Judgment :- 1. Writ Appeal No. 235 of 1967, is from Isaac J, who prohibited the State and the Director of Public Instruction from enforcing R.6, 7 and 8 of Chapter XXV of the Kerala Education Rules in respect of "the two Training Schools under the Corporate Management of Schools of the Diocese of Palai" but refused to make a general declaration that those Rules do not apply to 'minority schools' as a whole. The other 4 appeals are from Mathew J. who, in four other cases, held those "Rules are void to the extent they contravene the fundamental right of the minority to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice" and restrained the State from enforcing them "as against the schools in question." 2. The impugned Rules read thus: "6. Twenty per cent of the seats in Aided Training Schools shall be reserved for selection by the Managers of the respective Training Schools. 7. Selection of candidates for sixty per cent of the seats in aided Training Schools and for eighty per cent of the seats in Government Training Schools shall be made by a Selection Committee consisting of a member of the Public Service Commission as Chairman and an Official nominee of the Education Department. There shall be a Selection Committee for each Revenue District. 8. In the remaining twenty per cent of seats, the Director shall depute untrained teachers employed in Government and Private Schools for teachers' training in Government and Aided Training Schools: Provided that the teachers recruited through the Employment Exchange in Government Schools shall not be entitled for such deputation." Obviously, these Rules allow only 20 per cent of the seats in the Training Schools established and maintained by all private agencies to be filled by candidates selected by the management. The contentions of the State are that the schools involved in the present cases are not schools established and administered by religious minorities, and that the impugned rules are not violative of the freedom conceded by Art.30 of the Constitution, but are only regulative measures designed "to ensure the excellence of the institutions." 3. Shri Paripoornan pointed out that in Azeez Basha v. The Union of India AIR. 1968 SC. Shri Paripoornan pointed out that in Azeez Basha v. The Union of India AIR. 1968 SC. 662 the Supreme Court has indicated that the words 'establish' and 'administer' in Art.30 (1) must be read together and so read the Article gives the right to the minority to administer institutions established by them, and that if the educational institution has not been established by a minority it cannot claim the right to administer it under Art.30 (1). Counsel invited our attention also to The Rt. Rev. Bishop, S. K. Patro v. State of Bihar 1969-1 SCWR. 934 where the question considered by their Lordships was whether a School built with substantial aid of a Foreign Corporation and funds collected by local Christians was not an institution established by a minority. We do not think that this indicates that, in every case where benefit of Art.30 is claimed, the consideration shall be whether the building housing the institution has been put up by the minority. An institution is not a building: it can be run even in a rented building and yet be entitled to the privilege under Art.30 of our Constitution. That the establishment of an institution does not mean the putting up of the house for the institution or even setting up of the original institution which got converted into the present (concerned) institution is clear from the dictum in Azeez Basha's case AIR. 1968 SC 662 where the Aligarh Muslim University was held not to have been established by Muslims, even though the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College that got converted into the University was built and set up by Muslims for the purpose of imparting modern education and religious instructions to Muslim children and funds required by the Government of India for establishment of a University (Rs. 30 lakhs) were collected by the Muslims and made over to the authorities established under the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920 passed by the Central legislature. In the context of Art.30, the word 'establish' means to set up or bring into existence the instant institution. It is in that view, that the averments of the petitioners are to be scanned. 4. The appellants have, in their writ petitions, averred expressly that the concerned institutions belong to particular denominations of Christians in particular dioceses. In the context of Art.30, the word 'establish' means to set up or bring into existence the instant institution. It is in that view, that the averments of the petitioners are to be scanned. 4. The appellants have, in their writ petitions, averred expressly that the concerned institutions belong to particular denominations of Christians in particular dioceses. Thus, the Training Schools concerned in W.A. No. 235 of 1967 are averred to belong to the Roman Catholic community in the Diocese of Palai; those in W. A. No. 131 to be owned and conducted by the Diocese of Madhya Kerala in the Church of South India; those in W. A. No. 132 to belong to the Syrian Catholic Archdiocese of Trivandrum; that in W. A. No. 147 to have been established by the Bishop of and belongs to the Latin Catholic Diocese of Trivandrum: and that in W. A. No. 148 to belong to the Catholic Diocese of Quilon. These averments have not been challenged by the State, whose contention, as put forth by counsel before us, is that schools established and administered by the Christians or the Bishop of a diocese cannot be schools established and administered by the community of Christians and therefore educational institutions of a minority within the meaning of Art.30(1) of the Constitution. That the Christian community is a minority within the meaning of the Art.30 is not disputed before us. The contention is that to attract the benefit of the Article the institutions must have been established and must be administered by the community and not by an individual or group thereof. We do not find force in this contention. The right conceded under Art.30 (1) to a minority community, by its very nature, must necessarily avail a section of the community and even an individual thereof. It is not contended before us that the expression "all minorities... shall have the right" indicates that the right belongs to all the minority communities as one group or body. It is conceded that the right belongs to every minority community. A community as such is not a legal person and therefore a right cannot inhere to a community as a body; for, all rights must inhere to some person, natural or legal. When a right is conceded to a community it really means that every individual of the community has that right. A community as such is not a legal person and therefore a right cannot inhere to a community as a body; for, all rights must inhere to some person, natural or legal. When a right is conceded to a community it really means that every individual of the community has that right. It follows that the right can be claimed or asserted by a group in the community or their head and representative, here the Bishop, as well. The pleas in these cases are clear that the institutions concerned have been brought into existence by the Christians of a diocese or the Bishop thereof, for the purpose of qualifying teachers of their choice to be appointed in their schools. We hold that the Training Schools concerned in these five writ petitions do come within the ambit of Art.30 (1) of the Constitution of India, and affirm the finding to that effect by the learned Single Judges. 5. The question then is whether the reservation of seats in the Schools to be filled by candidates chosen by the Selection Committee or by the Director of Public Instruction would offend the guarantee of Art.30. Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabbai v. State of Gujarat AIR. 1963 SC. 540 is a parallel case that arose in Gujarat concerning a training school run by certain Christians. The Government directed 80 per cent of the seats therein to be reserved for unqualified teachers nominated by the Government, leaving only 20 per cent of the school strength for candidates chosen by the management thereof. Mr. Justice Shah, speaking for a Constitution Bench, observed: "The right established by Art.30 (1) is a fundamental right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art.19 it is not subject to reasonable restrictions....The right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so-called regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order which, while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution, destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the pubic or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Art.30 (1) will be but a 'teasing illusion', a promise of unreality. If every order which, while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution, destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the pubic or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Art.30 (1) will be but a 'teasing illusion', a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution." It is then obvious that the validity of any regulative measure imposed by the Government on an institution of the kind under consideration here, must be such that it doss not whittle down the character of the institution as a minority institution which means an institution which caters to the educational needs of a minority community or a section thereof. Their Lordships have observed categorically that the freedom conceded to minorities under Art.30(1) is absolute and does not admit any restriction. So the only question relevant is whether the reservation of 80 per cent of seats in the School for admission of outside candidates does not whittle down the freedom guaranteed to the minority communities under Art.30 (1) of the Constitution, and not whether it is good for larger public interest. It is well-known that the Christians have established and are maintaining many schools, primary and secondary, in different parts of the State, which require the service of a pretty large number of qualified teachers. They have therefore set up training schools to train teachers to be qualified for such appointments in their institutions. When it is remembered that the object of Art.30(1) is the conservation or advancement of the religious culture of minority communities, it is easily understandable that teachers of a particular category who will promote the purpose are required for service in their institutions, and that it is to train such teachers that these training schools are established by the community, though some other teachers who do not injure their cause will also be entertained there. To restrict the community's choice of candidates for training in their schools to 20 percent of the school-strength would certainly prejudice that interest of the community and would therefore violate the freedom assured to them under Art.30 of the Constitution. To restrict the community's choice of candidates for training in their schools to 20 percent of the school-strength would certainly prejudice that interest of the community and would therefore violate the freedom assured to them under Art.30 of the Constitution. The insistence that 80 per cent of the strength should be candidates chosen by extraneous authorities, like the Selection Committee or the Director of Public Instruction, would seriously affect the character of the institution as an institution of the minority community and would almost reduce their freedom to a "teasing illusion". A like condition, of reservation of 80 per cent of seats for candidates chosen by the Government of Bombay, was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Sidhrajbhai's case AIR. 1963 SC. 540. We do not find any material distinction between the facts of that case and the instant one. 6. Counsel for the State contended that the impugned Rules have been brought into force on July 1, 1961, and have not been challenged by the community upto the institution of these writ petitions in 1967 and after, that it is now too late to challenge them, after six years of operation throughout the State, before the discretionary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. In re the Kerala Education Bill 1957, AIR. 1958 SC. 956 (para. 26) the Supreme Court has observed that 'there cannot be any loss of fundamental rights, merely on the ground of non-exercise of it." It is interesting to note that in Campbell College Belfast (Governors) v. Commissioner of Valuation for Northern Ireland 1964-1 WLR. 912 the House of Lords have struck down a levy of a tax which had been paid by a school for 132 years though it was of a category exempted from taxation under the Act. The importance of conserving a fundamental freedom guaranteed to a minority community under an express provision in the Constitution seems to outweigh any embarrassment that may be caused by a prohibition of the restrictive impositions thereon even though they had been suffered for a period of six years. 7. We would therefore uphold the learned judges' directions that the condition of reservation of 80 per cent of the seats in aided training schools for candidates chosen by the Selection Committee and the Director of Public Instruction should not be applied to schools run by minorities within the meaning of Art.30 (1) of the Constitution. 7. We would therefore uphold the learned judges' directions that the condition of reservation of 80 per cent of the seats in aided training schools for candidates chosen by the Selection Committee and the Director of Public Instruction should not be applied to schools run by minorities within the meaning of Art.30 (1) of the Constitution. These appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. A. K. A. Dismissed.