the District Collector. The answer must be in the negative. The question is whether an appeal which was pending before the Sub-divisional Officer by the date of coming into force of the Amending Act can be automatically transferred to the District Collector. The answer must be in the negative. Section 11-A. has made no such provision either expressly or by necessary intendment. One would find similar provisions in other statutes where that is the object of the Legislature. For instance, in Section 22(Sic) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1967, there is a provision that notwithstanding the expiration of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 31 of 1958, all such proceedings pending before the Controller appointed under the said Act and all appeals pending thereunder shall respectively stand transferred to the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial). There is no such specific provision in the Amending Act and in the absence of the same, an appeal pending' before the Sub-divisional Officer on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act could not be transferred to the District Collector, who constitutes the new appellate forum. A similar provision is to be found in Section 78 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowment Act, 1951. So far as relevant it says: Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, all suits instituted under the I provisions of the Orissa Hindu Religious endowment Act, 1939, and pending on the date of commencement of this Act, shall stand transferred to the Courts of the Subordinate Judges having jurisdiction and be heard by them. 11. A similar matter came up for consideration in Mani Das and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Anr. ILR 1959 Cutt. 421, under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (Act I of 1952). Reliance was placed on the following passage in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving 1905 A.C. 369. To deprive a suitor in a pending Action of an appeal to a superior Tribunal, which belonged to him as of right, is a very different thing from regulating a procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal together and transferring an appeal to a new Tribunal. In either case, there is interference with existing rights contrary to the well known principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal together and transferring an appeal to a new Tribunal. In either case, there is interference with existing rights contrary to the well known principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. On the aforesaid authority, the order of the Board of Revenue who bad the initial jurisdiction to bear the appeal transferring the same to the District Collector of Puri who obtained jurisdiction under the new Act, was quashed. 12. The aforesaid Privy Council case emphasises the absence of difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring an appeal to a new Tribunal. We, are, therefore, clearly of opinion that, in the absence of any provision for transfer of the appeal or revision pending before the authorities prescribed u/s 155 the appeals or the revisions pending by the date of the Amending Act must be heard by those authorities. 13. Thus Sub-sections (4) to (6) of Section 11-A would apply to a decision given in an original proceeding pending before the O.T.R. Collector, but not to pending appeals and revisions, on the date the Amending Act came into force. Such a construction does not result in any absurdity. Rather it advances the remedy. 14. We would sum up our conclusion as follows: (i) Before the Amending Act, the O.T.R. Collector had jurisdiction to decide the question relating to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant only incidentally, and that decision was subject to the decision of the Civil Court which had exclusive jurisdiction to determine such a question. (ii) After the Amending Act the exclusive jurisdiction to decide such a question vested in the O.T.R. Collector, and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was ousted, though the Civil Court could decide such a question incidentally to order to determine its own jurisdiction. (iii) In respect of orders passed by the O.T.R. Collector in a proceeding involving a dispute of the aforesaid nature prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act, appeals and revisions would be governed by Section 15 read with Rule 20. (iii) In respect of orders passed by the O.T.R. Collector in a proceeding involving a dispute of the aforesaid nature prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act, appeals and revisions would be governed by Section 15 read with Rule 20. If any such appeals or revisions are pending, they must be heard by the authorities prescribed thereunder, and not by the new appellate and revisional authorities prescribed under Sub-sections (4) to (6) of Section 11-A. (iv) Appeals and revisions against orders of the O.T.R. Collector passed subsequent to the coming into force of the Amending Act even in a proceeding started earlier, would be heard by the new appellate and revisional forums created u/s 11-A. To this Bruited extent Section 11-A, by necessary implication takes away the jurisdiction of the forums prescribed by Section 15, in regard to decision of disputes of the aforesaid nature. 15. Mr. Mohanty places reliance on Hiranmoy Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam AIR 1954 Gau 224 (F.B.). We find nothing in this decision which runs counter to our view. 16. On the aforesaid analysis, the writ application fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. R.N. Misra, J. 17. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed