JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - The Plaintiff seeks to revise an order passed in a final decree proceeding arising out of a partition suit rejecting his objections to the passing of the final decree and ordering that the decree be made final. 2. learned Counsel for Plaintiff assails the order on the following two grounds; (1) the lower Court erred in holding that Section 23 of the Hindu Secession Act is not applicable to a case where both the heirs are females and, (2) as a consequence, the proceeding subsequent to the date of the impugned order including the drawing up, signing and sealing the final decree is without jurisdiction. For opp. party No. 1, it is contended that the view taken by the lower Court in construing Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act is absolutely correct, and secondly, irrespective of other considerations, as a final decree has been drawn up signed and sealed and Plaintiff has got a right of appeal against the same, the civil revision is not maintainable. 3. Section 23 of the Hindu Secession Act runs as follows: 23 Where a Hindu in testate has left surviving him or her both male and female heirs specified in class I of the Schedule and his or her property includes a dwelling house wholly occupied by members of his or her family, then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the right of any such female heir to claim partition of the dwelling house shall not arise until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein; but the female heir shall be entitled to a right of residence therein. Provided that where such a female' heir is a daughter, she shall be entitled to a right of residence in the dowelling house only if she is unmarried or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is widow. learned Counsel for Plaintiff contends that the proviso is to be construed independent of the main provision and its application confined to cases where the female heir is a daughter. learned Counsel for Plaintiff contends that the proviso is to be construed independent of the main provision and its application confined to cases where the female heir is a daughter. In other words, it is argued that where the female heir is a daughter, irrespective of the Hindu dying intestate leaving both male and female heirs or female heirs exclusively, the daughter is entitled to a right of residence in the dwelling house only, if she is unmarried or has been deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow. In support of this contention, he relies on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Commissioner of Income Tax Kerala and Coimbatore Vs. Krishna Warriar. Secondly, it is contended that a construction should be placed on a statutory provision consistent with the legislative intent and that the construction put by the learned Subordinate Judge will defeat the very object of the proviso. I do not find any merit in these contentions. 4. It is a well recognized rule of statutory construction that a proviso to a section is not independent of the section calling for independent consideration or construction detached from the construction to be placed on the main section, as it is merely subsidiary to the main section and is to be construed in the light of the section itself. The object of a proviso is to carve out from the main section a class or category to which the main section does not apply; and in so carving out, the Court has always to bear in mind what is the class referred to in the section and must also remember that the carving out intended by the proviso is from the particular class and in the particular circumstances dealt with by the main section. In the decision reported in Commissioner of Income Tax Kerala and Coimbatore Vs. Krishna Warriar this principle is recognized, though it has been observed: Clear language of the substantive provision as well as the proviso may establish that the proviso is not a qualifying clause of the main provision, but is in itself a substantive provision. In that case, while construing the main provision in Section 4(3)(i) and proviso (b) of the income tax Act, it was held that the clear language of both indicated that each is a substantive provision applicable to a particular class of income. In that case, while construing the main provision in Section 4(3)(i) and proviso (b) of the income tax Act, it was held that the clear language of both indicated that each is a substantive provision applicable to a particular class of income. The language of the main provision and the proviso in Section 23 of the Hindu Secession Act does not permit such a construction. A plain reading of Section 23 shows that the words "such female heir" refer to the female heir occurring in the last line of the first paragraph. A pre-condition of the appeal ability of Section 23 is the Hindu intestate leaving surviving him or her both male and female heirs in class 1. The section does not apply where all the heirs consist of exclusively of males or females. Mullah his book on Hindu Law, while commenting on Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act has observed. The restriction is confined to the right of any female heirs where there are other male heirs enumerated in class I and does not apply to a case where the heirs in that class are only males or females. Thus, the Court below has correctly construed the scope and applicability of Section 23 of the Hindu Secession Act. 5. In the light of the view taken on the first point urged, consideration of the second contention becomes redundant. How ever as the point has been urged, J would like to deal with it as wen. learned Counsel for Plaintiff contends that if his view of the construction of Section 23 is accepted, though the order of the Court below may not amount to one passed without jurisdiction, but it will be an order passed in illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction, and as such, amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Court. On the other hand, Mr. Mohapatra appearing for opp. party No. 1 contends that the order in pursuance of which the final decree was passed really amounts to a judgment, and when an appeal lies against the decree, no revision will lie against the order directing passing of a final decree. It is also pointed out by him that in this case, the order to make the decree final was passed on 17-8-1968, the civil revision was filed on 1-11-1968 and no stay was obtained till 13-5-1969. It is also pointed out by him that in this case, the order to make the decree final was passed on 17-8-1968, the civil revision was filed on 1-11-1968 and no stay was obtained till 13-5-1969. In the meanwhile, on 26-11-1968 the final decree was drawn up, sealed and signed. When Plaintiff could have filed an appeal against the final decree, it is not open to him to seek exercise of revisional jurisdiction. This contention of opp. party No. 1, in my opinion, must prevail. In the decision reported in In re P.R. Narasimhachari AIR 1956 Mad. 684 , the question arose whether an order making the decree final is open to revision. It was held that such an order is really the judgment and the final decree which has been drawn up is the decree. The final decree being an appealable one a revision was incompetent. This view also finds support from a decision of our High Court reported in Dr. Sk Wajid Ali Vs. Mst. Jiga Bibi. There, it was held that the order rejecting a plaint being a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2), CPC against which an appeal lies, a revision against the order rejecting the plaint is incompetent. In the present case, a final decree having been passed against which an appeal lies, this revision is not competent. 6. Thus, in any view of the matter, I find no merit in the revision which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed