ORDER One Sarungbam Bihari Singh obtained rule nisi under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against (1) the Union Territory of Manipur, (2) the Chief Commissioner of Manipur, (3) the Manipur State Transport Authority, Manipur, (4) Koijam Ibomcha Singh and (5) Hijam Hera Singh to show cause why a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ should not be issued quashing the order of the 3rd respondent (Manipur State Transport Authority) dated 22-4-1967 granting permit in favour of the 4th respondent allowing him to ply vehicle No. 4175 on Imphal to Kakching route. 2. The respondents showed cause. 3. The Motor Vehicles Department (Government of Manipur) issued a notification dated 5-1-1967 in the Manipur Gazette dated 11-1-1967 inviting applications for granting permits for 12 stage carriages and 3 "bazar buses". Vide Ext. A/1. Imphal to Kakching is one of the 11 routes mentioned therein. The petitioner owns vehicle No. 3808 of 1963 model. The respondent No. 4 owns vehicle No. 4175 of 1964 model and the 5th respondent owns another vehicle. They applied for the permit for the said Imphal to Kakching route. Thereupon, the Motor Vehicles Department (Government of Manipur) issued another notification dated 23-2-1967 in the Manipur Gazette mentioning the names of the various applicants for the various routes, the vehicles offered to be run by them and their models and called for objections and representations (under section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act - Act IV of 1939, hereinafter called as the Act) within 30 days from the date of the publication of the notice. It also mentioned that the applications for the permits would be available for inspection in the office of the State Transport Authority, Manipur during office hours on all working days and that the applications would be considered at the meeting of the State Transport Authority, Manipur, which would be notified later (vide Ext. A/2). The petitioner filed representation, as can be seen from Ext. A/3 dated 3-4-1967, opposing the applications filed by the respondents 4 and 5. A/2). The petitioner filed representation, as can be seen from Ext. A/3 dated 3-4-1967, opposing the applications filed by the respondents 4 and 5. The Manipur State Transport Authority held a meeting on 22-4-1967 and heard the petitioner and the respondents 4 and 5 and passed an order that out of the 3 applicants, the 4th respondent "quoted vehicle of a newer model and that keeping in view of the comfort and interest of the travelling public", the third respondent decided to grant permit to the 4th respondent in respect of his vehicle of newer model for 3 years. Vide Ext. A/4 (certified copy of the order of the 3rd respondent). 4. The petitioner, thereupon, preferred an appeal under Section 64 of the Act to the second respondent (Chief Commissioner of Manipur) in C. C. M. V. Appeal Petition No. 104 of 1967. The second respondent held that, though both the petitioner and the 4th respondent had previous experience of running buses on the route concerned, the vehicle of the 4th respondent was of 1964 model while that of the petitioner was of 1963 model and that, therefore, the 3rd respondent acted properly in giving the permit to the 4th respondent in the interest of the public. He, therefore, dismissed the appeal. 5. The petitioner filed the writ petition to quash the orders of the respondents 2 and 3. 6. The respondents 1 to 3 filed counter supporting the orders passed by the respondents 2 and 3. 7. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the 3rd respondent contravened the provisions of sub-section (3) of S. 57 of the Act by failing to publish the applications or their substance in the prescribed manner in Ext. A/2 (Manipur Gazette). This objection was not specifically taken by the petitioner in his writ petition, though he made a general statement that the notification as per Ext. A/2 is contrary to section 57 of the Act. He argued that the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 57 are mandatory as can be seen from Ashoka Bus Transport Corporation, Bhilwara v. Appellate Tribunal of State Transport Authority, AIR 1960 Raj 63 and Haomon Ibomcha Singh v. Manipur State Transport Authority, Imphal AIR 1960 Manipur, 36 and that the third respondent should have published all the 3 applications of the petitioner and the respondents 4 and 5 in extenso in Ext. A/2 or at least their substance "in the prescribed manner" in the Gazette. Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Act is mandatory. It requires the Regional Transport Authority to publish either the applications or their substance thereof in the prescribed manner. It is not necessary that the applications should be published in extenso. But, their substance can also be published "in the prescribed manner". The petitioners counsel, however, was not able to point out whether any "manner" was "prescribed" either by the Act or the Rules framed thereunder, in which the substance of the applications should be published. He admitted that he was not able to find out any provision in the Act or the Rules prescribing the manner in which the substance of the applications should be notified. Ext. A/2 contains the substance of the applications. It mentions the route for which the applicants filed their applications, the names of the applicants, their addresses, the numbers of the vehicles quoted by them and their models. The 3rd respondent invited objections and representations to be filed within 30 days from the date of the publication of the notice. It further stated that the applications for the permit would be available for inspection in the office of the 3rd respondent and that the applications for the permit would be considered at a meeting of the 3rd respondent, which would be notified later on. So, Ext. A/2 contains the substance of the applications. Therefore, there is no force in the contention that Ext. A/2 is contrary to the provisions of Section 57(3) of the Act. 8. The second contention of the petitioners counsel is that the petitioner filed Ext. A/3, objection and representation against the applications filed by the respondents 4 and 5, but that the 4th respondent did not file any rejoinder or objection to the petitioners representation, that the 3rd respondent was not competent to hear the 4th respondent and that it ought to have dismissed his application. In support of his contention he relied on the following two decisions, which have no bearing on the facts of this case. In Vijai Motor Transport Association v. Mahakoshal Transport Service AIR 1953 Nag 150, the non-applicant No. 1 filed an application for a permit. The Regional Transport Authority published his application in the gazette and called for representations against the grant of the permit. In Vijai Motor Transport Association v. Mahakoshal Transport Service AIR 1953 Nag 150, the non-applicant No. 1 filed an application for a permit. The