JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - The Appellant has been convicted u/s 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and Sections 467 and 477-A, Indian Penal Code, sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under the first count, while no separate sentences have been awarded under the latter to counts. 2. Admittedly, the Appellant was working as the Electrical Supervisor, Telegraphs, Cuttack during the period from November, 1958 in May, 1960. According to the prosecution, while so working between the dates 23-8-1959 and 7-5-1960, he dishonestly and fraudulently misappropriated Rs. 200-62 out of the imprest cash entrusted to him during the aforesaid period and to recoup the said amount, he falsified certain imprest bills vouchers and committed forgery of receipts. Appellants, in defence denied the allegations in to and pleaded that he did not falsify any imprest bills or commit forgery in respect of any receipt. The learned Special Judge who tried the case found him guilty of all the charges, convicted and sentenced him, as stated above. 3. The amount alleged to have been misappropriated by the Appellant which constitutes the first charge is the total of the amount by which he is alleged to have falsified and inflated the imprest bills by giving false and forged vouchers. Necessarily, the proof of this charge will depend on the proof or otherwise of the remaining three charges. Therefore, charges 2, 3 and 4 on which Appellant has been found guilty are taken up for consideration serially. 4. It is not disputed that during the relevant period Appellant was working as Electrical Supervisor, Telegraphs at Cuttack and his duties were to look after the installation and maintenance of electrical works in the buildings belonging to the Telegraph Department. It is also admitted that in his official capacity Appellant, was originally entrusted with imprest cash of Rs. 100./- which was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 200./- and he was autherised to engage casual labourers and make sundry purchases, if necessary, in connection with installation and maintenance of the electrical works meeting the cost out of the imprest cash in his possession which he was to recoup by submitting imprest bills supported by vouchers to his official superior (p.w. 1). There is no dispute that Appellant submitted the imprest bills (Exs. 1. There is no dispute that Appellant submitted the imprest bills (Exs. 1. 5, 7, 10 and 11) certifying that he had incurred the expenditure for the items mentioned therein which were duly passed and payment made to him by way of recumbent of the imprest cash. 5. Charge No. 2 relates to an amount of Rs. 1860 included in the imprest bill (Ex. 1) for the period ending with 25-3-1960. According to the prosecution, during the month of March, 1960, Appellant actually purchased only 30 gallons of distilled water on 2-3-1960 from the manufacturers Novo Pharmaceuticals (Private) Ltd., Cuttack. He, however, falsified Ex. 1 showing two such purchases from the said concern, once on 2-3-1960 and again on 22-3-1960 and obtained recoupment of the amount which he had misappropriated from the imprest cash. The defence version, on the other hand, is that he actually purchased 60 gallons of distilled water on these two dates and utilised them for the concerned work. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Special Judge accepted the prosecution version and found that actually one purchase had been made and that Appellant falsified Ex. 1 by showing two purchases and committed misappropriation of Rs. 1860. It is contended by learned Counsel for Appellant that the Court below erred in accepting the evidence of p.ws. 9 and 10 in the face of documentary evidence which shows two distinct purchases. The crucial point for determination is whether during the month of March, 1960 Appellant purchased only 30 gallons of distilled water on 2.3.1960 from the said concern or he purchased 60 gallons in two instalments. P.w. 9 is an employee and p.w. 10 is the Manager of the Navo Pharmaceuticals (Private) Ltd., Cuttack from whom Appellant claims to have purchased the destilled water. Both of them have categorically stated that during the month of March, 1960 Appellant purchased only 30 gallons of distilled water from them on 2-3-1960 and no second purchase was made by him. According to them, Appellant utilised the delivery chalan (Ex. 2) and the invoice (Ex. 3) as vouchers of two distinct purchases, though both related to one and the same purchase. Nothing has been elicited to discredit the testimony of p.ws. According to them, Appellant utilised the delivery chalan (Ex. 2) and the invoice (Ex. 3) as vouchers of two distinct purchases, though both related to one and the same purchase. Nothing has been elicited to discredit the testimony of p.ws. 9 and 10 Apart from it, the documentary evidence producer in this case conclusively proves that Appellant made only one purchase of distilled water during the month of March, 1960 from the said concern. Ex. 2 dated 2-3-1960 shows delivery of 30 gallons of distilled water to the Appellant. Though in Ex. 2, the amount of sales-tax amounting to Rs. O.95 had not been included, the number of the chalan is noted 450 at the top. In Ex. 3 which is dated 18.3-1960, the bill number is mentioned as 72 and the sales-tax of Rs. 0.95 has been included making the total amount payable for 30 gallons of distilled water as Rs. 19.55. The point is whether Ex. 3 relates to the identical purchase evidenced by Ex. 2 or it represents a distinct purchase. Ex. 3/2 is the bill in respect of the commodity mentioned in Ex. 3, Ex. 3/3 is the counterfoil of Ex. 2 and Ex. 3/4 is the counterfoil of Ex. 3. The genuineness of these counterfoils are beyond dispute. Ex.3/4 bears the same bill No. 72 and the delivery is noted to be under chalan No. 450 dated 2-3-1960. Ex. 3, the original, made over to the Appellant shows that at two places the writing has been smudged by ink. These two places are the chalan No. 450 and the date 2-3-1960. Thus, Ex. 3/4 clearly exposes the fraud committed, inasmuch as it shows that the purchase related to the distilled water delivered under chalan No. 450 dated 2-3-1960. This is quite consistent with the evidence of p.ws. 9 and 10 that during the month of March, 1960 only one sale of distilled water was made to Appellant and that is on 2-3-1960. This also finds corroboration from Ex. 23, the entry in the cash book of the concern. Thus, on a consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, I find no merit in the contention of Appellant without making a subsequent purchase utilised Ex. 3 as a separate voucher and falsified Ex. 1. 44 6. The next charge relates to the imprest bills (Exs. 5 and 7) dated 24-8-1959 and 21-4-1960 respectively. Thus, on a consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, I find no merit in the contention of Appellant without making a subsequent purchase utilised Ex. 3 as a separate voucher and falsified Ex. 1. 44 6. The next charge relates to the imprest bills (Exs. 5 and 7) dated 24-8-1959 and 21-4-1960 respectively. According to the prosecution Appellant falsified Ex. 5 by including the items covered by vouchers (Ext. 4 and 4/1) dated 23.8.1959 and 24.8.1959 respectively and Ex. 7 by including the items covered by vouchers (En. 6 and 6/1) dated 17.4.1960 towards the imprest cash which he had misappropriated. The defence of the Appellant, on the other hand, is that he had actually purchased the articles mentioned in these vouchers and utilised them in installation and maintenance of the works under his charge. On a consideration of the evidence of p.ws. 7 and a, the learned Special Judge accepted the prosecution version and found the Appellant guilty of this charge. It is contended before me that the veracity of p.w. 7 is open to question and the opinion of p.w. 7 should not be accepted as he purports to base his opinion on comparison of similarities in the writings on these vouchers with the admitted and specimen writings of the Appellant without referring to the dissimilarities p.w. 7 is the proprietor of the Janata Electric Service from whom Appellant purports to have made the purchases under the aforesaid four vouchers and made payments to him. He has stated on oath that he never stocks for sale or sells any electrical goods in his shop and that his business is confined to repair of electrical apparatus. He denies to have made any of the sales covered by these vouchers to the Appellant. According to him, Appellant had entrusted to him the repair of a departmental fan and his bill was outstanding. Appellant took some blank letterhead forms from him or the purpose of utilising them as reminders to the authorities for payment of his bill with his signatures in some of them and utilised the same for creating these vouchers. He was cross-examined at the length and nothing has been elicited or suggested as to why be should he deposing falsely against the Appellant. P.w. 7 is the Government Handwriting Expert, who on a comparison of the admitted writings of Appellant marked Ex. He was cross-examined at the length and nothing has been elicited or suggested as to why be should he deposing falsely against the Appellant. P.w. 7 is the Government Handwriting Expert, who on a comparison of the admitted writings of Appellant marked Ex. 12 series and his specimen writings marked Ex. 24 series, found that all the writings found in the body of these voucher were in the hand of the Appellant. He also opined that the signatures on Exs. 4 and 4/1 are not these of p.w. 7. Learned Counsel for Appellant assails the evidence of p.w. 7 saying that it has been elicited from him that under Ex. 20 he sold one steel rod with hanger to Harilal Prabhulal and on Diwali occasion be had hired out 27 lamps to Bharat Hospital Stores. It is, therefore, urged that his statement that be does not stock electrical goods for sale should not be believed. These instances do