JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - The Petitioners were prosecuted on a charge u/s 447, Indian Penal Code on the allegation that on 23-9-1964 at about 4.45 P.M., they unautherisedly held a meeting in the Rest Shed situated in the premises of the Kalinga Tubes, Ltd. Petitioner No. 3 is the President of the Kalinga Tubes Mazdoor Sangha, Petitioner No. 4 is the Vice President thereof and Petitioner No. 1 is the Joint Secretary. All the four Petitioners excepting Petitioner No. 3 are the employees of the Kalinga Tubes, Ltd. It is alleged that the General Secretary of the Kalinga Tubes Mazdoor Sangha applied on 21-9-1964 to the authorities of the Factory for permission to hold a meeting at the Rest Shed but that the permission was refused and that in spite of the refusal of the permission, the meeting was hela-there on 23-9-1964 between 4 and 7 P.M. attended by a large number of workers. It is also alleged that in course of the meeting speeches were made which were insulting to and defamatory of the authorities of the Factory. 2. The Petitioners pleaded not guilty They stated that on 23.9.1964 no meeting was held in the Rest Shed and no speeches were made which were either insulting to or defamatory of the Management. It is further stated that ever since the Union was formed, meeting are being held in the Rest Shed and that the present prosecution is resorted to only with a view to suppress the Petitioners who are the leaders of the Workers' Union. 3. During the examination of Petitioners u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure, it was not put by any of them that the meeting on the present occasion was held despite the refusal of the authorities to permit the holding of such a meeting. The Courts below however held that permission had been sought for holding the meeting and that it was refused and despite that the meeting was held in the Rest Shed which is inside the Factory premises and that at the meeting the Petitioners made speeches making adverse comments against the doing of the officers of the concern and that such speeches must have necessary caused annoyance to the authorities. The trial Court had sentenced each of the Petitioners to pay a fine of Re. The trial Court had sentenced each of the Petitioners to pay a fine of Re. 51/- and in default to S.J. for 15 days and the sentences were upheld in appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack. 4. In view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the case has to proceed on the footing that on 23.9.1964 the Petitioners held a meeting in the Rest Shed located in the precincts of the Company, and in the said meeting they also delivered speeches. The question for consideration is whether this constitutes the offence of criminal trespass punishable u/s 147, Indian Penal Code. Section 441, Indian Penal Code which defines the offence consists of three essentials, namely, (1) Entry into or upon property in the possession of another, (2) If such entry is lawful then unlawfully remaining upon such property and, (3) such entry or unlawful remaining must be with intent-(i) to commit an offence; Or (ii) to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession of the property from the map filed in this case VOL. XXXVI it may be seen that this Rest Shed is situated very near the main entrance gate and inside the premises. It is the place where the workers assemble and take rest pending commencement of the shift in which they are to work. p.w. 1, the Intelligence Officer, Kalinga Tubes has deposed that on several previous occasions, the workers also held meetings there altheugh he adds that for holding such meetings on certain occasions, prosecutions have been lodged. It would thus be clear that the Rest Shed is not a place to which the workers could not have had any access at any time, and therefore, if they had realty assembled there it would not be an offence. Even assuming that their assembly at the Rest Shed and holding a meeting there are unautherised, it would still not amount to criminal trespass unless it has been done either with the intent to commit an offence or with the intention to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession of the property. It is not the prosecution case that the Petitioners had assembled there with the intent to commit an offence. It is not the prosecution case that the Petitioners had assembled there with the intent to commit an offence. The prosecution case is by holding a meeting in which they delivered speeches insulting to and defamatory of the management, their intention was to insult or annoy the persons in charge of the Management. The witnesses who spoke about the deliberations of the meeting are p.ws. 1, 2 & 3. p.w. 1, the Intelligence Officer of the Company who was present at the meeting admitted that he personally did not feel insulted or annoyed by any of the speeches. According to him, all that the Petitioners said in the meeting was that the Personnel Officer was creating troubles and that he should be taught a lesson. Petitioner Sanatan Naik and Sanatan Panda said that the Management is not giving dearness allowance and is not fulfilling the demands of the Mazdoors and altheugh the workers do not have food to eat, the Deputy General Manager who came from Kerala with a jug and a blanket was found driving two cars. Petitioner Rajkishore Samantara said that the Management was doing injustice and that they should be taught a lesson. p.w. 2 who only heard the speech of Rajkishore Samantara stated that in the meeting the latter spoke about the demands of the labourers which were not being fulfilled by the Works Secretary and the Works Manager. p.w. 3 admitted that he did not hear any abuses being hurled at the Management at the meeting. It is therefore clear from the evidence of these three witnesses that nothing was said in the meeting by any of the Petitioners either to insult or to annoy the persons in charge of the Management of the Factory and that the meeting was convened only to ventilate the grievances of the workers. Sometimes voicing of these demands by the workers may be unpalatable to the Management but can it be said on that account that the Petitioners convened the meeting with the intent to insult or annoy any person? The answer must be in the negative. 5. It is argued on behalf of the opposite party that altheugh the Petitioners might not have intended to insult or annoy the Management still the effect of speeches which they delivered might result in such annoyance and that would bring the case within the mischief of Section 441, Indian Penal Code. The answer must be in the negative. 5. It is argued on behalf of the opposite party that altheugh the Petitioners might not have intended to insult or annoy the Management still the effect of speeches which they delivered might result in such annoyance and that would bring the case within the mischief of Section 441, Indian Penal Code. The effective answer to such an argument is provided by the decision in Mathuri and Others Vs. State of Punjab. Their Lordships observed: The proposition that every person intends the natural consequences of his act is often a convenient and helpful rule to ascertain the intention of persons when doing a particular act, It is wrong however to accept this proposition as a binding rule which must prevail on all occasions and in all circumstances. The ultimate question for decision being whether an act was done with a particular intention all the circumstances including the natural consequence of the action have to be taken into consideration. It is legitimate to think also that when Section 441, Penal Code speaks of entering on property with intent to commit an offence, or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of the property it speaks of the main intention in the action and not any subsidiary intention that may also be present. In order to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry; that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence was known to the person entering; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to consider all the relevant ciroumstances including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequences would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance, being the dominant intention which prompted the entry. Following this decision, Das, J. in Longu alias Satchidananda Misra and Anr. v. State ILR 1965 Cutt. Following this decision, Das, J. in Longu alias Satchidananda Misra and Anr. v. State ILR 1965 Cutt. 71, held in that case that the Petitioners who held a meeting inside the premises of the Sub-Divisional office at Bargarh to carry on canvassing for the election through propaganda was not guilty of criminal trespass because it was held that even though his action might have resulted in certain amount of annoyance to the staff of the office of the Sub-Divisional Officer, the object of the Petitioner could not be said to cause any annoyance to them. 6. I am, therefore, satisfied that in this case, the dominant intention of the Petitioners in holding the meeting was not to insult or cause any annoyance to the persons in charge of the Factory, but that the meeting was convened solely for the purpose of ventilating the grievances of the workers and that therefore they are not guilty of the offence with which they are charged. I would accordingly allow this application, set aside the conviction of the Petitioners and the fine imposed on them and direct that fines, if realised, should at once be refunded to them. Final Result : Allowed