Ram Agyan Singh v. Murli Dhar Agarwal — 1969 DIGILAW 184 (ALL)

JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - This Special Appeal concerns the premises commonly known as 'Manssarovar Palace' situated at No. 3, Sheo Charan Lal Road, Allahabad and used primarily as a cinema hall. The original owner was one Ram Swaroop Gupta. He leased the premises to Messrs Pioneer Exhibitors and Distributors Private Limited. The tenancy came to an end on June 30, 1952. Thereafter Ram Swaroop Gupta leased the premises under a registered deed to the appellant, Ram Agyan Singh, for a period of ten years, and the appellant entered into possession. There was no order allotting the accommodation to him under Section 7(2) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (to which I shall refer as 'the Act'). In suit No. 94 of 1955, instituted by Ram Swaroop Gupta against the appellant, the Civil Judge, Allahabad held that the lease commenced to operate from May, 5, 1955. The period of the lease, therefore, expired on May 4, 1965. Meanwhile, on March 26, 1962 the property was sold by Ram Swaroop Gupta to the respondents, Murlidhar Agarwal and Raj Kumar Agarwal. In January, 1963, and again in May, 1965 the said respondents (whom I shall call 'the contesting respondents') requested the appellant to vacate the premises and hand over possession. The appellant, however, continued in possession. On May 4, 1965 the contesting respondents applied for release of the accommodation in their favour. On December 3, 1965 the Additional District Magistrate made an order releasing the accommodation. The contesting respondents also moved an application under Section 7-A for the eviction of the appellant and notice "to show cause" was issued to the appellant under Section 7-A(1). The appellant applied under Section 7-F against the Additional District Magistrate's orders releasing the accommodation and issuing notice under Section 7-A(1). The application was rejected as incompetent. The appellant then invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner against the release order and the proceeding under Section 7-A(1). The Additional District Magistrate meanwhile issued a notice under Section 7-A(2), and that was also challenged in revision before the Commissioner. On April 15, 1966 the Commissioner made an order remanding the case for fresh consideration. The appellant then invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner against the release order and the proceeding under Section 7-A(1). The Additional District Magistrate meanwhile issued a notice under Section 7-A(2), and that was also challenged in revision before the Commissioner. On April 15, 1966 the Commissioner made an order remanding the case for fresh consideration. The Additional District Magistrate issued a fresh notice dated May 3, 1966 under Section 7-A(1) pointing out that the appellant was illegally occupying the accommodation without an allotment order and required him to show cause why he should not be evicted. The appellant filed a detailed reply. The Additional District Magistrate heard the parties but nevertheless again on June 18, 1966 issued a notice under Section 7-A(2). The appellant applied in revision before the Commissioner, and the revision application, which was heard by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division was dismissed by an order dated May 23, 1967. The appellant then applied under Section 7-F of the Act to the State Government. The State Government made an order that the appellant should not be dispossessed during the pendency of the proceeding under Section 7-F. The application under Section 7-F was heard after notice to the parties. On October 20, 1967, the contesting respondents were informed that the application under Section 7-F had been allowed by the State Government and the order of the Additional Commissioner dated May 23, 1967 had been set aside. 2. The contesting respondents filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order under Section 7-F of the State Government. The petition has been allowed by a learned single Judge, who has quashed the order of the State Government dated October 20, 1967. And now this Special Appeal. 3. It will be convenient to set out here the relevant provisions of Section 7 and 7-A : "7. Control of Letting. - (1)(a) Every landlord shall, within seven days after an accommodation becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the tenant vacating it or otherwise ceasing to occupy it or by termination of tenancy or by release from requisition or in any other manner whatsoever give notice of the vacancy in writing to the District Magistrate. (b) Every tenant occupying accommodation shall within seven days of vacation of such accommodation or ceasing to occupy it give notice thereof in writing to the District Magistrate. (b) Every tenant occupying accommodation shall within seven days of vacation of such accommodation or ceasing to occupy it give notice thereof in writing to the District Magistrate. (c) The notice given under clause (a) or (b) shall contain such particular as may be prescribed. (2) The District Magistrate may by general or special order require a landlord to let or not to let to any person any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. (3) ... ... ... ... (4) ... ... ... "7-A. District Magistrate's power to take action against unauthorised occupation : (1) Where in pursuance of an order of the District Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 7, the vacancy of any accommodation is required to be reported, or where an order requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let has been duly passed under sub-section (2) of Section 7 and the District Magistrate believes or has reason to believe that any person has in contravention of the said order occupied the accommodation or any part thereof, he may call upon the person in occupation to show cause; within a time to be fixed by him why he should not be evicted therefrom : Provided that no order under this section shall be passed if the District Magistrate is satisfied that there had been undue delay or it is otherwise inexpedient to do so. (2) If such person fails to appear in reply to the notice served under sub-section (1) or, if he appears but fails to satisfy the District Magistrate that the order under sub-section (2) of Section 7 was not duly passed and that he is entitled to remain in occupation of the accommodation, the District Magistrate may, without prejudice to any other action which may be taken against him under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, direct him to vacate the premises a period to be specified. (3) ... ... ... ... (4) .... .... ... ...." The appellant contends that the proceedings against him under Section 7-A are without jurisdiction. 4. In the first place, he urges, there was no valid general order under Section 7(2) when he entered into possession in 1962, and therefore, he cannot be said to have contravened any such order. 5. (3) ... ... ... ... (4) .... .... ... ...." The appellant contends that the proceedings against him under Section 7-A are without jurisdiction. 4. In the first place, he urges, there was no valid general order under Section 7(2) when he entered into possession in 1962, and therefore, he cannot be said to have contravened any such order. 5. On October 29, 1947 the District Magistrate, Allahabad made an order under Section 7(1) of the Act (as it then was) directing every landlord to give intimation of an accommodation falling vacant within three days of the vacancy arising and directing him to let out the accommodation to a person in whose favour an allotment order had been made by the Town Rationing Officer, Allahabad and prohibiting him from letting it out to any person without the permission of that officer. At that time Section 7(1) of the Act empowered the District Magistrate to require a landlord by general or special order to give intimation of any accommodation falling vacant of which he was landlord and to let or not to let such accommodation to any such person. Thereafter the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1948 was passed and Section 7 was replaced by a corresponding provision which in substance re-enacted the contents of the original Section 7(1). The Act was amended again in 1952. The U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1952 was enacted and the contents of Section 7(1) were now set out in two sub-sections, the first of which required the landlord to give notice of vacancy of the accommodation and the second empowered the District Magistrate to make a general or special order requiring the landlord to let or not to let any person any accommodation which had fallen vacant or which has about to fall vacant. 6. The submission of the appellant is that Section 7 as re-enacted by the Amendment Act of 1948 and thereafter of 1952 must be construed as a new and distinct provision, and the original Section 7 having been repealed by these Amendment Acts the general order of the District Magistrate under Section 7(1) lapsed with the repeal. It is urged that accordingly on October 13, 1952, when the lease deed was registered, no such general order subsisted. It is urged that accordingly on October 13, 1952, when the lease deed was registered, no such general order subsisted. Now, Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act provides : "Where any enactment is repealed and re-enacted by an Uttar Pradesh Act, with or without modification, then unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law made or issued under the repealed enactment shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted." The appellant concedes that the benefit of Section 24 was available when the original Section 7 was repealed and re-enacted in 1948 but it was not available, he contends when Section 7 was re-enacted in 1952. Accordingly, while by virtue of Section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, the general order survived the repeal and re-enactment of Section 7 in 1948, it ceased to be legally effective in 1952 when Section 7 was again repealed and re-enacted. The argument is that on the 1948 amendment the general order continued in force by virtue of Section 24, but on the amendment in 1952 Section 24 was not attracted because the general order was not an order made under Section 7 repealed in 1952. It was an order made under Section 7 repealed in 1948. There is a fallacy in the argument. Section 24 provides not only that the order made under the repealed provision shall continue in force upon re-enactment of that provision, but it also declares that the order shall be deemed to have been made or issued under the provision so re-enacted. Upon the repeal of the original section and its re-enactment in 1948 the general order of October 29, 1947 must be deemed by legal fiction to have been made or issued under the re-enacted Section 7. When this provision in turn was repealed in 1952, the general order deemed to have been made under it continued in force and must be deemed to have been made or issued under Section 7 as re-enacted. 