JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. Appeal from the decision of a learned Single Judge, reported in 1969 KLJ 571 . 2. The appellant company, incorporated in Calcutta, is supplied electricity by the Kerala State Electricity Board under agreements that fix the price for the energy and covenant not to enhance it. On December 10, 1965, the Kerala Government, by a Notification, Ex. P.5, declared "electrical energy" to be an 'essential article' within the scope of the Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 (Kerala Act III of 1962) hereafter, the Kerala Act , and on June 1, 1968 by the notified Order, Ext. P.1, imperatively directed the Electricity Board to levy a surcharge at rate specified therein. In compliance with that Order the Board served two sets of notices demanding surcharges totalling to Rs.1,45,477/- for electricity supplied in June and to Rs.1,45,948/- for the supply in July 1968, the respective bills being Exs. P.2 series and P.4 series. As the appellant's protest to the levy was not heeded to by the Board, it moved this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution, "to declare Exs. P.1 and P.5 as unconstitutional and void and also ultra vires the provisions of the Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act 1961, and the powers of the Government of Kerala: to issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ or order restraining the Respondents from levying or demanding any surcharge under Ex. P.1 older from the petitioner; to quash the levy and demand for surcharge and electricity duty thereon made in Exs. P.2(a), P.2(b), P.2(c), P4(a), P4(b) and P4(c); and to pass such other orders and grant reliefs as this Honourable Court may deem fit and proper." The Government as well as the Board opposed the motion. Mathew J. upheld Exs. P.1 and P.5 valid, the demands for surcharge not liable to be quashed, and dismissed the motion. Hence this appeal. 3. Before us, Mr. M.K. Nambiar, Senior Advocate, urged (1) that, the Kerala State Electricity Board being a trading corporation incorporated with its powers and obligations defined by the Central Act, the Electricity (Supply) Act LIV of 1948, the State Government is incompetent to amend or alter its powers as it has purported to do by the Order, Ex. 3. Before us, Mr. M.K. Nambiar, Senior Advocate, urged (1) that, the Kerala State Electricity Board being a trading corporation incorporated with its powers and obligations defined by the Central Act, the Electricity (Supply) Act LIV of 1948, the State Government is incompetent to amend or alter its powers as it has purported to do by the Order, Ex. P1; (2) that, the power to fix the terms and conditions of supply of electricity to consumers having been vested by the Central Legislature on the Electricity Board, an extraneous authority, like the Kerala Government, cannot interfere in the exercise of that power and compel exercise of that power in a particular manner fixed by it; (3) that the subordinate legislation in Ex.P1 cannot emanate from the provisions of S.3 of the Kerala Act and is beyond the legislative powers of the State under Art.246 of the Constitution; and (4) that, the definition of an 'essential article' in the Kerala Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation as no criteria is given in the Act to specify it. 4. Counsel pointed out that both S.100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Art 246 of the Constitution, provided for exclusive power of legislation on specified subjects to the Central Legislature and to the State Legislature, and for concurrent power of legislation to both on certain other subjects. They are respectively Lists I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. In such enumeration of legislative heads, incidental overlappings of subjects are bound to occur, and to reconcile conflicts arising therefrom one device adopted by the Courts is to exclude the particular from the general head. In In the matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, AIR 1939 FC 1 at 10. Chief Justice Sir Maurice Gwyer has observed: "........ In In the matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, AIR 1939 FC 1 at 10. Chief Justice Sir Maurice Gwyer has observed: "........ a general power ought not to be so construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field, when by reading the former in a more restricted sense, effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning." In Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v State of West Bengal AIR 1962 SC 1044 C. B. the Supreme Court has cited and adopted that dictum to reconcile the general entry 'Industries' with the particular entry "Gas and gasworks" in the Constitution. In Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon and Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 90 at 95. referring to the entry 'futures markets' in List I and to the entries 'trade and commerce' and 'production, supply and distribution of goods' in List II, Venkatarama Iyer J. observed: "It follows from this that where there are two entries, one general in its character and the other specific, the former must be construed as excluding the latter. This is only an application of the general maxim that Generalis specialibus non derogant. It is obvious that if entry 26 is to be construed as comprehending Forward Contracts, then 'Futures Markets' in entry 48 will be rendered useless. We are therefore of opinion that legislation on Forward Contracts must be held to fall within the exclusive competence of the Union under entry 48 in List I." 5. It is under entries 26 and 27 in List II that legislative competence is claimed for the State to make the Kerala Act. Entry 26 concerns 'trade and commerce within the state' and entry 27 concerns 'production, supply and distribution of goods'. Mr. Nambiar points out that entry 26, List II, has to be read with entry 43, List I, which concerns 'incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations'. The rule of harmonious construction would then exclude trade and commerce by a trading corporation like the Electricity Board from the ambit of the former, the State List. Any law relating to the functions or activities of the Electricity Board can therefore be passed only by the Central legislature. The rule of harmonious construction would then exclude trade and commerce by a trading corporation like the Electricity Board from the ambit of the former, the State List. Any law relating to the functions or activities of the Electricity Board can therefore be passed only by the Central legislature. It is pertinent to note here that in the statement of Objects and Reasons for the enactment of the Electricity (Supply) Act, it is stated: "....................... Government feels that it is not possible to legislate for this purpose within the framework or the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, which was conceived for a very different purpose. In their view what is needed is specific legislation, on the broad lines and of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1926, in force in the United Kingdom, which will enable Provincial Governments to set up suitable organisations to work out 'Grid Schemes' within the territorial limits of the Provinces. ........ Such Boards cannot, however, be set up by Provincial Governments under the existing Constitution Act as they would be in the nature of trading corporation within the meaning of entry 33 of the Federal Legislative List." The concerned entry 33 of the Federal List in the then Government of India Act, 1935, read thus: "Corporations, that is to say, the incorporation regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations, but not including corporations owned or controlled by a Federated State and carrying on business only within that State as cooperative societies, and of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one unit." In the Constitution, the above entry is split up and made two definite entries, entries 43 and 44 in List I, which read: "43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including cooperative societies. 44. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not including universities." S.5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, regulates the establishment of Electricity Boards, and S.18 charges them with the duty of developing the generation, supply and distribution of electricity. They are traceable to entry 43 in the present List I. S.6 of the Electricity (Supply) Act concedes interstate jurisdiction on Electricity Boards, though its exercise is conditional on agreements between concerned States. They are traceable to entry 43 in the present List I. S.6 of the Electricity (Supply) Act concedes interstate jurisdiction on Electricity Boards, though its exercise is conditional on agreements between concerned States. To that extent the Supply Act may be traceable to entry 44 in List I also. 6. An incorporation is not a mere formality: It must necessarily be for some definite purpose. As observed by Chief Justice Marshall in M' Culloch v The State of Maryland 1819 (4) US 316.at.411: "The power of creating a corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing them. ...... The power of creating a corporation is never used for its own sake but for the purpose of effecting something else. No sufficient reason is therefore, perceived, why it may not pass as incidental to those powers which are expressly given, if it be a direct mode of executing them." Incorporation of statutory corporation is not only the conferment of the status of a corporate personality on certain person or body of persons but includes the conferment of functions and powers to it. Halsbury's laws of England (3rd Edn.) Vol. 9, observes, at page 59, "Statutory corporations have such rights and can do such acts only as are authorised directly or indirectly by the statutes creating them." and at page 62 - 63, "The powers of a corporation created by statute are limited and circumscribed by the statutes which regulate it, and extend no further than is expressly stated therein, or is necessarily and properly required for carrying into effect the purposes of its incorporation, or may be fairly regarded as incidental to, or consequential upon, those things which the legislature has authorised. What the statute does not expressly or impliedly authorise is to be taken to be prohibited." It shows that the statute of incorporation of a statutory corporation, like the Kerala State Electricity Board, has necessarily to define the functions, powers and liabilities, rights and duties, etc. of the corporation. What the statute does not expressly or impliedly authorise is to be taken to be prohibited." It shows that the statute of incorporation of a statutory corporation, like the Kerala State Electricity Board, has necessarily to define the functions, powers and liabilities, rights and duties, etc. of the corporation. The expression 'incorporation', as a legislative head in the relevant entries in the Constitution, therefore, means not only the making of the corporation but also the definition of its functions and powers; and that has been done in detail by the Central legislature in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, in regard to the Electricity Boards. The Kerala State Electricity Board has been incorporated admittedly under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. If its powers and functions are to be and have been defined by a Central law under entry 43, List I, which is an exclusive legislative head for Central legislation, it is not competent to the State to interfere with the functions of the Board, either to add thereto or to deduct therefrom, without express authorisation therefor in the Central Act. In other words, any State legislation affecting the functions or powers of the Kerala State Electricity Board is incompetent. 7. The learned Advocate General invited our attention to S.78A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, which reads, "78A. (1) In the discharge of its functions, the Board shall be guided by such directions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the State Government. (2) If any dispute arises between the Board and the State Government as to whether a question, is or is not a question of policy, it shall be referred to the Authority whose decision thereon shall be final." It concerns directions on questions of policy. 'Policy' is defined in Wharton's Law Lexicon as the general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the legislature in its measures. It can only be general principles. A specific command to enhance the price of an article to a specified extent by the dealer cannot be characterised as a policy direction to the dealer. It can only be general principles. A specific command to enhance the price of an article to a specified extent by the dealer cannot be characterised as a policy direction to the dealer. Further, S.78A does not oblige the Electricity Board to accept every direction on questions of policy given by the State Government: on the other hand, it concedes a right in the Board to dispute it, and provides for the settlement of such a dispute by the Central Electricity Authority, constituted under S.3 of the Act, whose decision is made final thereon. The contents of the Order Ex. P1 are imperative commands to the Board to levy a specified surcharge on electricity supplied to consumers. It is conceded before us by counsel on all hands that surcharge imposed on price is an enhancement in price. The Order, Ex. P. 1, expressly declares unlawful any supply of electricity without imposition of the surcharge prescribed by it. The order leaves no option to the Board to dispute its contents, nor opportunity to the Central Electricity Authority to adjudge it. I am afraid that the contents of Ex. P. 1 have largely overstepped the limits of authority traceable to S.78A of the Electricity (Supply) Act. 8. Learned Advocate General referred us to S.59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 69, proviso to S.70 and S.72 and 78 of the Electricity (Supply) Act and contended that these sections confer a large control over the Board by the State Government. The question here is not whether the State Government has any control over the State Electricity Board: the question is only whether it can add to the price of electricity fixed by the Board by virtue of its powers under S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, If the power to fix the price has been statutorily vested in the Electricity Board, no extraneous authority can interfere with the exercise of that power. Mr. Nambiar cited Commissioner of Police v Gordhandas AIT 1952 SC 16 where Justice Bose, with concurrence of Justice Fazl Ali and Justice Mahajan, has observed: "...... the rules vest the Commissioner with an absolute discretion to cancel at any time a licence once granted. ......... we have held that the Commissioner did not in fact exercise his discretion ........ Mr. Nambiar cited Commissioner of Police v Gordhandas AIT 1952 SC 16 where Justice Bose, with concurrence of Justice Fazl Ali and Justice Mahajan, has observed: "...... the rules vest the Commissioner with an absolute discretion to cancel at any time a licence once granted. ......... we have held that the Commissioner did not in fact exercise his discretion ........ He merely forwarded to the respondent an Order of cancellation which another authority (the State Government) had purported to pass." and ultimately directed the Commissioner of Police, "...... after weighing all the different aspects of the matter, and after bringing to bear his own unfettered judgment on the subject, himself to issue a definite and unambiguous order either cancelling or refusing to cancel the said licence in the exercise of the absolute discretion vested in him by R.250 of the Rules for Licensing and Controlling Theatres and other places of Public Amusement in Bombay City, 1914." In State of Bihar v. K. S. H. Swami AIR 1966 SC 1847 , where the Collector of Gaya, by virtue of his statutory powers, gave permission to go ahead with reclamation and cultivation of an area declared to be private protected forest, and subsequently the Divisional Forest Officer, Gaya, obstructed Agricultural operations being done under that permission, and ultimately the Bihar Government directed the Collector to withdraw the permission pending the decision of the Government in the matter, the Supreme Court observed: "The permission given in the present case by the Collector was therefore in accordance with law and neither the Forest Officer nor the Government had any authority in law to interfere with that permission." It follows that, if S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act has vested the power to fix the price of electricity, as a term and condition of its supply, in the Electricity Board, it is not open to the State Government to interfere with that power and command an enhancement of price by its Order. 9. The learned Advocate General traces the enactment of the Kerala Act to entries 26 and 27 in List II. Mr. V. K. K. Menon urges that it may be traced 26 to entry 38 in List III as well. 9. The learned Advocate General traces the enactment of the Kerala Act to entries 26 and 27 in List II. Mr. V. K. K. Menon urges that it may be traced 26 to entry 38 in List III as well. I have already pointed out that entry, 26 List II must be read subject to entry 43, List I, and so read it does not authorise legislation by a State on the functions of an Electricity Board. Likewise, under the same rule of harmonious construction as mentioned above, the production, supply and distribution of "electricity", which comes under entry 38, List III, has to be held excluded from the scope of "Production, supply and distribution of goods " in entry 27, List II. In so far as the preamble to the Kerala Act delineate'; the object of the Act to be production supply and distribution of 'essential articles' is legislative competence must be traced to entry 27 in List II, which relates to 'production supply and distribution of goods' in general. As 'electricity' has been made a separate legislative head in entry 38, List III, it must be excluded from the scope of the general term "goods" in entry 27, List II, by the rule generalia specialibus non derogant. In other words, entry 27 in List II enables the State to legislate only on production, supply and distribution of 'goods other than electricity.' In In the matter of the Hindu Women's Rights to property Act, 1937 AIR 1941 FC 72. the Federal Court has observed: "No doubt if the Act does affect agricultural land in the Governors' Provinces, it was beyond the competence of the Legislature to enact it; and whether or not it does so must depend upon the meaning which is to be given to the word 'property' in the Act. If that word necessarily and inevitably comprises all forms of property, including agricultural land, then clearly the Act went beyond the powers of the Legislature; but when a legislature with limited and restricted powers makes use of a work of such wide and general import, the presumption must surely be that it is using it with reference to that kind of property with respect to which it is competent to legislate and to no other. The question is thus one of construction, and unless the Act is to be regarded as wholly meaningless and ineffective, the Court is bound to construe the word 'property' as referring only to those forms of property with respect to which the Legislature which enacted the Act was competent to legislate; that is to say, property other than agricultural land." On the same principle, the scope of the instant Kerala Act has to be limited to subjects within the competence of State legislation. The general expression "essential article" has then to be read exclusive of 'electricity', to make the enactment within the competence under entry 27, List II. If that be done, it follows that the scope of the Kerala Act cannot be extended to concern electricity, and Ex. P5 and P1 would be ultra vires of the Kerala Act III of 1962. 10. As regards the contention that the Kerala Act may be traced to entry 38, List III, it must be observed that the Act does not expressly refer to 'electricity'. It concerns only "essential articles," which is left undefined. Power to legislate on a general item as 'articles' which is synonymous with 'goods' can be traced only to entry 27 in List II, and not to entry 38 in List III. If 'electricity', which is a specific legislative head, is intended to be brought within the legislation, it has to be specified so in the Act itself, which has not been done. One test of legislative competence to issue a notified order is to consider if the State would have enacted the Order in the form of a pucca statute. In the presence of the Electricity (Supply) Act, the State could not have done it, without the assent of the President under Art.254(2) of the Constitution. Admittedly no such assent has been obtained for the issue of Ex. P1. What the State cannot do directly it cannot be indirectly either. By a general enactment on 'essential articles' which may validly cover several objects but no 'electricity', and then defining essential article to include electricity, the State cannot evade the necessity of the assent of the President to legislate on 'electricity'. 11. Mr. V. K. K. Menon read largely from Narasaraopeta Electric Corporation v. State of Madras AIR 1951 Madras 979. By a general enactment on 'essential articles' which may validly cover several objects but no 'electricity', and then defining essential article to include electricity, the State cannot evade the necessity of the assent of the President to legislate on 'electricity'. 11. Mr. V. K. K. Menon read largely from Narasaraopeta Electric Corporation v. State of Madras AIR 1951 Madras 979. That decision concerned the Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, XLIII of 1949, passed by the Madras legislature, with the assent of the President, to nationalise electricity undertakings in the State. Two companies, whose business included electricity supply, were served with notices under that Act to vest their undertakings in the Madras Government on specified dates, whereupon they challenged the vires of the Act. The Madras High Court, by its judgment reported in AIR 1951 Madras 979, upheld the Act; but, on appeal by one of the companies, the Supreme Court reversed it and struck down the Act by the judgment reported in Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. The State of Andhra AIR 1954 SC 251 C .B. As the judgment of the Madras High Court has been reversed, it does not exist now, and it is not therefore proper to cite anything said therein as a precedent, even though many of the observations therein may not be incorrect. I therefore decline to refer here to any observation in that Madras decision particularly so, because the Act impugned therein was of a different nature and all aspects of the question now in issue are covered by clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court in many a decision. Mr. Menon then referred us to Sri Venkata Seetaramanianeya Rice and Oil Mills v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 1781 (C. B.). There the question was whether the Andhra Pradesh Government was competent, by notified orders issued under S.3 of the Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary) Powers Act, XXIX of 1949 to increase the rate at which the Government itself had been supplying electricity to the petitioner company under a prior agreement. Though S.3 of that Act was parallel in expression to S.3 of the Kerala Act concerned here, the facts bear a material distinction, viz., that the production, supply and distribution of electricity in that case was by the State itself. Though S.3 of that Act was parallel in expression to S.3 of the Kerala Act concerned here, the facts bear a material distinction, viz., that the production, supply and distribution of electricity in that case was by the State itself. Neither a case of statutory corporation set up by Central legislation, nor a question of conflict with the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, nor any question of legislative competence arose in that case. The question there was only whether the Government could fix the price of electricity which it supplied. Under the scheme of the Electricity Act, 1910, in States where there is no Electricity Board, the production, distribution and supply of electricity have to be by the State Government or licensees of the State Government. Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, delivering the Judgment of the Court, observed: "It is true that where the State wants to sell its essential articles, it may be able to regulate the prices and control them by means of an executive order, but that is not relevant and material in construing the effect of the words; if the words take within their sweep essential articles sold by the State, there is no reason why it should not be competent to the State to issue a notified order controlling the prices in that behalf. " The present case turns entirely on the powers of an Electricity Board set up under a Central Act and on the right of a State Government to impose upon the Board by a notified Order. As no such question or anything analogous to it was mooted in that case, the decision therein is of little guidance to us. 12. Mr. Menon contended vehemently that the impugned order, in pith and substance, is a measure for maintaining the supplies of essential articles like electricity and their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices to consumers in the State, and is therefore within the competence of the State to legislate, and that its incidental encroachment on the Union's field under the entries 43 and 44 in List I is not material. I am afraid that this argument overlooks the fact that the establishment, by Central legislation, of Electricity Boards is designed to promote 'generation, supply and distribution of electricity', and generally to take "measures conducive to electrical development" in the State. I am afraid that this argument overlooks the fact that the establishment, by Central legislation, of Electricity Boards is designed to promote 'generation, supply and distribution of electricity', and generally to take "measures conducive to electrical development" in the State. If two independent authorities claim to exercise sovereign jurisdiction on the same matter, the conflict is not incidental, but substantial. Encroachment can be incidental, only when the legislation concerned has its substantial operation elsewhere. A measure of fixation of price for electricity has only one field of operation, and if that field has already been occupied by a Central legislation, the Electricity (Supply) Act, any measure by the State to refix the price of electricity, whether directly by a statute or indirectly by a statutory rule or notified Order, will be an ouster of the former, and not an incidental encroachment. I would, therefore, accept the contention of Mr. Nambiar that no question of incidental encroachment arises in the instant case. 13. In the view I have expressed above, the arguments advanced on 'excessive delegation in the definition of 'essential article' in the Kerala Act, III of 1962, does not appear material here, and I express no opinion thereon. 14. The learned Advocate General urged further that S.3 of the Kerala Act does not conflict with, but only supplements, S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. The argument is that the power conferred by S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act on the Electricity Board to fix the price for electricity is not disturbed by the Kerala Act or the notified Order, Ex. P1, issued under it, as the latter has only directed an enhancement in the price at a specified percentage. I regret inability to accept this argument. In the exercise of sovereign functions, like legislation, if power is vested in one authority, it is absolute and exclusive. Any action of an extraneous authority in the field of action of a legislature, even if it be to provide an addition thereto, is an interference with the sovereignty of the legislature, which is tantamount to ouster of the latter. In other words, in relation to sovereignty, there is no such thing as a complementary or supplementary action by an extraneous authority which does not amount to an ouster. In other words, in relation to sovereignty, there is no such thing as a complementary or supplementary action by an extraneous authority which does not amount to an ouster. Power to legislate includes power to amend or alter enactments, and therefore any concession of authority to amend or add to a measure made by one legislature is virtually conceding power to make original law, and is, in the language of constitutional law, an effective ouster of the former from its legislative field. It would be a contradiction in terms to assert that the Central legislature fixed the price of electricity and the State legislature made an addition to such price. Fixation of price of electricity by legislative measure can be done only by one of the two -- the Centre or the State, each being understood inclusive of its delegate as well. It may be pertinent to note here that, even as regards a subject in the Concurrent List, only one legislation -- either of the Centre or of the State -- can stand at a time. It may be that one may supersede the other under the express pro visions in the Constitution; but at no time do the legislations of both the Centre and the State stand together. 15. In view of all that has been mentioned above, I feel constrained to allow this appeal, to find the Notification, Ex. P5, and the Order, Ex. P1, to be beyond the competence of the State to issue, and therefore to declare them null and void. It must then follow that the demands for surcharge, made under Ex. P1, cannot also stand, and the notices, Exs. P2 series and P4 series have to be quashed. Judgment accordingly. P. Narayana Pillai, J. 16. The entries relevant for the present appeal are the following: List I -- Union List. 43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including cooperative societies. 44. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, whether trading or not with objects not confined to one State, but not including universities. List II -- State List. 26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III. 27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III. List III -- Concurrent List. 33. List II -- State List. 26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III. 27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III. List III -- Concurrent List. 33. Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, (a) The products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products; (b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; (c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates; (d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seed; and (e) raw jute. 38. Electricity. 17. The Kerala State Electricity Board, for short 'the Board', was constituted , as per the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, for short 'the Central Act'. S.49(1) of that Act reads thus: "49(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of regulations, if any, made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and condition as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs" It gives discretion to the Board to fix the terms regarding supply of electricity. S.78A(1) of the Act reads thus: "78 A(1) In discharge of its functions, the Board shall be guided by such directions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the State Government." It makes it obligatory on the part of the Board to be guided by directions given by the State Government in matters of policy. The State legislature passed the Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers)Act, 1961, for short 'the Kerala Act and in it after defining in S.2(a) "essential article" thus: " 'essential article' means any article (not being an essential commodity as defined in the Essential Commodities Act 1955) which may be declared by the Government by notified order to be an essential article:" empowered the Government by S.3 to regulate or prohibit production, supply and distribution of essential articles. The material portions of S.3 read: "3(1) If the Government are of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing the supplies of any essential article or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, they may, by notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s.(1), an order made thereunder may provide -- ................................................................... (f) for regulating or prohibiting any class of commercial or financial transactions relating to any essential article, which, in the opinion of the authority making the order, are, or if unregulated are likely to be detrimental to the public interest;" By the Notification, Ex. P5, dated December 10, 1965, the State Government declared electrical energy as an essential article and by the Order, Ex. P1, notified on June 1, 1968, it made it obligatory on the Board or levy a surcharge on electricity notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the contracts made by the Board with consumers. 18. According to the respondents the Board had run into financial difficulties, to get out of them it had to find out resources, it could not raise the charges for electricity supplied to the appellant and such other bulk consumers with whom the Board had entered into agreements for supply of electricity at specified rates and it was in such a situation that in public interest the State Government empowered the Board to levy surcharge also. As the reasons for the levy are irrelevant in considering the question of the legislative competence to issue the Order they are not material here. 19. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the Order, Ex. P1, was an interference with the discretion vested in the Board under S.49 of the Central Act regarding the charges to be levied on supply of electrical energy that the Centre had exclusive jurisdiction to legislate in respect of the Board as it fell within entries 43 and 44, List I, that it was not a matter felling within entire; 26 and 27, List II, and that even if there was overlapping of the entries on application of the rule of pith and substance it could be found that Ex. P1 in substance related to a matter falling within entries 43 and 44, List 1. P1 in substance related to a matter falling within entries 43 and 44, List 1. 20. No doubt the Canadian doctrine of permissibility of incidental encroachment has been adopted in this country and it has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that when an entry in one list overlaps that in another, the rule of pith and substance has to be applied and the question of the validity of an Act or Order has to be decided after ascertaining whether it falls on this or that side of the line. But there is scope for the application of those rules only if an entry in One List trenches on entry in another or if there is conflict between Central and State enactments and Orders. I do not find any conflict between S.49 of the Central Act and the Order, Ex. P1. Nor do I find any trespass of entries 26 and 27 in List II on entries 43 and 44 in List I or vice versa. 21. Under the power vested, in the Board under S.49 of the Central Act it could fix the price of electrical energy to be supplied by it. If price has once been fixed it can later on raise or lower it. Ex. P1 does not in any way interfere with that power. It only authorises the Board to collect from the consumer the surcharge mentioned in Ex. P1 also, over and above the charges fixed by the Board. And what is this surcharge? It is not a tax or a fee. It is only an additional charge or price. While the Board may enhance or reduce the charges it levies, the State Government may enhance or reduce the surcharge. The two are separate levies and there is no connection between them. Each stands independently of the other, the considerations which weigh for raising or lowering the rate of one may be different from those of the other. While one may be raised the other may be lowered or vice versa or both may be raised or lowered. In that view there is really no conflict between the charges the Board levies under S.49 of the Central Act and the surcharge mentioned in Ex.P1 and Ex P1 does not in the least interfere with the discretion vested in the Board under S.49. 22. In that view there is really no conflict between the charges the Board levies under S.49 of the Central Act and the surcharge mentioned in Ex.P1 and Ex P1 does not in the least interfere with the discretion vested in the Board under S.49. 22. It is true that corporations come in entries 43 and 44 in List I. But only certain specific matters connected with them are included there. They are "incorporation, regulation and winding up." Incorporation' has reference only to the bunging into existence of the corporation, 'winding up' to its dissolution, and 'regulation' to adjustment of its business when it is in existence. 'Regulation' as contrasted with 'control' only implies giving general directions as to what should ordinarily or usually or formally be done. In other words, only giving guidelines regarding management and administration are contemplated by the expression "regulation". Minute details of the day to day working, activities and functions of the corporation are not comprehended in the expression "Incorporation, regulation winding up" used in entries 43 and 44 and details regarding its activities and functions are outside the purview of those entries. As regards its activities and functions and they are matters entirely for the Board to exercise subject to the competent laws of the State or States where the Board functions. 23. The Kerala Act, as seen from its preamble, is traceable to entries 26 and 27 in List II. "Trade" referred to in entry 26 is business. Trade in an article takes place after it is produced and before it is consumed. During trade articles pass hands. In trade is involved fixation of price and calculation of profit and loss. If trade takes place at a loss, production and consequently supply would be affected. In regard to articles which are essential for nation building activities no progressive Government would in public interest allow production and supply to suffer. Under S.3(2)(f) of the Kerala Act the State Government is empowered to pass orders to regulate financial transactions relating to essential article which, if unregulated, are likely to be detrimental to public interest. Trade and commerce of a corporation and production, supply and distribution of its articles are matters which come within its activities and they have nothing to do with the 'incorporation, regulation and winding up' of the corporation. Trade and commerce of a corporation and production, supply and distribution of its articles are matters which come within its activities and they have nothing to do with the 'incorporation, regulation and winding up' of the corporation. Entries 43 and 44 in List I and entries 26 and 27 in List II are mutually exclusive as they deal with different matters and they do not overlap. 24. It was argued that of the relevant entries 43 and 44 in List I were particular ana 26 and 27 in List II were general and hence in case of conflict entries 43 and 44 in List I had to prevail. In the case of a corporation while its incorporation, regulation and winding up come in entries 43 and 44 only some of its activities, namely, production, supply and distribution and trade and commerce come in entries 26 and 27. I consider entries 43 and 44 in List I to be general and entries 26 and 27 in List II to be particular. 25. But this appeal has to be allowed on a short ground. By now it is a well settled rule of interpretation in Constitutional law that when the wording of one entry is general and another particular, effect should be given to both the entries by leading the general as including only the residue after excluding the particular. 'Electricity' referred to in entry 38 in List III comes within the expression 'goods' employed in entry 27 in List II. While the expression 'goods' is general' 'electricity' is particular. The particular goods referred to in entry 33 in List III are specifically excluded in entries 26 and 27 of List II. 'Electricity' should also be deemed to be excluded from them by the aforesaid rule of interpretation. The result is that entries 26 and 27 in List II take in only goods other than those referred to in entry 33 in List III and electricity. 26. When the Kerala Act received the assent of the President in 1952 there was no indication that electrical energy was meant to be included in the definition of "essential article" in it. It was only in 1965 that electrical energy was notified as per Ex. P5 as an essential article, and the assent of the President received for the Kerala Act would not cover the bringing of electricity within the fold of the Act. It was only in 1965 that electrical energy was notified as per Ex. P5 as an essential article, and the assent of the President received for the Kerala Act would not cover the bringing of electricity within the fold of the Act. Therefore the Notification, Ex. P5, and the Order, Ex. P1. based on it are constitutionally invalid. 27. I agree that the appeal be allowed as indicated in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother.