ORDER T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. 1. The revision petition raises a simple but much debated question regarding the scope of the 'real controversy' rule in O.6 R.17, CPC. 2. The plaintiff who is the revision petitioner seeks reversal of the order of the court below refusing his application for amendment of the plaint. The suit is on for recovery of amounts due under a promissory note executed by the then trustee the Kalpathy Sri Viswanatha Swami Devaswom in favour of the plaintiff with the previous sanction of the Assistant Commissioner H.R. & C.E. Administration Palghat from the properties of the Devaswom on the ground that the money borrowed was utilised for devaswom purposes. The defendant, the present trustee of the devaswom, contends inter alia that the suit being based on the promissory note, no decree can be granted for the recovery of the plaint amount against the devaswom properties. 3. The plaintiff therefore filed IA 2421 of 1967 for amendment of the plaint to claim the necessary relief also on the basis of the debt covered by the promissory note The court below refused the amendment for the reasons that it will deprive the defendant of the plea of limitation. In doing so the learned Munsiff followed the decision in Kunhi Achan v Chidambara Iyer, 1966 KLT 597 wherein disallowing the decree against the assets of the identical devaswom as the suit was on the promissory note, a learned single Judge overruled the prayer for amending the plaint into one on the original consideration raised for the first time in the second appeal thus: "Counsel for plaintiff made an (o:al) prayer for an opportunity to amerd the plaint to make it expressly on the debt covered by the suit promissory note. As a fresh suit on the debt would now be hopelessly barred by limitation, I am not allowing that prayer here". 4. I do not consider the above decision as an authority for the proposition that under no circumstances can an amendment be allowed if it deprives the defendant of the plea of limitation. 5. The principle to be followed by courts in dealing with applications for amendment of pleadings is stated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, in Ma Shwa Mya v. Maung Mo Hasung, 48 Ind App. 5. The principle to be followed by courts in dealing with applications for amendment of pleadings is stated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, in Ma Shwa Mya v. Maung Mo Hasung, 48 Ind App. 214 : AIR 1922 PC 249 thus: "All rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice, and it is therefore essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally excercised, but none the less no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by means of amendment, the subject matter of the suit." 6. It is true that the cause of action on a promissory note is distinct and different from the cause of action on the loan which gives rise to the promissory note. It cannot be disputed that the two causes of action can be set up in the plaint at the time when it is filed and reliefs claimed on that basis. If any authority is necessary I will refer to the observations of Lord Buckmaster in Sadhsuk Janki Das v Sir Kishan Pershad, ILR 46 Cal. 663 (PC) to the following effect: "It would, of course, have been open to the plaintiffs, had they thought fit, to have framed their case in an alternative form, and to have sued both on the hundis and alternatively upon the consideration." 7. If the two causes of action can be combined in the plaint at the time of filing I do not , find any principle why one of the causes of action left out bona fide cannot be included subsequently by an amendment of the plaint. Though the discretion vested in courts in dealing with applications for amendment of the pleadings is very wide the decided cases have taken the view that because of the clause 'and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of deciding the real questions in controversy between the parties' occuring in O.6 R.17 CPC the courts cannot by way of amendment substitute one distinct cause of action for another or change the subject matter of the suits. In dealing with the corresponding English Rule O.28 R.1 of the Rule of 1883, Lord Esher said in Steward v. North Metropolitan Tramways Company, 1886 (16) QBD 556 at 558: "With regard to questions of amendment of pleadings, a rule has been enunciated by the Court, which is rather a rule of conduct than a rule of rigid law such as can never be departed from: because I take it that the Court might depart from it if there were very exceptional circumstances in any particular case leading the Court to think that it would not be right to apply it. It is nevertheless a rule of conduct which must be generally followed. The rule was thus laid down in Tildesley v. Harner (10 Ch. D. 393) by Lord Bramwell, who there says: "My practice has always, been to give leave to amend, unless I have been satisfied that the party applying was acting, mala fide or that by his blunder he had done some injury to his opponent which could not be compensated for by costs or otherwise. 