7. When this provision in turn was repealed in 1952, the general order deemed to have been made under it continued in force and must be deemed to have been made or issued under Section 7 as re-enacted. 7. But, it is urged the general order is inconsistent with Section 7 as re-enacted in 1952 and therefore also, Section 24 cannot be availed of. The inconsistency, it is said, is demonstrated in a number of aspects. Firstly, the general order contemplates that the accommodation directed to be let out must be the accommodation of which intimation of vacancy has been given. That is because the word "such" is used to qualify "accommodation". Under the re-enacted Section 7, the word "such" does not occur in sub-section (2), and the accommodation directed to be let out under sub-section (2) need not be accommodation of which notice of vacancy has been given under sub-section (1). The appellant's inconsistency is resolved the moment we see that the word "such" qualifies accommodation which has fallen vacant and not vacant accommodation of which notice has been given. 8. Then, it is said, there is inconsistency because the general order requires a landlord to give intimation of vacancy within three days of the date on which the accommodation falls vacant, and that intimation is to be given to the Town Rationing Officer. The re-enacted Section 7 gives a period of seven days for such notice and it is to be given to the District Magistrate. Now, the general order consists of two parts. One part requires the landlord to give notice of vacancy and the other part directs him to let the accommodation to a person to whom an allotment order has been made by the Town Rationing Officer and not to let it out to any other person without the permission of that officer. The jurisdiction under Section 7-A has been exercised in the instant case on the ground that the appellant occupied the accommodation without an allotment order under Section 7(2). We must therefore, examine whether there is any inconsistency between the second part of the general order and the provisions of Section 7(2). In passing, it may also be pointed out that the two parts of the general order are severable and the second part is capable of surviving without the first. Viewed thus, the inconsistency now pointed out loses all relevant. In passing, it may also be pointed out that the two parts of the general order are severable and the second part is capable of surviving without the first. Viewed thus, the inconsistency now pointed out loses all relevant. Finally, the appellant says that while under Section 7(2) the direction to let or not to let is to be made by the District Magistrate, under the general order it is to be made by the Town Rationing Officer. It is apparently over-looked that when the Town Rationing Officer discharges his functions under the general order, it is by virtue of a notification dated June, 5, 1947 made under Section 2(d) of the Act which authorises him to perform all the functions of the District Magistrate under that Act. 9. Accordingly, there is no force in the submission of the appellant that the general order dated October 29, 1947 lapsed on the amendment of the Act in 1952. I am of opinion that the order was effective on the date when the appellant entered into the lease with Ram Swarup Gupta, and in entering into occupation without an allotment order the appellant did so in contravention of the general order under Section 7(2). 10. Among the findings which persuaded the State Government to make the order under Section 7-F of the Act, there is the finding that in 1965 the accommodation was not vacant for the purposes of Section 7 when the release order was made in favour of the contesting respondents, and therefore, the release order is without jurisdiction. The appellant also contends that he entered into a valid contract of lease with Ram Swarup Gupta and continued in legal occupation throughout, that upon the expiry of the lease he was immune from eviction by virtue of Section 3 of the Act and as his occupation could not be disturbed without a decree in a suit filed in conformity with Section 3 there was no vacancy, which alone could furnish occasion for release order in favour of the landlord. The validity of these submissions may now be examined. 11. The validity of these submissions may now be examined. 11. A full Bench of this Court has laid down in Udhoo Dass v. Prem Parkash, 1963 ALJ 406 that even if a contract of tenancy is entered into in violation of a general order under Section 7(2) of the Act it is a valid lease binding between the landlord and the tenant. But that does not mean that a person occupying the accommodation under such lease is not occupying it in contravention of the general order. That position was considered by this Court in Property Agents v. Bahadur where the learned judges observed : "Though the full Bench of this Court in Udhoo Das v. Prem Prakash (supra) held that a contract of tenancy between a landlord and tenant in violation of a special or general order under Section 7(2) of the Act is a valid and binding contract, it has further held that it is so binding only between the lessor and the lessee and not upon the rent control authorities. The full Bench has further laid down that even when such a contract of tenancy has been entered into it is open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to evict the lessee under Section 7-A of the Act; and it follows that, in such circumstances, he would also have the power to make an allotment of the accommodation under Section 7(2) in favour of some other person." 12. The same view was expressed in Sangam Lal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Special Appeal No. 595 of 1961 decided on 4.8.1966 (Allahabad). There, the Landlady, Kitabunnissa, had let out the accommodation to Kaura Mal in breach of a general order under Section 7(2) prohibiting the letting of accommodation without an allotment order, and an allotment order made subsequently in favour of Sangam Lal was challenged by her on the ground that there was no vacancy. The learned Judges held that as in breach of the general order Kitabunnissa did not obtain the permission of the District Magistrate before letting out the accommodation, the occupation of Kaura Mal must be held to be unauthorised and consequently in the eye of law there was a vacancy. The same position obtains where a special order under Section 7(2), commonly known as an allotment order, is passed. The same position obtains where a special order under Section 7(2), commonly known as an allotment order, is passed. This Court held in R.K. Kandelwal v. M.L. Chawala, 1964 ALJ 20 that a person occupying accommodation before an allotment order was passed and who continued to be in occupation thereafter could be said to occupy it in contravention of the allotment order whether that order was not passed in his favour, and that, therefore, he was liable to eviction under Section 7-A. 13. The appellant has placed before us several decisions of this Court where it has been laid down that the termination of tenancy by efflux of time or in any of the other modes laid down in Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act is not sufficient for holding that the accommodation has fallen vacant, and that the mere passing of a decree for ejectment against the tenant does not make the accommodation vacant and before the accommodation can be said to be about to fall vacant the executing Court should have issued the warrant of delivery. Some of the cases cited are Ram Krishna Prasad v. Mohd. Yahia, 1960 ALJ 379; Lachmi Narain v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1962 ALJ 213; Ram Gopal v. Ram Kumar, 1962 ALJ 553; Abdul Mazid v. Mukhtiar Hussain, 1965 ALJ 205; Mohd. Ishaq v. State Government of Uttar Pradesh, 1966 ALJ 397; Vishwamittra v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Jhansi, 1967 ALJ 500 and Hari Sankar v. Chaitanya Kumar, 1968 ALJ 387. In none of these cases it was decided that a person occupying the accommodation in contravention of a general or special order under Section 7(2) was entitled to continue in occupation under the authority of the Act. The decisions proceeded on the assumption that the person in occupation was entitled to occupy the accommodation in the contemplation of the Act, and in such a case recourse could not be had to Section 7-A for his eviction. Indeed, it was pointed out that his occupation was protected by Section 3 of the Act and even though the period of his lease had expired or his tenancy had been determined by the landlord he enjoyed immunity from ejectment unless the landlord obtained permission under Section 3 to sue him for ejectment or the case fell under any of the grounds (a) to (f) set out in Section 3. To accept the contention of the appellant that a person who occupies an accommodation in contravention of the general or special order under Section 7(2) is entitled to continue in occupation and is immune from eviction under Section 7-A will be to nullify the scheme embodied in the Act for regulating the letting out of accommodation and to defeat one of the cardinal objects of the Act. 14. An attempt was made before us to prove that Ram Swarup Gupta had given notice of vacancy when the accommodation was vacated on June 30, 1952 by the Pioneers Exhibitors and Distributors Private Ltd. and as no allotment was made within the prescribed period he nominated the appellant under Rule 4 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, the Additional District Magistrate has found in the order under Section 7-A(2), and the Commissioner has affirmed in the order under Section 7(4), that the landlord did not give notice of vacancy to the requisite authority and, therefore, no question arose of the appellant being nominated by the landlord in the supposed exercise of his right under Rule 4. Even if I were competent to enter into that question, I am not inclined to accept that contention having regard to the material before us. 15. Upon the view that the accommodation was vacant in the eye of law for the purpose of Section 7 of the Act, there can be no dispute that the order relating the accommodation in favour of the contesting respondents is a valid order. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that an order under Rule 6 releasing the accommodation in favour of the landlord must be considered to be an order made under Section 7(2). That view has been expressed in Ram Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Prem Shankar Pandaya v. U.P. Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd., 1952 ALJ 520; Syed Kasim Hussain v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, 1960 ALJ 546 and Onkar Nath v. Chajju Ram, 1963 ALJ 180. 16. We have also been referred to the circumstance that the appellant was granted a licence under the U.P. cinematograph Rules and it is urged that this could only be if the appellant was considered to be in proper occupation of the accommodation. 16. We have also been referred to the circumstance that the appellant was granted a licence under the U.P. cinematograph Rules and it is urged that this could only be if the appellant was considered to be in proper occupation of the accommodation. Even if that be so, a finding given by the District Magistrate in that proceeding cannot serve as a finding in a proceeding under the Act with which we are concerned. The considerations which govern the respective proceedings are entirely different. I cannot accept the contention that the grant of the licence is conclusive on the question which is now before us, namely whether the accommodation was vacant for the purposes of Section 7 of the Act when the release order was made. 17. The case, however, does not end here. The second part remains to be examined. The State Government held the appellant entitled to the benefit of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7-A, and the question is whether in doing so it acted without jurisdiction or with manifest illegality : The State Government, in the reasons disclosed by it has referred to the office note which states that as long ago as May 5, 1955 a cinema licence was granted by the District Magistrate to the appellant and the District Magistrate must have satisfied himself that the appellant was in legal possession of the accommodation, and further that "this question cannot be raked up in the year 1966". The State Government was influenced by this consideration in granting the benefit of the proviso to the appellant. Apparently, what the State Government had in mind was that the appellant had been carrying on the cinema business ever since 1955, for more than 12 years, and that was good reason why the benefit of the proviso should be extended in his favour. Clearly the State Government appeared to be satisfied that there had been undue delay or that it was otherwise inexpedient to make an order for the eviction of the appellant under Section 7-A. 18. It is urged on behalf of the contesting respondents that there was no delay because the unauthorised occupation of the appellant had to be judged with reference to the date of the release order in 1955 and not with reference to the date on which he had occupied the accommodation in 1952 without an allotment order. It is urged on behalf of the contesting respondents that there was no delay because the unauthorised occupation of the appellant had to be judged with reference to the date of the release order in 1955 and not with reference to the date on which he had occupied the accommodation in 1952 without an allotment order. The appellant in reply points out that the entire proceeding under Section 7-A has been taken against him on the footing that he entered into occupation in 1952 without the authority of an allotment order. To show this appellant has filed a supplementary affidavit before us annexing copies of the notices and orders made in the proceedings under Section 7-A. No objection has been taken to our considering that affidavit. It may be noted that the record of the case was produced before the learned single Judge and no objection was taken by any party to consideration of the documents comprised in that record. Before us also the parties have filed copies of documents forming part of that record. We are entitled, I think, to take those documents into consideration. On December 6, 1965 the Additional District Magistrate issued a notice under Section 7-A(1) pointing out that the appellant was illegally occupying the accommodation without an allotment order and to show cause under Section 7-A(1) why he should not be evicted. In passing, he mentioned that the accommodation had been released in favour of the contesting respondents. On December 16, 1965 the Additional District Magistrate made an order under Section 7-A(2) directing the appellant to vacate the accommodation. In this order he set out his finding that the appellant had illegally occupied the accommodation without an allotment order and it was on the basis of that finding that the order directing the appellant to vacate the accommodation was made. When these proceedings were set aside on revision application filed by the appellant, a fresh notice dated May 3, 1966 under Section 7-A(1) was issued by the Additional District Magistrate in which the contents of the earlier notice were repeated. The order under Section 7-A(2) dated June 18, 1966, which followed, directed the appellant to vacate the accommodation on the ground that he had occupied it without an allotment order. The order under Section 7-A(2) dated June 18, 1966, which followed, directed the appellant to vacate the accommodation on the ground that he had occupied it without an allotment order. It is clear from these documents that the proceedings under Section 7-A were taken on the basis that the appellant had entered into the accommodation without an allotment order. In other words, they referred to a contravention of the general order under Section 7(2) which dated as far back as 1952. The proceedings were not taken on the basis of any contravention by the appellant of the release order. In that context, the State Government cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily or perversely in granting the benefit of the proviso to the appellant. 20. The learned single Judge has referred to the findings of the Additional District Magistrate and the Additional Commissioner that the appellant expressly agreed in the lease that he would deliver vacant possession of the accommodation on the expiry of ten years. Under that agreement the parties mutually undertook not to take the benefit of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. As the appellant had not handed over vacant possession on the expiry of the lease the Additional District Magistrate and the Additional Commissioner held that the appellant had not come with clean hands and had not abided by the terms of the bargain agreed by him. The learned single Judge has pointed out that this aspect of the case was not considered by the State Government. He also observed that when referring to the comment of the Additional District Magistrate that the conduct of the appellant did not entitle him to the protection of the proviso the State Government had vaguely remarked that the Additional Commissioner had not mentioned the conduct of the contesting respondents themselves. The learned single Judge observed that the State Government should have explained what that conduct was and not left its vague remark unexplained. He has pointed out that the landlords held to the term agreed and did not move in the matter for ten years and it was only upon the expiry of that period that they took proceedings for possession under the Act. He commented that the State Government had not considered all these aspects which were relevant to the question of expediency under the proviso and that, therefore, the order was manifestly erroneous. 21. He commented that the State Government had not considered all these aspects which were relevant to the question of expediency under the proviso and that, therefore, the order was manifestly erroneous. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the record and his submission is that the learned single Judge has overlooked several material facts and circumstances which if he had considered would have led him to a wholly different conclusion in regard to the conduct of the parties. He says that the facts and circumstances which if he had considered would have led him to a wholly different conclusion in regard to the conduct of the parties. He says that the facts and circumstances mentioned by the Additional District Magistrate and the Additional Commissioner in their orders represent one part of the story only, weighted heavily in favour of the contesting respondents, and that it is only when all the facts and circumstances are taken into account that the true picture emerges. He points out that all these facts and circumstances were before the State Government when it came to its decision under Section 7-F. Learned counsel has referred to material showing that while under the lease the appellant had agreed to hand over possession on the expiry of the period of the lease and not to seek the benefit of the Act, the landlord Ramswarup Gupta, shortly after the appellant obtained his cinema licence and commenced the operation of his cinema business, filed Suit No. 94 of 1955 against the appellant in respect of this property and after the dismissal of that suit he filed Suit No. 83 of 1957 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad for ejectment of the appellant. Express reference to this suit ground place in the sale deed executed by Ramswarup Gupta in favour of the contesting respondents. When the contesting respondents purchased the property in March, 1962, they served a notice in January, 1963 while the period of lease had still to run over two years requiring the appellant to vacate the premises and hand over possession. In the attempt to oust him from possession the contesting respondents also commenced proceedings for cancellation of the appellant's cinema licence, and those proceedings were pursued before the District Magistrate and thereafter before the State Government and when those attempts failed they filed a writ petition in this Court. In the attempt to oust him from possession the contesting respondents also commenced proceedings for cancellation of the appellant's cinema licence, and those proceedings were pursued before the District Magistrate and thereafter before the State Government and when those attempts failed they filed a writ petition in this Court. Learned counsel points out that all these proceedings took place during the currency of the lease. We have also been referred to paragraph 9 of the rejoinder-affidavit in which the contesting respondents admit that from the very beginning they wanted to take possession of the premises for embarking upon the cinema business themselves. These are some of the circumstances says learned counsel, to which no reference has been made in the findings of the Additional District Magistrate and the Additional Commissioner when considering whether the benefit of the proviso should be given to the appellant. The Additional District Magistrate denied the benefit on the ground that the appellant had promised to hand over possession after ten years that he never cared to obtain an allotment order (it may be mentioned that in paragraph 38 of his objection filed before the Additional District Magistrate in the proceedings under Section 7-A the appellant had expressly requested that assuming that he was in possession in contravention of the Act then having regard to his continuous possession of about fourteen years his possession may be regularised in