Judgment :- 1. In this appeal against a second appeal, the 15th defendant is the appellant and plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the first defendant the respondents. Though there were other questions also involved in the case, the question before the second appellate court was and before us is confined to item 4 in schedule B which is part of schedule A to the plaint. The appellant claims that he is entitled to the item while respondents 1 and 2 claim that they are entitled to it. 2. The essential facts necessary for disposing of the case may now be stated. The first defendant conducted a chitty; and there were several subscribers to it. Four subscribers obtained decrees against him for amounts subscribed by them. One of the suits was in forma pauperis; and for the court fee payable to the Government, item 4 in schedule B was brought to sale and purchased by the appellant. Prior to that, schedule A, inclusive of schedule B, was brought to sale and purchased by the predecessors-in-interest of the first plaintiff and purchased by her. Shortly thereafter, the sal* right was transferred to the first plaintiff; and he obtained possession of schedule A. When the appellant sought recovery of possession of item 4 in schedule B, the plaintiffs obstructed. Their obstruction was overruled, against which they filed a revision petition before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the revision petition on 12th July 1950; and thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the suit giving rise to the present appeal on 16th August 1950 before the District Court of Trivandrum. 3. There were four prayers in the suit; and prayer C was for administration of the estate of the first defendant. For the purpose of jurisdiction this prayer was valued at Rs. 2000. But a fixed court he of Rs, 10 alone was paid alleging that the relief claimed by the plaintiffs was incapable of valuation. The appellant appeared and disputed the correctness of the court-fee paid; and the District Judge held that in prayer C the valuation for the purpose of court fee and for the purpose of jurisdiction should be the same. The District Judge consequently directed the plaintiffs to file a statement putting their own valuation on relief C for the purpose of court fee and for the purpose of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs filed a statement valuing relief C at Rs. The District Judge consequently directed the plaintiffs to file a statement putting their own valuation on relief C for the purpose of court fee and for the purpose of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs filed a statement valuing relief C at Rs. 400; and the District Judge then directed the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper court since the valuation given by the plaintiffs was not sufficient for instituting the suit in the District Court. This order was passed on 29th September 1951; and the plaintiffs took back the plaint and re-presented it in the Court of the Munsiff at Attingal on 11th October 1951. 4. There was an application under O. XXI R.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the sale under which the plaintiffs claimed. This application was dismissed; and the same day the sale was confirmed too. An appeal was filed against this; and the appellate court allowed the appeal and remanded the application for fresh hearing. However, the application again came to be dismissed for default; subsequent to that, there was no fresh order confirming the sale. 5. On the aforesaid facts, two contentions were raised before the second appellate Judge (Velu Pillai J): one, that the suit was barred by limitation; and two, that the sale under which the plaintiffs claimed was not confirmed and hence did not become absolute. 6. In the opinion of the second appellate judge, there was no question of limitation in the case. The learned judge points out that under S.10 of the Travancore Civil Courts Act (which is the relevant Act) the District Court shall be deemed to be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction; that S.9 of the same Act provides that the jurisdiction of a District Judge extends, subject to the Rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature; and that S,15 of the Code enacts that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. From these three provisions the learned judge concludes that the District Court is also a court of competent jurisdiction; that S.15 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only a provision relating to the place of suing and does not deprive the right of the District Court to try the original suit; and that the suit was validly instituted in the District Court, though it offended S.15 of the Code. S.9 of the Civil Courts Act says that the jurisdiction of a District Court extends, subject to the Rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature. This provision indicates that the jurisdiction of the District Court is subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore, S.15 of the Code must control S.10 of the Civil Courts Act. If so, the result may even be that the District Court had no original jurisdiction to try the present suit. If it had jurisdiction, it might follow that its return of the plaint for presentation to the court was without jurisdiction: what it should have done was to transfer the suit to the proper court. No authority has been brought to our notice to show that the District Judge should have done so. If he did so, rightly or wrongly, it might probably be argued, on the footing that the District Court had jurisdiction to try the suit, that the suit before the Court of the Munsif was a continuation of the earlier suit (vide Arya Pritinidhi Sabha v. Dev Raj Bhan AIR. 1963 Punjab 208). In a case like this where the plaint was returned, taken back and presented to the proper court, the theory of the earlier suit continuing cannot be applied. 7. The next aspect on the first questions in whether S.14 of the Limitation Act of 1908 applies to the case. When the plaint was re-presented in the Court of the Munsiff, no petition for excusing delay was filed, nor was any affidavit alleging the circumstances under which the suit came to be filed before the District Court, filed. As already stated, the order for return of the plaint was passed on 29th September 1951, and the plaint was re-presented only on 11th October. No explanation was made why and how this delay was caused. As already stated, the order for return of the plaint was passed on 29th September 1951, and the plaint was re-presented only on 11th October. No explanation was made why and how this delay was caused. The learned second appellate judge refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ittayavara Mathai v. Varkey Varkey (1963) (2) S.C.W.R. 326) and holds that, if elements of S.14 are present, the period may be excluded. The counsel of the plaintiff respondents also draws our attention to Bhanu Vikrama Panicker v. Janki Amma (1968 K. L.J. 322) by Madhavan Nair J., wherein a plaint was returned by one court on a particular day and the same day it was re-presented in the proper court. In the second of the aforesaid cases, Madhavan Nair J. held that, even though there was no application for excusing delay, the facts were clear to explain the delay. It is evident that in the case before us the facts are not clear that there was no delay. We reiterate that the order returning the plaint was on 29th September and the re-presentation before the proper court was on 11th October and the intervening delay is not explained. The counsel of the appellant also points out that, though prayer C was in the plaint, it was not pressed, nor was any argument adduced on that question (vide Para.27 of the judgment of the trial court), which, according to the counsel, indicates that that prayer was included just for the purpose of giving jurisdiction to the District Court. The counsel suggests that it even indicates lack of bona fides. For all the above reasons, on the first question we are of opinion that the suit, since it was brought beyond one year of the disposal of the revision petition by the High Court, was barred by limitation. 8. Now comes the second question. The counsel of the appellant relies on Varadarajan v. Muthu Venkitapathi Reddy (AIR. 1953 Madras 587), a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court. It has been held in that decision that the restoration of a petition under O.XXI R.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure dismissed for default would make the confirmation of sale already made ineffective; and such an order of confirmation might be treated as automatically vacated or even might be considered to be null and void. It has been held in that decision that the restoration of a petition under O.XXI R.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure dismissed for default would make the confirmation of sale already made ineffective; and such an order of confirmation might be treated as automatically vacated or even might be considered to be null and void. The facts in the aforesaid decision were similar to the case before us; and the learned judges have considered the question in fair detail. They have painted out that under R.92 of O.XXI the court shall make an order confirming the sale, where no application is made under R.89, 90 or 91 or where such an application is made and disallowed, and that thereupon, the sale shall become absolute. In the opinion of the learned judges, the order confirming the sale is a dependent order depending upon the dismissal of the application under R.89, 90 or 91, and if, therefore, the said dismissal is set aside and the application is restored, the confirmation already made would become ineffective and such order of confirmation should be treated as ineffective or automatically vacated. They placed reliance on Shama Purshad v. Hurro Purshad (10 M I.A. 203), where the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that certain orders and decrees were subordinate and dependent upon earlier orders and decrees, and such dependent orders and decrees could remain in force only so long as the orders or decrees on which they were dependent were not reversed or suspended. In the opinion of the Division Bench, the order confirming the sale is one such dependent order; and we are in agreement with this view. No convincing reason appears in the judgment of the second appellate judge to make us feel that this judgment of the Madras High Court is erroneous. Velu Pillai J. reasons that, if in such a case the appellate court's order restoring the application was taken on further appeal and that order of the appellate court was reversed and the application was dismissed, the earlier confirmation would stand revived. That is so. But, that is no reason for extending this principle to a case where the order was not taken in appeal but later on, after remand, the application for setting aside the sale was dismissed for default. That is so. But, that is no reason for extending this principle to a case where the order was not taken in appeal but later on, after remand, the application for setting aside the sale was dismissed for default. Velu Pillai J. says: "There is no doubt a distinction in the exercise of the, appellate power, but I do not see why in the absence of compelling authority the principle of reviver should not apply to a case like the present, where after restoration of the application it was again dismissed. It is needless to go through the meaningless formality of passing a fresh order of confirmation." We find it difficult to agree with this reasoning: we do not also feel that the fresh order of confirmation is a meaningless formality, in the light of O. XXI R.92 (1). In our opinion, the case before us is a stronger one in favour of the appellant than the case before the Madras High Court. In the latter, the order dismissing the application for setting aside the sale was on 10th July 1945 while the order confirming the sale was subsequently made on 12th July 1945. The learned judges, therefore, point out that the appellant could not have raised an objection to the order confirming the sale under S.105 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the appeal filed by him against the dismissal of his application for setting aside the sale. In the case before us, the application to set aside the sale was dismissed on 31st Edavom 1122 and the sale was also confirmed on the same day. A.S. No. 16 of 1123 was filed against that order; and, evidently, when, such an appeal was allowed, both the dismissal of the application for setting aside the sale and the order confirming the sale must have been vacated. In such a case the necessity for a fresh order of confirmation is stronger than in the case where the order of confirmation was subsequent to the order dismissing the application for setting aside the sale. For these reasons we hold the second point also in favour of the appellant. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed, and the concurrent decisions of the lower courts including that of the second appellate judge regarding item 4 of schedule B to the plaint is set aside. For these reasons we hold the second point also in favour of the appellant. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed, and the concurrent decisions of the lower courts including that of the second appellate judge regarding item 4 of schedule B to the plaint is set aside. The order dated 12th July 1950 passed by the High Court in CRP. No. 372 of 1125 in execution of the decree in O. S. No. 1129 of 1112 is resorted. In the circumstances, the appellant will get his costs of this appeal and the second appeal; and the costs of the trial court and the first appellate court the parties will bear.