ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - Four persons have filed this writ petition. They challenged the order of the authorities under the U.P. (Temp) Control of Rent and Eviction Act granting permission to the landlord respondent No. 4 for filing suits for the ejectment of the petitioners from the accommodation in dispute. At the threshold of the hearing of the petition the petitioner No. 1 filed an application that he had entered into a compromise with the landlord and that he does not desire to press the writ petition. The petition so far as the petitioner No. 1 is concerned has been dismissed. 2. The dispute relates to premises No. 55/55, Generalganj, Kanpur. The four petitioners were tenants in different portions of this building. On 6th October, 1964 the landlord, respondent No. 4, filed an application for permission to sue for the ejectment of all the four petitioners and also one Chiranji Lal who was also a tenant in a portion of this building. The Town Rationing Officer by an order dated 20th September, 1965 granted the requisite permission against all the tenants. The present four tenants filed a Revision (No. 27 of 1965) before the Commissioner on or about 7th October, 1965. The Commissioner agreed with the finding of the Town Rationing Officer that the need of the landlord was genuine because it proposed to demolish the building and reconstruct it for establishing a school for small boys and girls of the locality. He also agreed with the finding of the Town Rationing Officer that the landlord had every intention to carry out that scheme. He accepted the argument advanced by the tenants that Chiranji Lal had died and the landlord has not proceeded against his heris. Consequently, the portion in the possession of the heirs of Chiranji Lal could not be vacated and, therefore, the scheme of the landlord to demolish the house cannot succeed. The Commissioner, by his order dated 26th February, 1966, set aside the order of the Town Rationing Officer and remanded the case to him with the direction that he should satisfy himself whether Chiranji Lal's family could be ejected by private arrangement as has been argued before him, and if this be so there would not be any reason to find fault with the order of the learned Town Rationing Officer. 3. 3. After remand the landlord made a formal application for permission to file a suit against the heirs of Chiranji Lal. On or about 30th September, 1967 Hari Shanker, the son of Chiranji Lal, filed an application stating that the family of Chiranji Lal had come to terms with the landlord and that they had agreed to surrender the portion of the building under their tenancy. On 9th October, 1967 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer heard the parties and allowed the application for permission. He held that the stand taken by Hari Shanker was that the family of Chiranji Lal had come to terms and were prepared to surrender the possession of the accommodation under their tenancy to the landlord. He disbelieved the case of the other tenants that the compromise was not genuine. 4. Aggrieved by this order the present four petitioners filed a revision which was dismissed by the Commissioner on the 29th February, 1968. They then filed another revision before the State Government which has also been dismissed on 22nd April, 1968. 5. The orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner have been challenged on the principle ground that these officers ought to have accepted the uncontroverted affidavits filed on behalf of the tenants on the relevant point in question. They acted contrary to law in disregarding the affidavits. In the next place it urged that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer ought to have allowed an opportunity to the petitioners to cross-examine Hari Shanker on the genuineness of the compromise set up by him. The third point taken was that the Commissioner had not applied his mind to the merits of the case of the tenants. 6. In my opinion none of the points can succeed. 7. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 13th July, 1964 passed an order indicating that the case will be taken up on 30th July 1965 by when the landlord may file an affidavit. On 30th July, 1965 the counsel for the landlord made an application that no affidavit was considered necessary to be filed but that he was filing original documents. The Town Rationing Officer then passed an order noting this fact and giving the tenants an opportunity to file papers and affidavits, if any. On 30th July, 1965 the counsel for the landlord made an application that no affidavit was considered necessary to be filed but that he was filing original documents. The Town Rationing Officer then passed an order noting this fact and giving the tenants an opportunity to file papers and affidavits, if any. At that stage, Debi Prasad Jalan petitioner No. 1, is stated to have filed an affidavit in support of the case of the tenants that the need of the landlord was not genuine and that it had no intention to establish any school in the locality. The affidavit made several other allegations against the landlord. It has been urged that the landlord did not file any counter affidavit to controvert the allegations made in the affidavit. It is not denied that the landlord filed documentary evidence to support its case that it has planned out a scheme for the purpose of running a public school and that they have no intention of not carrying out that scheme. The Town Rationing Officer considered the material on the record and believed the case of the landlord. In my opinion it cannot be said that the affidavit, filed on behalf of the tenants, remained uncontroverted. It cannot be said that in law an affidavit can be controverted only by an affidavit. An affidavit constitutes evidence of the facts stated in it and nothing more. It is just like an oral evidence on oath. I am not aware of any principle or authority which lays down that oral testimony on oath cannot be controverted by the other side by filing documentary evidence. If there is an oral testimony on the one side and documentary evidence on the other, the law does not prevent a Court or a tribunal from considering the documentary evidence as relevant for adjudicating upon the point in issue. The party which has only sworn testimony, cannot be heard to sway that the Court should ignore the documentary evidence adduced by the other side and should accept the oral testimony of his simply because it was on oath. The authorities under the Rent Control Act are not governed by the Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act. They have to consider the materials adduced by the parties. The principal point at issue was whether the need of the landlord was genuine. The authorities under the Rent Control Act are not governed by the Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act. They have to consider the materials adduced by the parties. The principal point at issue was whether the need of the landlord was genuine. On that point the officer was entitled to look into the entire material which was relevant in order to decide the point. 8. For the petitioner reliance is placed on M/s. Mehta Parikh and Co. v. Commissioner Income Tax Bombay, AIR 1956 Supreme Court 554. In this case the assessee had filed affidavits in support of the entries made in their books of account. It was observed that the correctness of the cash book and the entries were not challenged and further no step was taken to cross-examine the deponents of the affidavits. In that factual situation it was not open to the revenue to challenge the correctness of the cash book entries or the statement made by those deponents in their affidavits. In substance it was held that the deciding authority ought to have accepted the uncontroverted affidavit because there was no controverting material before it, and not because a counter- affidavit was not filed. The present case was clearly distinguishable from this case as in this case there was a good deal of controverting material on the point in issue. 9. Reliance was placed upon the decision of Juggilal Kamlapat v. Ram Janki Gupta and another, AIR 1962 Allahabad 407. This was a case of Misc. application under Order 19 Rule 1 CPC Miscellaneous matters are dealt with on affidavit and it was observed that as no counter-affidavit was filed it was not open to the Court to disbelieve the allegation of the plaintiff's affidavit. This case also proceeds on the factual basis that on the record before the Court there was no contradicting material on the basis of which the sworn affidavit could be disbelieved. Further, both these decisions assume that the circumstances of the case also did not disclose any valid or cogent reason which may have impelled the Court to disbelieve the case set up in the affidavit. I am not prepared to accept the position that either of these cases lays down the broad proposition that the hands of a Court are tied down to an affidavit, if it has not been controverted by a counter-affidavit. 10. I am not prepared to accept the position that either of these cases lays down the broad proposition that the hands of a Court are tied down to an affidavit, if it has not been controverted by a counter-affidavit. 10. In this connection it was also argued that at the revisional stage when Hari Shanker filed the compromise' the other son of Chiranji Lal, viz., Pooran Chand had filed an affidavit stating that he had not come to terms with the landlord. As another son of Chiranji Lal he had also succeeded to the tenancy right of Chiranji Lal. Since this affidavit was uncontroverted the learned Commissioner was bound to accept it and hold that the heirs of Chiranji Lal had not agreed to surrender the tenancy. The Commissioner considered this affidavit and came to the conclusion that Pooran Chand was not a permanent resident of Kanpur. He was residing in Bombay mostly and that Hari Shanker was in factual possession of the accommodation and that Hari Shanker's statement was to be believed as having been made on behalf of the family. There was contradictory material in the shape of the oral statement of Hari Shanker as against the affidavit of Pooran Chand, coupled with the circumstance that the tenants were not able to produce before the Commissioner any member of the family of Chiranji Lal to substantiate the allegation of Pooran Chand. It cannot be said that there was no contradicting material before the Commissioner. The Commissioner was not, as a matter of law, bound to accept the affidavit of Pooran Chand. 11. The next submission of the learned counsel was that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer ought to have allowed an opportunity to the petitioners to cross-examine Hari Shanker. It appears that on the 4th October, 1967 the petitioners made an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer raising various objections to the compromise set up by Hari Shanker. In the relief clause, along with various other reliefs they prayed that they be allowed to cross-examine Hari Shankar. From the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, dated 9th October, 1967 it appears that at the hearing Hari Shanker was present in person. He made a statement which has been recorded. There is no allegation that at that stage the petitioners wanted to cross-examine Hari Shanker and that such a prayer was refused. From the judgment of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, dated 9th October, 1967 it appears that at the hearing Hari Shanker was present in person. He made a statement which has been recorded. There is no allegation that at that stage the petitioners wanted to cross-examine Hari Shanker and that such a prayer was refused. From the judgment dated 9th October, 1967 it appears that one of the objections raised by the counsel for the present petitioners was that full opportunity to cross-examine Hari Shanker was not given. That would suggest that an opportunity was afforded, but that did not satisfy the petitioners. There is nothing in the writ petition to clarify what was lacking in the opportunity afforded to them. I am, therefore, not satisfied that there is any merit in this grievance. 12. The third point raised by the learned Counsel was that the Commissioner did not consider the various pleas on the merits raised by the petitioners. The petitioners' case was that the need of the landlord was not genuine. The Town Rationing Officer had given detailed reasons. The Commissioner, in the order of remand, expressly affirmed the findings of the Town Rationing Officer. It is no doubt true that the Commissioner did not give elaborate reasons of his own. But he made, in my opinion, enough compliance of the requirements of law. A full Bench of this Court in Haji Manzoor Ahmed and another v. State of U.P. and others, 1968 ALJ 809 observed that where the superior authority finds the reasons of the inferior authority acceptable to it, it need not specify the reasons in its order but may merely refer to the reasons given by the inferior authority or give an outline of the process of reasoning by which it finds itself in agreement with the inferior authority. Thus the superior authority can accept the finding and say that it agreed with it. That is sufficient compliance of the requirement of law. The Commissioner's order, therefore, cannot be held to be contrary to law on this ground. 13. The order of the State Government was challenged by the learned counsel on the ground that it violated the principle of natural justice. It is alleged that the revision filed by the petitioner was served on the landlord respondent who was asked to furnish his version on the same. 13. The order of the State Government was challenged by the learned counsel on the ground that it violated the principle of natural justice. It is alleged that the revision filed by the petitioner was served on the landlord respondent who was asked to furnish his version on the same. That version of the respondent was not served or shown to the petitioners, inspite of the request for the inspection of the record or a copy thereof. I am not satisfied that this violated the principle of natural justice. When the petitioners filed a revision it was incumbent on the quasi judicial authority to ask the other side what have they to say on the points raised in the revision. The authorities have to decide on the basis of the respective cases of the two parties. There is no further requirement. The learned counsel urged that the respondent may have raised some fresh ground or material in their reply but this argument is based on speculation. On this it was urged that the petitioners wanted to be sure that this was not so and for that reason they applied for an inspection of the record but the State Government refused that request. Even when the State Government had refused that request, there is no reason why the petitioner did not apply in this Court for summoning of the record and obtaining an order for inspection of the record. An application for production of the record was actually filed by the petitioner on 3rd December, 1968 which was directed to be listed with previous papers. But it does not appear to have been listed thereafter and the petitioners also did not, it appears, take any further interest in the matter. Moreover the respondent No 4 has annexed to his counter-affidavit a copy of the representation submitted by him to the State Government. The petitioners, therefore, knew what the reply of the landlord was. My attention was not invited to any part of that representation to prove that the landlord had taken up a new case or furnish any new material for controverting which the petitioners may have validly required a fresh opportunity. The principles of natural justice are a matter of substance and not merely of form. No such principle was infringed. 14. My attention was not invited to any part of that representation to prove that the landlord had taken up a new case or furnish any new material for controverting which the petitioners may have validly required a fresh opportunity. The principles of natural justice are a matter of substance and not merely of form. No such principle was infringed. 14. Further in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath, 1968 AWR 713 in which it was held that on the institution of a suit on the basis of the permission granted by an inferior authority, the revision, made to the State becomes infructuous. Here permission was granted by the Commissioner and on that basis the landlord had instituted the suit. The petitioners' revision before the State Government hence became infructuous. It was liable to be dismissed. 15. The petition fails and is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs.