JUDGMENT R.L. Gulati, J. - This is an appeal by the State of UP against the order dated 19-3-1966 passed by Sri R.S. Agarwal, Magistrate First Class Kanpur, acquitting the respondent of a charge under section 35 of the UP Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962 (UP Act No. XXVI of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). 2. On 18-4-1965, the Labour Inspector visited the shop of the respondent and found that the respondent had not properly maintained the attendance and wages register as required by the law. A written complaint was filed by the Labour Inspector against the respondent and the same was handed over to the clerk of the Court on 14-10-1965. On 21-10-1965 the cognizance of the complaint was taken by the learned Magistrate when he ordered the case to be registered and summoned the respondent. 3. Eventually on 19-3-1966, the learned Magistrate rejected the complaint as being barred by time relying on S. 36 of the Act. section 36. of the Act which prescribes the period of limitation for launching prosecutions in respect of the offences under the Act is in the following terms: "36. Limitation of prosecution-(1) No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act or the rules made thereunder except on complaint in writing made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed." A plain reading of this section shows very clearly that in order that a complaint under the Act may be taken cognizance of it must be a written complaint filed within six months of the commission of the offence. The period of limitation prescribed thus relates to the making of the complaint. There is no period of limitation within which the court must take cognizance of the complaint. The learned Magistrate, however, has taken the view that the complaint must be taken conziance of by the Court within a period of six months otherwise it would be treated as barred by time. This view is clearly erroneous. As already observed above, the limitation is upon the finding of the complaint and there is no limitation upon the court taking its cognizance. The complaint in the instant case was clearly made within the 'period of limitation and was not, therefore, liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation. 4. This view is clearly erroneous. As already observed above, the limitation is upon the finding of the complaint and there is no limitation upon the court taking its cognizance. The complaint in the instant case was clearly made within the 'period of limitation and was not, therefore, liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation. 4. A similar question arose before a Division Bench of this Court in Gopal Das Saxseria v. State, 1965 ALJ 687 relating to S. 106 of the Factories Act which provides that "No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of a Inspector." It has been held in that case that the limitation of three months relates only to the making of the complaint and it is not essential that the cognizance of the complaint should also be taken within three months. This case has specifically over-ruled an earlier decision of this Court in Madan Lal Haweliwala v. State, 1954 ALJ 27 in which a learned Single judge of this Court had taken a contrary view and upon which the learned Magistrate placed reliance in the instant case. 5. In these circumstances this appeal must succeed and the same is allowed. The learned Magistrate shall restore the complaint to its original number and shall dispose it of in accordance with the law.