JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - These are four criminal references made by the learned Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, against four orders passed by Sri M.N. Asthana, judicial Magistrate, Roorkee; two such orders being passed in each of the two cases which were pending. None has appeared to support these references. I have heard Sri Shaukat Hyder Abdi on behalf of the State, he has opposed these reference. 2. The short facts leading to these references are that two cases being Case No. 59 of 1968 and case No. 60 of 1968. K.N. Srivastava v. Anand Swarup and two others; and Kailash Saran v. Anand Swarup and two others, respectively were pending against the accused under Ss. 420 and 406, IPC read with Section 34 IPC. The cases started on two complaints filed by the complainants Kailash Saran and K.N. Srivastava, employees of the Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Ranipur, Hardwar, against three accused persons, namely, Anand Swarup, P.C. Singhal and R. S. Singhal. The prosecution case briefly was that the accused had approached the complainants and represented to them that the accused had floated a housing scheme and thereby induced the complainants to purchase plots in a certain colony. On that representation, complainant K.N. Srivastava advanced a sum of Rs. 1,875/- and the complainant Kailash Saran advanced Rs. 1,700/- to the three accused. The date fixed for the execution of the sale deed passed and the accused did nothing to transfer the plots. The complainants pressed hard that the sale deeds should be executed or, in the alternative, the money advanced by them should be refunded. The accused made lame excuses and twice issued cheques which were dishonoured. On these facts, the aforesaid complaints wee filed. 3. It appears from the order sheet of the case that the accused positively adopted dilatory tactics. First of all, they moved transfer applications to cause delay, later they began to ask for adjournments on the ground of their alleged illness. All this was repeated so frequently and persistently that it became obvious that the only intention of the accused persons was to cause delay in the case and, for that purpose, all sorts of expeditions and devices were adopted. In order to curb this deliberate attempt of the accused to prevent progress in the case the learned Magistrate on one occasion granted adjournment subject to Rs. In order to curb this deliberate attempt of the accused to prevent progress in the case the learned Magistrate on one occasion granted adjournment subject to Rs. 100/- as costs and directed the accused to be present on the next date fixed in the case. This happened on Feb. 27, 1968, in case No. 60 of 1968, and on the same date, in the other case, namely, case No. 59 of 1968, wherein similar orders were passed. On the next dates, namely, March 4, 1968 and March 5, 1968, fixed in the aforesaid two cases respectively, again the accused absented themselves and asked for adjournment on the ground of illness. The learned Magistrate allowed the adjournment, but made it subject to payment of Rs. 100/- as costs. These orders passed on about four occasions in the aforesaid two cases awarding costs are the subject matter of these references. 4. The learned Sessions Judge relying on two rulings, has held that there was no power in the Magistrate to award costs and, consequently, the impugned orders against which revisions have been preferred by the accused persons were illegal and should be set aside. I am unable to endorse the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge. One of the authorities relied upon by him is a decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Fado Moni v. Sarat Chandra, 1956 CrLJ 1419 . That was a case in which the provisions of S. 344, CrPC were examined and the High Court, on the facts of that particular case, held on merits that the order awarding costs was not proper. Therefore, it does not lay down that there is any prohibition under S. 344, CrPC to award costs in suitable cases. The next ruling referred to by the learned Sessions Judge is a Division Bench case Mona Rajan Ray v. Gadadhar Mandal, 1962(1) CrLJ 139 in which the Calcutta High Court laid down that in S. 344, CrPC, the power to order payment of costs during the pendency or a proceeding was limited by the words of the section to a case where there was scope for the exercise of the Court's discretion to adjourn or refuse to adjourn. It was held that since in case of the absence of an accused person, the Magistrate was bound to adjourn the trial, there was no power in him to award costs, that the decision to adjourn was a decision with no scope for the use of the Court's discretion. I regret, I am unable to agree with the view taken in the Calcutta case. In my opinion, the power to award costs is clearly comprehended within the language of S. 344(1-A), CrPC which runs as follows:- 344(1-A), Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings:- "It, from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn any inquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefore, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. Remand:- Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a terms exceeding fifteen days at a time. Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them except for special reasons to be recorded in writing." 5. A perusal of the language of the section makes it clear that it is entirely the discretion of the court to impose such terms as it thinks fit for the purpose of granting adjournment. It may be that in certain contingencies, for instance, in the absence of the accused person, an adjournment may have to be granted and not refused by a Magistrate, nevertheless that does not detract from him power to impose terms on the accused in order to prevent him from adopting dilatory tactics. It does not seem to me to be the intention of the Legislature that the power conferred by S. 344, CrPC should be so ineffectual that a recalcitrant accused may be allowed to hamper and obstruct the proceedings in court by his own tactics. The court is always invested with ample power to put a stop to all actions which are designed to obstructed the progress of proceedings in a court of law. The court is always invested with ample power to put a stop to all actions which are designed to obstructed the progress of proceedings in a court of law. Therefore, the instability of granting the request for adjournment is not inconsistent with the exercise of the power to award costs so that the proceedings may be disposed of expeditiously. 6. I am also unable to appreciate the view of the learned Sessions Judge that without passing an order u/s 540/A, CrPC for exemption of the personal presence of the accused, the power u/S. 344 CrPC regarding the payment of costs could not be exercised. If the accused wanted exemption of their attendance, it was their duty to apply for the same. The Magistrate was under no obligation to pass such an order `suo motu' or refrain from ordering payment of costs until he had exempted attendance of the accused. Such procedure is not enjoined by law. Thus, I am satisfied that the procedure followed by the learned Magistrate in the two trials which were pending before him was eminently proper and expedient in the ends of justice so that the proceedings may be expeditiously concluded and all attempts of the accused to obstruct the progress of the case be foiled. The intention of the law can never be to put a premium on such activities or devices employed by a party as are calculated to arrest the progress of legal proceedings. 7. For these reasons, I reject the references made by the learned Sessions Judge.