'The subject was against discussed in Claranode v Commercial Union Association (32 W.R. 262), Where I stated the rule in terms substantially equivalent to those used by Lord Bramwell. I there said, "The rule of conduct of the Court in such a case is that, however negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed, if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs: but, if the amendment will put them into such a position that they must be injured, it ought not to be made.' And the same principle was expressed. I think perhaps somewhat more clearly, by Bowen, L. J., who says that an amendment is to be allowed 'whenever you can put the parties in the same position for the purposes of justice that they were in at the time when the slip was made." 8. I think perhaps somewhat more clearly, by Bowen, L. J., who says that an amendment is to be allowed 'whenever you can put the parties in the same position for the purposes of justice that they were in at the time when the slip was made." 8. In Cropper v. Smith, 1884 (26) Ch.D. 700 at 710 Bowen L.J., observed: "Now, I think it is a well established principle that the object of Courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with what I have heard laid down by the other division of the Court of Appeal and by myself as a member of it, I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the Court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such amendment as a matter of favour or of grace. O.XXVIII R.1, of the Rules of 1883, which follows previous legislation on the subject, says that, All such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. It seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as such a matter of right on his part to have it corrected, if it can be done without injustice. as anything else in the case is a matter of right." 9. In Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd edition) Vol. 24 page 200, para 358 the rule regarding amendment of pleadings is stated thus: "...... and a plaintiff will not be allowed to amend his pleadings to as to introduce a cause of action which is barred by the statute at the time of the attempted amendment." 10. In Weldon v. Neal, 1887 (19) QBD 394 the plaintiff who commenced an action for slander was non suited by the trial Judge on the ground that he had not alleged any special damage aod slander was not actionable without any special damage. In Weldon v. Neal, 1887 (19) QBD 394 the plaintiff who commenced an action for slander was non suited by the trial Judge on the ground that he had not alleged any special damage aod slander was not actionable without any special damage. The plaintiff who obtained an order from the court of appeal for a new trial with leave to amend her statement of claim, set up in the trial court by way of amendment, fresh claims based on assault, false imprisonment and other causes of action which were barred on the date of amendment. In overruling the amendment Lord Esher M. R. observed: "We must act on the settled rule of practice, which is that amendments are not admissible when they prejudice the rights of the opposite party as existing at the date of such amendments If an amendment were allowed setting up a cause of action, which if the writ were issued in respect thereof at the date of the amendment, would be barred by the Statute of Limitation it would be allowing the plaintiff to take advantage of her former writ to defeat the statute and taking away an existing right from the defendant, a proceeding which, as a general rule, would be, in my opinion, improper and unjust. Under very peculiar circumstances the Court might perhaps have power to allow such an amendment, but certainly as a general rule it will not do so". 11. The term "cause of action" in the above extract was explained by the Court of Appeal in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corporation, 1962 (2) All E.R. 24 thus: "In my view, the dictum of Lord Esher was not intended to lay down a rule that no material averment could ever be amended or added to after the period of limitation had expired. When he said 'a cause of action', he was I think, referring to what is popularly known as a cause of action, namely, a claime made on a certain basis. By 'a new cause of action', he meant a new claim made on a new basis. Mere the plaintiff's original elaim was for damages for breach of a contract made by the third plaintiff with the defendant and they claimed that it had been made on behalf of the first and second plaintiffs. By 'a new cause of action', he meant a new claim made on a new basis. Mere the plaintiff's original elaim was for damages for breach of a contract made by the third plaintiff with the defendant and they claimed that it had been made on behalf of the first and second plaintiffs. By their amendment, the plaintiffs still wish to claim the same damages in respect of the same contract made with the defendant through the person of the third plaintiff but they wish to claim as equitable assignees of the benefit which the then principals had in 1938' Thus, they are claiming the same relief but they are amending their title, namely, the intervening facts which entitle them to the benefit of the contract. In no sense is the nature of the action altered. The plaintiffs still wish to claim that which they claimed in 'the beginning. Nor are they suing in a different capacity. Although they now wish to claim by virtue of their right as equitable assignees of the benefit of the principal to the original contract, they still sue in their personal capacity as principals through the same agency on the contract albeit through an assignment of the benefit to them." 12. The above decision was followed by the Supreme Court in A. K. Gupta & Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1976 SC 96. The plaintiff in the said case had done work for the defendant under a contract of work which contained a clause that in case of an increase in the prevailing labour rate of more than ten per cent the plaintiff would be entitled to charge proportionate increased rates. Subsequent to the contract, there was an increase in labour rate by 20 per cent: Disputes arose between the parties regarding the interpretation of the contract. The plaintiff therefore filed the suit for a declaration that he was entitled to an enhancement of 20 per cent over the tendered rates. The trial court decreed the suit but the High Court in appeal dismissed the suit as not maintainable in view of S.42 of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff's application in the High Court for leave to amend the plaint by adding further relief for recovery of the money due under the contract was also refused. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the amendment ought to be allowed. The plaintiff's application in the High Court for leave to amend the plaint by adding further relief for recovery of the money due under the contract was also refused. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the amendment ought to be allowed. Sarkar, J., speaking for the majority view observed: "It is not in dispute that at the date of the application for amendment, a suit for a money claim under the contract was barred. The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a new cause of action particularly when a suit on new case or cause of action is barred: Weldon v. Neale, 1887 (19) QBD 394. But it is also well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action or raise a different case, but amounts to no more than a different or additional approach to the same facts, the amendment will be allowed even after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation .......... The expression 'cause of action' in the present context does not mean 'every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed' as was said in Cooke v. Gill, 1873 (8) C.P. 107 (116), in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts." 13. In Dorman v. J. W. Ellis & Co., Ltd., 1962 (1) All E.R. 393 the Court of appeal pointed out that introducing a new cause of action in the context of amendment of pleadings means introducing 'a new case', 'a new set of ideas'. In Marshall v London Passenger Transport Board, 1936 (3) All E.R. 83 the plaintiff who was injured in a collision between his bicycle and a tram car and who claimed damages for personal injuries because of the negligence of the defendants, their servant and agent, prayed for permission to set up a case of neglect to keep the tramway and the highway in repair describing the neglect as a breach of statutory duty. On the date of amendment the new case set up was barred by limitation. Lord Wright, M. R. in holding that the amendment cannot be granted observed: "........ But it is certainly an entirely different claim from a claim for negligent driving, and it is a claim which is not based on vicarious liability, it is a claim for breach of a statutory duty, which is a liability personal to the corporation and not capable of being delegated; but in addition to that it involves, as I read the proposed amendment, a quite different set of ideas, quite a different allegation of fact. As I understand it the original claim of negligence had been because the defendants' tramcar was driven into and struck the plaintiff, whereas the proposed amendment seems to allege that the bad repair of the road and the tramlines caused the plaintiff to collide with the defendants' tramcar, which is quite a different set of ideas from the idea of negligent driving. In my view, therefore, the proposed amendment would, if allowed, have set up a new cause of action involving quite new considerations, quite new suts of facts, and quite new causes of damage and injury, and the only point of similarity would be that the plaintiff had suffered certain injuries." 14. In Charan Das v. Amir Khan, 47 Indian Appeals 255 the plaintiffs filed suits for mere declaration of preemption rights in the respect of the plaint properties without claiming recovery of possession of the properties sold and the necessary consequential reliefs. The defendants while admitting the plaintiff's right to preemption contended that the suits were not maintainable having regard to the proviso to S.42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The application of the plaintiffs to amend the plaint by claiming possession was refused by the trial court and the first appellate court on the ground that on the date of the application for amendment time had expired for bringing a suit to enforce the right. But in second appeal the amendment was allowed because there was no reason to suspect the good faith of the plaintiffs and the proposed amendment did not alter the nature of the reliefs sought. But in second appeal the amendment was allowed because there was no reason to suspect the good faith of the plaintiffs and the proposed amendment did not alter the nature of the reliefs sought. Lord Buckmaster in overruling the plea of the defendants against the amendment observed: "That there was full power to make the amendment cannot be disputed, and though such a power should not as a rule be exercised where its effect is to take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time yet there are cases: see for example Mohummud Zahoor Ali v. Kutta Koer, 1867 (11) Moox, IA 468, (485), where such considerations are out weighed by the special circumstances of the case, and their Lordships are not prepared to differ from the Judicial Commissioner in thinking that the present case is one' 15. In Kisan Das Rupchand v Rachappa Vithoba, ILR 33 Bom. 644 the plaintiffs filed a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts on the ground that there was a partnership agreement in pursuance of which they supplied cloth worth Rs. 4001/- to the defendants. The trial court held that the alleged partnership was not proved and the suit is not maintainable but upheld the plaintiff's case regarding the supply of cloth to the defendants. In the appeal the plaintiffs filed an application for leave to amend the plaint to add the prayer for recovery of Rs. 4001/- after the claim became barred by limitation. The appellate Judge allowed the application for amendment and this view was confirmed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Batchelor and Beaman, JJ. Justice Batchelor observed: "As to the principles I think there is no room for doubt: they are contained in O.6 R.17 of the Code, which is substantially identical with O. XXVIII, R.1 of the English Rules of the Supreme Court. From the imperative character of the last sentence of the rule it seems to me clear that, at any stage of the proceedings, all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Upon the record before us 'there can be no doubt that this second condition is satisfied here, nor was this point challenged for the appellants. It remains to consider whether the allowance of the amendment worked injustice to the defendants. Upon this question Weldon v. Neal, 1887 (19) QBD 394, was cited for the appellants. Reference may also be made to Tildesley v Harner, 1878 (10) Ch. D. 393 at p. 396, Clarapede & Co., v Commercial Union Association, 1883 (32) W.R. 263, and Steward v. North Metropolitan Tramways Co., 1885 (16) QBD 178 : C.A. p. 556' But I refrain from citing further authorities, as, in my opinion, they all lay down precisely the same doctrine. That doctrine, as I understand it, is that amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused; to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still remains the same: can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the otherside, or can it not ?" 16. The concurring Judge Beaman observed: "A careful analysis of the leading English cases seems to me to yield this result. Amendments of pleadings will always be allowed, unless allowing the amendment will place the other party at a disadvantage for which he cannot be adequately compensated by costs. That is a rule of practice or as one of the great English judges prefers to call it, a rule of conduct, not of positive law. And, while usually adhering to it, the English Courts have been careful to distinguish its essential character, from a rule of positive law which must be obeyed in all cases Thus it has been observed that notwith' standing the salutariness and general correctness of the rule, it is always open to exception where circumstances of a particular case are very peculiar. In my opinion two simple tests, and two only, need to be applied, in order to ascertain whether a given case is within the principle. First could the party asking to amend obtain the same quantity of relief without the amendment? If not, then it follows necessarily that the proposed amendment placee the party at a disadvantage, it allows his opponent to obtain more from him than he would have been able to obtain but for the amendment. Second, in those circumstances, can the party thus placed at a disadvantage be compensated for it by costs? If not, then the amendment ought not, unless the case is so peculiar as to be taken out of the scope of the rule, to be allowed." 17. The decisions in Charan Das v Amir Khan, 47 Indian Appeals and Krisan Das Rupchand v Rachappa Vithoba, I.L.R 33 Bom. 644 have been quoted with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Leach & Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Jardine Skinner & Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 and P. H. Patil v K. S. Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363 . In the former case a suit for conversion was allowed to be amended into one for recovery of damages for breach of contract for non delivery of goods after the claim had become barred. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., speaking for the court observed: "Schedule R to the plaint mentions the several indent? in respect of which the defendants had committed default by refusing to deliver the goods, and the damages claimed are also stated therein. The plaintiffs seek by their amendment only to claims damages in respect of those consignments. The prayer in the plaint is itself general and merely claims damages. Thus all the allegations which are necessary for sustaining a claim for damages for breach of contract are already in the plaint. What is lacking is only the allegation that the plaintiffs are, in the alternative, entitled to claim damages for breach of contract by the defendants in not delivering the goods. It is no doubt true that Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. It is no doubt true that Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendments should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice." 18. In P. H. Patil v. K.S. Patil, the plaintiff who filed a suit under O.21,R.103 CPC for a declaration that he was entitled to recover possession of the properties from the 1st defendant did not give the grounds in the plaint claiming title to the properties against the 1st defendant. When this was pointed out by the 1st defendant, the plaintiff prayed for leave to amend the plaint to incorporate further and better particulars of the claim made in the plaint. Though the application was rejected by the trial court it was allowed by the High Court in appeal. In the Supreme Court it was contended that the High Court should not have allowed the amendment because the period of limitation for the suit had expired on the date when the amendment application was filed. In overruling the contention their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: "What happened in the present case was that there was a defect in the plaint which stood in the way of the plaintiff asking for the reliefs he asked for; that defect was removed by the amendments. The quality and quantity of the reliefs sought remained the same; whether the reliefs should be granted or not is a different matter as to which we are not called upon to express any opinion at this stage ................. A The amendments do not really introduce a new case, and the application filed by the appellant himself showed that he was not taken by surprise; nor did he have to meet a new claim set up for the first time after the expiry of the period of Limitation." 19. The decisions discussed above establish that a plaintiff will not be allowed to amend the plaint by setting up fresh claims in respect of causes of action which have become barred on the date of the application for amendment of the plaint. The decisions discussed above establish that a plaintiff will not be allowed to amend the plaint by setting up fresh claims in respect of causes of action which have become barred on the date of the application for amendment of the plaint. Where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action nor raise a different case but amounts to not more than a different or additional approach to the same facts based on the same cause of action, the amendment will be allowed even after the period of limitation. 20. In the case before me the only amendment prayed for is for a decree against the properties of the Devaswom based on the original consideration and I think in view of the principles pointed out the amendment asked for is only formal and should have been allowed. It is now well settled that where the terms and the facts of the original consideration are set out in the plaint but the plaint is based on a promissory note not admissible in evidence or barred by limitation, it is open to the court to grant a decree D to the plaintiff on the original loan although there is no such prayer even without an amendment of the plaint. In Ram Raghubir v. United Refineries Ltd., 1931 Rangoon 139 Carr, J. observed: "The District Judge seems to have accepted part of this contention, for he says, on p.8 of his judgment: "Before the plaintiffs could fall back on the original consideration they would have to amend their plaint, which they had not done. Why, holding this view, he did not dismiss the suit I cannot understand. There were only two possible causes of action - the original consideration and pronote. The second failed and if the suit was not so framed as to disclose the first then no cause of action at all was disclosed. I have no doubt that the plaint was originally drawn as one in a suit on a pronote, but its sufficiency as a plaint on the original consideration seems to me to depend on whether it discloses a cause of action on which the plaintiff can succeed independently of the pronote. And in my opinion it satisfies this test, though it would have simplified matters had it been amended. And in my opinion it satisfies this test, though it would have simplified matters had it been amended. If we omit from the plaint all references., direct or indirect, to the promissory note we still have a clear statement that there is still owing to the plaintiff the sum of two lacs of rupees on account of the sale price of the refinery, and that is I think a sufficient disclosure of a cause of action for the relief claimed. The objection is a purely technical one the main facts being admitted and I do not think that it can prevail." 21. In my opinion there is no injustice to the defendant in allowing the amendment but there will be injustice to the plaintiff in refusing it. The object of O.6, R.17, CPC is to enable the court to try the real questions in controversy between the parties after ascertaining the real character of the dispute between them thereby not giving undue attention to form. A rigid practice of refusing amendment of pleadings will only lead to failure of justice. 22. I am of the view that the order of the court below cannot be sustained as it is vitiated under S.115(c) CPC. I therefore set aside the same and allow the revision, but in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.