JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution prays that the order passed by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, dismissing the petitioner's revision for default of appearance be quashed and the Commissioner be directed to hear the revision on merits. 2. The petitioner is a tenant of a portion of premises No. 7/152, Swarup Nagar, Kanpur since November, 1947. Dr. Kalindi Mitter, respondent No. 3, is the landlady. The landlady applied for permission under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act for filing a suit for ejectment of the petitioner from the premises in dispute. The Additional District Magistrate on 9th December, 1968 granted the requisite permission on the finding that the need of the landlady was more genuine and pressing than that of the tenant. The petitioner filed a revision under Section 3(2) of the Act before the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, on 14th December, 1968. The revision was fixed up for hearing at Allahabad on 25th February, 1969. The petitioner states that she had engaged three counsel at Allahabad for conducting her revision. The petitioner's counsel was informed that as the Commissioner was on tour the revision will not be taken up on 25th February, 1969. It appears that 19th March, 1969 was fixed for the hearing of the revision at Kanpur. Notice of this date was sent to the counsel for the petitioner. The three counsel expressed their inability to attend the case at Kanpur because they had not been paid or instructed to do so. They had been instructed to appear at Allahabad, only. On 14th March, 1969, an application purporting to have been signed by some one as the counsel for the petitioner was moved before the Commissioner praying for adjournment of the case for three months and further praying that the hearing of the case be fixed at Allahabad. It was stated that the petitioner had been operated upon for cancer of the uterus and that she was unable to look after her case for the next three months. It was further stated that since the case was being looked after by counsel who live at Allahabad it would not be possible for them to go to Kanpur. No orders appear to have been passed on this application till 19th March, 1969, which was the date fixed for hearing of the revision at Kanpur. 3. It was further stated that since the case was being looked after by counsel who live at Allahabad it would not be possible for them to go to Kanpur. No orders appear to have been passed on this application till 19th March, 1969, which was the date fixed for hearing of the revision at Kanpur. 3. On 19th March, 1969, the Commissioner took up the case at Kanpur. He found that no one was present on behalf of the petitioner. He appears to have refused the prayer for adjournment and the same day passed an order dismissing the revision in default. He observed that the case was very old and was pending since 1966. Nobody was present on behalf of the tenant. 4. Mr. Kacker, appearing for the petitioner, urged that the Commissioner was a statutory tribunal. He could exercise only such powers as were conferred by the statute. The Control of Rent and Eviction Act did not grant the revising authority any power to dismiss a revision for default of appearance. The Commissioner was obliged to pass an order on the merits of the case. 5. It is true that a statutory tribunal functions within the four corners of the statute. It has only such powers as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred on it by the provisions of the law. Otherwise, it has no inherent powers. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, provides that the party aggrieved by the order of the District Magistrate granting or refusing to grant the permission may within thirty days from the date of the communication of the order to him apply to the Commissioner to revise the order. Sub-section (3) then states :- "The Commissioner shall hear the application made under sub-section (2), as far as may be, within six weeks from the date of making it, and he may, if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him, alter or reverse his order, or make such other order as may be just and proper." It is evidence that the Commissioner has to hear the revision application. The purpose of the provision for hearing obviously is that the applicant may satisfy the Commissioner as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order of the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him. If at the hearing the Commissioner is not satisfied with the order he can revise it. This result obviously comes into existence as a consequence of the hearing, the Commissioner cannot hear the application by himself. The provision for hearing is obviously for hearing the parties. The Commissioner can only afford the parties an opportunity of hearing. It is for the parties to avail of it. If the parties choose not to appear before the Commissioner to conduct the hearing. The Commissioner would be powerless to "hear" the application. In that event, it will be difficult for the Commissioner to say that he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order. Hence, he will be unable to alter or reverse the order of the District Magistrate. 6. Section 3(3) authorises the Commissioner in the alternative to make such other order as may be just and proper. If the Commissioner thinks that it will be just and proper he can adjourn the hearing, in exercise of this power, but, if he find that there is no good reason for adjourning the hearing, then he would be within the statute if he dismissed the revision for default of appearance of the applicant. This the Commissioner would do on the footing that that is the just and proper order. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 authorises the Commissioner to pass such an order as may be just and proper and if the Commissioner so thinks, he can pass an order of dismissal for default as well. Such an order could not be outside the purview of Section 3(3). Such an order being within the contemplation of the statute, it cannot be said that the Commissioner purported to exercise inherent jurisdiction outside the ambit of the statute. 7. The learned counsel cited my decision in G.P. Dixit v. State of U.P., 1969 ALJ 469. There it was observed that there was no provision in Section 3 authorising the District Magistrate to dismiss an application for permission in default of prosecution or appearance. 7. The learned counsel cited my decision in G.P. Dixit v. State of U.P., 1969 ALJ 469. There it was observed that there was no provision in Section 3 authorising the District Magistrate to dismiss an application for permission in default of prosecution or appearance. But if, he had such an inherent power, then the power to set aside such an order of dismissal would also inhere in him as a necessary appendage to the power of dismissal. That decision did not relate to the powers of the Commissioner under Section 3(3) but to the powers conferred on the District Magistrate by Section 3(1) of the Act. The two powers have been conferred in different language. The decision in G.P. Dixit's case is in my opinion, not apposite for deciding the point now before me. 8. Mr. Kacker placed reliance on Vishwanath Prasad v. M.S. Sharma, AIR 1964 Allahabad 181. In that case a Division Bench of this Court held that the Election Tribunal had no power to dismiss an election petition for default. This view has taken on an interpretation of Sections 90 and 92 of the Representation of People Act. The case is really not helpful because it was over-ruled by a full Bench of this Court in Duryodhan v. Sita Ram, 1969 ALJ 87. 9. The next case cited on behalf of the petitioner was an unreported decision by a single Judge of this Court in Rajindra Nath v. State of Transport, Appellate Tribunal (Civil Misc. Writ No. 1271 of 1964) decided on 6.2.1969. It was observed that there is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act of the Rules giving the appellate tribunal power to dismiss an appeal in default. It was noticed that the Act and the Rules prescribed an elaborate procedure for presentation and hearing of the appeals. The decision therefore, turned upon the construction of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules. There is no observation in that decision laying down a principle of general application. This decision, is therefore, not helpful. 10. The last case cited on behalf of the petitioner was Hindustan Metal Works v. The Sales Tax Officer, Hathras, 15 STC 116. In this case Manchanda, J. held that the Judge (appeals) had no jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal preferred under Section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act for default of appearance of the parties. 10. The last case cited on behalf of the petitioner was Hindustan Metal Works v. The Sales Tax Officer, Hathras, 15 STC 116. In this case Manchanda, J. held that the Judge (appeals) had no jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal preferred under Section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act for default of appearance of the parties. This case also turned upon the express language of Section 9 which prescribed the mode of disposal of an appeal. The section expressly stated that the appellate authority shall not exercise any powers or perform any further function except those conferred on it or entrusted to him as such authority. The provision then provided that the appeal shall be heard before the disposed of in one or the other of the modes prescribed therein. Dismissal for default was not within any of the prescribed modes. It was held that Section 9 rules out any notion of the exercise of inherent powers which are to vest in all judicial and quasi judicial bodies. This decision is also not helpful because the relevant provisions of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act are materially different than those of the Sales Tax Act. As seen above, the Control of Rent and Eviction Act does contemplate that the Commissioner may pass an order as he may consider just and proper in the circumstances obtaining before him. In my opinion the Commissioner was within his jurisdiction in dismissing the applicant's revision for default. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that in the circumstances, the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing. I am not impressed by this submission. The petitioner's counsel were informed of the date well in advance. The petitioner does not state that she or her husband was not aware of the date fixed for the hearing of the revision. Her case is that she had engaged counsel at Allahabad who were not prepared to go to Kanpur. She was lying ill in a hospital. Consequently she could not appear before the Commissioner on 19th March, 1968. The respondents have stated that one Roshan Lal Bhatia had been conducting the petitioner's rent control litigation. He had conducted the present litigation in the Court of first instance. Mr. She was lying ill in a hospital. Consequently she could not appear before the Commissioner on 19th March, 1968. The respondents have stated that one Roshan Lal Bhatia had been conducting the petitioner's rent control litigation. He had conducted the present litigation in the Court of first instance. Mr. Bhata had on 19th March, 1968, met the landlady and her counsel in the Court compound and had enquired about the fate of the revision. The petitioner has admitted in her rejoinder affidavit that her husband had gone to the district Courts to find out the date to which the case had been adjourned. She has also admitted that on the evening of 19th March, 1968, Shri R.L. Bhatia, Advocate, informed the petitioner's husband of the fate of the revision. The fact that the petitioner's husband could go to the district Courts on the date fixed for the hearing of the revision to find out the date fixed in the case shows that he could as well have gone to the Commissioner to press the application for adjournment and in the alternative to have conducted it. The case taken up by the petitioner that she was lying seriously ill in the hospital, and therefore, her family members could not leave her bed side on that date seems to be an argument in contradiction of the facts. Her husband did leave her bed-side that day to find out the date fixed to which the case had been adjourned. She was rather presumptuous in thinking that her application for adjournment was bound to be granted in her absence. I am, therefore, not satisfied that the Commissioner committed any error because of which it could be said that the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing. There has been no violation of any principle of natural justice in this case. 12. The petition has no merits and is accordingly dismissed with costs.