JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, A.C.J. - This writ petition by the Hindustan Sugar Mills Limited, Gola Gokarannath, Kheri, (hereinafter referred to as the mills) is directed against the order dated 8-8-1968 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kheri; remanding the mill's case for a fresh hearing before the assessing authority for making the assessment. 2. Mr. Bishun Singh, who has appeared for the mills before us, has assailed the appellate order on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner was a quasi judicial tribunal and not a court and for that reason he could not exercise the power of remand. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon Sushil Kumar Sen Gupta v. State Transport Authority, 70 Calcutta Weekly Notes 341. The mills was assessed to house and water tax. Section 160 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides for an appeal against the order of assessment in such cases. That provision reads :- "160. Appeal relating to taxation.- (1) In the case of a tax assessed upon the annual value of buildings or lands or both an appeal against an order passed under sub-sec. (3) of Section 143 or under sub-sec. (3) of Section 147, and, in the case of any other tax, an appeal against an assessment, or any alteration of an assessment, may be made to the District Magistrate or to such other officer as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf. (2) Provided that where a Board has been superseded under Section 30 and the District Magistrate has been appointed under clause (b) of Section 31 to exercise and perform the powers and duties of the Board, the appeal shall lie to such authority as may be prescribed." 3. Placing reliance upon Section 164 (2) of the Act Mr. Bishun Singh, the learned counsel for the mills, contends that the legislature has confined the powers of the District Magistrate while hearing an appeal to either confirming an order of assessment or setting it aside or modifying it and that no power of remand has been conferred upon the District Magistrate. Section 164 of the Act reads :- "164. Bishun Singh, the learned counsel for the mills, contends that the legislature has confined the powers of the District Magistrate while hearing an appeal to either confirming an order of assessment or setting it aside or modifying it and that no power of remand has been conferred upon the District Magistrate. Section 164 of the Act reads :- "164. Bar to jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal Courts in matters of taxation.- (1) No objection shall be taken to a valuation or assessment, nor shall the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act. (2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying an order in respect of valuation or assessment or liability to assessment or taxation shall be final; provided that it shall be lawfull for the appellate authority, upon application or his own motion, to review any Order passed by him in appeal by a further order passed within three months from the date of his original order." 4. We are unable to agree with Mr. Bishun Singh that sub-sec. (2) of Section 164 of the Act defines the powers of the appellate authority. It only lays down a rule of finality in respect of certain appellate orders, the orders being those of confirming the assessment orders or setting aside those orders or modifying those orders. The marginal note to Section 164 of the Act is "bar to jurisdiction of Civil and Criminal Courts in matters of taxation". It is clear from the language of the provision that all that it intends to do is to make the orders mentioned in sub-sec. (2) final subject to their being reviewed by the appellate authority: It would be misreading the section to read in it any restrictions on the powers of the appellate authority. The two sections, which deal with appeal, are Sections 160 and 164 of the Act. In our opinion the powers given to the Deputy Commissioner are not hedged in by any restrictions or conditions. The whole matter is at large before him and he can pass such orders as he considers necessary to do in the interest of justice. 5. Section 160 of the Act gives an absolute right of appeal to the aggrieved person. In our opinion the powers given to the Deputy Commissioner are not hedged in by any restrictions or conditions. The whole matter is at large before him and he can pass such orders as he considers necessary to do in the interest of justice. 5. Section 160 of the Act gives an absolute right of appeal to the aggrieved person. That section does not provide either the grounds on which interference can be made by the appellate authority or the nature of orders that he can pass. Consequently we are of the opinion that the legislature gave the appellate authority complete freedom in the matter and it was free to pass any order which it considered necessary in the interest of justice. 6. It was observed in Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi, AIR 952 SC 319 as follows :- "Like all courts of appeal exercising general jurisdiction in civil cases, the respondent has been constituted an appellate court in words of the widest amplitude and the legislature has not limited his jurisdiction by providing that such exercise will depend on the existence of any particular state of facts." 7. This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Narendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, A.I.R. 1958 SC 398. That was a case of a quasi judicial tribunal and not of a court and the Supreme Court was considering the powers of the Commissioner in respect of excise matters. Their Lordships observed :- "Neither the Act nor the rule made thereunder, indicate the grounds on which the first Appellate Authority, namely, the Excise Commissioner, or the second Appellate Authority (the Excise Appellate Authority) , has to exercise his or its appellate or revisional powers. There is no indication that they make any distinction between the grounds of interference on appeal and in revision. That being so, the powers of the Appellate Authorities in the matter of settlement, would be coextensive with the powers of the primary authority, namely, the District Collector or the Sub-Divisional Officer. See in this connection, the observations of the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lot Chaudhuri, 1940 FCR 84 at p. 102 : A.I.R. 1941 FC 5 at p. 13, and of this Court in Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian-General of Evacuee Property at page 322. 8. See in this connection, the observations of the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lot Chaudhuri, 1940 FCR 84 at p. 102 : A.I.R. 1941 FC 5 at p. 13, and of this Court in Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian-General of Evacuee Property at page 322. 8. In asmuch as we are of the opinion the legislature on the powers of the appellate no restriction has been imposed by the legislature on the powers of the appellate authority (District Magistrate) , he was free to pass a remand order. 9. The decision of the Calcutta High Court cited before us is distinguishable because in that case the powers of the appellate court had been defined. The provisions that came up for interpretation before the Calcutta High Court read :- "The appellate authority, after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard and after such further enquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary, may confirm, vary, or set aside the order against which the appeal is preferred." 10. The clause extracted above clearly shows that in that case the powers of the appellate authority were confined to the passing of orders confirming, varying or setting aside the orders of assessment against which an appeal was preferred. We have already said earlier that there is no restriction on the powers of the District Magistrate in respect of an appeal filed under, Section 160 of the Act and that sub-sec. (2) of Section 164 of the Act only lays down a rule of finality and the ouster of the jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts in these matters. 11. The Calcutta decision is directly in conflict with the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in P. Swarajyalakshmi v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 AP 321. The cases being distinguishable, it is not necessary for us to form an opinion whether the Calcutta or the Andhra view is correct. 12. For the reasons mentioned above we do not think that there are any merits in the contention of Mr. Bishun Singh. 13. We may further add that even if Mr. Bishun Singh's contentions were correct, we would not have interfered in this case in exercise of the powers conferred upon us under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because the impugned order sub-serves the cause of justice. Bishun Singh. 13. We may further add that even if Mr. Bishun Singh's contentions were correct, we would not have interfered in this case in exercise of the powers conferred upon us under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because the impugned order sub-serves the cause of justice. It is well settled that if substantial justice has been done between the parties and there are no equities in favour of the petitioner, the Court would decline to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. The petition is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. The stay order dated 29-8-1968 is vacated.