not prove business in sale of electrical goods. If really p.w. 7 is engaged in sale of electrical goods, the instances would not have been confined to sale of a steel rod and hiring out some bulbs. So far as the evidence of p.w. 7 is concerned, learned Counsel refers to the following observation in the decision reported Ravjappn v. Nilakenta Rao AIR 1962 Mys 53 . In examining a disputed document, the true test is not the extent of similarities observed when compared with genuine documents as forged documents usually are good imitations of genuine documents, but the nature and extent of the dissimilarities noticed. It is these differences which expose the true character of the document in question and contends that when the opinion is not based by reference to dissimilarities in the two writings, it should not be relied upon. This contention has no merit. No doubt, the opinion of a Handwriting expert by itself may not be a very satisfactory type of evidence to base a conviction. At the same time, where such opinion is arrived at by magnifying the writings, super-imposing the lines, measuring the angles tapering strokes, etc. It cannot be lightly brushed aside. In the present case, p.w. 7 has taken into consideration various characteristics which be has described in detail in his evidence for arriving at his conclusions. At the same time, where such opinion is arrived at by magnifying the writings, super-imposing the lines, measuring the angles tapering strokes, etc. It cannot be lightly brushed aside. In the present case, p.w. 7 has taken into consideration various characteristics which be has described in detail in his evidence for arriving at his conclusions. The question of existence of dissimilarities may be relevant where there is an attempt to imitate another's writing, but in the present case it is nobody's case that Appellant tried to imitate the writing of p.w. 7. On the other hand, the prosecution case is that Appellant made the entries found in these vouchers without any attempt to disguise the writing. Therefore, the question of dissimilarities between these writings and the admitted handwriting of Appellant can not exist. In such circumstances, as has been observed in the decision reported in Bisseswar Poddar Vs. Nabadwip Chandra Poddar and Another, striking general similarity between the two writings is a telling test in determining whether both are in the same hand or not. Apart from it, there is the direct evidence of p.w. 7 who denies to have written these vouchers or sold the articles to Appellant and there is little reason to disbelieve him. The opinion of p.w. 8 only corroborates his testimony. There, in my opinion, the contention of Appellant challenging the finding of the court below has no merit. 7. Lastly, in relation to his charge, it has been contended by learned Counsel for Appellant that the finding of the trial Court cannot be sustained, because the charge itself specifies falsification of imprest bills dated 27-4-1960 and 4-5-1960 while the finding relates to Exs. 5 and 7 which are dated 24-8-1959 and 21-4-1960 respectively. Learned Government Advocate, in reply, states that the dates of imprest bills mentioned in the charge are due to an inadvertent error and Appellant all along was aware to what actual imprest bills the charge related and has not been prejudiced in any manner. It is argued by him that any such error in the charge is curable. In my opinion, this contention of learned Government Advocate must prevail. Such a ground has not been taken in the memo of appeal or at any stage while the case was being tried in the Court below. It is argued by him that any such error in the charge is curable. In my opinion, this contention of learned Government Advocate must prevail. Such a ground has not been taken in the memo of appeal or at any stage while the case was being tried in the Court below. Further, though in the charge dates of the imprest bills have been given as 27-4-1960 and 4-5-1960, in the body of the charge, the dates of vouchers by which the imprest bills are alleged to have been falsified have been correctly mentioned as 23-8-1959, 24-8-1959, 17-4-1960 and 18-4-1960. The evidence also related to the two imprest bills (Exs. 5 and 7) and the vouchers (En. 4, 4/1, 6 and 6/1). In such circumstances, there could have been no occasion for the Appellant having been prejudices or misled in his defence. Further, the two questions Nos. 4 and 5 put to the Appellant in his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure clearly indicate the dates of Exs. 5 and 7 as ending with 24-8-1959 and 21-4-1960. Thus, at every stage from the inception, Appellant knew in connection with which imprest bills and which vouchers, the accusations were being made against him. In these circumstances, the mere error in the dates of the imprest bills in this charge which obviously was due to inadvertence cannot be a ground to set aside the finding of the trial Court. Hence, I agree with the finding of the learned Special Judge that this charge is fully established. 8. The next charge relates to the imprest bills (Exs. 10 and 11). According to the prosecution, Appellant purchased only one fan insulator costing Rs. 0.93 which together with sales-tax came to Re. 1.00 under the vouchers marked Exts. 9 and 9/2 and one roll of black tape costing Rs. 1.18 which together with sale-tax came to Rs. 1.25 under the voucher marked Ex. 9/1 from the Bombay Electricals. He, however, inserted various items of fictitious purchases in each of these vouchers after erasing the entry relating to sales-tax and thereby inflated the amount under Ex. 9 to Rs. 36.31, under Ex. 9/1 to Rs. 39.27 and under Ex. 9/2 to Rs. 35.24. He included these fabricated vouchers in the imprest bills (Ex. 10 and 11) and obtained recoupment of the amounts alleged to have been misappropriated by him from the imprest cash. 9 to Rs. 36.31, under Ex. 9/1 to Rs. 39.27 and under Ex. 9/2 to Rs. 35.24. He included these fabricated vouchers in the imprest bills (Ex. 10 and 11) and obtained recoupment of the amounts alleged to have been misappropriated by him from the imprest cash. In defence, Appellant pleaded that he actually purchased the various items mentioned in the three vouchers and utilised them in different works. 9. P.w. 4 is the Proprietor of the Bombay Eleotricals and p.w. 5 was an employee under him at the relevant time p.w. 4 has deposed that under Exs. 9/1 and 9/2, he sold only one roll of black tape and one fan insulator respectively to the Appellant. P.w. 5 has deposed that he sold only one fan insulator under Ex. 9 to the Appellant. While admitting their signatures on the vouchers p.ws. 4 and 5 have denied to have Bold any of the other items found therein or the entries relating to the other items to have been made by them. Nothing material has been elicited or suggested to attribute any bias to these witnesses against the Appellant or their being in any manner interested in the success of the prosecution. Their testimony finds corroboration from the opinion of the Hand-writing Expert (p.w. 8) who has stated that except one item in each of these vouchers, the rest of the writings are in the band of the Appellant. He has also stated that in each of these vouchers erasings have been made which is consistent with the evidence of p.ws. 4 and 5 that the endorsements relating to the sale-tax which were originally put by them had been erased to enable making of the subsequent entries. Apart from the evidence of p.w. 8, the testimony of p.ws. 4 and 5 obtains full corroboration from the counterfoils of the vouchers (Exs. 9 to 9/2). Ex. 9/16 is the counterfoil of Ex. 9, Ex. 9/14 of Ex. 9/1 and Ex. 9/15 of Ex. 9/2. In each of these counterfoils which are carbon copies, only one item of sale has been mentioned. Learned Counsel for Appellant made suggestion to p.ws. 4 and 5 that in the carbon copies which constitute the counterfoils of Ex. 1 to 1, 1/2, impression of only one item has been taken with the object of avoiding sales-tax. This suggestion has been rightly rejected as fantastic. 10. Learned Counsel for Appellant made suggestion to p.ws. 4 and 5 that in the carbon copies which constitute the counterfoils of Ex. 1 to 1, 1/2, impression of only one item has been taken with the object of avoiding sales-tax. This suggestion has been rightly rejected as fantastic. 10. In the course of arguments, learned Counsel for Appellant drew my attention to a pencil endorsement on the back of the last page of the charge report (Ex. 31) and contended that the items found in Ex. 9/2 purchased in connection with the work 14 BPL were actually made over by Appellant to his successor (p.w. 13) at the time of handing over charge. It was argued that the prosecution case of fictitious items of purchase having been included in Exs. 9 to 9/2 cannot be true as in that case, delivery of these items at the time of making over charge could not have been made. Learned Government Advocate, on the other hand contends that the endorsement on the back of Ex. 31 is not genuine and must have been inserted there subsequent to production and admission of the document in evidence. The following reasons leave no room for doubt in my mind that the pencil endorsement on the back of Ex. 31 is not genuine and was obviously made during some stage of the pendency of the case, though it is difficult to determine at what stage it was or could have been made. This disputed endorsement does not find a place in the copy of Ex. 31 included in the paper book. During the course of trial of the case, no reference was made by Appellant to the existence of any such endorsement which he would not have failed to do had it originally is existed in Ex. 31. The original of the Charge report (Ex. 31) shows that in all the pages wherever Appellant has put his signature in token of making over charge p.w. 13 has signed in acknowledgment of having received charge and both of them have invariably put their signatures in ink. The endorsement on the back of Ex. 31 on which reliance is sought to be placed now is only initialed by Appellant in pencil and does not bear the corresponding signature of p.w. 13. The endorsement on the back of Ex. 31 on which reliance is sought to be placed now is only initialed by Appellant in pencil and does not bear the corresponding signature of p.w. 13. If actually Appellant banded over these articles as per the endorsement to p.w. 13, he would not have failed to put even a single question about it to the latter during cross-examination. There is no reference to the existence of such an endorsement in the grounds of appeal. Ex. 31 relates to making over charge of records, registers, etc. and has nothing to do with making over charge of any stores. Lastly, the answer of Appellant to question No. 10 put to him during his examination u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure completely exposes the hollowness of the present suggestion relating to the endorsements. While denying the allegation that he had inserted any fictitious item in Ex. 9/2, Appellant in, his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure categorically stated that the articles mentioned in that voucher had been purchased and utilised in the work relating to electric installation in a post-office building. If these purchased items had been utilised, it is fantastic on his part now to say that these items were made over by way of stores to p.w. 13 at the time of making over charge. As already stated, the aforesaid circumstances clearly prove that the endorsement on the back of Ex. 31 is not genuine, and as such, cannot support the contention that the items referred to above had been actually purchased. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, I find no merit in the contention of Appellant and agree with the findings of the learned Special Judge so far as this charge is concerned. 11. Learned Counsel for Appellant next contends that even if it is found that Appellant did not actually purchase the items constituting the subject-matter of different charges from the respective concerns from which they purport to have been purchased under the vouchers, the charges cannot be sustained unless the prosecution by satisfactory evidence excludes the possibility of such articles having been acquired and utilised by the Appellant for the concerned works irrespective of the sources from which they might have been acquired or purchased. In other words, the contention is that if Appellant actually supplied the materials for being utilised in the connected works, he cannot be said to have falsified the accounts with intent to defraud. Learned Government Advocate, on the other hand, contends that the prosection has, by proving that Appellant did not actually make the purchases under two vouchers, discharged its onus, and if Appellant claims to have purchased, acquired them from a source other than the concerns from which the purchases purport to have been made under the vouchers, it is a matter within his special knowledge and it is for him to show that he actually made these purchases or utilised them. At no stage of the trial of this case, Appellant has taken the stand that he acquired these articles from sources other than these mentioned in the respective voucher. Though the obligation lies on the prosecution to discharge its initial onus of proving entrustment and the failure of the accused to account for it in the manner in which it purports to have been utilised or spent, it is not the law that the prosection is to eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate the accused, vide in Krishan Kumar Vs. The Union of India, and State of Orissa v. Prafulla Kumar 1964 C.L.T. 499. Once the prosection has discharged its initial onus, it is for the accused to prove facts and circumstances which are within his special knowledge if he seeks exoneration on these grounds. In the present case, Appellant has purported to have spent the money from the imprest cash entrusted to him in making certain purchases from specific concerns. The entrustment has been proved by the prosecution. The prosection has also proved that Appellant did not make these purchases from the concerns mentioned in the vouchers. If Appellant wants to prove that he made such purchases not from the concerns mentioned in the vouchers but elsewhere and utilised them, these being matters exclusively within his special knowledge, be alone can explain or prove where, when or how he acquired or purchased the said articles. No attempt has been made by the Appellant to offer any such explanation much less proof either in his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure or by making suggestion to p.ws. or by leading defence evidence. Therefore, this contention has no merit. 12. No attempt has been made by the Appellant to offer any such explanation much less proof either in his examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure or by making suggestion to p.ws. or by leading defence evidence. Therefore, this contention has no merit. 12. It is next contended on behalf of Appellant that in the present case a conviction u/s 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act will not be sustainable even if it is found that Appellant obtained payment of the amounts in question by falsification of imprest bills or fabrication of receipts. It supported in Emperor Vs. John McIver, ; Surendra Pal Singh Vs. The State, and State v. Radhanath Patnaik 20 (1954) C.L.T. 80 and it is urged that the said payments can be said to have been obtained by practising deception and not conversion of the amounts which had been lawfully entrusted to him. The principle of Jaw laid down in the aforementioned decisions is not disputed by learned Government. Advocate. He concedes that in the absence of proof of entrustment of money or property the offence of criminal breach of trust cannot be committed. He, however, argues that in the present case, it is not the prosecution case that Appellant committed conversion of the amounts obtained under the imprest bills, but the prosecution case is that he misappropriated certain amounts from the imprest cash of Rs. 200./- which had admittedly been entrusted to him and subsequently obtained recoupment to the imprest cash under the imprest bills. The word "entrusted" when used with respect to money or other property means that the same had been transferred to the recipient under circumstances which show that notwithstanding its delivery the property in it continues to vest in the person who made the entrustment, though the money or other property remains in possession or control of the recipient in trust to be restored to him or applied in accordance with instructions or for purposes for which the entrustment had been made. In cases, where money or other property is obtained by practicing deception, there can be no question of entrustment, because when the custody or control over it is made over, the property or rights therein pass to the reappoint. The decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for Appellant refer to the latter category of cases. In cases, where money or other property is obtained by practicing deception, there can be no question of entrustment, because when the custody or control over it is made over, the property or rights therein pass to the reappoint. The decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for Appellant refer to the latter category of cases. In the present case, the questions whether breach of trust was committed or not will necessarily depend on the finding whether the conversion of the money was made by Appellant from out of the imprest cash in his custody or of the money obtained under the imprest bills. It is not denied that Appellant in his capacity as a public servant was entrusted with Rs. 200./- as imprest cash 'for being utilised in incurring expenditure purchase of sundry article and for meeting labour charges in connection with installation and maintenance of electrical works. The procedure laid down under the rules admittedly is that on such expenditure being incurred from the imprest cash in his custody, Appellant was to get recoupment of the same by submitting imprest bills. Therefore, unless money had been spent from the imprest cash in his custody, the question of obtaining recoupment would not have arisen. Thus, when Appellant submitted the imprest bills, get them passed and obtained recoupment, the amounts obtained thereunder went to recoup the shortage that had occurred in the imprest cash in his hand had taken place by purported purchase of fictitious articles. It follows that before obtaining recoupment under the imprest bills, Appellant misappropriated certain amounts from the imprest cash which was subsequently recouped. Therefore, the misappropriation in this case is not of the money obtained under the imprest bills, but it had already been committed out of the imprest cash. As such, the decisions relied upon by Appellant are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 13. In this case, it is clearly established that Appellant from time to time misappropriated amounts totalling Rs. 199.67 out of the imprest cash of Rs. 200./- entrusted to him and obtained recoupment of the shortage in the imprest cash under the imprest bills (Exs. 1, 5, 7, 10 and 11) by committing falsification of the accounts and fabricating receipts. Therefore, he has been rightly convicted and sentenced. 14. In the result, I find no merit in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of Appellant. 200./- entrusted to him and obtained recoupment of the shortage in the imprest cash under the imprest bills (Exs. 1, 5, 7, 10 and 11) by committing falsification of the accounts and fabricating receipts. Therefore, he has been rightly convicted and sentenced. 14. In the result, I find no merit in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of Appellant. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed