JUDGMENT : The petitioner, a Village Officer, who was working in Manimala in Kottayam District was compulsorily retired from service by Ext. P4 order passed by the State Government on the 23rd July, 1966 for alleged misconduct. “That you, Sri. P. A. Janardhanan Pillai, while employed in Government service as Village Officer, Manimala Village on 16-6-1962 at about 1.15 P. M. received Rs. 10 from Sri. Mathew Chako alias Kunjachan at Village Office as illegal gratification to do official favour in connection with the registration of revenue puramboke lands in the name of Tommy Kuriakose, son of Major Kuriakose” 2. The Government decided that the case with which the petitioner was charged should be tried by the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings as envisaged by R.2(c) of the Kerala Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1960 and the records were accordingly sent to the Tribunal in accordance with R.5 (d) of the above rules. The Tribunal conducted an enquiry and its findings are contained in Ext. P5. The Government provisionally accepted those findings (Vide Memo No. 13666/F.7/65/Home dated 20th April, 1965) and proposed the punishment of compulsory retirement of the petitioner. Though the petitioner objected to the proposal, he has been compulsorily retired by Ext. P4 order impugned in this petition. 3. The evidence on the basis of which findings have been entered against the petitioner consists of the testimony of pws. 1, 2 and 4. 4. Counsel for the petitioner has raised two points before me in his attempt to have the order Ext. P4 and the findings contained in Ext. P5 set aside. They may be formulated as under: (i) The fact that the evidence that has been accepted, those of pws. 1, 2 and 4, is that of what are termed ‘trap witnesses” has not been borne in mind and the necessary caution with which such evidence should be viewed has not been applied and this has vitiated the procedure adopted by the Tribunal as well as the State Government and has resulted not only in miscarriage of justice but on findings being entered against the petitioner which would not have been entered had these aspects been borne in mind, (ii) The Tribunal as well as the State Government also omitted to note that the trap employed in the case is one that has been termed by courts as “an illegal trap’. In cases where an “illegal trap” has been employed the evidence of the trap witnesses must not only be accepted with caution but there should be independent corroboration before the evidence is relied on. 5. Dealing with these aspects I may refer to the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of Vindhya Pradesh reported in 1954 S. C. 322. In Para.11 of the judgment there is the following statement: “It must be said however that neither Nagindas nor Panna lal nor as a matter of fact Sir Chinubhai, their principal was a willing party to the giving of the bride to the Appellant No. 1 and were only actuated with the motive of trapping the Appellant No. 1. Their evidence therefore could not be treated as the evidence of accomplices. Their evidence was nevertheless the evidence of partisan witnesses who were out to entrap the Appellant No. 1. The evidence of these two witnesses was not satisfactory and could not be relied upon for implicating the Appellants without independent corroboration.” 6. The above passages were referred to in a later decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh reported in 1958 S. C. 500 and I may usefully extract Para.14 and 15 of the judgment therein: “In some of the cases which have been cited at the bar a distinction has been drawn between two kinds of ‘traps’ legitimate and illegitimate as In re M. S. Mohiddin 1952 Cri. LJ.1245: (AIR. 1952 Mad. 561) (F), and in some other cases a distinction has been made between tainted evidence of an accomplice and interested testimony of a partisan witnesses and it has been said that the degree of corroboration necessary is higher in respect of tained evidence than for partisan evidence (see Ram Chand Tolaram Khatri v. The State, AIR. 1956 Bom. 287. We think that for deciding the questions before us, such distinctions are somewhat artificial, and in the matter of assessment of the value of evidence and the degree of corroboration necessary to inspire confidence, no rigid formula can or should be laid down. For the aforesaid reasons, we think that the learned Judge of the High Court did not correctly appreciate the effect of the decision in 1954 S.C.R. 1098: (AIR. For the aforesaid reasons, we think that the learned Judge of the High Court did not correctly appreciate the effect of the decision in 1954 S.C.R. 1098: (AIR. 1954 S.C. 322 (A) and he was in error in thinking that the decision laid down any inflexible rule that the evidence of the witnesses of the raiding party must be discarded in the absence of any independent corroboration. The correct rule is this; if any of the witnesses are accomplices who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual crime charged, their evidence must be treated as the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are not accomplices but are partisan or interested witnesses, who are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way as other interested evidence is tested by the application of diverse considerations which must vary from case to case and in a proper case, the Court may even look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person. If a Magistrate puts himself in the position of a partisan or interested witness, he cannot claim any higher status and must be treated as any other interested witness.” 7. Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Major E. G. Barsay v. The State of Bombay reported in 1961 S.C. 1762 where the proposition has been laid down in these terms: “Though Lawrence was not an approver, he was certainly an interested witness in the sense that he was interested to see that the trap laid by him succeeded. He could at least be equated with a partisan witness and it would not be admissible to rely upon such evidence without corroboration. It would be equally clear that his evidence was not a tainted one, but it would only make a difference in the degree of corroboration required rather than the necessity for it.” From the above statements it is very clear that assuming that the witnesses who have been examined in the case were not accomplices or approvers their evidence still has to be viewed with caution an d a certain degree of corroboration depending on the facts and the circumstances of the case must be available before their evidence is accepted in toto. At any rate, the rule has been clearly laid down that this aspect of the matter must not only be borne in mind but it must be seen from the judgment that it has been adverted to. I may extract a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan reported in (1952) S.C.R. 377. “In these cases it is necessary that the judge should, give some indication in big Judgment that he has had this rule of caution in mind and should proceed to give reasons for considering it unnecessary to require corroboration on the facts of the particular case before him and show why be considers it safe to convict without corroboration in that particular case.” I must also refer to the passage from the decision reported in 1958 SC 500. “How the evidence of an accomplice is to be treated is no longer open to any doubt; the matter has been dealt with in a large number of decisions, and as was observed by this Court in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan 1952 SC R.377 at p. 385: ( AIR 1952 SC 54 at P. 57(B), the rule laid down in King v. Baskerville, 1916 2KB- 658 (C) with regard to the admissibility of the un-corroborated evidence of an accomplice is also the law in India. The rule is that such evidence is admissible in law; but it has long been a rule of practice, which has virtually become equivalent to a rule of law, that the Judge must warn the jury of the danger of convicting a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” This rule must apply in a lesser degree even in the case of partisan witness and I gain strength in this view from what has been said in the same judgment of the Supreme Court in Para.10. “There is no doubt that the testimony of partisan or interested witnesses must be scrutinised with care and there may be cases, as in Shiv Bahadur Singh’s case (A), where, the Court will as a matter of prudence look for independent corroboration. “There is no doubt that the testimony of partisan or interested witnesses must be scrutinised with care and there may be cases, as in Shiv Bahadur Singh’s case (A), where, the Court will as a matter of prudence look for independent corroboration. It is wrong, however, to deduce from that decision any universal or inflexible rule that the evidence of the witnesses of the raiding party must be discarded, unless independent corroboration is available.” It must however be clear that the fact that the authority was dealing with the evidence of partisan witnesses was known to the authority and this must be evident from the order. Exts. P4 and P5 do not indicate that this aspect had been adverted to. There is no indication that this aspect has been borne in mind either by the Tribunal or the State Government. I could find none and counsel for the State has not been able to point out to me any particular circumstance from which it is possible to come to the conclusion that this important aspect had been adverted to or considered before the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the misconduct has been made out. On this ground therefore I must set aside the order Ext. P4 as well as the findings entered by the Tribunal, Ext. P5. 8. But the matter does not end there and it takes me specifically to ground (ii) raised by counsel for the petitioner. According to him, this is a case of an “illegal trap”. He relied on certain circumstances which of course it is not for me to assess or to evaluate or to pronounce upon. But I consider that this contention must also be considered by the authorities and so I am referring to it. Counsel urged that the only evidence in the case about a prior demand it said to be contained in the evidence of pw. 1, whom I may term as an agent of major Kuriakose whose son Tommy Kuriakose was interested in getting registry of certain Government lands. It was to expedite the movement of the papers in connection with the registry that it is alleged that the sum of Rs. 10 had been paid to the petitioner, the Villlage Officer of the Manimala Village. The story spoken to by pw. It was to expedite the movement of the papers in connection with the registry that it is alleged that the sum of Rs. 10 had been paid to the petitioner, the Villlage Officer of the Manimala Village. The story spoken to by pw. 1 is that the Village Assistant mentioned to him on the 6th June, 1962, that the Village Officer would like to see him. This according to pw. 1 created an impression in his mind (Pw. 1’s mind) that the Village Officer wanted a bribe. This impression he never mentioned to anybody. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, pw. 4 who was working in Trivandrum made a sudden visit to the Manimala Village with a police constable, pw. 2. The Deputy Tahsildar, pw. 3, also was called by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and pw. 3 has been declared hostile and cross-examined at the time of the enquiry. Counsel on this material submits that this is not a case of bribe being given on the basis of a prior demand but one of illegal trap set by pw. 1 and pw. 4 for the first time on the 15th June and carried out on the 16th and referred me to a number of decisions where it has been said that in such cases the evidence of witnesses who laid the trap must be treated not only as those of partisans but of participants in a criminal process. Their evidence must be treated either as that of accomplices or approvers. In two judgments of this court, one in Criminal Appeal 19 of 1966 and the other in Cherian Lukose v. State of Kerala reported in 1967 K.LT. 968 this aspect has been emphasised. I may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajanam Singh v. The State of Bihar reported in 1956 SC. 643 and read the head-note (c) there of: “Whatever the criminal tendencies of a man may be, he has a right to expect that he will not be deliberately tempted beyond the powers of his frail endurance and provoked into breaking the law; and more particularly by those who are the guardians and keepers of the law. 643 and read the head-note (c) there of: “Whatever the criminal tendencies of a man may be, he has a right to expect that he will not be deliberately tempted beyond the powers of his frail endurance and provoked into breaking the law; and more particularly by those who are the guardians and keepers of the law. However regrettable the necessity of employing agents provocateurs may be (and this is unfortunately often inevitable if corruption is to be detected and bribery stamped out), it is one thing to tempt a suspected offender to overt action when he is doing all he can to commit a crime and has every intention of carrying through his nefarious purpose from start to finish, and quite another to egg him on to do that which it has been finally and firmly decided shall not be done. The very best of men have moments of weakness and temptation, and even the worst, times when they repent of an evil thought and are given an inner strength to set Satan behind them; and if they do, whether it is because of caution, or because of their better instincts, or because some other has shown them either the futility or the wickedness of wrong doing, it behaves society and the State to protect them and help them in their good resolve; not to place further temptation in their way and start afresh a train of criminal thought which had been finally set aside.” 9. I may conclude by referring to the decision in In re M. S. Mohiddin reported in 1952 Mad. 561. “Mr. Jayarama Iyer, for the appellant raised several contentions. The first was that this was a “trap case” where corroboration by untainted evidence would be required under the law, and there was no such corroborative evidence and as such the case must fail ia view of the ruling in ‘Lakshminarayana Iyer v. Emperor’, 1917 Mad. W. N. 831 and the ruling in Brannan v. Peek, (1947) 2 All. E. R.572, where Lord Justice Goddard has observed that unless authorised by an Act of Parliament no trap can be laid by the Police or the magistracy to find out whether a man will commit an offence, and that persons trapping him like that would be accomplices liable for punishment themselves. E. R.572, where Lord Justice Goddard has observed that unless authorised by an Act of Parliament no trap can be laid by the Police or the magistracy to find out whether a man will commit an offence, and that persons trapping him like that would be accomplices liable for punishment themselves. But I have held ia several cases already that there are two kinds of traps ‘a legitimate trap”, where the offence has already been born and is in its course, and “an illegitimate trap”. Where the offence has not yet been born and a temptation is offered to see whether an offence would be committed, succumbing to it, or not. Thus where the bribe has already been demanded from a man, and the roan goes out offering to bring the money but goes to the police and the magistrate and brings them to witness the payment, it will be a legitimate trap’ Wholly laudable and admirable, and adopted in every civilized country without the least criticism by any honest man. But where a man has not demanded a bribe, and he is only suspected to be in the habit of taking bribes and he is tempted with a bribe, just to see whether he would accept it or not and to trap him, if be accepts it will be a ‘anil legitimate trap’, and. unless authorised by an Act of Parliament, it will be an offence on the part of the persons taking part in the trap who will all be “accomplices” whose evidence will have to be corroborated by untainted evidence to a similar or larger extent as the case may be before a conviction can be had under a rule of Court which has ripened almost into a rule of law. 10. According to counsel for the petitioner, this is a case of an illegal trap. He expatiated on this aspect by adverting to certain facts. He said that one son of major Kuriakose is a D. S. P., Special Branch, Trivandrum and well known to pw. 4, also a D. S. P. working at Trivandrum. pw. 4 rushed all the way from Trivandrum and when he reached Manimala the constable pw. 2 was with him. The constable is from Kottayam. pws. 2 and 4 are said to have witnessed the payment of the amount to the petitioner on the 16th June, 1962. 4, also a D. S. P. working at Trivandrum. pw. 4 rushed all the way from Trivandrum and when he reached Manimala the constable pw. 2 was with him. The constable is from Kottayam. pws. 2 and 4 are said to have witnessed the payment of the amount to the petitioner on the 16th June, 1962. This he pointed out, to say the least, is a very carious procedure, revealing an undue amount of interest in booking the Village Officer. 11. In these circumstances, whether the trap is a legitimate one or not is a factor which ought to be taken into account by the authorities burdened with the duty of assessing the evidence in the case. This has not been done. 12. I therefore set aside Ext. P4 order as well as the findings entered in Ext. P5. The Tribunal will deal with the evidence in the case afresh and in the light of what is stated in the judgment and enter fresh findings which will be taken into account by the State Government and appropriate orders passed. 13. The Original Petition is ordered on the above terms. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed