JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, J. - The Appellant has been convicted u/s 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution case may be stated in brief. Makar Majhi (the deceased), the accused and Kalia (p.w. 3) are brothers. About 4 years back there was a dispute between the accused and the deceased over this lands. There was an amicable settlement through the intervention of the village punch. This lands were divided. Even thereafter they continued to quarrel. In Jesthe 1965 the accused administered some poison in the rice to be taken by the deceased. The deceased made a station diary entry (Ext. 6) at the Champua Police Station. Thereafter the accused and his wife (p.w. 18) left this village Kasipal and went to do labour in the mining area. On 25-10-1965, p.w. 9 found the accused sitting near a hillock in the afternoon. There was some instrument lying near the accused which looked like a Bala. P.ws. 7 and 8 saw the accused coming towards village Kasipal at about evening. p.w. 2 the sister of the accuses, and p.w. 4 the dallghter of the deceased were sleeping with the deceased in the same room. They found the accused inside that room focussing a torch in that very night but this evidence has not been accepted. In the following morning the deceased was found dead with injuries on his person, the accused was arrested on 27-10-1965. While in police custody be gave discovery of the Bala (M.O.I) from inside a bamboo bush. The Bala, on serological test, was found to contain human blood. On the aforesaid facts, the Appellant was charged u/s 302. Indian Penal Code. The defence is one of denial. The learned Sessions Judge held that the death was homicidal and that the Appellant killed the deceased. The finding that the death was homicidal is not assailed before us. 3. The only question for consideration is whether the accused killed the deceased. The learned Sessions Judge recorded the following findings: (i) The accused and the deceased were on inimical terms. The accused bad therefore a motive to commit the murder. (ii) In the afternoon of the date of occurrence, p.w. 9 found the accused sitting near a hillock which is at a distance of 5 miles from the village Kasipal. (iii) P.ws. The learned Sessions Judge recorded the following findings: (i) The accused and the deceased were on inimical terms. The accused bad therefore a motive to commit the murder. (ii) In the afternoon of the date of occurrence, p.w. 9 found the accused sitting near a hillock which is at a distance of 5 miles from the village Kasipal. (iii) P.ws. 7 and 8 saw the accused coming towards village Kasipal in the evening of that day. (iv) The accused made 3 statement before p.ws. 11, 12, 15 and 16, while in police custody, that he would give discovery of the Bala (M.O.I) concealed in a bamboo bush in the outskist of village Balarampur. The accused led the witnesses and brought M.O.I. which, on serological test, was found to contain human blood. The evidence of the Doctor (p.w. 6) is that the injuries on the deceased could have been caused by the Bala (M.O.I). (v) p.w. 12 deposed that the Bala (M.O.I.) belongs to the accused. p.w. 12 is truthful witness and there is no reason to dishelieve his statement. (vi) The accused came from the mining area with a Bala, but returned back without the Bala. The learned Counsel on either side do not dispute the correctness of the aforesaid findings. 4. These findings, in this ultimate analyasis, boil down to the existence of 3 important circumstances. They are: (1) The accused was in the village on the date of occurrence. (2) He bad a motive to murder his brother, and (3) He had given discovery of the Bala (M.O.I) belonging to him, concealed in a bamboo bush, and the Bala was stained with human blood and could have been used as the instrument of murder. 5. There being no eye-witness, the question for consideration IS whether the aforesaid circumstances are sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Law is well settled that the circumstances must be such, as taken together they would leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court that the accused was the allthor of the murder. 6. The first circumstance is Dot at all incriminating. The accused had come back to his own village and his presence in the village is not an incriminating circumstance. The second circumstance cannot seriously militate against the accused. There was definitely bad blood between the accused and the deceased. 6. The first circumstance is Dot at all incriminating. The accused had come back to his own village and his presence in the village is not an incriminating circumstance. The second circumstance cannot seriously militate against the accused. There was definitely bad blood between the accused and the deceased. The existence of a motive can therefore be reasonably inferred. It cannot however be overlooked that the existence of bad relationship can equally be construed as a circumstance whereby the accused might also be falsely implicated. This circumstance therefore by itself is not very incriminating. 7. The third circumstance is the confessional statement u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. The statement of the accused that he had concealed the Bala (M.O.I.) inside a bamboo bush is admissible. The further fact that it contained human blood and the opinion of the Doctor that by M.O.I the injuries on the deceased could have been caused aggravates inference that the Bala belonged to the accused and was used in the commission of the crime. The question for consideration however is whether this circumstance is by itself conclusive to connect the accused with the crime. 8. Kottaya v. Emperor AIR 1947 P.C. 67 , is the leading decision on this point. A clear exposition of the evidentiary value of such a statement is given in para 11 of the judgment this Lordships observed thus: Except in cases in which the possession, or concealment, of an object constitutes the gist of the offence charged, it can seldom happen that information relating to the discovery of It fact forms the foundation of the prosecution case. It is only one link in the chain of proof, and the other links must be forged in manner allowed by law. The effect of this passage has unfortunately been overlooked in most of the 'Subsequent decisions. The implication of this concept may be explained by an illustration. If the statement made u/s 27 of the Evidence Act leads to discovery of opium, then a conviction can be founded solely on the basis of that statement, as possession of opium without licence is by itself an offence under the Opium Act. Similarly discovery of arms without licence on the basis of a statement made u/s 27 of the Evidence Act can constitute the sole basis of conviction. Similarly discovery of arms without licence on the basis of a statement made u/s 27 of the Evidence Act can constitute the sole basis of conviction. But where the gist of the offence it not possession alone, then the statement leading to discovery in most cases cannot constitute the foundation of the prosecution case. As this Lordships put it is only one link in the chain of proof, and the other links must be established beyond reasonable doubt before the guilt is brought home to the accused. 9. A direct case on the point is to be found in AIR 1936 335 (Lahore) . In that case, a blood stained chopper and a blood stained chadar were recovered from the house of the accused this Lordships held that such a discovery was not by itself enough to justify the conviction. They observed thus: This is ciscumstantial evidence the value of which is very great when used to corroborate other evidence. It cannot by itself prove the Case for the Crown. I It is possible to imagine many an occasion where the mere discovery of a blood-stained weapon or blood-stained clothes was due to something other then murder, for instance, concealing a dead body or receiving from the real murderer a blood-stained weapon in order to hide it and so assist the murderer. It is impossible to say that the discovery of a blood-stained article is enough by itself to justify a conviction for murder. A similar view was taken In Re: Periyaswami Thevan. There the distinction in the effect of discovery of an article belonging to the deceased and to the accused was forcefully brought out this Lordships held that if the prosecution had shown that the blood-stains on the chopper belonged to the same group as the blood of the deceased, the answer would have been clinching. They observed thus: Ordinarily in It case of circumstantial evidence where there has been a discovery as a result of confession made u/s 27, Evidence Act, one expects to find the discovery of something which can be associated with the deceased and not with the accused. The question of the weapon with which the offence was committed being discovered as a result of information given by the accused is also probable. The question of the weapon with which the offence was committed being discovered as a result of information given by the accused is also probable. But in such a case the mere fact that a weapon, which could have been used for the commission of a crime like this, was discovered with blood-stains on it on information given by the accused, would not, by itself, be sufficient to show that he was the murderer. On the dictum of the Privy Council allthority, we are clearly of opinion that the confessional statement leading to discovery, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot establish the prosecution case that the accused was the murderer, though it raises grave suspicion. 10. Two decisions of the Supreme Court, through they are not exactly identical on facts, may be noticed. In Prabhu Vs. State of U.P., the motive was established though the motive could be ascribed to the accused as much as to his father this Lordships held that from the mere production of blood-stained Article by the Appellant one cannot come to the conclusion that the Appellant committed the murder. They observed thus: Even if somebody else had committed the murder and the blood stained articles had been kept in the house, the Appellant might produce the blood stained articles when interrogated by the Sub-Inspector of Police. It cannot be said that the fact of production is consistent only with the guilt of the Appellant and inconsistent with his innocence. The same view as reiterated in para 11 of the judgment, State of U.P. v. Daoman Upadhyaya AIR 1950 S.C. 1125, was cited as taking the contrary view this lordships distinguished that case saying that there were other circumstances present in addition to the statement made u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. The decision of K.K. Jadav v. State of Gujarat AIR 1966 S.C. 831, is also distinguishable on facts. But even in that case there is an observation in para 9 of the judgment supporting our conclusion this Lordships held: The mere fact that the dead body was pointed out by the Appellant or was discovered as a result of a statement made by him would not necessarily lead to the conclusion of the offence of murder. 11. But even in that case there is an observation in para 9 of the judgment supporting our conclusion this Lordships held: The mere fact that the dead body was pointed out by the Appellant or was discovered as a result of a statement made by him would not necessarily lead to the conclusion of the offence of murder. 11. On the aforesaid analysis, we are clearly of opinion that the discovery of the blood-stained Bala, made on the basis of the information given by the accused, arouses grave suspicion against him, but in the absence of other circumstances the mere existence of the motive would not be enough to justify the conclusion that the accused murdered the deceased. The information leading to the discovery is merely a link in the chain of circumstance. The other links are missing, and even if motive is taken into consideration, the entice chain is not complete. The accused is therefore entitled to benefit of doubt. 12. In the result, the order of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge is set aside and the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The Appellant be set at liberty forthwith. Ray, J. 13. I agree. Final Result : Allowed