JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a Special Appeal by Ghasi against the order of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition of Waqf Alalaulad, respondent No. 1, and thereby not only quashing the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in a revision under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, but also restoring the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) . 2. There has been considerable litigation between the contesting parties. Hamid Ali originally instituted a suit against Ghasi for declaration, permanent injunction and, in the alternative, for possession, with the allegation that he was the Bhumidhar of the disputed land, which was a grove land. It was held that the Waqf Alalaulad, and not the plaintiff, was the grove-holder of the plot in dispute. These words have been taken from the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge in an appeal preferred by Hamid All against the dismissal of his suit. Thereafter Waqf Alalaulad through Hamid All instituted another suit under Section 202 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for the ejectment of Ghasi, on the ground that the plot was the intermediary's grove of Waqf Alalaulad and Ghasi being merely an asami was liable to ejectment. Before the suit could be finally decided, consolidation operations started with the result that the Second Appeal pending before the Board of Revenue was stayed and Waqf Alalaulad made a fresh objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act before the Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the objection, but the order was set aside in appeal by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), who recorded the finding that the land was the grove land of the objector, Waqf Alalaulad, and Ghasi was merely an asami, and not a sirdar. Ghasi preferred a revision under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation under the impugned order. The Deputy Director did not record any finding on the material question whether the disputed land was grove land. Ghasi preferred a revision under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation under the impugned order. The Deputy Director did not record any finding on the material question whether the disputed land was grove land. He recorded a finding on three points only: he held that Waqf Alalaulad was not acted upon; that Hamid Ali could assert that the Waqf Alalaulad was the Bhumidhar, even though he had initially claimed such rights in his own personal capacity and that even if Ghasi was an asami he became sirdar by virtue of Section 204 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on account of no suit for ejectment having been instituted within the period of one year then prescribed under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. 3. In the end, the claim of Waqf Alalaulad was also dismissed on the ground that Compensation Statement under Section 240-G of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition ' and Land Reforms Act had become final. 4. While disposing of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Consolidation the learned Single Judge held that the claim for ejectment of Ghasi as asami was not i-4 barred by limitation and that Ghasi was estopped from raising the tenancy rights of Waqf Alalaulad, i.e.. to contend that Hamid All in his personal capacity, and not the Wag f Alalaulad, was the Bhumidhar. The effect of the Compensation Statement does not appear to have been raised before the learned Single Judge. It appears to us that this point was not raised on account of a Full Bench decision of this Court laying down clearly that the finality of the Compensation Statement does not act as res judicata and the aggrieved party can raise the question in a regular proceeding. 5. None of the points which appealed to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to give a judgment in favour of Ghasi appear to be justified by law. How can it be said that the Waqf Alalaulad duly registered has not been acted upon? 5. None of the points which appealed to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to give a judgment in favour of Ghasi appear to be justified by law. How can it be said that the Waqf Alalaulad duly registered has not been acted upon? If the Mutwalli was a person other than the maker of the Waqf, or a beneficiary or a co-beneficiary, such an inference could be drawn if there was no delivery of possession to the stranger Mutwalli; but where the Mutwalli is the maker of the Waqf or is a beneficiary, there would be no actual transfer of possession, and the same person would continue to manage the property. In these circumstances, the genuineness of the waqf could be presumed unless proved to the contrary by strong and reliable evidence. No such evidence exists in the case. On the other hand, in, the first suit Ghasi had himself pleaded that the property belonged to Waqf Alalaulad. 6. Having raised the plea that the property belonged to Wiaqf Alalaulad, Ghasi shall be debarred, on the principle of estoppel, or on the application of the principle of res judicata, from alleging to the contrary in a subsequent negation between the same parties, that is, between him and the Waqf Alalaulad. Consequently, in the present consolidation proceedings Ghasi could not be allowed to raise the plea that the land did not belong to Waqf Alalaulad. In so far as Ghasi is concerned, the objection of Waqf Alalaulad could be entertained : it being a different thing that the public authorities may, in the end, record the land in the names of the beneficiaries, and not the Waqf Alalaulad. This observation is being made to ensure that the final entry made is not against the law as interpreted by this Court. A Single judge of this Court expressed an opinion in Syed Simtey Hasan v. Joint Director, Consolidation, U.P. Camp at Bareilly, 1968 UPRC (HC) 26, that Waqf could not be Bhumidhar. The question has, we are told, been referred to a larger Bench, Consequently, if this Court finally takes the view that the land cannot be the Bhumidhari of the Waqf the consolidation authorities can consider recording the land in the names of the beneficiaries as in existence on the date o; vesting; of course, if any of the beneficiaries is dead, the names of his heirs shall be recorded. But if this Court takes the view that Waqf can be a Bhumidhar, the entry shall continue in the name of the Waqf Alalaulad. 7. It was in 1954 that the period of limitation of one year originally prescribed for the ejectment of an asami holding an intermediary's grove land was detected. Consequently, if it was necessary for the Waqf Alalaulad to institute the suit within one year of the date of vesting, Ghasi even though an asami shall, by virtue of Section 204 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, become a sirdar; but if the period of limitation had not expired by the time the above rule was amended, there would be no period of limitation and Ghasi would be,. liable to ejectment and cannot, as asami, be deemed to have become a sirdar. 8. The Deputy Director of Consolidation was unduly moved by the Qabuliyat executed by Ghasi. Ghasi merely admitted his thumb-mark on this Qabuliyat, but alleged that it was a fabricated one, he being an illiterate person. If so, how could this document be used in his favour. If the document was a genuine one, it would show that Ghasi was a mere-licencee, and not an asami, and the only right he had was to the fruits of the trees. But if the document was not a genuine one, contents thereof could not be utilised to infer that the grove land was given to Ghasi for purposes of cultivation for a period of 2 years. The best thing was not to use this document in favour of Ghasi. In such a case, the lease in favour of Ghasi would be from year to year, and not for any fixed term. Where the lease is from year to year, it cannot be said that the cause of action arises at the end of every year. A person holding the land year after year has a right to continue in possession till the lease is determined. For so long as there is no determination of the lease, the lessee can remain in possession, and hence no cause of action can be deemed to have arisen for the ejectment of the person in possession. 9. A person holding the land year after year has a right to continue in possession till the lease is determined. For so long as there is no determination of the lease, the lessee can remain in possession, and hence no cause of action can be deemed to have arisen for the ejectment of the person in possession. 9. The period prescribed for a suit under Section 202 was originally one year from the date of the accrual of the cause of action and when no cause of action had accrued, there was no occasion for instituting a suit and hence the effect of Section 204 could not come into operation. In other words, if Ghasi was an asami, he will remain an asaini and cannot by virtue of Section 204 become a sirdar. 10. The points decided by the Deputy Director of Consolidation against the Wiaqf Alalaulad could not justify his setting aside the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) As the Deputy Director has not recorded a finding on the nature of the land, whether it was on the date preceding the date of vesting a grove land, it is necessary that the revision be reheard by him so that there may be a decision in the revision on all the material points. 11. The Special Appeal is hereby allowed in the sense that the order of the learned Single Judge restoring the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) is set aside. The Deputy Director of Consolidation is directed to decide afresh the revision under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act keeping in mind the findings recorded above. In substance, what he has now to decide is the nature of the land and the status enjoined by the cultivator of the land. Costs easy. Stay order is vacated.