H. R. KHANNA, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent by Union of India, Chief Settlement Commissionerand Regional Settlement Commissioner, is directed against thejudgement of learned Single Judge whereby he accepted the writpetition filed by Shrimati Bishan Devi respondent, quashed theorder dated 14/3/1967 of Joint Chief Settlement Commissioner and the auction-sale, in respect of the property in dispute, held on 9/03/1967. Order was also made that Shrimatibishan Devi was entitled to the transfer of the property in disputein her favour. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts giving rise to this appeal are that Shrimati Bishandevi and her husband Buta Rani were displaced persons fromgujranwala in Pakistan. Bisharn Devi and Buta Ram made separate claims for properties left in Pakistan. The claim ofbishan Devi was verified on 7/03/1951 for Rs. 24,000. 00. On revision the amount was enhanced on 18/06/1951 tors. 29,784. 00. The claim of Buta Ram was verified for an amountof Rs. 31,900. 00. The property in dispute, situate in Rameshnagar, Mew Delhi, had been built by the government. It was put to auction on 27/11/1955, under the orders of thechief Settlement Commissioner. Bishan Devi gave the highestbid of Rs. 15,400. 00. Her bid was accepted and on 17/12/1955 she was told to give the registration numbers of herclaim application and of any of her relatives or associate. Bishandevi gave the registration number of her claim which had been verified for Rs. 29,784. 00. She also along with that associatedthe claim of her husband which had been verified for Rs. 31,900. 00. The total compensation due on the two verified claims calculatedas separate units, according to Bishan Devi, came to Rs. 17,654. 00. She moved the Chief Settlement Commissioner for the finali-zation of her case. On 16/07/1957 the Settlement Officerissued a notice to Bishan Devi asking her to produce surrender certificate in respect of a quarter occupied by her husband inpurana Qila. She was told that unless she did so the sale of theproperty in her favour would be cancelled and the amount of10/o deposited by her would be forfeited. Bishan Devi wasalso given provisional possession of the property in dispute. Bishan Devi filed objections to the demand of surrender certificate. On 16/09/1957, Regional Settlement Commissionerpassed on order clubbing the claims of Bishan Devi and herhusband. Bishan Devi wasalso given provisional possession of the property in dispute. Bishan Devi filed objections to the demand of surrender certificate. On 16/09/1957, Regional Settlement Commissionerpassed on order clubbing the claims of Bishan Devi and herhusband. It was observed that the property held by Bishandevi in Pakistan had not been shown to have been purchasedby her out of her Stridhana. On 10/12/1957, Bishandevi was asked to pay Rs. 3,060. 00 being the extra amount payable by her towards the sale price by reason of the clubbing togetherof the claims of Bishan Devi and Buta Ram. Bishan Devidid not pay that amount. On 7/02/1958 an order wasmade cancelling the auction-sale in favour of Bishan Devi andforfeiting the 10% deposit made by her. On Februarya 28, 1958 Bishan Devi was asked to hand over vacant possessionof the property in dispute. Bishan Devi filed an appeal againstthe orders dated 7/2/1958 and 28/2/1958, buther appeal was dismissed by Shri Gajendra Singh, Deputy Chiefsettlement Commissioner, on August 28, 1958. Bishan Devifiled an application under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (hereinafter REFERRED TOto as the Act) against the order of Shri Gajendra Singh, but thesame was dismissed on 15/06/1959. ( 3 ) DURING the pendency of Bishan Devi s application undersection 33 of the Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner issueda memorandum on 27/12/1958, Paragraphs 1 and 4of that memorandum, with which we are only concerned, readas under :- "in supersession of the instructions contained in thisoffice letter noted in the margin on the above subject,it has been decided that cases kept pending on the groundthat inquiries were to be made whether or not the propertywhich is the subject of the claim and which is shownin the name of a particular claimant was not purchasedbenami, the claimant may be paid on the basis of theclaim assessment order as it stands, if the value of the claimis Rs. 1,00,000. 00 or less. This means that where any claimis valued at one lakh or less, it will not be clubbed on theground that the inquiry whether or not it is a benami transaction has not been done. 4. These instructions will be effective from the dateof the issue, and past cases will not be re-opened. " ( 4 ) AFTER the issue of the above memorandum. Bishan Devi filedan appeal against the order directing the clubbing of her claimwith that of her husband. 4. These instructions will be effective from the dateof the issue, and past cases will not be re-opened. " ( 4 ) AFTER the issue of the above memorandum. Bishan Devi filedan appeal against the order directing the clubbing of her claimwith that of her husband. This appeal was accepted by Shris. R. Anand, Assistant Settlement Commissioner, as per orderdated 20/3/1959. It was held that the claim of Bishandevi could not be clubbed together with that of her husband andthat she be paid compensation for the claim verified in her favourwithout clubbing the same with that of her husband. Afterthe above order had been made by Shri Anand, Buta Ram,husband of Bishan Devi, surrendered possession of the housein his occupation in Purana Qila. He also filed an applicationthat in view of the order of Shri Anand the case might be reopenedand property be tranferred to Bishan Devi. Buta Ram wasthereupon informed that the case and been sent to another official for doing the needful. Buta Ram died on Januarv 9,1965. ( 5 ) IN March, 1967, it is stated, the Regional Settlement Commissioner directed that the property in dispute be sold by publicauction on 9/03/1967. Bishan Devi tiled an application under Section 33 of the Act against the proposed resale of theproperty. During the pendency of the revision the propertyin dispute was sold by auction on 9/03/1967 and was purchased by Subash Chander respsondent for Rs. 24,050. 00. Application under Section 33 of the Act filed by Bishan Devi wasdismissed on 14/03/1967 by Shri H. R. Nair, Joint Chiefsettlement Commissioner with delegated powers of the Centralgovernment. Bishan Devi thereupon filed the present writpetition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 14/3/1967. Prayer was also madethat the property in dispute be not sold by public auction usthe property was in the meantime sold and purchased by Subushchand. he too was impleaded as a party under order dated 6/12/1967,of Andley, J. ( 6 ) THE learned Single Judge in allowing the writ petition heldthat the order dated 7/2/1958, cancelling the auction-salein favour of Bishan Devi, as well as the order dated 28/8/1959 made by Shri Gajendra Singh stood superseded by thethe order dated 20/3/1959 of Shri Anand. The order dated 14/3/1967. The order dated 14/3/1967. made by the Joint Chief Settlement Commissioner, was held to be not in conformity with law, as, in theopinion of the learned Single Judge, the Joint Chief Settlementcommissioner had not applied his mind to all the various groundsespecially that relating to the order of Shri Anand. View wasalso expressed by the learned Single Judge that a personal hearing should have been given to Bishan Devi or her counsel beforethe dismissal of her application under Section 33 of the Actby Shri Nair, although it was observed that it was not necessaryto base the decision on that ground. The resale of the propertyin favour of Subash Chander was held to be illegal. ( 7 ) WE have heard Mr. Kapur on behalf of the appehants, Mr. Bhawani Lal on behalf of Bishan Devi respondent and Mr. Nijhawan on behalf of Subash Chnader,. and are of the view that no case has been madefor interfering with the decision of the learned Singlejudge in accepting the petition of Bishan Devi. It wouldappear from the resume of facts given above that subsequent to the order dated 16/9/1957 of the Regional Settlementcommissioner by which the claims of Bishan Devi and her husbandwere clubbed together as also subsequent to the order dated7/2/1958 by which the auction sale in favour of Bishandevi was cancelled and the order dated 28/8/1958 of Shrigajendra Singh, Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner by which Bishan Devi s appeal was dismissed, the Chief Settlementcommissioner issued a memorandum dated 27/12/1958. According to that memorandum, in pending cases relating claimsof Rs. 1,00,000. 00 or less the claimant might be paid compensationon the basis of claim asessment order and the claim need nota be clubbed on the ground that the inquiry, whether or not it isa benami transaction, has not been done. After the issue ofthe above memorandum, Bishan Devi whose application undersection 33 of the Act, against the order of Shri Gajendra Singhwas pending, filed an appeal against the order directing the clubbing of her claim with that of her husband. This appeal wasaccepted by Shri Anand as per order dated 20/3/1959and it was held that her claim could not be clubbed togetherwith that of her husband and that she was entitled to be paidcompensation for the claim verified in her favour without suchclubbing. The above order of Shri Anand was not set aside inany proceeding and holds the field. This appeal wasaccepted by Shri Anand as per order dated 20/3/1959and it was held that her claim could not be clubbed togetherwith that of her husband and that she was entitled to be paidcompensation for the claim verified in her favour without suchclubbing. The above order of Shri Anand was not set aside inany proceeding and holds the field. In the face of the orderof Shri Anand, no order could be made for the resale of the property in dispute because such a resale could only be ordered onthe assumption that the claims of Bishan Devi and her husbandcould be validly clubbed together and the compensation payableon account of those claims as clubbed together fell short of theamount of bid made by Bishan Devi, Such an assumption couldobviously be not made in view of the order passed by Shrianand. ( 8 ) ARGUMENT has been advanced by Mr. Nijahwan that the memorandum dated 27/12/1958, constituted administrativeinstructions and could not have the force of law. It is not necessary, in our opinion, to go into this question as we are of the viewthat the order for resale of the property in dispute was illegalbecause of the order of Shri Anand. As we base our decisionupon the order of Shri Anand alone, there is no need to dealwith the question whether the said memorandum had the forceof law. [f it was the case of the appellants that the order ofshri Anand was not in conformity with law and he was in errorin relying upon that memorandum, the proper course was toassail it in appropriate proceedings. As things stand, we findthat the order of Shri Anand holds the field as remarked earlier. In the face of that order the property in dispute could not beordered to be resold. ( 9 ) THE learned Single Judge, though he did not base his decisionon that ground, has also expressed the view that it is necessarythat the petitioner should be given a personal hearing before hisapplication under Section 33 of the Act is rejected by the Centralgovernment or the authority delegated with the powers of thecentral Government under that Section. A Division Bench authorityof Falshaw and Tek Chand, JJ. in case Ranjit Singh v. Theunion of India and others (1), was cited before the learned Singlejudge but he expressed his disagreement with the dictum laiddown in that case. A Division Bench authorityof Falshaw and Tek Chand, JJ. in case Ranjit Singh v. Theunion of India and others (1), was cited before the learned Singlejudge but he expressed his disagreement with the dictum laiddown in that case. After hearing the learned counsel for theparties, we, with due deference, are of the opinion that the principle laid down by the learned Judges in the case of Ranjit Singhv. The Union of India others ) is correct. Section 24 of theact deals with revision petitions which may be filed under theact and the grounds on which such revisions can be entertained. Section 33 deals with the residuary powers and reads as under :- "certain residuary powers of Central Government. "the Central Government may at any time call forthe record of any proceeding under this Act and may passsuch order in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case require and as is not inconsistent withany of the provisions contained in this Act or the rulesmade thereunder. " ( 10 ) ACCORDING to Rule 105 of the Displaced Persons (Compensationand Rehabilitation) Rules, except as otherwise provided in theact or in the Rules, the procedure laid down in Order XLI ofthe Code of Civil Procedure, shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to the hearing and disposal of appeals and revisionsunder the Act. A proviso was added to the above Rule as pernotification published on 20/07/1963, that in the case of arevision under sub-section (4) of section 24 of the Act, it shallnot be necessary to give an oral hearing if, after sending for therecord, if necessary, and considering the petition for revision,the Central Government thinks fit to dismiss the revision. Before the above proviso was added a Full Bench of the Punjabhigh Court in Him Lal Kher v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi, (2), held that it is only after hearing thethe petitioneror his pleader that a revision petition can be dismissed. The Full Bench case related to a revision under Section 24 of the Act and not to a matter under Section 33 whichdeals, as stated above, with the residuary powers of the Centralgovernment. If an application is made to the Central Government under Section 33 of the Act and it finds no force in the application, it is, in our opinion, not incumbent upon the Government to hear the petitioner orally. If an application is made to the Central Government under Section 33 of the Act and it finds no force in the application, it is, in our opinion, not incumbent upon the Government to hear the petitioner orally. It is only when the Centralgovernment decides to interfere with the impugned order thata duty is cast upon it to hear the other party because not to doso would offend against the principles of natural justice. Wefind ourselves in this respect in agreement with the followingobservations in the case of Ranjit Singh v. The Union of Indiaand others ), "it is, however, quite clear that the provisions ofsection 33 are very different from those of section 24which is headed power of revision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner . This clearly means that any petitionfiled under that section must be treated as a regular revision petition. On the other hand section 33 is headed certain residuary powers of Central Government Someof the words of the two sections are undoubtedly similarbut I do not regard any representation made to the Centralgovernment with a view to causing it to exercise its residarypowers under section 33 as a revision petition or governedby rule 105. Our attention was drawn to a decision of D. K. Mahajan, J. in Dewan Jhangi Ram v. Union of lndia,in which the view has been expressed that the petitionershould be heard before a decision is made by the Centralgovernment under section 33, but in that case it appearsthat the person who moved this Court under Article226 was one against whom some previous order in his favourhad been reversed by the Central Government purportingto act under Section 33 without giving him any opportunity to be heard : I would certainly agree that althoughthe words which occur in sub-section (3) of section 24 of theact no order which prejudicially affects any personshall be passed under this section without giving him areasonable opportunity of being heard do not occur insection 33, they embody a principle which should beapplied by the Central Government when acting undersection 33 and that before any previous decision is reversedunder this section the person likely to be prejudiciallyaffected by it should be given an opportunity to be heard. This, however, does not mean that any person who choosesto make a request to the Central Government for the purposeof reversing some earlier decision must necessarily be givena personal hearing before the decision of the Government not to interfere is communicated to him. The dictumlaid down above was followed in Sobha Ram Sethi v. Union of India and others ), Darshun Kumur v. Union ofindia and others, decided on 1/09/1967, andhazara Singh another v. Union of India and others (6), decided on 3/02/1968" ( 11 ) IT may be observed that the absence of oral hearing doesnot per se offend against the principles of natural justice andthat oral hearing is not a necessary concomitant of all quasijudicial proceedings. It would always depend upon the circumstances of each case whether oral hearing should be grantedor not. Dealing with the question of oral hearing, Viscounthaldane L. C. observed in a case, decided by the House of Lords,local Government Board v. Arlidge, : "what appears to me to have been the fallacy of thejudgment of the majority in the Court of Appeal is thatit begs the question at the beginning by setting up the testof the procedure of a Court of justice, instead of theother standard which was laid down for such cases inboard of Education v. Rice. I do not think the Boardwas hound to hear the respondent orally, provided ingave him the opportunities he actually had. " ( 12 ) THE above case was REFERRED TO to with approval by their Loidshipsof the Supreme Court in Board of High School and Interniediai yj. P. Allallabad v. Ghansliyain Das Gupta. in the case ofmessrs Serajuddin Company v. Union of India and others ),while dealing with an application under Rules 54 and 55of the Mineral Concession Rules, it was held that though theproceedings were of a quasi-judicial nature, it was not imperativefor the Central Government to give an oral hearing to the petitioner. ( 13 ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. The amount paid by Subash Chander should be refunded to him forthwith. The parties, in the circumstances of the case, shall bear their own costs.