Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was appointed as clerk in the society in question on 191962. The Board of Directors of the Society, herein-after referred to as the Board, passed a resolution on 26 51967 to terminate the services of the petitioner. The Secretary of the society issued Ext. P2 notice on 5 61967 on the basis of the resolution of 26 51967, stating that the petitioner will cease to be an employee of the society after one month of the receipt of the notice. 2. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the services of the petitioner were not terminated in accordance with the provisions of the byelaws of the society regulating the conditions of service of its employees, that the bye-laws have got the force of law, and therefore, the termination in violation of the bye-laws raises a justiciable controversy. 3. The society has framed the bye-laws under R.4 of the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Rules framed by the government in pursuance of S.96 (2) (d) of the Act reads: "In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, such rules may, (d) prescribe the matters in respect of which a society may or shall make bye-laws and for the procedure to be followed in making, altering and abrogating bye-laws, and the conditions to be satisfied prior to such making, alteration or abrogation;" Rule 4 of the Rules framed by the Government in pursuance of S.96 (2) (d) runs as follows: "4. With every application for registration the applicants shall submit a draft of the bye-laws agreed upon by them. The bye-laws shall be consistent with the Act and with the rules made by the Government thereunder and they shall deal with the matters specified in clauses (a) to (bb) and may deal with such other matters incidental to the organisation of the society and the management of its business as may be deemed necessary (bb) the method of recruitment, the conditions of service and the authority competent to fix, revise or regulate the scale of pay and allowances of paid officers and servants of the society and the procedure to be followed in regard to disciplinary action against them." If the rules framed in pursuance of S.96 (2) (d) have got the force of law, it is difficult to see why the bye-laws framed in pursuance of the rules are not laws. The legal order consists of a hierarchy of norms; the lower depending for its validity upon its conformity with the higher. In Dukhooram v. Co-Op. Agrl. Assort., Kawardha AIR. 1961 M. P. 289 a Division Bench of that court held that the bye-laws framed by the Co-operative Society in question there, have the force of law as they were framed in pursuance of the rules framed under the corresponding Act, and that for terminating the services of an employee in violation of the provisions of the bye-laws, a writ could be issued. In Madan Mohan v. State AIR. 1966 Calcutta 23 a learned judge of the Calcutta High Court held that a writ could be issued to a Co-operative Society. In Arumughan v. Urban Bank 1960 KLT. 727 Velu Pillai J., held that no writ will lie against a Bank registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for terminating the services of an employee of the Bank, even if the termination be in violation of the bye-laws of the Bank. The learned judge observed: "The byelaws framed by the Bank have no statutory force merely because the provisions of the Act enable such bye-laws to be framed. Notwithstanding their registration under the Act they remain as byelaws of the corporation. Granting that the byelaws have been violated in the present case, in holding the disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner, the petitioner cannot avail himself of any remedy under Art.226." 4. S.9 of the Travancore-Cochin Co-operative Societies Act provides that an application should be made for the registration of a society and that along with the application a copy of the bye-laws should be filed. S.10 of the Act provides that on registration the bye-laws will govern the affairs of the society. In the light of these provisions, I am not quite sure whether it is possible to say that the bye-laws derive their validity from the consent of the members of the society. It is possible to argue that they derive their validity from rules framed by the government in pursuance of S.96 (2) (d) of the Co-operative Societies Act. In other words, just as the rules framed by Government derive their validity from S.96 (2) (d) of the Act, the bye-laws derive their validity from R.4 of the Rules made by the Government. In other words, just as the rules framed by Government derive their validity from S.96 (2) (d) of the Act, the bye-laws derive their validity from R.4 of the Rules made by the Government. The relation between a norm of a higher level and one of a lower, for instance that between a constitution and a statute enacted in accordance with it, means also that in the higher norm is found the reason for the validity of the lower; a legal norm is valid because it has come into being in the way prescribed by another norm. This is the principle of validity peculiar to positive law. It is a thoroughly dynamic principle. The unity of the legal order is achieved by this connection." (See 'The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical uri pru 'ence' by Hans Kelson - 55 Harvard Law Review, Page 44 at 62) The reason for the validity of the rules is found in the higher norm, namely, S.96 (2) (d) of the T. C. Co-operative Societies Act. So also the reason for the validity of the bye-laws is to be found in R.4, the higher norm so far as the bye-laws are concerned. However, a discussion of this question is academic in view of the Supreme Court ruling in The Co-op. Central Bank & Ors. v. The Addl. Industrial Tribunal, A. P. & Ors. C.A. Nos. 2093 and 2094 of 1968. There, their Lordships have held that bye-laws derive their validity from the consent of the members, and that like the articles of association of a company, they only govern the affairs of a society, and have not got the force of laws. In the light of this decision I hold that even if there was any violation of the bye-laws of the society in terminating the services of the petitioner, the petitioner has no justiciable cause of action. 5. Mr. N. R. K. Nair, appearing for the society, submitted that under bye-law 42 (16) it was the Board that is to dispense with the services of an employee, and it was the board which passed the resolution terminating the services of the petitioner, and therefore, there is no basis for the complaint that the bye-laws have been violated in terminating the services of the petitioner. I think, the services of the petitioner were not terminated as a punishment and that the proper authority under the bye-laws has acted in the matter. 6. Mr. Krishnankutty Menon, submitted that notice should have been given before terminating the services. I do not think that there was any obligation on the part of the society to have issued such a notice. The plea of malafides has not been substantiated. I dismiss the petition. No costs.