ORDER 1. This revision arises from an execution proceeding and is directed against the setting aside of sale under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C. 2. The judgment-debtor mortgaged the property in dispute to the appellant decree-holder. It was a mortgage with possession. There was a leaseback from the mortgagee to the mortgagor. A decree for arrears of rent was passed against the mortgagor-tenant in favour of the mortgagee landlord. In execution' of that decree, the mortgaged house was put to sale. 3. On February 17, 1966, the property was knocked down to one Girdharilal for his highest bid of Rs.9,250. But be did not deposit 25% of the purchase money as required under Order 21, Rule 84, C.P.C. The auction was then continued on different dates from February 24 to March 25, 1966. Ultimately the property was knocked down to Brijlal for Rs. 7,500 on March 25, 1966. 4. The judgment-debtor filed an application under Order 21, Rule, 90, C.P.C., for setting aside the sale on various grounds. The executing Court dismissed all the objections. But, on appeal, the Learned Additional District Judge, Gwalior, set aside the sale on two grounds: (1) A fresh proclamation of sale was not issued, when the property was put to re-sale, and (2) the executing Court had not decided the judgment-debtor's objection, which he had filed on May 1, 1965. Aggrieved by the appellate order setting aside the sale, the decree-holder preferred this revision. 5. It is contended for the petitioner that a fresh proclamation is not necessary, when the property is resold under Order 21, Rule 84, C.P.C. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor, on the other hand, contends that firstly, a fresh proclamation was mandatory as required by Order 21, rule 87. Secondly, in the present case a fresh proclamation was necessary because the property was not resold "forthwith as required under Order 21, Rule 84 C.P.C., but it was a fresh sale altogether as it was held subsequently; and since there was no fresh proclamation of sale, which was imperative, the subsequent sale was a nullity. 6. The scheme of the relevant Rules is that as soon as a person is declared to be the purchaser, he must pay immediately a deposit of 25 per cent on the amount of his purchase money (Rule 84). He has to pay the balance on or before the 15th day from the sale (Rule 85). 6. The scheme of the relevant Rules is that as soon as a person is declared to be the purchaser, he must pay immediately a deposit of 25 per cent on the amount of his purchase money (Rule 84). He has to pay the balance on or before the 15th day from the sale (Rule 85). In default of payment of the 75 per cent as required by Rule 85, the consequences are: (a) the deposit may be forfeited; and (b) the property shall be resold (Rule 86). It is then provided in Rule 87 that every resale of immoveable property, 10 default of payment of the purchaser money within the period allowed by such payment, shall be made after the issue of a fresh proclamation. The words "within the period allowed for such payment" make it quite clear that Rule 87 refers to the default under Rule 85, the consequences of which are provided in Rule 86. The words "within the period allowed for such payment" in Rule 87, exclude its application to Rule 84, because the latter requires the payment of deposit of 25 per cent "immediately after such declaration"; there is no "period allowed for payment". This was also the view taken in Pragdas v. Beniprasad AIR 1937 All 556. It is provided in Order 21, Rule 84, C.P.C., that as soon as the property is knocked down to the highest bidder, and he is declared the purchaser, he must deposit on the spot 25 per cent of the purchase money. If he does not, the property must be resold forthwith. It is conspicuous enough that in this Rule, there is no direction for issuance of a fresh proclamation. This is obviously so because of the force of the word "forthwith. Since the property has to be resold with reasonable speed and expedition, a fresh proclamation as required by Order 21, Rule 67, C.P.C., is not contemplated. The language of Rule 27 is in contrast with that of Rule 84. The object of issuing a proclamation of sale is to let the intending purchasers know what property is going to be sold and when, so that they may take part in the auction and offer their bids. That is why Rule 87 requires a fresh proclamation but not Rule 84 which envisages resale "forthwith". 7. The object of issuing a proclamation of sale is to let the intending purchasers know what property is going to be sold and when, so that they may take part in the auction and offer their bids. That is why Rule 87 requires a fresh proclamation but not Rule 84 which envisages resale "forthwith". 7. The word "forthwith" has received judicial interpretation on numerous occasions and in different contexts. In Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar v. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay 1956 SCR 653 , their Lordships had to consider the meaning of that word as it occurs in section 3 (3) of the Preventive Detention Act. It was held that the act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have been so done, when it is done with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay. As early as in Reg v. Justices of Worcester (1839) 54 RR 902 (903), Coleridge, J., observed :- "I agree that this word "forthwith" is not to receive a strict construction like the word 'immediately' so that whatever follows, must be done immediately after that which has been done before." In Hudson and others v. Hill and others (1874) 43 LJ CP 273 (280), it was held that the word 'forthwith' means without unreasonable delay. To do a thing 'forthwith' is to do it as soon as reasonably convenient. See also Reg. v. Price 14 ER 78 (Privy Council). No doubt, 'forthwith' means with all reasonable celerity, yet, it does not mean within so many minutes but within a reasonable time. (See Burges v. Boete Feur (1884) 135 ER 193 and King v. Chamberlain (1871) 40 LJCP 273). When a statute requires an act to be done 'forthwith' that act has to be done within a reasonable time and the word must be construed with regard to the object of the provision and the circumstances of the case. (Ex parte Lamb) (1881-82) 19 ChD 169. "A rule in an action to plead forthwith means as soon as by reasonable exertion it may be accomplished. 'forthwith' has a relative meaning, and will imply a longer or shorter period, according to the nature of the thing to be done." See (Moffat v. Dickson) 3 Colo. 313, 314. That word has not received a strict construction like the word "immediately" but whatever is to be done "forthwith" ought to be done without any unreasonable delay. 'forthwith' has a relative meaning, and will imply a longer or shorter period, according to the nature of the thing to be done." See (Moffat v. Dickson) 3 Colo. 313, 314. That word has not received a strict construction like the word "immediately" but whatever is to be done "forthwith" ought to be done without any unreasonable delay. In Ex. p. Lowe (1846) 3 Dowl. & L, 737, Coleridge, J., said:- "Now, without putting any critical construction on the word 'forthwith'; it means, I think, with as little delay as the Circumstances will reasonably admit of.” In Brown v. Bonnyrig Magistrates 1936 SC 258, Lord Carmont said: "To act 'forthwith'..... seems to mean 'reasonably soon in the circumstances'." The term has been said to be an elastic one with a relative meaning depending in any case on the circumstances. In more technical applications, as indicating, or allowing for, a reasonable time, the word does not mean instantaneously, instanter, or instantly, but has been variously defined as meaning as quickly as practicable; as soon as is reasonably convenient or reasonably possible; as soon as the thing may be done by reasonable exertion confined to that object, with all reasonable celerity, diligence or dispatch; within such convenient time as is reasonably requisite within such time as to permit that which is to be done to be done lawfully and orderly and effectually according to the practical and ordinary course of the thing or things to be performed or accomplished…without inexcusable, unnecessary or unreasonable delay." (per 37 C.J.S. 128-130). In Exparte Lamb: In re Southam (1881 - 82) 19 Ch. D 169 which was followed in Re Muscovitch (1939) 1 AER 135, Jessel, M.R., observed thus:- "I think that the word 'forthwith' must be construed according to the circumstances in which it is used...But where an act which is required to be done, forthwith can be done without delay it ought to be so done." With reference to these cases, their Lordships said in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar (supra): "There is nothing in the decision in Re Miscovitch and Ex parte Lamb: In re Southam, which can be considered as marking a departure from the construction put on the word 'forthwith' in the earlier authorities that it meant only that the act should be performed With reasonable speed and expedition, and that any delay in the matter should be satisfactorily explained.." 8. In view of the above authorities, it must be held that on its true construction the word "forthwith" employed in Order 21, Rule 84, C.P.C. does not mean instanter or instantly but means that the property must be resold without unreasonable delay, that is, with reasonable speed and expedition, and any delay in the matter must be satisfactorily explained. 9. Order 21, Rule 69, C.P.C., authorises the Court to adjourn any sale to a specific date and hour and the officer conducting the sale may, in his discretion, adjourn the sale by recording his reasons for such adjournment, That Rule further enacts that where a sale is adjourned for a period longer than 7 days, a fresh proclamation under Rule 67 shall be made, unless the judgment-debtor consents to waive it. Although the provisions of Order 21 Rule 69 C.P.C. do not apply in terms to a re-sale under Order 21, Rule 84. Its principles must be applied so that the very object of an execution sale may not be defeated. (See the principle of Thakurdin v. Ramlal, L. P. A. 23 of 1960, decided on October 10, 1961). In Beliram v. Sohansingh & others AIR 1916 Lah. 445 (2), where a fresh proclamation was made, the re-sale after six months was held to be "forthwith" See also Madhao Narayanrao Ghatate v. Mt. Watsalabai w/o Ganpatrao Deshmukh and another 35 MPLC 212 = ILR 1947 Nag. 939 and Hanumayamma v. Kottapalli Ankamma ILR 53 Mad. 900. 10. This discussion leads to the following conclusions:- (1) When the person, who is declared to be the purchaser, does not, after such declaration, pay immediately a deposit of 25 per cent of his purchase money to the officer conducting the sale, the property must be resold forthwith. The word 'forthwith' in Order 21, Rule 84, C.P.C., means with reasonable speed and expedition and delay, if any, must be explained. (2) If the officer conducting the sale commences the resale then and there on the spot, such resale is within the Rule, and it cannot be assailed on the ground that a fresh proclamation was not issued. The word 'forthwith' in Order 21, Rule 84, C.P.C., means with reasonable speed and expedition and delay, if any, must be explained. (2) If the officer conducting the sale commences the resale then and there on the spot, such resale is within the Rule, and it cannot be assailed on the ground that a fresh proclamation was not issued. (3) Where the officer conducting the sale does not commence the resale then and there but appoints, and announces to all present, another date and hour for the resale, such, date being not longer than 7 days, and reports the matter to the Court, and the resale takes place on such appointed date and hour, it is within Order 21, Rule 84, and no fresh proclamation is necessary. (4) Where the officer conducting the sale does not, then and there on the spot, commence the resale nor appoints another date and hour as above, a fresh proclamation is necessary before the resale. And, if the property is resold after a fresh proclamation, it is still within Order 21, Rule 84 C.P.C. (5) But where the resale is not commenced than and there nor is another date appointed as above, but the property is resold on another date without a fresh proclamation having been issued; the resale is a nullity on the principle that a sale which is held without intimating the public of the date and time of the sale is not a sale in the eye of law and must be struck down as null and void. 11. The present case is within the third proposition. On February 17, 1966, Girdharilal's bid of Rs.9,250 was accepted but he did not deposit 1/4th of the amount of bid. The officer conducting the sale then and there fixed the 24th February for continuing the sale and announced it on the spot. He reported the 'matter to the Court. It is said in his report that Girdharilal is a man without means and, on question being put to him, he told the officer conducting the sale that he had offered that bid because the judgment-debtor wanted him to do so. Then, on the 24th February, the fresh sale commenced. On the 24th February, nobody offered and bid, nor on the 25th and 26th February. Then on the 1st March, Brijlal offered a bid of Rs. 7,500. Then, on the 24th February, the fresh sale commenced. On the 24th February, nobody offered and bid, nor on the 25th and 26th February. Then on the 1st March, Brijlal offered a bid of Rs. 7,500. The auction was continued on the 2nd March and 3rd March, but no higher bid was offered. The officer conducting the sale fixed the 4th March mid-day and proclaimed it. He reported the matter to the Court for orders. The Court did not authorise him to accept the final bid on the 4th March. Then the auction continued on the 4th March, but there was no higher bid offered. The officer then fixed the 1st March and placed the matter before the Court. The Court again directed the officer to continue the auction and to report to it on the 12th March. Accordingly, on the 11th March the auction was continued, but nobody offered any higher bid. The officer therefore, fixed the 14th March for continuing the sale and reported the matter to the Court. It appears that the auction continued on the 14th March and the 21st March, but no higher bid was offered. The officer, therefore, fixed the 25th March and reported the matter to the Court on the 22nd March. The Court, by its order of the 22nd March, directed the officer conducting the sale to call out the highest bid three times on the 25th March and to accept the highest bid and receive 25 per cent of the purchase money. From all this it is quite clear that it was not as if the bid of Brijlal was accepted in any haste or as soon as the property was resold on the 14th February. The auction continued on different dates upto the 25th March, but when no higher bid was offered, the bid of Brijlal, which had been offered on the 1st March was accepted. 12. For these reasons, it cannot be held that there was material irregularity in conducting or publishing the sale. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that there was any substantial injury caused. No evidence has been relied on before me to show that the value of the house is much more than Rs. 7,500. The bid of Girdharilal for Rs.9,250 is irrelevant; for a bogus bid cannot determine the value of the property. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that there was any substantial injury caused. No evidence has been relied on before me to show that the value of the house is much more than Rs. 7,500. The bid of Girdharilal for Rs.9,250 is irrelevant; for a bogus bid cannot determine the value of the property. For these reasons, it must be held that the appellate Court was in error in setting aside the sale on the ground that a fifth proclamation was not issued before the property was put to a fresh auction. 13. It is worthy of note that the objection of the judgment-debtor was not that there was no appointment or announcement of the date and hour of resale as appears in the report of the sale amin dated February 17, 1966 or that there was no auction from the 24th February to 25th February and that the report of the officer conducting theresale is false. 14. Adverting to the second ground for which the sale has been set aside, it is true that on May 1, 1965, the judgment debtor filed an objection that the mortgaged property could not be put to sale without a suit for sale having been brought as provided in Order 34, Rule 14 C.P.C. and it is also true that the application remained undecided. But, in my opinion, that cannot be a ground for setting aside the sale, because it appears that the judgment debtor did not pursue and press this application until after the sale. Under the local amendment of Madhya Pradesh, a sale cannot be set aside under: O.21, R.90, C.P.C., on a ground which could be raised but was not raised before the sale. In the present case, the learned Additional District Judge has set aside the sale on the ground that the judgment debtor's application dated May 1, 1966, remained undecided. But this particular objection that his application was not being decided was not raised before the sale was held. The judgment debtor could have at least between the 17th February and 25th March 1966 raised the objection before the executing Court that his application dated May 1, 1965 had not been decided. He kept quiet. But this particular objection that his application was not being decided was not raised before the sale was held. The judgment debtor could have at least between the 17th February and 25th March 1966 raised the objection before the executing Court that his application dated May 1, 1965 had not been decided. He kept quiet. It is remarkable that from the orders of the executing Court and the appellate Court, it is patent enough that this second ground was not raised by the judgment debtor, but it was taken up by the Court suo motu. 15. It is unnecessary to consider Shri Patankar's argument that the lease back from the mortgagee to the mortgagor although simultaneous with the mortgage and although the lease is a mere device for securing payment of interest regularly in the form and in the name of rent, is an independent transaction and does not form part and parcel of the mortgage transaction so that the decree for rent is not a decree for money arising from the mortgage within the meaning of Order 34, Rule 14, C.P.C. 16. It is equally unnecessary to express any opinion on the question whether the judgment debtor can still-pursue his application dated May 1, 1965, in the executing Court and on the further question whether the sale can be held to be null and void under section 47 C.P.C. 17. The revision is allowed. The judgment and order of the appellate Court are set aside and those of the executing Court are restored with costs throughout. Counsel's fee Rs. 50/- in this Court.