Judgment :- 1. lthough this second appeal raises only a humdrum point in execution as to whether a judgment-debtor can avail himself of the immunity from detention in the civil prison on the score of serious illness, as provided in S.59, Civil Procedure Code, Sri M. S. Kurien, learned counsel for the appellant, has engagingly argued his case on the exalted basis of the human rights, enshrined in the civil and political covenants agreed to by the member nations of United Nations Organisation, including India, and has passionately pleaded for a humanistic interpretation and application of the law relating to arrest and detention as a means of enforcing a decree for money. 2. I shall deal with the two points separately. The decree holder respondent obtained a decree as early as 26-8-1960 against the judgment-debtor who was paying but small sums of money, leaving a large balance and so his arrest and detention in the civil prison was sought by the decree holder. On 20-10-1966 the Court found that the judgment-debtor had means to pay the amount of the decree and had neglected to pay it. This order has become final and is not available for attack before me in this second appeal although counsel has claimed that it is amenable to reconsideration for the reason that every time a judgment-debtor is, sought to be despatched to the civil prison, there must be a fresh finding about his ability to answer the decree. Unfortunately for him, the proviso to S.51 Civil Procedure Code, even with the humanistic amendment added by Act 21 of 1936, does not go so far. Mere inability to pay does not justify an order for detention in prison. Under the existing law, imprisonment as a means of enforcement of a money decree is available only if there has been some contumacious or unworthy conduct on the part of the judgment-debtor, the burden of proving which is on the decree holder. It must be established that the judgment-debtor has or has had after the decree was passed, the means to pay the decree amount or a substantial part thereof. It must also be shown that he refuses or neglects to pay or has refused or neglected to do so. It must be established that the judgment-debtor has or has had after the decree was passed, the means to pay the decree amount or a substantial part thereof. It must also be shown that he refuses or neglects to pay or has refused or neglected to do so. In short, if at some time after the decree was passed, the judgment-debtor has had the resources to pay a good part of the decree and notwithstanding this, has neglected to pay, he is amenable to incarceration. The question is not whether today he has the means to pay and neglects, but whether at any time after the decree was passed he has had the means and has neglected in the past. A ruling reported in Francis v. Palai Central Bank Ltd. (1959 K. L. J. 1036) seems to suggest by implication that if after the previous order upholding the judgment-debtor's financial ability and calculated indifference a substantial change in his economic circumstances has taken place, a fresh investigation into ability and indifference has to be made and found, before he can be sent to jail. The humane spirit informing the proviso to Sec.51 is in keeping with such a construction. I am inclined to the view that if a debtor had sufficient means once to pay off the decree debt but since then has fallen on evil days and so is unable now to pay even a substantial part of the decree, it is unjust to commit him to the civil prison. That would be, not a means for recovering the debt for, how can a man unable to pay, do so by being behind the prison bars? - but a punishment for non-payment. Nor is a debtor's person to be kept as hostage till his relations discharge the liability. Similarly, it is not sufficient to say that a debtor has means pay to the particular debt under execution. There must be a refusal or neglect to pay. Where the judgment debtor, having other pressing claims to meet or compelling expenditures to incur, utilises the money he has for satisfying them, he cannot be held to neglect to pay the same to the decree-holder. Assuming that a debtor has Rs. 10,000/- with him and a decree debt for Rs. There must be a refusal or neglect to pay. Where the judgment debtor, having other pressing claims to meet or compelling expenditures to incur, utilises the money he has for satisfying them, he cannot be held to neglect to pay the same to the decree-holder. Assuming that a debtor has Rs. 10,000/- with him and a decree debt for Rs. 5,000/- is being executed against him, if he is afflicted by cancer and has immediately to undergo an expensive surgical treatment involving the entire Rs; 10,000/- he has, it is harsh to hold him liable to imprisonment because he does not divert the money to meet the decree debt instead of using it to salvage his life. 3. A brief sum up of the content of S.51 (c) read with the proviso may now be given. The judgment-debtor will come within the provision if he has current means to pay the amount of the decree and still refuses or neglects to pay the same. "Means", in this context, depends on liquid resources or assets which can reasonably furnish such resources. 'Neglect' is something less than refusal but more than mere omission and involves some sort of demand and indifferent response. Thus, if the judgment-debtor makes a credible offer to pay in reasonable instalments, it is a negation of "neglect" to pay. I have explained this position at some length in a recent decision in S.A. No. 716 of 1969. Past resources are, under the proviso, sufficient only if there is at that time a refusal or neglect to pay If, for instance, the judgment-debtor had at one time means to pay the decree amount but the decree holder did not then move to demand or recover the money, he cannot later rely upon this affluence to levy execution by arrest and detention, if the judgment-debtor has by then sunk into straitened circumstances. Past affluence can furnish a ground for arrest and detention in prison only if it is accompanied, in time, with a move for payment by the decree-holder and a refusal or neglect by the judgment-debtor. A finding by Court of the means of the judgement-debtor, and a refusal or neglect to pay by him can be relied upon in subsequent stages of the execution unless the judgment-debtor proves that there has been a substantial change, for the worse, in his financial position. A finding by Court of the means of the judgement-debtor, and a refusal or neglect to pay by him can be relied upon in subsequent stages of the execution unless the judgment-debtor proves that there has been a substantial change, for the worse, in his financial position. This interpretation of S.51 (c) read with proviso (b) reflects the spirit and even the letter of Art.11 of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights. 4. However, in the present case, as rightly pointed out by respondent's counsel, there is a clear finding, recently made, of the means to pay the decree debt. No case of a substantial change in the circumstances of the debtor has been urged or established. No other demanding claims on him disabling him from paying this decree debt have been set up or made out and so the order for arrest and detention in civil prison cannot be held erroneous. 5. Another compassionate ground called, to his aid by the judgment-debtor's counsel to extricate his client from the prison gates is that the debtor "is not in a fit state of health to be detained in the civil prison" and that even his arrest should not be ordered in view of his serious illness. The humanitarian impulse of S.59 CPC. must not be lost sight of when applying it to the concrete facts of a particular case. After all, Courts must remember that there is a brutal element in driving a decrepit or one in the grip of a deadly disease or excruciating pain into a prison cell, unless the object be the somewhat depraved one of inflicting on a debtor the worst suffering for the sin of not having paid off his relentless creditor. S.59 of the Civil Procedure Code seasons justice with mercy and justice is a coefficient of law. In this context, counsel for the appellant stressed the need of the Court to view this provision of law in the humane perspective of the International Covenants on civil and political rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16th December, 1966. Article II reads: "No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation". Article II reads: "No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation". Whether this is part of the law of the land or not an aspect with which I will presently deal, because it has been persistently pressed before me there is no doubt that courts functioning in democratic societies must have due regard to the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations recognising the inherent dignity of the human person, while applying the municipal law to given situations. Counsel rather sentimentally reminded me of the International year for human rights which has just passed, and the Gandhi Centenary Year which we are currently passing through, and insisted that his client should be immunised from imprisonment on the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Leaving aside that argument for a moment and paying attention to the provision in the Civil Procedure Code which inhibits arrest of a judgment-debtor who is seriously ill, I find that this objection has not received serious consideration by the Courts below. The appellant is nearly 70 years old. He is suffering from prostate enlargement, frequent urination and such like troubles. He has given evidence about the symptoms of his disease. It is not at all uncommon to find old men suffering from prostate enlargement a disease which can become suddenly agonising in the absence of immediate surgical intervention. In this case, technically speaking, there is no admissible evidence about the judgment-debtor's ailment, apart from his ipse dixit. A medical certificate has been produced from a competent doctor in Government service. But then the lower Courts have held that a mere certificate may not be evidence because the doctor who issued it has not been examined. The judgment-debtor had admitted that he was not bed-ridden but was attending on some homeopathic clients of his. The Courts proceeded on the footing that if a man was not bed-ridden his illness was not sufficiently serious. Serious illness is no less such even if the man is not bed-ridden, the real test being; the gravity of the disease or the degree of suffering which makes his confinement in the prison cell either dangerous or a torment. The Courts proceeded on the footing that if a man was not bed-ridden his illness was not sufficiently serious. Serious illness is no less such even if the man is not bed-ridden, the real test being; the gravity of the disease or the degree of suffering which makes his confinement in the prison cell either dangerous or a torment. Sometimes, the nature of the disease, serious though it is, may make the patient seek relief by moving about or keeping himself engaged otherwise; sometimes the socio-economic circumstances of the ailing patient may also keep him away from bed notwithstanding the seriousness of his malady. No mechanical test of serious illness will work and a closer scrutiny is necessary. 6. While it is right that a mere medical certificate is perhaps written hearsay, it is true that many Courts for example, in applications for adjournments in criminal cases do act on such certificates on occasions. The rule of hearsay has had its day and if applied to-day, in all its amplitude, may even harm the very object of discovering the truth. Even in England, legislative inroads into the rule of hearsay have been made. Parliament in India too may, one may hope, modify the rigour of the law of evidence, which totally excludes even written hearsay, so as to suit the conditions of our country and to help the quest for truth by Courts. 7. The courts below have misconceived the scope of S.59 of the Civil Procedure Code and misunderstood the evidence in the case and its impacton the point in issue. A remand will meet the ends of justice in the circumstances of this case and the absence of a judicial approach to the whole question by the Courts below justifies such a course in law. It is only just that the judgment-debtor is given an opportunity to adduce evidence regarding his failing health and serious illness by examination of a medical witness who can give direct testimony after examining the patient, if he be one. Counsel for the respondent does not object to this course, but insists that there must be the evidence of a doctor making out the case of serious illness and a mere certificate cannot be acted upon by the Court. Counsel for the respondent does not object to this course, but insists that there must be the evidence of a doctor making out the case of serious illness and a mere certificate cannot be acted upon by the Court. In this view, the proper course to adopt appears to me to be that the order of the Courts below should be set aside and the execution case sent back to the Court of first instance. A fresh enquiry into the objection based upon S.59, Civil Procedure Code, will be made. I need hardly say that this beneficent provision should be construed in a liberal and not narrow way by the executing Court. Both sides will be permitted to lead evidence on the limited point in issue. 8. The last argument which consumed most of the time of the long arguments of learned counsel for the appellant is that the International Cavenants on Civil and Political Rights are part of the law of the land and have to be respected by the Municipal Courts. Art.11, which I have extracted earlier, grants immunity from imprisonment to indigent but honest judgment-debtors. 9. The march of civilization has been a story of progressive subordination of property rights to personal freedom; and a by-product of this subordination finds noble expression in the declaration that "No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation." This revolutionary change in the regard for the human person is spanned by the possible shock that a resuscitated Shylock would suffer if a modern Daniel were to come to judgment when the former asks for the pound of flesh from Antonio's bosom according to the tenor of the bond, by flatly refusing the mayhem on the debtor, because the inability of an impecunious obligee shall not imperil his liberty or person under the new dispensation proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Viewed in this progressive perspective we may examine whether there is any conflict between S.51 CPC. and Art.11 of the International Covenants quoted above. As already indicated by me, this latter provision only interdicts imprisonment if that is sought solely on the ground of inability to fulfil the obligation. S.51 also declares that if the debtor has no means to pay he cannot be arrested and detained. and Art.11 of the International Covenants quoted above. As already indicated by me, this latter provision only interdicts imprisonment if that is sought solely on the ground of inability to fulfil the obligation. S.51 also declares that if the debtor has no means to pay he cannot be arrested and detained. If he has and still refuses or neglects to honour his obligation or if he commits acts of bad faith, he incurs the liability to imprisonment under S.51 of the Code, but this does not violate the mandate of Art.11. However, if he once had the means but now has not or if he has money now on which there are other pressing claims, it is violative of the spirit of Art.11 to arrest and confine him in jail so as to coerce him into payment. The construction of the proviso to S.51 CPC. suggested by the Division Bench of this Court in Francis v. Palai Central Bank Ltd. (1959 KLJ.1036) harmonises the noble objective of the International Covenants and the provision in the Civil Procedure Code. But Shri. M. S. Kurien, learned counsel, ambitiously but wrongly asked for a total immunity from arrest based on Art.11 of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights India, he argued, is a member of the United Nations Organisation, and is bound to respect the covenants on human rights as an assenting party State. He quoted profusely from the eloquent speech of Bhulabhai J. Desai in the historic Red Fort Trials and invited me to treat International Law so far as it was not inconsistent with national law, as an integral part of or as incorporated into, the law of the land. He drew my attention to various Articles of the Indian Constitution to emphasise that this nation intends to stand by its obligations under the U. N. Charter. He proceeded to cite passages, from Francis Manjooran v. Government of India (1965 KLT.1076 FB.) and Satwant Singh Sawhney v. Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi (AIR. 1967 SC. 1836) to convince me that Indian Courts, like the American Courts (332 U. S.633, Cvamia v. California) and the Supreme Court of Cyprus (See page 122 of the Report of the Commission of Jurists, Vol. IX, December, 1968) have referred to and relied upon the great rights assured by the Articles of the International Covenants. 10. 1967 SC. 1836) to convince me that Indian Courts, like the American Courts (332 U. S.633, Cvamia v. California) and the Supreme Court of Cyprus (See page 122 of the Report of the Commission of Jurists, Vol. IX, December, 1968) have referred to and relied upon the great rights assured by the Articles of the International Covenants. 10. Counsel for the respondent, Shri K. A. Mohammed, dismissed these impassioned submissions as out of manner. The remedy for breaches of International Law in general is not to be found in the law courts of the State because International Law per se or proprio vigore has not the force or authority of civil law, till under its inspirational impact actual legislation is undertaken. I agree that the Declaration of Human Rights merely sets a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations but cannot create a binding set of rules. Member States may seek, through appropriate agencies, to initiate action when these basic rights are violated; but individual citizens cannot complain about their breach in the municipal Courts even if the country concerned has adopted the covenants and ratified the Optional Protocol. The individual cannot come to Court but may complain to the Human Rights Committee, which, in turn, will set in motion other procedures. In short, the basic human rights, enshrined in the International Covenants above referred to, may at best inform judicial institutions and inspire legislative action within member-States; but apart from such deep reverence, remedical action at the instance of an aggrieved individual is beyond the area of judicial authority. Indeed the construction I have adopted of S.51 CPC. has the flavour of Art.11 of the Human Rights Covenants. Counsel for the appellant insisted that law and justice must be on speaking terms by justice he meant, in the present case, that a debtor unable to pay must not be detained in civil prison. But my interpretation does put law and justice on speaking terms. Counsel for the respondent did argue that International Law was the vanishing point of jurisprudence. The idea that International Law is the vanishing point of jurisprudence is itself vanishing in b world where humanity is moving steadily, though slowly, towards a world order, led by that intensely active, although yet ineffectual body, the United Nations Organisation. Counsel for the respondent did argue that International Law was the vanishing point of jurisprudence. The idea that International Law is the vanishing point of jurisprudence is itself vanishing in b world where humanity is moving steadily, though slowly, towards a world order, led by that intensely active, although yet ineffectual body, the United Nations Organisation. Its resolutions and covenants mirror the conscience of mankind and inseminate, within the member States, progressive legislation; but till this last step of actual enactment of law takes place, the citizen in a world of sovereign States, has only inchoate rights in the domestic Courts under these international covenants. 11. I have dealt with what otherwise might appear to be unnecessary for the decision of this case only because counsel for the appellant was insistent on my dealing with what he considered was the correct orientation of law in the light of the civil and political rights covenants. 12. I set aside the order of the Courts below and remand the case to the Court of first instance for disposal in the manner and for the limited purpose indicated earlier in this judgment.