JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - Indrajeet opposite-party No. 2 was challenged before the City Magistrate, Meerut, for an offence under Section 7116 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for selling adulterated milk. He was found guilty of the offence but, instead of sentencing him, the magistrate released him on Probation under Section 4 of the U. P. First Offenders' Probation Act. Against this order, the Food Inspector went up in revision to the Court of session. The Additional Sessions fudge, Meerut, was of the opinion that the U. P. First Offenders Probation Act was not applicable to the offence under Section 16 (1) which was punishable with a minimum sentence of six months' imprisonment and Rs. 1,000/- fine as, according to him, this Act is not applicable to offences punishable, with a sentence of fine. He was also of opinion that this was not a fit case in which the papers under Section 4 should have been exercised. He has accordingly made this reference for enhancement of the sentence imposed by the magistrate. 2. The main question, which arises for our consideration in this case, is whether the provisions of Section 4 of the U. P. First Offenders' Probation Act are applicable to offences which are punishable with a sentence of imprisonment and fine. He has accordingly made this reference for enhancement of the sentence imposed by the magistrate. 2. The main question, which arises for our consideration in this case, is whether the provisions of Section 4 of the U. P. First Offenders' Probation Act are applicable to offences which are punishable with a sentence of imprisonment and fine. Section 4 (1) , with which we are concerned, reads as follows :- "4 (1) When any person is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or transportation for life, and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it appears to the court before which he is convicted regard being had to the age, characters, antecedents or physical or mental condition of the offender and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the court may, instead of sentencing him atonce to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period not exceeding three years as the court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour : Provided that the court shall not direct the release of an offender under this Sec. unless it is satisfied that the offender, or his surety, has a fixed place of abode and regular occupation in the place for which the court acts, or in which the offender is likely to live during the period named for the observance of the conditions: Provided also that if a person under twenty-one years of age is convicted of any offence under the Indian Penal Code, at any other enactments prescribed in this behalf under rules made by the State Government, which is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six months, the court shall take action under this section unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, it does not consider it proper to do so." 3. The Sessions Judge has relied upon the decision of Mukerji, J. in Debi Das v. State, 1953 ALJ 466 wherein he has observed : "In my judgment, if the First Offenders' Probation Act cannot be invoked in aid by a convicted person who is sentenced to a fine only, for relief, then it follows that a convicted person cannot get relief in respect of a sentence of fine also even though he may have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment as well. I am also of the opinion that the Scheme of the Act clearly indicates that the Legislature contemplated action being taken by courts in the case of first offenders only when they were being sent to jail. The object of the legislation clearly was to provide courts with the power of keeping away first offenders of a certain standard of life or of a certain status from being contaminated by the atmosphere prevailing in jails. The sentence of fine passed on an offender has no such dangers about it. If the intention of the First Offenders' Probation Act were that by taking action under it the stigma of conviction was also to be wiped out then possibly it could have been contended that courts were given powers to take action under the Act in a case where the offender was sentenced only or in addition to a sentence of fine; but that is not the scope or the object of the Act. I am, therefore, of the view that action under the First Offenders' Probation Act cannot be taken to relieve an offender in respect of a sentence of fine." 4. Our attention has been drawn to the decision of Division Bench of the Oudh Chief Court in Sital Prasad v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 233 where it has been held that Section 562, Cr. P. C., the language of which is similar to the language of Section 4 of the U. P. First Offenders' Probation Act, covers also offences punishable with fine only. On the language of Section 4, there is, in our opinion, no escape from the conclusion that the section covers offences punishable with imprisonment and fine also. P. C., the language of which is similar to the language of Section 4 of the U. P. First Offenders' Probation Act, covers also offences punishable with fine only. On the language of Section 4, there is, in our opinion, no escape from the conclusion that the section covers offences punishable with imprisonment and fine also. The section is applicable to a person convicted of "an offence not punishable with death or transportation for life." These words indicate that the section is applicable to all offences punishable with a less severe sentence than death or life imprisonment. A sentence of fine alone or a sentence of imprisonment coupled with a sentence of fine, where the sentence of imprisonment is not life imprisonment, is a sentence less severe than a sentence of death or life imprisonment. Similar words, viz., "offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than seven years" used in Section 562, Cr. P. C. came up for interpretation before a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Voijappa Shivlingappa Humberwadi v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 Bombay 402. Beaumont, C. J. observed : "Reading Section 562, sub-secs. (1) and (1-A) it seems to me quite clear that they are dealing with cases of first offenders where the conviction is for an offence of less than a certain degree of gravity, the degree of gravity being measured by the maximum punishment which can be imposed for the offence, and the intention is to enable such first offenders to be dealt with leniently. It is clear that an offence punishable with fine only is an offence of a minor character, of very such less gravity than an offence punishable with imprisonment upto seven years. Reading the section as a whole, I have no doubt whatever that the expression "offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than seven years" was intended to .......... include offences punishable only with fine." 5. These observations support the view which we are taking that Section 4 of the U. P. First Offenders' Probation Act applies to offences punishable with imprisonment and fine where the imprisonment is not life imprisonment. 6. This interpretation is fortified by the following words used in the later part or the section :- "......... These observations support the view which we are taking that Section 4 of the U. P. First Offenders' Probation Act applies to offences punishable with imprisonment and fine where the imprisonment is not life imprisonment. 6. This interpretation is fortified by the following words used in the later part or the section :- "......... the court may instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment,direct that he be released ............." The words "any punishment" include a sentence of imprisonment, a sentence of fine and a sentence both of imprisonment and fine. These words show that the section empowers the court to release an offender on probation in lieu of "any sentence" to which he is liable; provided the case is otherwise covered by Section 4. This means that, even if an offender is punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, the court has the power, under this provision, to release him on probation instead of sentencing him. Thus the release on probation can be for an offence for which the offender renders himself liable to punishment of imprisonment and fine. 7. If we were to accept the contention that Section 4 is applicable only to those offences which are punishable with imprisonment only, then the section will become inapplicable to a large number of offences set out in the Indian Penal Code which are punishable with imprisonment as well as fine either in the alternative or in addition to it. It was suggested by learned counsel for the State that an accused may be re-leased on probation instead of being sentenced to imprisonment and the sentence of fine may be imposed upon him. But the section does not permit such a procedure. It provides that a court may release an offender on probation instend of sentencing him. This means that, if the court decides to release an offender on probation, it will not pass any sentence against him. The sentence of imprisonment and fine is really one sentence for the offence and the court may either sentence the offender or release him on probation. If it decides to release him on probation, it cannot, at that stage, sentence him at all, but if it decides not to release him on probation, it may, if it * so provided, either sentence him to imprisonment or to fine or to both. 8. If it decides to release him on probation, it cannot, at that stage, sentence him at all, but if it decides not to release him on probation, it may, if it * so provided, either sentence him to imprisonment or to fine or to both. 8. In our opinion, the provisions of Sec. of the U. P. First Offenders' Probation Act are applicable to an offence under Section 16 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and' the City Magistrate had jurisdiction to release opposite-party No. 2 on probation. 9. It was then contended that this was not a fit case for releasing opposite-party No. 2 on probation. We are not satisfied that any case has been made out for interference with the discretion of the trial court in the matter. No enhancement of sentence is called for. The reference is rejected.