Regional Transport Authority published his application in the gazette and called for representations against the grant of the permit. The petitioner did not file any representation. But, at the time of the hearing of the application by the Regional Transport Authority, the petitioner appeared for the first time to oppose the grant of the permit. It was held that, as he did not make his representation under the provisions of Section 57(3) of the Act, he was not entitled to be heard in opposition to the application. In Anjaneya Motor Transport v. State of Madras AIR 1955 Mad 660 , N. S. Motor Service, Salem, applied for variation of the conditions of the permits for two buses. The Central Road Traffic Board issued a notification under S. 57(3) of the Act inviting representations and objections to the application of the N. S. Motor Service. But, no representation was made by anybody within the time limited. The appellants filed representations out of time. It was held that they had no right to be heard before the orders were passed and that it was the effect of S. 57(4) of the Act. So, these two cases do not relate to the case of an applicant who had filed his application for a permit. Sub-section (4) of Section 57 lays down that no representation in connection with an application referred to in sub-section (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority, unless it is made in writing before the appointed date and unless a copy of the order is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the person making such representation. According to sub-section (5), where any representation has been made under subsection (3) the Regional Transport Authority shall dispose of the application at a public hearing in which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard either in person or by a duly authorised representative. Sub-section (5) does not debar the Regional Authority from hearing an applicant, who had filed an application, though he has not filed any representation or objection against his rival claimant. Every applicant is entitled to be heard. Sub-section (5) does not debar the Regional Authority from hearing an applicant, who had filed an application, though he has not filed any representation or objection against his rival claimant. Every applicant is entitled to be heard. So, even though the 4th respondent did not file any re-joinder to the petitioners representation or representation to the petitioners application, he was entitled to be heard and the 3rd respondent was under a duty to dispose of his application on merits. The failure on the part of the 4th respondent to file re-joinder or Appellant representation against the petitioners representation or application would not debar him from pressing his own claim for the permit. Vide in this regard Shiv Narain v. Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur Region, Jaipur, AIR 1953 Raj 1 and my own judgment in Smt. Konthoujam Ningol Yumshang Devi v. Bharat Sevak Samaj, Imphal, Civil Writ Appl. No. 4 of 1968 D/-24-10-1968 : AIR 1969 Manipur 58 . Whether he would be entitled to file an appeal under Section 64 of the Act against an adverse order is quite a different matter. So, there is no substance in the contention that the 3rd respondent should not have heard the 4th respondent, but should have rejected his application for the permit. 9. The third contention of the petitioners counsel is that the 3rd respondent did not consider the representation made by the petitioner, that the 4th respondent had no previous experience of running a bus on the route in question, that the reasons given by the 3rd respondent for granting permit to the 4th respondent are vague and that, therefore, the order of the 3rd respondent evidenced by Ext. A/4 is liable to be set aside. He relied on Mannarghat Union Motor Services Ltd., v. Regional Transport Authority, Malabar AIR 1953 Mad 59 , Onkarmal Mistri v. Regional Transport Authority, Darjeeling AIR 1956 Cal 490 and Hanuman Transport Co., Ltd. Udipi v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 Mys 72 in support of his contention that the reasons for refusal to grant permit should not be vague. In the present case, the 3rd respondent stated in its order as per Ext. In the present case, the 3rd respondent stated in its order as per Ext. A/4 that the 3rd respondent considered the application of the petitioner and the respondents 4 and 5, that, out of the 3 applicants, the 4th respondent "quoted a vehicle of a newer model and that keeping in view comfort and interest of the travelling public, the 3rd respondent granted the permit" to the 4th respondent "for his vehicle of newer model". But, the second respondent considered the representation of the petitioner also and discussed in his order as per Ext. A/5, the relative merits and de-merits of the parties. He stated that both the petitioner and the 4th respondent had equal experience as they ran their vehicles on the same route previously and that, other things being equal the 4th respondents application was entitled to be preferred as he quoted a vehicle of 1964 model, while the petitioner quoted a vehicle of 1963 model. Exts. B/1 to B/5 show that the 4th respondent operated his vehicle on the same route previously. Under Section 55 (1) (a) of the Act, the respondents 2 and 3 were entitled to take into consideration the interest of the public generally while granting a permit. The matter was at large in the appeal before the 2nd respondent and he could reassess the relative merits of both the parties and his reasons would count. Vide also in this regard National Transport Co. v. S. K. Jain AIR 1953 Nag 264 and N. K. Das v. Appellate Board Transport, Assam AIR 1960 Assam 100. So, the reasons given by the respondents 2 and 3 are very sound. Though the proceeding before the State Transport Authority is a quasi judicial one, vide also AIR 1960 Manipur 36 and AIR 1960 Assam 100, the High Court does not sit in judgment as a Court of Second Appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the reasons for the impugned orders and decide for itself what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made. The writs, as are referred to in Article 226 of the Constitution of India, are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them or there is an error apparent on the face of the record and where such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. Vide G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 , Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi AIR 1952 SC 319 , Kanta Prosad Singh v. State Transport Authority, Assam AIR 1954 Assam 219, Jamnagar Motor Transport Union Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra and AIR 1955 Sau 57 and Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1956 SC 463 . 10. Thus, there are no merits in this Writ Petition and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Pleaders fee Rs. 100.00 nP. Petition dismissed.