JAYANTILAL PARSHOTTAMDAS KAPALI v. STATE — 1969 DIGILAW 19 (GUJ)

P. N. BHAGWATI, N. K. VAKIL, J. ( 1 ) SPECIAL Civil Applications Nos. 1392 of 1968 1366 of 1968 1394 of 1968 and 1393 of 1968 and Spl. C. A. No. 1436 of 1968 raise some common questions of law and facts and they can be conveniently disposed of by one judgment We may however mention that some of the questions of facts are not common and we shall deal with them separately at the appropriate place. These writ petitions are directed against the orders made by the Collector of Surat respondent No. 2 in all the petitions whereby lands bearing certian survey members situated in the village of Althan in the District of Surat have been requisitioned under sec. 5 (1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act 1948 hereafter referred to as the Act. They also seek to have the consequential notices for possession and in some cases of auctioning crops quashed. We shall prefer to deal with Special Civil Application No. 1392 of 1968 as the main petition or representative petition in which we propose to deal with all the questions of law which are common and also first deal with the questions of facts that arise in the said petition. ( 2 ) THE petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 1392 of 1968 are the Managing Trustees of the public Trust known as Shri Surat Panjrapole Surat hereafter referred to as the Trust. It was founded about 150 years ago the object whereof is protection of infirm cattle. The Trust is also registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 For the fulfillment of the object of the said Trust the trust looks after and maintains nearly 1750 infirm cattle. The petitioners as Managing Trustees of the said Trust hold agricultural lands in the District of Surat. Parts of them are used as grazing land for the infirm cattle and the rest are used for growing crops to realise income to carry out the object of the Trust. The said Trust also runs and manages a dairy and its income is also utilised for the fulfillment of the object of the trust. The agricultural lands held by the petitioners therefore are very important from the point of view of enabling the Trustees to fulfill the object of the Trust. The said Trust also runs and manages a dairy and its income is also utilised for the fulfillment of the object of the trust. The agricultural lands held by the petitioners therefore are very important from the point of view of enabling the Trustees to fulfill the object of the Trust. The said Trust is exempted from the application of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 under sec. 88b of the said Act and it is also exempted from the operation of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 1960 ( 3 ) AMONGST the lands held in various villages the trustees also hold lands at village Althan Taluka Choryashi District Surat of the following description. SURVEY No. Area a. G. . Assessment. Rs. Ps 17 2-31 15 - 81 18 0-36 5 - 56 19 5-34 30 - 87these lands are situated in a compact block on one side of the Udhna Magdalla road and are situated near an irrigational canal. Part of these lands is used as pasture land for milch and dry cattle maintained by the Trust. According to the petitioners on the date of the petition there was standing crop of Juwar valued at approximately Rs. 4500. 00. ( 4 ) IN the month of August 1968 the river Tapti was in spate and the flood waters inundated vast areas of Surat District. Several villages were totally washed out. Water had also entered the city of Surat and nearly 3/4th of the area was affected. Extensive loss of life and property was cause in the aforesaid villages. ( 5 ) VILLAGES of Althan Bhatar and Bhalthan (which are contiguous) were comparatively less affected by the flood. The level of the flood waters in these villages had reached about four feet and water had receded within 24 to 48 hours. Damage to properties in the said villages was comparatively less and there was no loss of life. Survey Nos. 17 18 and 19 of village Althan held by the petitioners as the Managing Trustees were also under water the level being four feet for nearly 48 hours during the floods. Damage to properties in the said villages was comparatively less and there was no loss of life. Survey Nos. 17 18 and 19 of village Althan held by the petitioners as the Managing Trustees were also under water the level being four feet for nearly 48 hours during the floods. The State Government undertook a scheme of shifting and rehabilitating the residence of low lying areas along the bank of river Tapti to areas situated on a higher level with a view to minimise loss of life and property in the event of recurrence of floods. It appears that about 85 families of the village Bhatar Taluka Choryasi District Surat had made representation to the President of the Surat District Panchayat requesting that they may be shifted from the low lying area of village Bhatar to a suitable place higher in level under the said Scheme. Their request was sympathetically considered and the District Panchayat selected certain areas in village Althan for the purpose. The petitioners having come to know that amongst the land so selected the aforesaid survey Nos. 17 18 and 19 were also included addressed a letter on the 3rd October 1968 jointly to the President of the Surat District Panchayat the Collector of Surat Rehabilitation officer of Surat and the Mamlatdar of Choryasi bringing to their notice that S. Nos. 17 18 and 19 and part of S. No. 25 of village Althan which were reported to have been selected for migration and rehabilitation of 85 families of village Bhatar were not suitable for the purpose because during the floods the said lands were also under 4 to 5 feet of water and the object will not be fulfilled. It was pointed out that not only the object of rehabilitation would fail but it would also deprive the public trust of its valuable property without the real purpose being served. Despite this letter a letter dated 25th of October 1968 was received from the Mamlatdar Choryasi inquiring whether the petitioners were willing to sell S. No. 19 admeasuring 5 acres 34 gunthas at the prevalent market price for the purpose of rehabilitating flood affected persons of village Althan and Bhatar. The letter also directed that the petitioners should attend the office of the third respondent on the 28th of October 1968 at 12 noon to give necessary statement in that behalf. The letter also directed that the petitioners should attend the office of the third respondent on the 28th of October 1968 at 12 noon to give necessary statement in that behalf. It was also stated therein that in the event of petitioners failing to attend the office as directed it would be assumed that the petitioners were not willing to sell the land for the aforesaid purpose and the authorities would take proceedings for acquisition of the said lands. The petitioners replied to the said communication on the 28th October 1968 pointing out inter alia the unsuitability of the lands in question for shifting and rehabilitating the flood affected families. They also expressed their unwillingness to sell the land as they were required for the purposes of the trust. It was also stated therein that some interested persons in order to serve their self interest and save their own high level land appeared to have persuaded the authorities in having the said lands selected for the aforesaid purpose. Copies of the said reply were forwarded to the President of the District Panchayat Collector of Surat and the Rehabilitation officer. As required Ranchhodbhai Jinabhai the constituted attorney of the petitioners attended the office of the third respondent on the 28th of October 1968. His statement was recorded. In the said statement also the unsuitability of the land was pointed out. It was also pointed out how the land was necessary for the purpose of the Trust and also that it was not possible to sell the land as desired by the authorities. ( 6 ) ON the 2nd November 1968 the Collector of Surat made the impugned order requisitioning the lands described in the schedule annexed thereto for public purpose of rehabilitating the flood affected persons. In the schedule amongst the lands described were also lands of the following description belonging to the Trust. VILLAGE taluka s. No. Total area requisitioned a. G. A. G. Althan choryasi 17 2-51 2-31 18 Part 0-36 0-20 19 Part 5-34 4-31. THE second respondent had made the above order purporting to act in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by sec. 5 (1) of the Act read with Government Resolution Public Works Department No. GHJ. 154/ Gl. G. M. 67 dated 29th August 1967. A copy of the said impugned order is annexed as Annexure E to the petition. THE second respondent had made the above order purporting to act in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by sec. 5 (1) of the Act read with Government Resolution Public Works Department No. GHJ. 154/ Gl. G. M. 67 dated 29th August 1967. A copy of the said impugned order is annexed as Annexure E to the petition. On November 4 1968 the third respondent issued a notice directing the petitioners to remain present on the site at 9-0 A. M. on the 5th of November 1968 to handover possession of the said lands. The notice also intimated that if the petitioners failed to remain present possession of the lands shall be taken in presence of the Panchas. A copy of this notice is annexed to the petition Annexure F -. As the petitioners were not desirous of participating in any of the proceedings relating to the requisition of the said lands did not remain present as required. The petitioners believe that the possession of the lands was taken by the third respondent in the absence of the petitioners. On the 6th November 1968 the Taluka Development officer respondent No. 4 issued a public notice intimating that a public auction of the Juwar crops trees grass etc. standing on the aforementioned requisitioned lands will be held at 4-0 p. m. on the 15th of November 1968. Copy of the said notice is annexure G to the petition. ( 7 ) THE petitioners contend that the aforesaid order of requisition and the consequent notices are illegal ultra vires mala fide null and void and without and/or in excess of jurisdiction. Broadly speaking they have contended that sec. 5 of the Act under the provisions whereof the said order of requisition is made violates the fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) (f) as well as Article 14 of the Constitution. It is also contended that sec. 16 read with sec. 19 (2) (iv) of the Act contravenes the provisions of Article 14. The action of the respondents as reflected in the order of requisition and the consequential notice is violative of the fundamental rights to property guaranteed under Article 31. The purpose for which these lands have been requisitioned is not a public purpose. 16 read with sec. 19 (2) (iv) of the Act contravenes the provisions of Article 14. The action of the respondents as reflected in the order of requisition and the consequential notice is violative of the fundamental rights to property guaranteed under Article 31. The purpose for which these lands have been requisitioned is not a public purpose. Neither judicial procedure nor principles of natural justice have been followed though the necessity to follow them flows from the nature of the declaration required to be made and the action following upon it under the impugned provisions. The petition is also based on the contention that the requisition in the present case could not have been validly made under sec. 5 (1) as only parts of S. Nos. 18 and 19 have been requisitioned without specifying which part of those survey numbers were requisitioned and therefore it suffers from the vice of vagueness and uncertainty. It is also contended that it is not open to the State Government to break up the unity of any land. The subjective satisfaction as regards the existence of public purpose and the necessity or expediency of requisitioning the petitioners lands for the said public purpose is not arrived at bona fide or reasonably but arbitrarily and perversely and is a colourable satisfaction. The lands in question are already being used for a public purpose and the powers under sec. 5 (1) of the Act could not have been validly invoked for issuing the impugned order of requisition. It was also contended that the lands in question have been requisitioned for a purpose permanent in nature which is colourable exercise of power and fraud on the statute having regard to the fact that the statute itself is essentially of a temporary nature. ( 8 ) THE respondents in the petition are the State Government (Respondent No. 1) the Collector of Surat (respondent No. 2) the Mamlatdar Choryasi Taluka (respondent No. 3) and the Taluka Development officer (respondent No. 4 ). ( 8 ) THE respondents in the petition are the State Government (Respondent No. 1) the Collector of Surat (respondent No. 2) the Mamlatdar Choryasi Taluka (respondent No. 3) and the Taluka Development officer (respondent No. 4 ). On behalf of the respondents respondent No. 2 has filed two affidavits in reply and they oppose the petition generally speaking on the ground that the Government was called upon to meet an unprecedented situation of damage to and destruction of crops properties and cattle caused by the floods of the river Tapti in August 1968 and it was called upon to set up measures for dealing with such emergency. One of the measures taken was for resettlement of the flood affected people at safe sites. The enormity of the damage and the task to be faced by the Government have been stated in great details in these affidavits Respondents have denied that on neither of the grounds made out by the petitioners the impugned order of requisition and the consequential notices can be held to be invalid. It is asserted that they do not violate any of the provisions of Article 14 or 31 (2) as alleged. They have also denied any colourable exercise of power or fraud on the statute. We do not think it necessary at this stage to state in details the defence raised but we will refer to the relevant contentions raised by the respondents when we discuss the respective submissions made on behalf of the petitioners ( 9 ) MR. Sorabji the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners formulated the following submissions for our consideration:-I. The Bombay Land Requisition Act 1948 is violative of the provisions of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India. II. (a) Sec. 5 (1) of the Act gives unfettered power to requisition land in one case and not to exercise the power in another case and therefore it violates Article 14 (B) Sec. 16 of the Act read with sec. 19 (2) (iv) invests the Government with unfettered power with regard to exemption of any kind from the provisions of sec. 5 or 6 is therefore violative of Article 14; therefore assuming that sec. 5 (1) standing by itself is valid the said section read with sec. 16 violates Article 14. III. Discrimination is inherent in sec. 5 itself viz. 19 (2) (iv) invests the Government with unfettered power with regard to exemption of any kind from the provisions of sec. 5 or 6 is therefore violative of Article 14; therefore assuming that sec. 5 (1) standing by itself is valid the said section read with sec. 16 violates Article 14. III. Discrimination is inherent in sec. 5 itself viz. in respect of open land which has been put to actual use by way of cultivation no immunity from requisition is conferred as in the case of buildings which have been resided in for a period of six months. The safeguard of an and the requirement of a declaration are dispensed with in the of land that are required in the case of buildings. IV. In view of the law declared by the Supreme Court that the order of requisition entails civil consequences an opportunity to be heard should be given prior to its making. Even if it is assumed that it is an administrative order principle of fair play requires that the party must have an opportunity to be heard before the order is made. No such opportunity was given and therefore the order of requisition is null and void. V. Under the Act the order of requisition can be made for a purpose which is of a temporary nature having regard to the very temporary nature of the Act. That the requisition made under the impugned order being for a purpose of a permanent nature the order is invalid. VI. On a true construction of sec. 5 a requisition order cannot be passed so as to break up the unity of any land if it is a composite piece of land and cause sub divisions. VII. The order is vague and uncertain inasmuch as it does not specify which particular portion of S. Nos. 18 and 19 have been requisitioned. VIII. In the facts and circumstances of this case the requisition is not for a public purpose because (I) the land is not required for rehabilitating persons who are in fact rendered houseless (II) Having regard to the location and situation and particularly the level of the requisitioned land the purported public purpose is not sub served at all. (iii) It cannot be a public purpose to requisition the property of one flood affected person or institution for the benefit of another flood affected persons. (iii) It cannot be a public purpose to requisition the property of one flood affected person or institution for the benefit of another flood affected persons. (IV) Activities of the petitioners are also an element which has to be taken into account and taking all the circumstances in respect of their activities into account the order of requisition militates against the purpose of the Act viz. to sub serve a public purpose. (V) Lands tried to be requisitioned are clearly in excess of the requirement for the public purpose. (vi) The order of requisition is mala fide and in colourable exercise of power. WE will deal with the submissions in the order in which they are placed before us. ( 10 ) AS regards the challenge based on the ground of violation of the provisions of Article 19 (1) (f) the submission is that sec. 5 of the Act which authorises the State Government to requisition any land for any public purpose by an order made in writing if in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary and expedient so to do is violative of the fundamental right to acquire hold and dispose of property guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f) and the restrictions imposed by sec. 5 are neither reasonable nor in the interest of general public. The decision of the State Government or its delegate is made final and conclusive and the citizens aggrieved by it has no right to approach any civil Court or other authority by reason of sec. 17 of the Act. Besides no provision is made for holding any inquiry for giving any opportunity to the persons concerned to be heard before the order is made under sec. 5 (1 ). This contention however is not now open to the petitioners and has to be rejected in view of the settled law that statutes dealing with acquisition and requisition fall within the purview of Article 31 (2) read with (2a ). Article 31 (2) read with 2 (A) provides a self contained code and is not subject to Article 19 (1) (f ). These statutes therefore are not required to meet the challenge of Article 19 (1) (f) Vide Mangalbhai v. State V Guj. L. R. 329 Ishwarlal v. State VIII Guj. L. R. 729 and Shah and Co. v. State of Maharashtra A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1877. These statutes therefore are not required to meet the challenge of Article 19 (1) (f) Vide Mangalbhai v. State V Guj. L. R. 329 Ishwarlal v. State VIII Guj. L. R. 729 and Shah and Co. v. State of Maharashtra A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1877. ( 11 ) THE constitutional challenge on the basis of Article 14 contained in the second submission is in two parts the first of which is on the ground that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 5 of the Act gives unfettered power to requisition land in one case and not to exercise the power in another case therefore it violates the provisions of the said Article. It will be convenient at this stage to reproduce sec. 5:5 If in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do the State Government may by order in writing requisition any land for any public purpose:-PROVIDED that no building or part thereof wherein the owner the landlord or the tenant as the case may be has actually resided for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the order shall be requisitioned under this section. (2) Where any building or part thereof is to be requisitioned under sub-sec. (1) the State Government shall make such enquiry as it deems fit and make a declaration in the order of requisition that the owner the landlord or the tenant as the case may be has not actually resided therein for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the order and such declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the owner landlord or tenant has not so resided. ( 12 ) THE principle is well settled that any provision of law which vests in the executive authority untrammeled and arbitrary powers without providing any principle or policy enabling the authority to exercise the power at its sweet will to the detriment of any fundamental right of the citizen is invalid. Question is whether sec. 5 (1) confers such uncanalised arbitrary power without laying down any policy or principle to guide the exercise thereof by the Government or its delegate. We are unable to answer the query in the affirmative for reasons we will immediately proceed to state. Question is whether sec. 5 (1) confers such uncanalised arbitrary power without laying down any policy or principle to guide the exercise thereof by the Government or its delegate. We are unable to answer the query in the affirmative for reasons we will immediately proceed to state. ( 13 ) THE Bombay Land Requisition Act 1948 was proceeded by the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance 1947 which was promulgated on 4th December 1947. In the statement annexed to the ordinance it was stated that there was great pressure on accommodation available in urban areas and as the powers of requisitioning which the Government had under the Defence of India Rules have lapsed it had become necessary to regulate the distribution of vacant premises and therefore it was felt essential to have powers of requisitioning. Clause (2) of this Ordinance defines various expressions land premises to requisition etc. Clause 3 provides that the Provincial Government if it was of the opinion that it was necessary or expedient to do so may pass an order in writing requisitioning any land for any public purpose. This ordinance was followed by the Requisition Act which came into force on April 11 1948 The preamble to this Act states that it is an Act to provide for the requisition of land for the continuance of requisition of land and for certain other purposes. Sec. 4 is the definition clause and gives the definitions of the term referred to here above. Sec. 5 enables the State Government to requisition any land for any public purpose as stated here above. Sec. 6 deals with requisition of vacant premises. Sec. 7 deals with the continuance of requisition sec. 8 deals with payment of compensation sec. 9 provides for release from requisition sec. 10 deals with power of inquiry for the purpose of holding an inquiry under sec. 9 sec. 11 deals with the power to take possession sec. 15 deals with the delegation of function by the State Government sec. 16 deals with the power of the Government to exempt any land by making rules from the provisions of sec. 5 and 6 or both and sec. 19 deals with the power of the State Government to make rules to carry into effect the purposes of the Act. These are the relevant provisions of the Act with which we are concerned. 5 and 6 or both and sec. 19 deals with the power of the State Government to make rules to carry into effect the purposes of the Act. These are the relevant provisions of the Act with which we are concerned. ( 14 ) THE history of this legislation shows that the Ordinance and the Act were enacted to requisition land in areas where there was an acute scarcity of accommodation and though the Ordinance and the Act were intended to be of a fixed duration the very conditions that had led to the enactment thereof continued in an even more aggravated form and therefore it was found necessary that lands already requisitioned must continue under the requisition and the Government must also continue to have the power to requisition land for a public purpose if it were necessary or expedient so to do. Land under the inclusive definition covers all classes of land and buildings and things attached to land and buildings. The power to requisition is vested in the State Government or its delegate if so empowered by the State Government under sec. 15. Sec. 2 provides that the Act will not operate all over the State but will only apply in the first instance to the areas mentioned in the Schedule. The Schedule shows that it mentioned only two districts viz. Ahmedabad and Surat (so far as the territory now forming the State of Gujarat is concerned ). But sub-sec. (2) naturally gives power to the State Government to extend any or all of the provisions of the Act to any other areas also. By 1959 however it appears the situation having become acute all over the State by the Bombay Land Requisition (Extension and Amendment) Act 1959 the Act was applied by the Legislature itself to the then whole State of Bombay. It also then vested the State Government with the authority to discontinue the application in any particular area. We have referred to these facts only with a view to show the nature and purpose of this legislation and the necessity of leaving to the State Government even the discretion to apply or not to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act. We have referred to these facts only with a view to show the nature and purpose of this legislation and the necessity of leaving to the State Government even the discretion to apply or not to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act. It also is to be noticed that though under the inclusive definition of land all categories of land and buildings would be included in land as regards buildings actually occupied for residential purposes for a particular period have been treated on a different basis. The scheme of the Act further reveals that even in the class of buildings those which fall within the definition of premises have to be dealt with on a different basis. We are at this stage concerned only with sec. 5 (1) of the Act. ( 15 ) THERE is no doubt that sec. 5 (1) is a provision of wide amplitude in the scheme of the Act. It provides for requisition of land by an order in writing for a public purpose if in the opinion of the Government or its delegate it is necessary or expedient so to do. It vests in the executive authority a wide discretion to exercise or not to exercise the power vested under the section. But the inquiry with which we are concerned is does it vest an arbitrary power without providing any guidance by way of policy or principle. The first thing noticeable is that the power can be exercised only for a public purpose. There is now no difficulty in ascertaining the concept of. public purpose. It is therefore a policy or principle laid down that except for a public purpose the power shall not be exercised. It is a policy prescribed by the Legislature because whenever the power is to be exercised the nature of the public purpose for which it is tried to be exercised has to be a decisive factor. But the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that by itself the requirement that the requisition shall be for a public purpose is not any factor that provides any guidance or lays down a principle. It is at best a fetter on the power. But the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that by itself the requirement that the requisition shall be for a public purpose is not any factor that provides any guidance or lays down a principle. It is at best a fetter on the power. Assuming for the sake of argument but not admitting that it is so what is to be seen is whether there is no criteria laid down even within those legal confines to guide the exercise of power by the executive authority. The Legislature has laid down that not only the power shall be exercised for a public purpose but it shall be so exercised only if it is necessary or expedient so to do by an order in writing. ( 16 ) IT was however urged on behalf of the petitioners that even if the factors of necessity or expediency can be said to be intended to lay down any principle or criterion to provide guidance in fact they do not provide any guidance whatever. Under sec. 5 (1) the entire exercise of power to requisition is left to the sole subjective satisfaction of the State Government or its delegate (vide. sec. 15) as to the necessity or expediency of any public purpose. The authority to form a subjective opinion as regards necessity and expediency gives unguided and unlimited power to the State Government and its delegate and makes the subjective satisfaction of the executive authority conclusive. The concept of the terms necessity and expedient and particularly the latter is extremely vague and nebulous in character. The word expedient particularly introduces an element of complete vagueness and uncertainty and does not furnish any definite indication. Infinite variety of factors and shades of facts can be made to fall within the ambit of the word. It may justifiably permit different connotations to be made out by different persons exercising the power and one can never be able to challenge the act as falling beyond the pale of the expression expedient. Infinite variety of factors and shades of facts can be made to fall within the ambit of the word. It may justifiably permit different connotations to be made out by different persons exercising the power and one can never be able to challenge the act as falling beyond the pale of the expression expedient. It would be well nigh impossible to contend that the authority has not applied its mind to the requirement of expediency for the public purpose which is condition precedent to the exercise of the power for the word expedient has no defined connotation and therefore fails to provide any definite guide line to prevent the executive act from impinging upon the provisions of Article 14. ( 17 ) WE are unable to agree with the learned counsel. So far as the term necessary is concerned it is difficult to see how it could be said to be a word which has no definite connotation or is vague and nebulous. Necessary means what is indispensable needful or essential. The term in our view has a precise meaning and connotation and there is nothing vague or nebulous about it. It is true that it cannot be said that the word expedient has so defined and precise a connotation. It has no doubt a wider ambit and gives larger scope to the exercise of power. But this expression has also a recognised connotation in the eye of law. The dictionary meaning that would in the context in which it is used and which is most fitting is useful for affecting a desired result; fit or suitable for the purpose. If the word is read in isolation it is possible that it introduces such variety of shades and considerations that it would be difficult to say with any definiteness as to whether a particular thing or act could be said to be expedient or not. But the word has not to be read in isolation. It has to be read in context of the other parts of the provision of law in which it appears. In the present case the word has to be read in context of the word necessity which precedes it and particularly in the context of the expression for a public purpose. This word expedient is no stranger to the statute law and consequently to the Courts. In the present case the word has to be read in context of the word necessity which precedes it and particularly in the context of the expression for a public purpose. This word expedient is no stranger to the statute law and consequently to the Courts. In many a statute in England and in this country the expression has been used. In the Defence of India Act 1962 sec. 3 which gives power to make Rules provided that:-3 Power to make rules.- (1) The Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette make such rules as appear to it necessary or expedient for securing the defence of India and civil defence the public safety the maintenance of public order or the efficient conduct of military operations or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. (2) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 reads as follows:- (1) If the Central Government is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices it may by order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. (2) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx sec. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act XXIV of 1946 is as follows:- (1) The Central Government so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining and increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices may by order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. Rule 4 of the Enemy Property (Custody and Registration) Order 1962 made under the Defence of India Rules 1962 reads as follows:- (1) Whenever by order made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 133-V of the Defence of India Rules 1962 the property of an enemy is vested in the Custodian the Custodian may take or authorise the taking of such measures as he considers necessary or expedient for preserving the property and where the property belongs to an individual enemy subject may incur such expenditure out of the property as he considers necessary or expedient for the maintenance of that individual or of his family in India. IT is obvious that in all these provisions the authority in which the power was vested had to decide as a condition precedent whether it was necessary or expedient to exercise the power in relation to the purpose to be attained In these provisions also the Legislature having regard to the nature of the power and the purpose to be attained had thought it advisable to leave flexibility in the basis on which the power shall be exercised and advisedly used the term necessary or expedient. ( 18 ) OUR attention was drawn by the learned Advocate General to two English authorities and we may with advantage refer to them here In re Cravens Estate Lloyds Bank Limited v. Cockburn (No. 2) Chancery Division 1937 p. 431 (Vol. I) the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Trustee Act 1925 sec. 57. Sec. 57 sub-sec. (1) of the Trustee Act 1925 provides:- Where in the management or administration of any property vested in trustees any sale lease mortgage surrender release or other disposition or any purchase investment acquisition expenditure or other transaction is in the opinion of the Court expedient but the same cannot be effected by reason of the absence of any power for that purpose vested in the trustee by the trust instrument if any or by law the Court may by order confer upon the trustees either generally or in any particular instance the necessary power for the purpose on such terms and subject to such provisions and conditions if any as the Court may think fit. . . . . . . . . . . . . The question to be determined was whether the Trustees could under a power of advancement in the will of the testatrix make an advance for the benefit of the son to enable him to become a member of Lloyds or if they have no power to do that whether under sec. 57 of the Trustee Act 1925 the Court will permit that to be done. In order to do this the Court had to interpret sec. 57 and it held that for the Court to exercise its power under the sub-section the proposed transaction must be in the opinion of the Court expedient not for the benefit of the beneficiary only but for the benefit of the whole trust. The above underlining is ours. Dealing with sec. 57 the Court observed that sec. 57 was undoubtedly framed in very wide terms. It was intended to apply to cases where the powers expressly given by the instrument creating the trust were insufficient to enable that to be done which it was expedient to do in the interest of the beneficiaries under the trust which the trustees had to administer but which without this power could not be done at all. Then as regards the word expedient used in sec. 57 the Court observed:- The word expedient there quite Clearly must mean expedient for the trust as a whole. It cannot mean that however expedient it may be for one beneficiary if it is inexpedient from the point of view of the other beneficiaries concerned the Court ought to sanction the transaction. In order that the matter may be one which is in the opinion of the Court expedient it must be expedient for the trust as a whole. The word expedient was thus interpreted in the context of the other parts of the provision in which it was set. ( 19 ) IN 1941 2 Kings Bench Division p. 306 (Rex v. Comptroller General of Patents) sec. 1 sub-sec. 1 of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 came before the Court for construction. It read as follows:-SUBJECT to the provisions of this section. ( 19 ) IN 1941 2 Kings Bench Division p. 306 (Rex v. Comptroller General of Patents) sec. 1 sub-sec. 1 of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 came before the Court for construction. It read as follows:-SUBJECT to the provisions of this section. His Majesty may by Order in Council make such regulations (in this Act referred to as Defence Regulations) as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for securing the public safety the defence of the realm the maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of any war in which His Majesty may be engaged and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. IT was held that sub-sec. 1 gave to His Majesty in Council complete discretion to make such regulations as appear to him to be necessary or expedient to effect the purposes named in the sub-section. If a regulation is expressed to have been made because it appeared to His Majesty in Council to be necessary or expedient to secure those purposes or that fact is to be implied the Court has no jurisdiction to investigate the reasons which moved His Majesty to come to the conclusion that it was necessary or expedient to make the regulation or to inquire whether the making of the regulation was in fact necessary or expedient to effect any of the specified purposes. In the said case it had become necessary to construe the words necessary and expedient and it was observed that the effect of the words as appear to him to be necessary or expedient is to give to His Majesty in Council a complete discretion to decide what regulations were necessary for the purposes named in the sub-section. We need not enter into the details either of the facts or discussion in the said case. Suffice it to say that this phraseology is to be found in many statutes and the Courts have been called upon to interpret the ambit thereof in the context in which they are placed. It is obvious therefore that the word Expedient has a connotation which can reasonably be said to be definite and indicative when read in context with the other parts of the provision in which it is to be found. It is obvious therefore that the word Expedient has a connotation which can reasonably be said to be definite and indicative when read in context with the other parts of the provision in which it is to be found. ( 20 ) IN the present case in our view the word expedient when read in context with the expression for a public purpose though it may leave a larger scope to the executive authority in exercise of power it does provide a principle or criteria to guide the authority. Whether a particular requisitioning is expedient for a particular public purpose or not may require many factors and shades of considerations to be taken into account but it does canalise the exercise of power or the discretion to be used by the executive authority. .