N. G. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) [ His Lordships after stating the facts further observed: ] ( 2 ) THE short point that requires to be determined in this appeal is as to whether an order passed under sec. 12 (4) of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act 1951 hereinafter referred to as the Act requires that there must be a final decision about the defendant being the tenant of the suit premises or that B person shown or found to be a prima facie tenant is enough to justify the Court to exercise its powers under sec. 12 (4) of the Act. The contention in this regard made by Mr. Nanavaty the learned advocate for the appellant is that before passing an order under sec. 12 (4) of the Act the Court must record its finding about the defendant being a tenant in respect of the suit premises and that finding must be of a final character in the sense that it determines the issue raised in that regard in the suit itself. Unless that is done any order passed under sec. 12 (4) of the Act cannot be said to be valid and within the competence of the Court and therefore the order passed by the learned judge In striking off the defence raised by defendant No. 1 in the suit was obviously bad in law. He sought support from the decision Civil Revision Application No. 32 of 1966 given by Mehta J. on 17th October 1967. In that revision application the defendant had denied to be a tenant in respect of a suit shop belonging to the plaintiffs and an issue in that regard was already raised. However before deciding that issue the Court exercised its powers under sec. 11 (4) of the Bombay Rent Control Act (which applied to that suit) on the basis that there was prima facie case that the defendant was a tenant withholding the rent as required thereunder and Mehta J. took the view that the Court was in complete misimpression of law in interpreting the provisions of sec. 11 (4) in holding that when a person was prima facie shown to be a tenant such an order could be made. 11 (4) in holding that when a person was prima facie shown to be a tenant such an order could be made. He has then observed that the person against whom an order was passed must be a tenant or that the tenant must be withholding the rent and since the condition precedent for passing such an order namely about his finally deciding the issue as to whether he was a tenant in respect of the suit property did not exist no such order could be passed. The order was Thus ultra-vires sec. 11 (4) and was thus set aside in exorcise of the revisional jurisdiction under the Act. ( 3 ) WE are therefore required to consider the effect of such an order passed In this case under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 12 of the Act which has been analogous to sub-sec. (4) of the sec. 11 of the Bombay Rent Control Act. In other words the questions to be considered are whether the Court was competent and had jurisdiction to pass such an order if so whether It could do so without finally deciding about the defendant No. 1 being the plaintiffs tenant in respect of the suit premises. According to Mr. Nanavati once that order is found to be invalid subsequent orders passed by the trial Court being consequential cannot stand and his right to defend the suit has been wrongly taken away by the Court. Sec. 12 (1) of the Act provides that a landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases if any and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. Sub- sec. (2) thereof then says that no suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted Increases due until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted Increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 Sub- sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 Sub- sec. (3) thereof then says that no decree for eviction shall be passed in any suit if of the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due. The Explanation below that sub-section says that where there is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-sec (2) be makes an application to the Court under sub-sec (3) of sec. 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court. Then comes the relevant clause contained in sec. 12 (4) of the Act. It runs thus:-WHERE at any stage of a suit for the recovery of rent with or without a claim for possession. the Court is satisfied from the pleading of the parties and affidavits or otherwise that the tenant is withholding the rent on the ground that the rent is excessive and standard rent should be fixed the Court shall and in any other case if it appears to the Court that it is just and proper to pass such an order it may pass an order directing the tenant to forthwith deposit in the Court such amount of rent as the Court believes to be reasonably duo to the landlord. The Court may also order him to deposit in Court monthly or periodically such amount as it considers proper against rent which may become due during the pendency of the suit. Then comes the material part of the provision under which the order is passed by the learned Civil Judge and which has come to be challenged in this appeal. It provides that the Court may further order that if the tenant fails to comply with such order within such time as may be granted by the Court he shall not appear or defend the suit unless be obtains leave from the Court so as to appear or defend. It provides that the Court may further order that if the tenant fails to comply with such order within such time as may be granted by the Court he shall not appear or defend the suit unless be obtains leave from the Court so as to appear or defend. Such leave shall be in the discretion of Court and may be granted on such terms and conditions as the Court deems fit. Then sub-sec. (5) says that no appeal shall be from any order under sub-sec. (4 ). ( 4 ) NOW it is indeed true that the defendants has challenged his status as that of a tenant in respect of the suit premises and that such a question has got to be decided by the Court contemplated under the Act. It is equally true that if at the final hearing of the suit on an issue raised out of the pleadings in that regard the Court finds that he vas not a tenant the Court would have no jurisdiction to try the suit against him and has to dismiss it. But there is nothing to show under the Act that if a question such as the one arises in the suit the Court loses its competence to try the suit if reliefs claimed therein otherwise fall under the provisions of the Act. Sec. 28 of the Bombay Rent Control Act which gave competence to the Court came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court in she case of Babulal Bhuramal and another v. Nandram Shivram and others A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 677 and it has laid down clearly that the provisions of sec. 28 cover a case wherein a suit where one party alleges that he is the landlord and the other denies that he is his tenant or vice versa and the relief asked for in the suit in the nature of a claim arising out of the Act or any of its provisions. Later on it has been observed by the Supreme Court that the suit does not cease to be a suit between a landlord and a tenant merely because the defendants denied the claim of the plaintiffs. Whether the plaintiffs are the tenants would be claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions which has to be dealt with by the Court trying the suit. Whether the plaintiffs are the tenants would be claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions which has to be dealt with by the Court trying the suit. We have a similar provision contained in sec. 29 of the Saurashtra Rent Control Act and the decision can well apply here. It follows therefrom that when such a question arises in the suit the Court constituted under the Act is competent to try the same and in case it and that the defendant is not a tenant the suit may well be liable to be dismissed as one not falling under the provisions of the Act and the reliefs claimed against the tenant thereunder. The jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of determining the points arising in such a suit has to be determined on the recitals in the plaint and that was there and consequently the Court was competent to deal with all questions that arise under the different provisions of the Act so as to afford suitable reliefs to the parties in the suit. In the present case the relief sought for was under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 12 of the Act and the Court was therefore competent to deal with any such application filed by the plaintiffs in the suit. ( 5 ) NOW on an analysis of this sub-sec. (4) of sec. 12 of the Act it is no doubt clear that before passing any order directing the defendant to deposit in Court any amount of rent as the Court believes to be reasonably due to the landlord or even order him to deposit the amount of rent that may become due during the pendency of the suit it has to be satisfied in the first place that (1) he was a tenant and (2) that be was withholding the rent and (3) on the ground that it was excessive and that the standard rent should be fixed or that it is just and proper for the Court to pass such an order. The nature of this order is however of an interlocutory character and it was urged for the respondent that it is not necessary for the Court at that stage to determine finally the issue arising fin the suit viz. as to whether the defendant is a tenant for the suit premises. The nature of this order is however of an interlocutory character and it was urged for the respondent that it is not necessary for the Court at that stage to determine finally the issue arising fin the suit viz. as to whether the defendant is a tenant for the suit premises. and that it is enough as it happens in other interlocutory orders If he is shown to the Court to be a tenant prima facie. According to him all that is necessary is that he must be prima facie round to be a tenant before he can be so called upon to deposit any such amount of rent due or that may become due from him. What was attempted to be urged by Mr. Nanavati at first was that be must be admittedly a tenant as according to him there is nothing like prima facie or provisional determination of the status of the defendant and then it was said that at any rate he must be found by the Court on an issue raised in the suit that he was a tenant before any such order can be passed under sec. 12 (4) of the Act. The first part of the argument has no longer any substance in view of the Supreme Court decision referred to above for after all the Court is competent to decide such a point if arising in the suit. The use of the word tenant in sec. 12 (4) of the Act shows nothing suggestive that he must be either admittedly a tenant or that he must be shown to be a tenant prima facie or provisional. But the indication as to what is meant or intended by more use of the word tenant has to be gathered from the provision itself and in our view it makes it clear that the order passed thereunder being of a provisional character the findings in respect of points involved before passing any such order are also provisional and of an interlocutory character. Though they are provisional they have the finality for the purpose of passing orders under sec 12 (4) of the Act. Now in this regard the first thing to be noticed is that an order can be passed at any stage of the suit as the opening words of sub-sec. (4) show. Though they are provisional they have the finality for the purpose of passing orders under sec 12 (4) of the Act. Now in this regard the first thing to be noticed is that an order can be passed at any stage of the suit as the opening words of sub-sec. (4) show. It may be soon after the dependent appears and even before the issues are raised on the pleadings in the suit provided the other conditions of the suit under the Act are fulfilled. The object behind such an interlocutory order is of a two-fold character It would resolve the dispute for the time being as to at what rate rent was to be paid by the defendant-tenant if there exists any dispute and that he may be able to show that he was willing and ready to pay the rent and avail of the benefits under the Act. At the same time the landlord should not be made to suffer by not getting the amount of rent even at a reasonable rate to be fixed by the Court that would become due during the pendency of the suit. It cannot therefore be said that the question of his being a tenant if in dispute has to be determined for the purpose of final decision on an issue raised in the suit before any such order is passed by the Court. Not only that but such an application can well be decided on the strength of the pleadings of the parties and affidavits or otherwise and not by recording evidence as done in regular hearing of the issues or the suit. In other words the procedure adopted for the purpose of determination of the points arising thereunder would be of an interlocutory and summary character. Besides we may point out that all that this provision requires is that the Court has to be satisfied from such material on record that the defendant who is said to be a tenant has been withholding the rent on the grounds contemplated therein or that it is a case where it appears to the Court that it is just and proper to make such an order. No appeal has been even provided against any such order passed under this sub-section as would appear from sub-see. (5) of sec. 12 of the Act. No appeal has been even provided against any such order passed under this sub-section as would appear from sub-see. (5) of sec. 12 of the Act. In those circumstances the order passed thereunder much though is of an interlocutory character and not final in the sense that it determines finally the issue arising in the suit itself so that it cannot be redetermined in the suit but in our view it has been given a finality in so far as the Court is required to decide for the purpose of affording relief claimed on the determination of the points arising under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 12 of the Act. While therefore it is true as held by Mehta J. in the decision relied upon by Mr. Nanavati that such an order can only be passed against a tenant-it being a condition precedent it does not mean and in fact is not required that a final decision as in the suit has to be given by the Court about his being B tenant under sec 12 (4) of the Act. In our view it is enough if the Court is satisfied that he is a tenant even prima facie or provisionally for purposes of that application. He need not necessarily be held to be a tenant for all purposes in the suit that it may not have to be determined later one If it is done by raising a preliminary issue there is nothing wrong in it but not having so done it is perfectly open at the Court to decide it for the limited purpose contemplated in sec. 12 (4) of the Act. To hold otherwise would render the effect of sec. 12 (4) nugatory and meaningless. It follows therefore that once the Court exercised its powers and passed an order as done in this case under sec. 12 (4) of the Act the parties thereto are hound by the same in that proceeding. In fact the non-compliance thereof by the person against whom it is passed further entitles the Court subject to the provisions of the sub-section to pass an order whereby his defence can well be struck off as done by the trial Court. 12 (4) of the Act the parties thereto are hound by the same in that proceeding. In fact the non-compliance thereof by the person against whom it is passed further entitles the Court subject to the provisions of the sub-section to pass an order whereby his defence can well be struck off as done by the trial Court. In fact the powers given to the Court are far too wide in the sense that it can direct the defendant not to appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from the Court so as to appear or defend. The subsequent order on his non-compliance of the order passed under sec. 12 (4) was thus merely consequential and it is in no way shown to be invalid. It cannot therefore be said that the order was not a valid decision under sec. 12 (4) of the Act. It was pointed out by Mr. Nanavati that such an order would cause considerable hardship in case he did not comply therewith by not depositing the amount in Court. The consequences according to him are far too serious and any such interpretation given to it would not therefore be proper Now once the Court was competent to pass the first part of the order namely to direct the tenant to deposit the amount in Court as it believes to be reasonably due to the landlord it becomes an order of the Court which is required to be obeyed. The Court has been given powers to see that its order is complied with. It can exercise such powers by passing an order that on the tenant failing to comply with such an order during such time as it may fix he shall not appear or defend the suit unless permitted by it. Such a consequence arises out of his own act of non-compliance of the order and if he invites it which he can avoid by depositing the same-even under protest if he so chooses he must face the effect of the consequential order. Apart from that position the Legislature has taken into account and provided for his moving the Court for obtaining necessary leave to appear to defend the suit and the Court is given powers to exercise any such discretion if it feels justified about the seriousness of the consequences arising out of non-compliance of such an order passed by it. Apart from that position the Legislature has taken into account and provided for his moving the Court for obtaining necessary leave to appear to defend the suit and the Court is given powers to exercise any such discretion if it feels justified about the seriousness of the consequences arising out of non-compliance of such an order passed by it. In fact the intention of the Legislature is to see that the tenant should be given benefits arising under the Act provided in the first instance he pays up all the arrears of rent due to the landlord in the case on an order passed by the Court. Such powers are contemplated under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code where there arises any non-compliance of the order passed by the Court as for instance it would appear on a reference to Order 11 Rule 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is thus clear that such an interlocutory order passed under sec. 12 (4) of the Act being within the competence of the Court and since it bounds the parties to the suit for purposes of that application arising under sec. 12 (4) of the Acts there is no justification to say that the order passed by the Court was in any way bad in law and that therefore it cannot pass further orders on non-compliance thereof even though they may be penal. If at the end of the trial the Court finds that the defendant was not a tenant as contemplated under the Act it would be open to 2t to dismiss the snit But that stage reed not be gone into when such a matter arising under sec. 12 (4) is required to be considered and decided in the case. With respect therefore we are unable to agree with the view expressed in the decision given on 17th October 1967 in Civil Revision Application No. 231 of 1966. ( 6 ) WE may here observe that an application for being so permitted to defend was given and the same was rejected by the Court. That order was within the discretion of the Court and the exercise thereof against the defendant was confirmed by the appellate Court. We feel no justification to disturb any such order in Second Appeal. There is no other point urged and the appeal is liable to he dismissed. That order was within the discretion of the Court and the exercise thereof against the defendant was confirmed by the appellate Court. We feel no justification to disturb any such order in Second Appeal. There is no other point urged and the appeal is liable to he dismissed. ( 7 ) IN the result the appeal fails. It is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. .