accordance with the Act instead of evicting him, that the accommodation had been released in favour of the contesting respondents and that the appellant had not respected the law. As to the last, learned counsel for the appellant points out that the remark is vague and apart from the circumstance that the appellant entered into possession without an allotment order it cannot be said that he contravened any other provision of law. It is urged that it is precisely for the benefit of unauthorised occupants that the proviso is brought into play. The Additional Commissioner, considering the application of the proviso, held that on December 4, 1965 when the contesting respondents applied under Section 7-A there was no delay. He also said that there was no expediency in favour of the appellant as the landlords wanted the premises to run own business. The Additional Commissioner, considering the application of the proviso, held that on December 4, 1965 when the contesting respondents applied under Section 7-A there was no delay. He also said that there was no expediency in favour of the appellant as the landlords wanted the premises to run own business. These considerations, learned counsel urges, are immaterial when considering the application of the proviso, because it is in spite of the fact that an allotment order has been made or the accommodation has been released for the needs of the landlord that the unauthorised occupant is protected from eviction by the benefit under the proviso. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant explains that when the State Government referred to "the conduct of the opposite parties" it was the conduct of Ramswarup Gupta in pursuing ever since 1955 a course of litigation for the ejectment of the appellant although the period of the lease had barely commenced and the attempts of the contesting respondents, immediately after they acquired the premises in 1962, to compel the appellant to vacate the premises and to achieve that end even by cancellation of his cinema licence, all of which, learned counsel emphasises, was done even before the lease had run its course. It appears that all these features of the case were apparently not placed before the learned single Judge. 23. Now, the State Government had the entire record before it which included all this material and also the further material set out in the appellant's objection in the proceedings under Section 7-A that the appellant had staked almost all his resources and capital amounting to rupees one and a half lakhs ever since 1962 and had made strenuous efforts for over two and a half years in getting the building renovated, fitted with electric installations, seating furniture and other appointments in conformity with the rules under the Cinematograph Act, that the cinema business was the main source of income of his family and that termination of the business would make him liable for heavy damages to various distributors of cinema films with whom he had already entered into contracts, and reference was also made to the burden of compensation payable to his employees for the premature termination of their services. It is established from the record that the State Government gave a personal hearing to the parties before disposing of the application under Section 7-F, and there is no reason to doubt that the entire material on the record must have been placed before it by the parties according as it supported their respective interests. The statement of reasons on which the impugned order under Section 7-F was made was drawn up after this personal hearing, and although all that is stated there is that the benefit under the proviso should be given to the tenant and not to the landlord there is no reason to suppose that the State Government considered part only of the material which was before it. In my opinion, the omission of the State Government to refer in its order to all the material on the record does not vitiate the order. In passing, reference may be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court where with respect to an order of the State Government under Section 7-F in a case arising out of permission granted under Section 3(1) of the Act, the Supreme Court observed that the State Government was not obliged to disclose the reasons which had influenced it in coming to its decision. See Mohd. Ismail v. Nanny Lal, 1969 AWR 281. 24. In a petition for certiorari the Court can interfere with an order of a judicial or quasi judicial authority only when that order suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity or is vitiated by a manifest illegality. It is not an appellate jurisdiction, and although the Court may in an appropriate case have taken a different view on the merits of the issues raised had the matter been in appeal before it, that is not open to the Court on a petition for certiorari. 25. There is also the important consideration that the benefit under the proviso is dependant on the satisfaction of the State Government, and I think it is well settled that where it is the satisfaction of a statutory authority which affects the determination of question it is not open to the Court on a petition for certiorari to interfere with that determination unless the satisfaction of the statutory authority can be shown to be perverse or vitiated by mala fide. In the instant case, the State Government had to be satisfied that there had been undue delay or that it was otherwise inexpedient to make the order of eviction. After careful consideration, I am unable to hold that the satisfaction of the State Government upon which it gave the benefit under the proviso to the appellant has been proved to suffer from any infirmity. In my opinion, it has not been shown that the order under Section 7-F is vitiated by any jurisdictional error or manifest illegality. 26. It is urged on behalf of the contesting respondents that it is the District Magistrate alone who had to be satisfied under proviso to Section 7-A(1) that there has been undue delay or that it is otherwise inexpedient to make an order under Section 7-A. It is urged that the satisfaction of the State Government in the regard is not contemplated by the proviso. In my opinion, that is a matter pertaining to the exercise of the power not only by the District Magistrate but also by the Commissioner in revision and by the State Government under Section 7-F. There is no reason why the entire content of the power under Section 7-A cannot be exercised by the State Government when the proceeding comes up before it under Section 7-F. To hold that the satisfaction of the State Government is not contemplated by the statute in such a proceeding would be to abridge the power of the State Government in dealing with a proceeding under Section 7-A and lead in deed to wholly illogical results. The position would be that while the State Government can consider whether a person is in occupation of accommodation in contravention of the orders mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 7-A it cannot examine whether the benefit under the proviso should be extended to such a person. The position would be that while the State Government can consider whether a person is in occupation of accommodation in contravention of the orders mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 7-A it cannot examine whether the benefit under the proviso should be extended to such a person. An argument somewhat similar to this was raised in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Macmillan and Co., 1958(33) ITR 182 (SC) : AIR 1958 Supreme Court 207 where the point was whether the opinion of the Income-tax Officer under Section 13 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 was alone contemplated or it was open to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in appeal also to be satisfied whether the accounts of the assessee were correct and complete but the method employed was such that the income could not properly be deducted from them. The Supreme Court repelled the contention and held that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal could also apply its mind for the purpose of arriving at that opinion. 27. The contesting respondents also contend that the jurisdiction of the State Government under Section 7-F is confined to considering pure matters of law, and questions of fact cannot be gone into by it. We have been referred to Model Mills Manager v. Dharamdas, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 311 where the Supreme Court observed that the revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 16 of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 could be exercised on a point of law and not on questions of fact. The provisions of Section 16 of that Act have not been placed before us, and there is nothing to show how the observations of the Supreme Court applying to the instant case. The provisions of Section 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act confer a wide amplitude of power on the State Government and any express limitation on the exercise of that power is conspicuously absent. The entire record of the case is before the State Government and it is empowered to make such order as appears necessary for the ends of justice. The entire record of the case is before the State Government and it is empowered to make such order as appears necessary for the ends of justice. Reference may also be made here to Swastik Oil Mills v. H.B. Munshi, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 843 where the Supreme Court observed : "Whenever a power is conferred on an authority to revise an order, the authority is entitled to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the order and to pass such suitable orders as the authority may think fit in the circumstances of a particular case before it." 28. Finally, the contesting respondents say that while considering whether the benefit under the proviso to Section 7-A(1) should be given to the appellant the State Government should not have interfered with the discretion exercised by the Additional District Magistrate. We are referred to Register of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 558. In that case, Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1914 clearly conferred a discretion upon the Registrar to make an order regarding disclaimer. The terms of the proviso to Section 7-A, however, are merely different. The proviso prohibits the making of an order for eviction under Section 7-A if the authority is satisfied that there has been undue delay or it is otherwise inexpedient to make such order. 29. In my opinion, the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition and quashing the order dated October 20, 1967 of the State Government must be set aside. 30. The appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of learned single Judge is set aside, the writ petition is dismissed with costs throughout. R.L. Gulati, J. - I agree.