Judgment N.L.Untwalia, J. 1. This is a defendants first appeal from the judgment and decree of the Court of the 1st Subordinate Judge at Dhanbad in Title Suit 12 of 1961, whereby the suit of the plaintiff-respondent for a declaration that it is the owner of the truck described in the schedule appended to the plaint has been decreed. 2. The sole plaintiff in the case Is Sunda Hire Purchase Corporation, a registered firm carrying on business at Dhanbad, and the sole defendant is Sardar Gurdial Singh Bedi carrying on business at Jamshedpur. The plaintiffs case is that it is the owner of a Motor, Tata Mercedes Benz Truck No. BRT 5405. On 23-3-1960 the defendant entered into a hire-purchase agreement in respect of the said truck with the plaintiff. He duly executed the agreement on the said date, in which were incorporated the terms and conditions of the agreement. A copy of the agreement was filed as annexure to the plaint and it was marked Ext. 7 at the trial. According to the agreement, the defendant was to make monthly payment of the hire money for the truck to the plaintiff. He made a few irregular payments, the total of which was Rs. 2,900 only. In spite of several demands by the plaintiff, the defendant neglected and failed to make any further payment. In pursuance of the term of the agreement, the plaintiff exercised its discretion as owner of the truck and repossessed the truck on 25-11-1960 at Joda in the district of Kenjore in Orissa. Thereafter the truck was brought back to Dhanbad, and an information was given to the Additional Superintendent of Police at Jamshedpur. At the time of the seizure of the truck and its repossession on behalf of the plaintiff, no objection was raised by the defendant. But subsequently he instituted a false criminal case against the plaintiff concealing the true state of affairs and got the truck seized by the Baghmara Police on 23-12-1960. The truck was in the custody of the Baghmara Police within the jurisdiction of Dhanbad Court on the date of the institution of the suit and hence the plaintiff instituted the suit for a declaration as already stated. 3. The appellant took various pleas in his written statement. The truck was in the custody of the Baghmara Police within the jurisdiction of Dhanbad Court on the date of the institution of the suit and hence the plaintiff instituted the suit for a declaration as already stated. 3. The appellant took various pleas in his written statement. To state briefly only those which are relevant for the purposes of deciding the points urged in appeal, mention may be made of the following pleas- (i) The defendant did not enter into any Hire-purchase agreement on 23-3-60 or at any time with the plaintiff in respect of Motor Truck No. BRT 5405; the alleged agreement is forged and fabricated. (ii) The plaintiffs case that the defendant made some irregular payments of Rs. 2,900 to it and thereafter failed to make any payment is false and frivolous. (iii) In February, 1959 the defendant entered into a Hire-purchase agreement with Messrs. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (hereinafter, for the sake of bravity, to be referred to as Telco Ltd) with respect to the truck in question on payment of certain sums of money agreeing to pay the balance in eleven equal monthly instalments of Rs. 1,700 each. Thereafter the defendant paid on different dates Rs. 9,200 to Telco Ltd. In March, 1960 the defendant received Rs. 9,508 from Messrs. Tewary Bechar and Co. Private Ltd., which took the signature of the defendant on a handnote which was in favour of Sunda Credit Corporation. On receipt of the said loan, the defendant paid the amount to Telco Ltd. through Tewary Bechar and Co. Private Ltd., on 25-3-1960 in full satisfaction of the claim of the Telco Ltd. On 12-12-1960 the said company issued a Hire-purchase termination letter in favour of the defendant terminating the Hire-purchase agreement and thereafter transferring the complete ownership of the truck in favour of the defendant. (iv) Out of the aforesaid loan of Rs. 9,508 the defendant claimed to have paid Rs. 7,050. (v) After the defendant had become the owner of the truck, he was plying it for his business and while it was in the custody of his driver Ram Prasad in the night of 25/26-11-1960, Rashid and Anand of Dhanbad along with three others, by misrepresentation, befooled Ram Prasad and took away the truck from Sini within Seraikella Sub-division in Singhbhum District. Information was lodged against the aforesaid persons on the next day at Seraikella and the Seraikella Police with the help of Baghmara Police seized the truck which was kept concealed by the aforesaid persons. (vi) The defendant filed an application before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Seraikella, for release of the truck in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff objected to it. The learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, however, by his order dated 5-1-1961, after hearing the parties, directed release of the truck in favour of the defendant. As against the aforesaid order, the plaintiff filed a revision petition in the court of the Sessions Judge of Singhbhum at Chaibassa. The learned Sessions Judge rejected the petition of the plaintiff by his order dated 8-4-1961. (vii) The suit is barred under Sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. (viii) The Dhanbad Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge accepting the plaintiffs case and overruling all the pleas raised by the defendant has decreed the suit. The defendant has come up in appeal. Mr. Basudeva Prasad Learned counsel for the defendant, has urged the following points- (I) The suit is barred under Sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. (II) The Dhanbad Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as the defendant did not reside within its jurisdiction nor did arise therein any part of the cause of action. (III) The rinding of the court below that the defendant had entered into a Hire-purchase agreement with the plaintiff is wrong; it ought to have been held that the alleged agreement is a forged and fabricated document. (IV) In any view of the matter, the agreement was not valid in law as on the date of the agreement the truck did not belong to the plaintiff. 5. The first point urged on behalf of the appellant is covered by the decision of the court below on issue No. 3 in relation to that point. In paragraph 12 of the judgment, the court below has rightly pointed out that the Police had seized the truck from the custody of the plaintiff and the truck being in Police custody, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to ask for recovery of possession of the truck. The truck was bound to be released to the person in whose favour the decision of the civil court could go. The truck was bound to be released to the person in whose favour the decision of the civil court could go. I may in this connection refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Deo Kuer V/s. Shea Prasad Singh, AIR 1966 SC 359 wherein Sarkar, J., as he then was, delivering the judgment of the Court, pointed out that "..... In a suit for declaration of title to property filed when it stands attached under Sec.145 of the Code, it is not necessary to ask for the further relief of delivery of possession". Applying the same principle, the seizure of the truck by the Police will be tantamount to the truck being in the custody of the Police for the benefit of the party who is declared by the civil court to be entitled to its possession. 6. Apart from the fact that under Sec.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellant had to show prejudice which he has utterly failed to show even if it were to be held that the Dhanbad Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, on the facts pleaded and found, it is manifest that the said court had jurisdiction to try it. The truck was seized from the plaintiffs custody at Dhanbad by the Baghmara Police. The cause of action, as rightly pleaded in paragraph 12 of the plaint, arose within the jurisdiction of the Dhanbad Court on 23-12-1960. the date when the truck was seized. The defendant does not denv this fact as it was so obviously true a fact. I, therefore, held that the Dhanbad Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. 7. On the main question of fact, the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff is so overwhelming and reliable that it is surprising that the defendant not only took a false and dishonest plea in his-written statement and at the trial of the suit in the court below but he persisted to pursue it even in this court, although Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, found it difficult almost impossible to attack any finding of fact recorded by the court below by advancing any argument of substance. The argument advanced in this regard was of such a flimsy character that we did not think it necessary to call upon the plaintiff respondent to reply to it. Basudeva Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant, found it difficult almost impossible to attack any finding of fact recorded by the court below by advancing any argument of substance. The argument advanced in this regard was of such a flimsy character that we did not think it necessary to call upon the plaintiff respondent to reply to it. Nor was the said respondent asked to reply to any of the first two points stated earlier. The only point on which it was called upon to reply was the fourth one, which will be discussed hereinafter. 8. The circumstances under which the defendant changed the Hire-purchase agreement and entered into one with the plaintiff are these. In the first instance the defendant had entered into a Hire-purchase agreement with Telco Ltd. But he committed defaults in payment of the amounts of instalments due, which led the said company to write a letter dated 11th of March, 1960, a copy of which is Ext. 2/h, to the defendant. This copy was sent along with letter (Ext. 2/g) of the same date to Tewary Bechar and Co., Jamshedpur. In Ext. 2/h it is stated- "We have been hearing from you one excuse after another for non-payment of the instalments. Your account has been carried in a very unsatisfactory manner right from its inception ..... We are not agreeable to give you any further latitude and unless the above instalments are remitted by return, we shall have no alternative but to arrange further action in the matter." While forwarding Ext. 2/h to Tewary Bechar and Co., Telco Ltd, wrote in Ext. 2/g. "The Hirer has been giving trouble right from the beginning. If his vehicle has come to you with a broken housing, kindly arrange to seize the same". It is then that Tewary Bechar and Co., arranged with the plaintiff for advance of Rs. 18,000 or Rs. 19,000 to the defendant on the condition that he would execute the Hire-purchase agreement in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the truck in question. To this effect is the clear evidence of Ajab Lal Anand (P.W. 11) who was at the relevant time in service of the plaintiff firm. He is supported in this regard by the Branch Manager of Tewary Bechar and Co., Shri Onkar Pra-sad Dubey (P. W. 12). To this effect is the clear evidence of Ajab Lal Anand (P.W. 11) who was at the relevant time in service of the plaintiff firm. He is supported in this regard by the Branch Manager of Tewary Bechar and Co., Shri Onkar Pra-sad Dubey (P. W. 12). On instructions from the General Manager of the Company at Jamshedpur, P. W. 12 contacted Shri A. L. Anand, the Manager of the plaintiff corporation and arranged the deal. The learned Subordinate Judge has referred to numerous pieces of documentary evidence on the point of the deal between the parties. As I have said above, no argument of any substance could be advanced to attack the substantial finding of fact recorded by the court below on the overwhelming evidence adduced by the plaintiff, supported as it was by some of the documents filed and/or exhibited by the defendant himself. It is not necessary for me to deal with all that evidence in any detail. I am afraid, however, I shall have to repeat or paraphrase some of the observations of the court below with reference to some pieces of evidence. 9. On receipt of the bank draft for Rs. 18,000 from the plaintiff Corporation, Sri S. C. Sarkar, Secretary of Tewary Bechar and Co;. Jamshedpur, wrote the letter (Ext. 2/k) on the 21st March, 1960 to the plaintiff Corporation stating therein- "This is to inform you that Sardar Gurdial Singh Bedi has paid in full (out of the money paid by you) the instalments due to M/s. Telco Ltd., under hire-purchase agreement covering Tata Mercedes Benz truck No. BRT 5405. You may, therefore, enter into a hire-purchase agreement with him covering the said truck." The proposal form (Ext. 13) was filled up bv the defendant on the 23rd March, 1960. In this proposal form against the various columns, he stated that Telco Ltd., with which there was a Hire-purchase agreement earlier, had released the vehicle which was Tata Mercedes Benz Truck bearing No. BRT 5405. Accepting this proposal form, the Hire-purchase agreement (Ext. 7) was entered into on the same day, i.e., 23-3-1960. This also bears the signature of the defendant and Jiwanlal Sunda. partner of the plaintiff Corporation, besides the signature of the guarantor. The defendant has falsely and dishonestly denied his signatures on those documents and on some others, as remarked by the court below. 10. 7) was entered into on the same day, i.e., 23-3-1960. This also bears the signature of the defendant and Jiwanlal Sunda. partner of the plaintiff Corporation, besides the signature of the guarantor. The defendant has falsely and dishonestly denied his signatures on those documents and on some others, as remarked by the court below. 10. The defendant has admitted, as stated in the 17th paragraph of the judgment of the court below under issue No. 9, that he had given Rs. 9,503 to Telco Ltd. as the balance of the amount due under the Hire purchase agreement and that he was short of fund; therefore, he had requested Tewary Bechar and Co. to arrange for the money in order to pay off the dues of Telco Ltd. His case that the said amount was arranged from Sunda Credit Corporation on the basis of a hand-note has not been substantiated at all. Jawanlal Sunda was a partner of both the Corporations. Ext. 2/f is a letter from the defendant to Tewary Bechar and Co., Jamshedpur, requesting the latter to pay to Telco Ltd. Rs. 9,508 being the balance due to it towards Hire-purchase contract of the said Company out of the amount of Rs. 18.000 received from Messrs. Sunda Hire-purchase Corporation on the defendants account. The defendant denied his signature on this letter. But it is manifest that all his denials were shamelessly dishonest as a reputed firm like Tewary Bechar and Company which was a big Company, as admitted bv the defendant himself, could not have forged such large number of documents to support an allegedly false case of the plaintiff. P. Ws. 7 and 12 on behalf of Tewary Bechar and Co. have come to support the case of the plaintiff. The fact of the deal finds further support from Ext. C, entries in the ledger book of Tewary Bechar and Co., which was used by the defendant. The ledger stood in the name of G. S. Bedi, the defendant. The entry in the ledger shows that a sum of Rs. 18,000 was credited to the account of the defendant on March 25, 1960 as having been received by a demand draft from Sunda H. P. Corporation. The entry on the 25th March indicates that it was so made on encashment of the draft, although on receipt of it Tewary Bechar and Co. informed Messrs. 18,000 was credited to the account of the defendant on March 25, 1960 as having been received by a demand draft from Sunda H. P. Corporation. The entry on the 25th March indicates that it was so made on encashment of the draft, although on receipt of it Tewary Bechar and Co. informed Messrs. Sunda Hire-purchase Corporation earlier in its letter (Ext. 2/k) on 21st March 1960 that the instalment money due to Telco Ltd. had been paid, meaning thereby that it can be taken for granted that that had been paid. Ext. C further shows that a sum of Rs. 9,511 including bank charges was debited to the account of Bedi on March 25 when it was sent to Telco Ltd. The balance of Rs. 8,458.25 was refunded to Bedi as evidenced by Ext. C. Ext. D is the account in respect of the Hire-purchase agreement between the defendant and Telco Ltd. It shows receipt of the sum of Rs. 9,508 on 25-3-1960, the date of Telcos receipt being 30-3-1960. Exts. 4 series are the entries in the cash book of Tewary Bechar and Co., Supporting the case as just stated. Ext. 8 is the receipt granted by the defendant to Tewary Bechar and Co. for having got the refund of Rs. 8,458.25. Mr. Basudeva Prasad stated before us that there was no receipt granted by the defendant for the said amount. When his attention was drawn to the original of Ext. 8, he stated that it was a voucher prepared in the office of Tewary Bechar and Co. But surprisingly enough this contained the stamped receipt of G. S. Bedi also in token of the receipt of payment of the sum of Rs. 8,458.25. The defendant had the hardihood to deny his signature on Ext. 8 also, suggesting thereby that Tewary Bechar and Co. has colluded with the plaintiff in forging his signature on Ext. 8. The stand of the defendant is too obviously false to merit any detailed consideration. 11. On receipt of the balance of the dues, Telco Ltd. addressed a letter (Ext. A) that its interest in the ownership of the vehicle covered by the Hire-purchase agreement had ceased as from March, 30, 1960. A copy of this letter was sent to the plaintiff Corporation as also to the defendant. 11. On receipt of the balance of the dues, Telco Ltd. addressed a letter (Ext. A) that its interest in the ownership of the vehicle covered by the Hire-purchase agreement had ceased as from March, 30, 1960. A copy of this letter was sent to the plaintiff Corporation as also to the defendant. This letter was meant to be handed over to the hirer after recovering from him Telcos previous letter addressed to the registering authority. Exts. A/1 and A/2 referred to in the 18th paragraph of the judgment of the court below also lend support to the facts aforesaid. In the 19th and 20th paragraphs of the judgment is discussed the payment of a further sum of Rs. 1,000 by the plaintiff to the defendant, and the final finding is recorded in paragraph 21 regarding the payment of Rs. 18,000 in March, 1960 and Rs. 1,000 in May, 1960. 12. Ext. 2/n is the letter dated 10-9-60 by G. S. Bedi to the plaintiff in which he accepts the fact that he made a Hire-purchase agreement in March, 1960 through O. P. Dubey of Messrs. Tewary Bechar and Co. Very unfortunately for the defendant, in his chain of denial of his signatures on so many documents, he forgot to deny his signature on, and the genuineness of, the letter (Ext. 2/n). In this letter he pleaded for more time for payment of the instalments due to the plaintiff. Ext. 2/q is the letter from the defendant to the Superintendent of Police, Jamshedpur, written on 23-3-60 accepting that he had taken the truck--BRT 5405-- on hire from Sunda Hire-purchase Corporation, Dhanbad. He authorised the registering authority to transfer the vehicle at the request of the Corporation at any time. Ext. A/3, a document filed by the defendant, shows that Tewary Bechar and Co. had informed the Additional Superintendent of Police, Jamshedpur, on 10-1-61 that the interest of Telco Ltd. had ceased in this truck and the plaintiff had got a Hire-purchase agreement in its favour by G. S. Bedi. 13. In the 24th paragraph of the judg-ment of the court below have been discussed the facts and evidence relating to the part payment of the instalments by the defendant. The evidence is so overwhelming that no part of it could be attacked. Some of the payments were made through bank drafts (Exts. 11 series) which bore the endorsements Ext. 13. In the 24th paragraph of the judg-ment of the court below have been discussed the facts and evidence relating to the part payment of the instalments by the defendant. The evidence is so overwhelming that no part of it could be attacked. Some of the payments were made through bank drafts (Exts. 11 series) which bore the endorsements Ext. 10 series) under the signature of the defendant. The defendant did not hesitate in denying his signature even on Exts. 11 series, suggesting thereby that the State Bank of India had also colluded with the plaintiff in the alleged act of forging many documents. I do not find it necessary to refer in detail to the various other documents referred to in paragraphs 24 to 26 of the judgment of the court below. They all irresistibly lend to the conclusion that the case of the plaintiff is true and that of the defendant is false. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the signature was not sent to any handwriting expert for comparison. On the facts of this case, it was not at all necessary to do so. On a bare comparison of some of the disputed signatures of the defendant with those of his admitted ones, it was even clear to us on a visual test that his signatures were genuine. Counsel then submitted that Jiwanlal Sunda, the partner of the plaintiff Corporation, has not examined himself. It was not necessary for him to do so. Ample evidence was there to prove the case of the plaintiff corporation. 15. I, therefore, hold in agreement with the finding of the court below that the defendant had entered into a Hire-purchase agreement with the plaintiff and that the agreement (Ext. 7) is a genuine document. I also hold that the defendant comitted breach of the terms and condition? oi" the agreement, did not pay the instalment amounts in time and, therefore, the plaintiff became entitled to take possession of the truck under the terms of the agreement. The plaintiff did take possession of the truck accordingly and the criminal case started by the defendant was unwarranted and unjustified. 16. The agreement (Ext. 7) recites that the plaintiff Corporation is entering into it as the owner, and the defendant as the hirer, of the vehicle in question. The plaintiff did take possession of the truck accordingly and the criminal case started by the defendant was unwarranted and unjustified. 16. The agreement (Ext. 7) recites that the plaintiff Corporation is entering into it as the owner, and the defendant as the hirer, of the vehicle in question. It further recites in the 4th clause that on payment of the entire instalment money due. "the hiring shall come to an end and the vehicle shall at the option of the Hirer become his property and the Owners will assign and make over all their right, title and interest in the name of the Hirer, but until such payments as aforesaid have been made the vehicle shall remain the absolute property of the owners." The 4th condition in the agreement is --"The Hirer acknowledges that he holds the vehicle as a bailee of the Owners and shall not have any proprietary right or interest as purchaser therein until he shall have exercised his option of purchase as herein provided and shall have paid the whole amount due under this agreement or under any term thereof". The 5th condition reads as follows :- - "The owner may terminate with or without notice the contract of hiring and forthwith retake and recover possession of the vehicle :- - (a) If any monthly hire or part thereof is in arrear and left unpaid for a period of seven days after the date fixed for its payment for any reason whatsoever and particularly notwithstanding any claim which the Hirer may have in respect of insurance hereinafter mentioned. (b) If the Hirer commits or suffers any breach of the conditions and obligations herein stipulated to be observed and performed by him or does anything or suffers any act to be done which in the opinion of the Owners may prejudice their title to the Vehicle". In pursuance of the conditions aforesaid, it is manifest, the plaintiff became entitled to retake and recover possession of the vehicle and the Police had no power to seize it from its custody. The vehicle, namely, truck No. BRT 5405 must be released and handed over to the plaintiff Corporation by the authority in whose custody the truck may be. 17. Ext. 1 is the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Seraikella, directing the release of the truck in favour of the defendant. Ext. The vehicle, namely, truck No. BRT 5405 must be released and handed over to the plaintiff Corporation by the authority in whose custody the truck may be. 17. Ext. 1 is the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Seraikella, directing the release of the truck in favour of the defendant. Ext. J is the certified copy of the order of the learned Sessions Judge of Chaibassa refusing to make a reference to the High Court in Criminal Revision 1 of 1961 to quash the order of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate contained in Ext. 1. The orders in those proceedings cannot help the defendant at all. I may also add that the learned Sessions Judge referring to the various papers which were relied on before him observed in his order (Ext. 9).- "All these papers are letters of correspondence and relate to the question of title and unless there is a thorough enquiry concerning this aspect of the case by a Court of competent jurisdiction by looking into the originals of these papers as well as the connecting registers of the Corporation and Tewary Bechar & Co., it would be rather a difficult task for a criminal court to give any considered opinion on these papers." All the papers have now been duly considered by the Civil Court and a correct finding has been recorded by it, which is being affirmed by me. 18 Now coming to the 4th and the last point urged on behalf of the appellant, it would be noticed that till the truck was released by Telco Ltd., in the eye of law, technically that company was the owner of the truck. The truck was released either on the 25th March, 1960, as observed by the learned Subordinate Judge, or on the 30th of March, 1960, as mentioned in some of the documents exhibited, which have already been referred to including the letter (Ext. A). The facts clearly show, however, that release could only be obtained from Telco Ltd. when the payment of Rs. 9,508 which was arranged to be paid through the plaintiff Corporation, was made. The defendant wanted some more money to run his business and he got it to the tune of Rs. 8,000 to Rs. 9,000 from the plaintiff Corporation. A). The facts clearly show, however, that release could only be obtained from Telco Ltd. when the payment of Rs. 9,508 which was arranged to be paid through the plaintiff Corporation, was made. The defendant wanted some more money to run his business and he got it to the tune of Rs. 8,000 to Rs. 9,000 from the plaintiff Corporation. On the date, i.e., the 23rd March, 1960 when the Hire-purchase agreement was entered into neither the plaintiff was the owner of the truck in the eye of law nor was the defendant as the ownership on that date vested in Telco Ltd. Two questions were canvassed in this regard-- (i) that there was nothing to indicate that the defendant had transferred his ownership of the truck to the plaintiff on or before the 23rd of March, 1960 and (ii) that he had no right to transfer the ownership as on that date he was not the owner, 19. In my opinion, there is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant even in this regard. The truck was a movable property. Wo registered document was necessary for the transfer of ownership in it. The facts recited in the proposal form (Ext. 13) and more specifically in the agreement (Ext. 7) unmistakably show that the ownership had been transferred by the defendant by necessary implication and implied contract to the plaintiff. He admitted the plaintiff to be the owner of the truck, characterising himself as a bailee of the vehicle in the 4th "Condition of the agreement quoted above. He cannot now turn round and say that the plaintiff is not the owner of the truck in view of the provision of law contained in Sec.117 of the Evidence Act. A principle of estoppel codified therein states- ".....nor shall any bailee or licensee be permitted to deny that his bailor or licensor had, at the time when the bailment or license commenced, authority to make such bailment or grant such license". 20. On release of the truck by Telco Ltd. either on the 25th or 30th March, 1960 undoubtedly the defendant became its owner. In that view of the matter, the principle of law decided in the case of Co-operative Hindustan Bank Ltd. V/s. Surendra Nath Dey, AIR 1932 Cal 524, referred to in the judgment of the court below would be attracted. In that view of the matter, the principle of law decided in the case of Co-operative Hindustan Bank Ltd. V/s. Surendra Nath Dey, AIR 1932 Cal 524, referred to in the judgment of the court below would be attracted. The principle is based upon certain decisions of the English Courts, the gist of which can better be stated by a quotation from Article 1002 of Halsburys Laws of England, volume 14 (3rd Edition), at page 532, which is as follows : "Upon the same principle is based the efficacy of an assignment of after-acquired property. Neither in equity nor at law can there be an assignment of what has no existence. The assignment operates as a contract, and if it is for value then when the property comes into existence equity, treating that as done which ought to be done, fastens upon the property and then contract to assign becomes in equity a complete assignment". A few lines may also be quoted with advantage from Article 418 of the 15th Volume of Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edition, at pages 220 and 221.- "where the grantor or lessor subsequently acquires a legal title to the premises which he has purported to demise, the legal estate or interest is said to feed the estoppel; and the grant or the lease then takes effect in interest and not by estoppel; but the grantor or the lessor is estopped from saying that he had no interest at the time of the grant or lease. Where a person who has no legal interest in premises purports to grant a tenancy and subsequently acquires the legal estate, the acquisition feeds the estoppel and the tenancy by estoppel becomes a legal estate and takes priority over a mortgage created after the acquisition." 21. I may also refer to another Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rustam Ali Mia V/s. Abdul Jabbar, AIR 1923 Cal 535. One Asgar Ali had executed a hibanama in favour of his wife. He was the owner to the extent of two-third only in respect of one of the properties conveyed under the hibanama, the remaining one-third share being owned by his sister. The sister (defendant No. 3) sold that share to defendant No. 2 who, in his turn, sold it to Asgar Ali. He was the owner to the extent of two-third only in respect of one of the properties conveyed under the hibanama, the remaining one-third share being owned by his sister. The sister (defendant No. 3) sold that share to defendant No. 2 who, in his turn, sold it to Asgar Ali. Holding that the hibanama operated upon the entire property, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court said- "We think the decree of the lower appellate court can be supported on the ground that the conveyance of a non-existent property though inoperative as a conveyance, is operative as an executory agreement which would attach to the property the moment it is acquired by the grantor and which in equity would transfer the beneficial interest to the vendee without any new act being done by the vendor to confirm the conveyance. This doctrine is elaborated at length in the cases reported in (1908) 7 Cal LJ 387 and in 27 Cal LJ 289 = (AIR 1918 Cal 419)". Applying the principles of law as stated above, I have no difficulty in holding that the defendant could and did transfer the ownership of the vehicle to the plaintiff on or before the 23rd of March, 1960 although technically and in the eye of law he became its owner a few days later--either on the 25th or 30th March, 1960 Its not open to him to deny either the transfer of ownership or the fact that the plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle in question on the day when he entered into Hire-purchase agreement with it. 22 For the reasons stated above, the appeal is devoid of any substance and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. M.P.Verma, J. 23 I agree.